Fleet v. Fleet, 68 N.Y. 361 (1877)

When a testator’s intent, gathered from the will and surrounding circumstances, indicates a desire to ensure all beneficiaries receive their intended shares, the court may infer an intent to charge pecuniary legacies upon the real estate not specifically devised, especially when a power of sale exists with no other apparent purpose.

Summary

This case concerns the interpretation of a will and codicil to determine whether a mortgage should be shared by all children and whether pecuniary legacies were intended to be charged upon the testator’s real estate. The court held that one daughter, Mrs. Fleet, was not entitled to a share of the mortgage based on the testator’s explicit intentions in the ninth clause of the will. Furthermore, the court found that the testator intended to charge the pecuniary legacies upon his real estate, considering the power of sale granted to the executors and the overall testamentary scheme aimed at providing for all children.

Facts

A testator created a will devising specific real estate and chattels to his daughter, Mrs. Fleet, and pecuniary legacies to other children. A mortgage existed, and a later clause addressed its disposition. A codicil granted the executors a power of sale over real estate not specifically devised and provided for the investment of the pecuniary legacies to protect the principal for remaindermen. The will’s language regarding the mortgage’s distribution was ambiguous, particularly concerning the number of children intended to benefit from it.

Procedural History

The case originated in a lower court, likely a surrogate’s court, where a dispute arose regarding the interpretation of the will. The General Term reviewed the decision. The New York Court of Appeals then heard the case, reviewing the General Term’s judgment.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Mrs. Fleet was entitled to a share of the mortgage under the will.
2. Whether the testator intended to charge the payment of the pecuniary legacies upon his real estate not specifically devised.

Holding

1. No, because the testator’s intent, as expressed in the ninth clause of the will, clearly indicated that the mortgage should be part of the amount specifically devised to his other children.
2. Yes, because the testator’s intent, gathered from the will and circumstances, indicated a desire to ensure all beneficiaries received their intended shares, and the power of sale granted to the executors implied a means to secure funds for the legacies.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that Mrs. Fleet was not entitled to a share of the mortgage due to the testator’s specific direction in the ninth clause, which stated the mortgage should be part of the amount specifically devised to his other children. The court emphasized that the ninth clause was the later expression of the testator’s will and explicitly embodied his intention regarding the mortgage. The court refused to interpret the will in a way that would require adding words to the restrictive clause. Regarding the legacies, the court considered the power of sale granted to the executors, noting it would be unnecessary if not intended to secure funds for the legacies. The court applied the principle that real estate sold in pursuance of a power of sale in a will is deemed converted into personal property. The court also considered the testator’s intent to dispose of his whole estate and provide for each child with an approximation to equality. The court noted, “It is plain that the testator meant to dispose of his whole estate, and so that each of his children should share in it, and with an approximation to equality, all things considered.” Given the lack of other apparent purposes for the power of sale, the court inferred an intent to charge the real estate with the legacies, referencing Taylor v. Dodd (58 N. Y., 335) and stating, “As, in the contemplation of the will and codicil, there was substantially no need of money, save for the payment of the legacies, so the power to sell to meet that need, must be to get money for that payment.”