New York Law Review

Tag: First-Degree Robbery

  • People v. Howard, 22 N.Y.3d 388 (2013): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Showup Identifications

    People v. Howard, 22 N.Y.3d 388 (2013)

    A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on discrete omissions must show that counsel failed to raise a “clear-cut” or “dispositive” argument; showup identifications are permissible under certain circumstances, and the determination of their reasonableness presents a mixed question of law and fact.

    Summary

    Malik Howard and Hilbert Stanley were convicted of first-degree robbery. They appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue an affirmative defense (the displayed weapon was inoperable) and challenging the admissibility of a showup identification. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that counsel’s strategic choices were reasonable, given the misidentification defense pursued, and that record support existed for the lower courts’ determination that the showup was proper under the circumstances, even with a time lapse and distance from the crime scene. The court emphasized that showup determinations are fact-specific and should not be second-guessed absent clear error.

    Facts

    Domingo Lopez was robbed at gunpoint by two men who exited a gray car. One man pressed a gun to Lopez’s head, while the other rifled through his pockets. Lopez reported the crime. Shortly after, police officers stopped a silver car matching the description, driven by Stanley with Howard as a passenger. Officers observed open beer containers and smelled marijuana. A search of the car revealed Lopez’s wallet insert and a black imitation pistol. Lopez was taken to the scene and identified Howard and Stanley as the robbers in a showup identification.

    Procedural History

    Howard and Stanley were indicted for first-degree robbery and other charges. Their motion to suppress the showup identification was denied. They were convicted of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed. One of the dissenting Justices granted Howard’s motion for leave to appeal, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals subsequently granted Stanley’s related motion.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Howard and Stanley were deprived of effective assistance of counsel due to their attorneys’ failure to (a) request dismissal of the first-degree robbery count, (b) request a jury charge on the affirmative defense that the displayed weapon was inoperable, and (c) request a clarifying instruction on the basis for the first-degree robbery count?

    2. Whether the showup identification was unduly suggestive and violated Howard and Stanley’s rights?

    Holding

    1. No, because the attorneys’ strategic choices were reasonable given the facts of the case and the misidentification defense pursued.

    2. No, because the showup identification was reasonable under the circumstances, and the lower courts’ determination was supported by the record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to establish ineffective assistance based on discrete omissions, a defendant must show that counsel failed to raise a “clear-cut” or “dispositive” argument. Here, there was evidence beyond the BB gun that something was pressed into Lopez’s back, which could legally constitute display of a firearm. The decision not to pursue the affirmative defense could have been strategic, as it would undermine the misidentification defense.

    Regarding the showup identification, the Court noted that while it occurred five miles from the crime scene and after some time had passed, these factors alone did not render it improper. The police stopped the car roughly one hour and 15 minutes after the crime, and Lopez identified the defendants about 45 minutes later. There was no improper suggestion by the police. The Court emphasized that showup determinations are fact-specific and present mixed questions of law and fact, and the lower courts’ determination had record support. The Court quoted People v. Harrison, stating, “[R]easonable minds may differ as to the inference to be drawn… and accords with the general principle long recognized in civil cases that questions of the reasonableness of conduct can rarely be resolved as a matter of law even when the facts are not in dispute.”

    The Court emphasized that showups must be reasonable under the circumstances and not unduly suggestive, but the determination of reasonableness is a mixed question of law and fact, beyond the Court of Appeals’ review if record support exists. The Court stated: “Viewing possible suspects is the entire point of a showup, and the lower courts reasonably found that none of the features of this showup rendered it more prejudicial than any other.”

  • People v. Ford, 11 N.Y.3d 875 (2008): Evaluating Sufficiency of Evidence Based on Jury Charge Absent Objection

    People v. Ford, 11 N.Y.3d 875 (2008)

    When a jury instruction is not objected to, the legal sufficiency of a conviction must be viewed in light of the charge as given, even if the charge incorrectly states the law; the appellate court must evaluate whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction under the erroneous jury charge.

    Summary

    Defendant Ford was convicted of first-degree robbery. On appeal, he argued insufficient evidence of “actual possession” of a dangerous instrument (knife) and erroneous denial of his severance motion. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the first-degree robbery conviction to third-degree robbery, concluding that the evidence of actual possession was legally insufficient, even though the charge, as given, alerted the jury to the “actual possession” element. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the jury charge was not objected to, the legal sufficiency of the conviction must be viewed in light of that charge, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction under the given charge. The Court also rejected the severance claim.

    Facts

    Ford was indicted on robbery charges related to two successive robberies in elevators. Before trial, he unsuccessfully sought to sever the trials. At one of the robberies, Ford stated, “I got a knife,” while moving his hand toward his pants pocket.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Ford of two counts of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the conviction for first-degree robbery to third-degree robbery. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted both the People and defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree robbery, given the jury charge as given, even though that charge did not explicitly require a finding of “actual possession” of a dangerous instrument.
    2. Whether the trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s severance motion.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was no objection to the jury charge, the legal sufficiency of the conviction must be viewed in light of that charge, and the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant “used or threatened the immediate use” of a knife under the charge as given.
    2. No, because the defendant failed to establish good cause for severance, and the evidence as to the two crimes was presented separately and was readily capable of being segregated in the minds of the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the jury charge did not adequately convey the “actual possession” requirement because it did not use the term “actual possession” or otherwise communicate that requirement. The court distinguished its recent decision in People v. Jean-Baptiste, where the defendant’s motion to dismiss apprised the trial judge of the error in the charge, rendering an objection superfluous. Here, by contrast, the legal sufficiency objection was based on the perceived inadequacy of proof, not an interpretation of an element of the offense. Because the defense failed to object to the jury charge, the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction had to be evaluated in light of the charge as given. The Court found that the evidence, specifically Ford’s statement “I got a knife,” while simultaneously moving his hand toward his pants pocket, was sufficient to establish that Ford “used or threatened the immediate use” of a knife as the trial court charged. The Court emphasized that under CPL 200.20 (3)(a), severance was not warranted because there was no material variance in the quantity of proof for the separate incidents and the evidence of each was easily segregated by the jury.