New York Law Review

Tag: Flight

  • People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.3d 976 (2015): Reasonable Suspicion for Stop and Frisk Based on Flight and Prior Knowledge

    People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.3d 976 (2015)

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred by ruling that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain individuals, Brown and Thomas, where the officers observed them running in a high-crime area, knew of their prior criminal activity in the area, and knew that Brown had been previously instructed by police to leave that location.

    Summary

    The case concerns the standard for reasonable suspicion necessary for a police stop. Officers in Times Square observed Brown and Thomas running and looking over their shoulders. The officers knew Brown had a history of fraudulent accosting in the area and knew Thomas associated with people involved in similar scams. Within a short time, the officers had a robbery victim identify the two as the perpetrators. The trial court found reasonable suspicion. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding the reversal was not “on the law alone” but held that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on their observations and prior knowledge of the individuals. The dissent disagreed with the majority and would have reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the cases to that Court for a review of the facts.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours in Times Square, officers of the “cabaret unit” saw Brown, whom they had previously arrested for fraudulent accosting, and instructed him to leave the area. Three hours later, the officers, in an unmarked van, observed Brown and Thomas running down Broadway, looking over their shoulders. The officers stopped them, and a robbery victim identified them as the perpetrators. The victim’s Rolex and cash were recovered from Thomas.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the identification. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial court’s finding of reasonable suspicion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Brown and Thomas based on their observations and prior knowledge.

    Holding

    No, because the Appellate Division erred, as a matter of law, in holding that the undisputed facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom failed to satisfy the minimum showing necessary to establish reasonable suspicion. Therefore the case was dismissed, and the Appellate Division’s decision was reversed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the stop under the standard of reasonable suspicion, stating that this standard is met when an officer has “the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand” (People v. Cantor). The court found that the officers’ observations of the defendants running and looking back, combined with their knowledge of Brown’s history of fraudulent accosting and Thomas’s associations, provided reasonable suspicion. The Court found that the police officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop Brown and Thomas and that the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they not done so.

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes the importance of officers’ prior knowledge in establishing reasonable suspicion, especially in high-crime areas. It suggests that flight, when combined with other specific circumstances such as prior knowledge of criminal activity or associations, can give rise to reasonable suspicion. This ruling guides law enforcement in determining when a stop and frisk is justified, balancing the need for effective law enforcement with the protection of individual rights. This case also illustrates how a court may assess actions in their totality, rather than dissecting each individual act by the police. The case also shows how a court must not be too quick to second-guess police on the street.

  • People v. Moore, 96 N.Y.2d 509 (2001): Justification for Police Pursuit Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Moore, 96 N.Y.2d 509 (2001)

    Flight from police, combined with other specific suspicious circumstances, can create reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit, even if the initial encounter was merely a common-law right of inquiry.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legality of a police pursuit and subsequent search based on reasonable suspicion. Plainclothes officers in an unmarked car observed the defendant acting nervously in a drug-prone area. His reaction to the police vehicle, coupled with his hand movements suggesting he was concealing a weapon, led the officers to attempt a brief inquiry. The defendant fled, and during the pursuit, he discarded a gun. The Court of Appeals held that the officers’ initial observations, combined with the defendant’s flight, established reasonable suspicion justifying the pursuit and the subsequent recovery of the discarded weapon.

    Facts

    On February 19, 1998, at approximately 11:00 p.m., three plainclothes NYPD officers were patrolling a drug-prone area on 152nd Street in New York City in an unmarked vehicle. The officers observed the defendant walking with another individual, appearing nervous and looking around. When the defendant noticed the officers’ car, his “eyes bulged out.” As the car approached, he placed his hand under his jacket in a cupping motion, leading the officers to suspect he was adjusting a gun. The defendant then maneuvered to keep his right side away from the officers’ view. When the car drew parallel, the defendant abruptly changed direction and fled, abandoning his companion.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially suppressed the gun and the defendant’s statements. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the officers had a “founded suspicion” justifying a common-law right of inquiry. They further held that the defendant’s flight, combined with the initial suspicion, created reasonable suspicion to justify the pursuit.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant based on his initial behavior and subsequent flight.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s nervous behavior, coupled with his suspicious movements suggesting he was concealing a weapon, and his subsequent flight upon the approach of the officers, provided reasonable suspicion justifying the police pursuit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, relying on the principle articulated in People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444 (1992), that reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, is the standard for a police stop or detention short of actual arrest. The court stated that “a ‘defendant’s flight may be considered in conjunction with other attendant circumstances’ in determining whether reasonable suspicion justifying a seizure exists.” The Court found that the defendant’s actions prior to the flight, specifically his nervous behavior, his “eyes bulging out” upon seeing the police, and his cupping motion under his jacket, combined to provide a reasonable basis for the officers to suspect criminal activity. The court emphasized the significance of the defendant’s flight, stating it further heightened the suspicion. Because the record supported the Appellate Division’s determination that reasonable suspicion existed, the Court of Appeals upheld the legality of the pursuit and the admissibility of the discarded weapon. The court noted, “Whether the particular circumstances of a case give rise to reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact beyond our review if there is support in the record.”

  • People v. Woods, 98 N.Y.2d 627 (2002): Flight Plus Specific Circumstances Justifies Police Pursuit

    People v. Woods, 98 N.Y.2d 627 (2002)

    A defendant’s flight in response to an approach by the police, combined with other specific circumstances indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity, may give rise to reasonable suspicion, the necessary predicate for police pursuit.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether police had reasonable suspicion to pursue a suspect who fled upon their approach. Police responded to a report of a gunpoint robbery involving three African-American men, where the victim was described as an African-American man in all white. Arriving at the scene, they found the defendant, matching the description of the victim, but he fled when approached. During the pursuit, the defendant discarded a jacket containing a gun and marijuana. The New York Court of Appeals held that the temporal proximity between the robbery report and the encounter, the matching description, and the defendant’s flight, provided reasonable suspicion for the police pursuit, justifying the denial of the motion to suppress the evidence.

    Facts

    On July 2, 1997, two police officers received radio reports of a gunpoint robbery by three African-American men. The victim was described as an African-American man in all white clothing, waiting for assistance at Mott and Central Avenues in Queens. Within a minute, the officers arrived and observed the defendant, an African-American male dressed in white and carrying a white jacket, at the specified location. When an officer approached to offer assistance, the defendant fled. During the chase, the defendant threw his jacket to the ground before being apprehended. The jacket contained a loaded .32 caliber revolver and 20 bags of marijuana.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and marijuana. He moved to suppress the gun and marijuana, but the motion was denied. A jury convicted him on both counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s flight in response to a police approach, coupled with other specific circumstances, constituted reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit.

    Holding

    Yes, because the temporal proximity of the robbery report, the matching description of the defendant, and his flight were sufficient to create reasonable suspicion for the police pursuit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent establishing that flight combined with other specific circumstances can create reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is defined as “that ‘quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand’ ” (quoting People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444, 448 (1992)). The court emphasized that the determination of reasonable suspicion involves mixed questions of law and fact, and appellate courts are bound by the lower courts’ findings if there is evidence in the record to support them. Here, the court found that the temporal proximity between the robbery report and the officers’ arrival, the defendant matching the victim’s description, and the defendant’s flight (an action inconsistent with being a robbery victim) provided sufficient evidence to support the lower courts’ determination of reasonable suspicion. The court stated that the issue was beyond further review because sufficient evidence supported the lower court’s finding. The Court explicitly referenced and applied the principles articulated in People v. Sierra, 83 N.Y.2d 928 (1994) and People v. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d 1056 (1993).

  • People v. Cintron, 95 N.Y.2d 329 (2000): Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Knowledge in Stolen Property Cases

    People v. Cintron, 95 N.Y.2d 329 (2000)

    Circumstantial evidence, including flight from police and implausible explanations, can be sufficient to establish knowledge that property is stolen, even without specific jury instructions on inferences from possession of stolen property or unauthorized vehicle use.

    Summary

    Carlos Cintron was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property and related charges. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove Cintron knew the car was stolen and that he lacked the owner’s consent to drive it. The Court reasoned that Cintron’s flight from police, high-speed chase, and implausible explanation for his conduct, combined with his recent and exclusive possession of the stolen vehicle, allowed the jury to reasonably infer the necessary knowledge elements of the crimes, even absent specific jury instructions regarding those inferences. This case emphasizes that a jury can use its common sense to infer knowledge from the totality of the evidence.

    Facts

    Police officers in an unmarked car observed Cintron driving a green Acura Legend. Upon checking the license plate, they discovered the car’s insurance was suspended. After Cintron ran a red light, the officers activated their lights and siren. Cintron accelerated and led the officers on a high-speed chase, eventually crashing into a guardrail. He then fled on foot but was apprehended. The car had been stolen three days earlier. At trial, Cintron claimed a friend let him drive the car and that he fled because he was being chased by a man with a gun.

    Procedural History

    Cintron was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property, unauthorized use of a vehicle, and reckless endangerment. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Cintron appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish he knew the vehicle was stolen or that he lacked the owner’s consent.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Cintron knew the vehicle he possessed was stolen and that he did not have the owner’s consent to operate it, despite the absence of specific jury instructions on inferences arising from the possession of stolen property or unauthorized vehicle use.

    Holding

    Yes, because viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt based on Cintron’s recent and exclusive possession of the stolen vehicle, his flight from the police, his implausible explanation for his conduct, and the other circumstances of the case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that knowledge can be proven through circumstantial evidence. Citing People v. Zorcik, 67 N.Y.2d 670, 671, the Court noted that “knowledge that property is stolen can be established through circumstantial evidence ‘such as by evidence of recent exclusive possession, defendant’s conduct or contradictory statements from which guilt may be inferred.’” The Court found that Cintron’s flight from the police, as well as his “improbable explanation for his conduct at trial” supported an inference of knowledge. The Court stated that this was not a case where the defendant’s flight was the only evidence of guilt. “In this case, defendant attempted to flee from the police officers’ vehicle when they turned on their lights and siren, nearly knocking down pedestrians and leading the officers on a high-speed chase. He continued to flee on foot after crashing the car into a guardrail. Moreover, he gave an improbable explanation for his conduct at trial. These facts are sufficient to support the reasonable inference that defendant knew that the vehicle was stolen and that he did not have the owner’s consent to operate it.” The court held that the absence of jury instructions concerning inferences does not preclude a jury from using its common sense to infer knowledge from the evidence. The Court explicitly rejected the contrary holding in People v. Edwards, 104 A.D.2d 448, and similar cases.

  • People v. Sierra, 83 N.Y.2d 928 (1994): Flight Plus Specific Circumstances Justifies Police Pursuit

    83 N.Y.2d 928 (1994)

    A defendant’s flight in response to a police approach, combined with other specific circumstances indicating possible criminal activity, can create reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases, People v. Sierra and People v. Robbins, address when a suspect’s flight from police justifies pursuit. The Court of Appeals held that in Sierra, the police had reasonable suspicion due to the defendant’s flight combined with the known drug activity in the area and suspicious behavior. Thus, the drugs Sierra abandoned were admissible. However, in Robbins, the defendant’s flight after exiting a cab stopped for a traffic violation, without any other indicia of criminal activity, did not justify the pursuit. The drugs Robbins abandoned should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    People v. Sierra: Police patrolling a high-crime area known for drug activity observed Sierra call out to a man exiting a car with out-of-state plates. When the man saw the police, he turned away. Sierra then refused to approach the police cruiser and fled. During the pursuit, Sierra abandoned a bag containing drugs.

    People v. Robbins: Police stopped a livery cab for defective brake lights. Robbins, a passenger, exited the cab, grabbed at his waistband, and ran. During the pursuit, he abandoned a bag containing drugs.

    Procedural History

    People v. Sierra: The lower courts denied Sierra’s motion to suppress the drug evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding reasonable suspicion justified the pursuit.

    People v. Robbins: The lower courts denied Robbins’ motion to suppress the drug evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the pursuit was unlawful, and the evidence should have been suppressed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant’s flight from police, combined with other circumstances, can establish reasonable suspicion to justify police pursuit.

    2. Whether, in People v. Sierra, the police possessed reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant.

    3. Whether, in People v. Robbins, the police possessed reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a defendant’s flight combined with other specific circumstances indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity, may give rise to reasonable suspicion, the necessary predicate for police pursuit.

    2. Yes, because the defendant’s flight, combined with the known drug activity in the area and the suspicious behavior, provided reasonable suspicion.

    3. No, because the defendant’s flight after exiting a cab stopped for a traffic violation, without any other indicia of criminal activity, did not justify the pursuit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that flight alone is not enough to justify police pursuit, but flight combined with specific circumstances indicating possible criminal activity can create reasonable suspicion. The Court noted that the determination of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact, and the Court of Appeals will only reverse if there is no evidence to support the lower courts’ determination.

    In Sierra, the Court found sufficient evidence. The police were patrolling a known “narcotics supermarket.” They saw the defendant call out to a man who exited a car with New Jersey license plates, and the man turned away upon seeing the police. The court held that these facts “furnished an objective, credible reason to approach defendant. Defendant’s refusal to approach the cruiser and his subsequent flight gave rise to reasonable suspicion that he was committing or was about to commit a drug-related crime.”

    In Robbins, the Court found the evidence insufficient. The police only knew that Robbins exited a cab stopped for a traffic violation, grabbed his waistband, and fled. The Court stated that these facts “provided them with no information regarding criminal activity.” Therefore, the pursuit was unlawful, and the evidence obtained as a result should have been suppressed.

  • People v. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d 1056 (1993): Flight as Reasonable Suspicion for Police Pursuit

    People v. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d 1056 (1993)

    Flight from police in conjunction with other factors, such as presence in a high-crime area and prior observed suspicious behavior, can provide reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit.

    Summary

    Police officers observed the defendant in a high-crime area engaging in what appeared to be a drug transaction. Upon being approached by the officers, the defendant fled into a store, discarding a bag containing drugs. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s flight, combined with the prior observations, provided reasonable suspicion for the police pursuit, making the abandonment of the bag lawful and the drugs admissible as evidence. This case clarifies the circumstances under which flight can escalate an encounter from a mere approach to a justified pursuit.

    Facts

    On October 12, 1989, Officer Carney, stationed at a hidden observation post in a high-crime area of Manhattan, observed Holmes standing on a street corner. Carney witnessed Holmes remove a small plastic bag from a brown paper bag and exchange it with another man for money. Carney radioed Officers Shea and Fitzgerald, providing a detailed description of Holmes. Shea and Fitzgerald approached Holmes, who then quickened his pace and entered a delicatessen, where he discarded the brown paper bag. The bag was recovered and found to contain over 100 vials of crack cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Holmes was arrested and indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the physical evidence, which was denied. He was subsequently convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with a dissenting Justice granting leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s flight from police officers, combined with the officers’ prior observations of the defendant engaging in suspicious behavior in a high-crime area, provided reasonable suspicion justifying the officers’ pursuit.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s street corner activity gave the police an objective, credible reason to approach him, and his subsequent flight furnished reasonable suspicion that he had committed or was about to commit a crime, thus justifying the pursuit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed based on the motion court’s rationale, which the Appellate Division did not disturb. The court relied on the principle established in People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976), that police may approach an individual when they have an objective, credible reason. Here, the observed hand-to-hand transaction provided such a reason. The court then applied the rule from People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444 (1992), holding that flight in response to police presence can escalate the encounter to reasonable suspicion justifying pursuit. The court reasoned that Holmes’s abandonment of the bag was not in response to unlawful police conduct, and the contents of the bag (the crack cocaine) supplied probable cause for his arrest. The court emphasized the importance of considering the totality of the circumstances, including the high-crime area and the observed transaction, when evaluating the justification for the police action. The court stated, “Defendant’s street corner activity gave the police an objective, credible reason to approach him (see, People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223). In the circumstances presented, defendant’s flight furnished reasonable suspicion that he had committed or was about to commit a crime such that pursuit by the officers was justified (see, People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444, 448).”

  • People v. Leung, 68 N.Y.2d 734 (1986): Justification for Police Pursuit Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Leung, 68 N.Y.2d 734 (1986)

    When police observe a suspect passing what appears to be drug packaging in an area known for drug activity, and the suspect immediately flees upon being approached by police, reasonable suspicion exists to justify police pursuit.

    Summary

    This case addresses the level of suspicion required for police to pursue a fleeing suspect. Plainclothes officers in an unmarked car observed Leung in a high-narcotics area passing a three-by-five-inch brown envelope resembling drug packaging. When the officers identified themselves, Leung fled. He discarded a hat and a gun during the pursuit. The Court of Appeals held that the officers’ observations, coupled with Leung’s flight, created reasonable suspicion justifying the pursuit and subsequent arrest. The recovery of the discarded gun was deemed lawful.

    Facts

    Police officers patrolling a high-crime, high-narcotics area in Queens observed Leung handing another man a brown envelope approximately three-by-five inches in size. The officers believed the envelope resembled the packaging used for drug transactions (“three dollar bags”). The officers exited their vehicle and identified themselves as police. Leung immediately fled on foot. During the pursuit, Leung discarded a hat and threw a black object under some bushes. The officers apprehended Leung approximately five houses from where the pursuit began. They recovered a loaded, operable nine-millimeter pistol from under the bushes where Leung had thrown it.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after Leung was convicted on weapons charges. Leung appealed, arguing that the initial police action was an investigatory stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion, and that his flight did not create reasonable suspicion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant, based on his observed actions and subsequent flight, such that the recovery of the discarded weapon was lawful.

    Holding

    Yes, because the passing of what appeared to be a drug package in a narcotics-prone area, coupled with the defendant’s immediate flight upon the officers’ approach, established reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime, thus justifying the pursuit and the subsequent recovery of the discarded weapon.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. De Bour, which established a framework for evaluating the legality of police encounters with citizens. The court stated that the level of police intrusion must be weighed against the circumstances known to the police as the encounter unfolds. The Court determined that the officers’ initial approach was justified because observing Leung pass what appeared to be a “three dollar bag” in a high-narcotics area provided at least an “objective credible reason” for the police to approach him. The Court emphasized that Leung’s immediate flight, when coupled with the initial observation, elevated the officers’ suspicion to the level of “reasonable suspicion.” The court cited People v. Howard, stating that flight can be a significant factor in establishing reasonable suspicion. The Court distinguished the case from situations involving discarded containers where an intent to abandon the property must be proven, explaining that Leung’s attempt to discard the gun was not a direct result of unlawful police action, as the pursuit was justified. Therefore, the gun was lawfully discovered during a legitimate detention, providing probable cause for arrest on the weapons charge. The court found that the trial judge’s instruction on “possession” was an accurate statement of the law, and that claims of prosecutorial misconduct were without merit.