New York Law Review

Tag: Firefighter’s Rule

  • Cusumano v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.3d 319 (2010): Predicate for Firefighter’s Rule Liability

    15 N.Y.3d 319 (2010)

    To recover under General Municipal Law § 205-a, a firefighter must demonstrate injury resulting from negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties.

    Summary

    A firefighter, Nocenzo Cusumano, was injured in a fall on stairs in a City-owned building during a training session. He sued the City under General Municipal Law § 205-a, alleging violations of the NYC Administrative Code relating to safe building maintenance and handrail requirements. The jury found the City liable. The Appellate Division reversed in part, finding one code section inapplicable. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the improper jury instruction on an inapplicable code provision tainted the entire verdict, even though there was a finding of a violation of a separate code section.

    Facts

    Nocenzo Cusumano, a New York City firefighter, fell down a flight of stairs while attending a training session in a building owned by the City. He claimed he slipped on debris and was unable to grasp the handrail, which he alleged was improperly constructed. He based his claim on several sections of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, including sections concerning safe building maintenance generally and a specific section on interior stair handrail dimensions.

    Procedural History

    Cusumano sued the City under General Municipal Law § 205-a in Supreme Court. The jury found the City liable. The City moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the section of the Administrative Code concerning handrail dimensions did not apply to the stairs in question. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division modified the damages award but agreed that the handrail section was inapplicable. However, the Appellate Division majority found sufficient evidence to support liability based on other code sections. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s error in submitting an inapplicable section of the Administrative Code to the jury requires a new trial, even where the jury also found a violation of other, more general, code sections.

    Holding

    Yes, because the erroneous jury instruction, coupled with expert testimony linking the general code sections to the specific, inapplicable section, made it impossible to determine the basis of the jury’s verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Administrative Code section concerning handrail dimensions for “interior stairs” did not apply to the stairs where the firefighter fell, as those stairs did not serve as a required exit. The court reasoned that because expert testimony had linked the violation of the general maintenance code sections to the violation of the specific handrail dimension code, it could not be assumed that the jury viewed the handrail testimony in a vacuum. The court noted testimony that the City violated the general code sections because it violated the specific handrail section. The Court stated that Supreme Court’s erroneous submission of section 27-375 (f) to the jury, coupled with the expert testimony, renders it impossible to discern the basis of the jury’s verdict. The Court declined to address whether the general maintenance sections could form an independent basis for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-a, as the City had only objected to the applicability of those sections to the extent they were interwoven with the inapplicable handrail section. Chief Judge Lippman, in concurrence, argued the court should have addressed whether section 27-127 was a sufficient independent predicate, arguing that Appellate Division case law and legislative intent favored a broader interpretation of section 205-a to protect firefighters. He stated, “a plaintiff need only establish a `practical or reasonable connection’ between the statutory or regulatory violation and the claimed injury”.

  • Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 72 (2003): Establishing Causation in Firefighter Injury Claims

    100 N.Y.2d 72 (2003)

    Under General Municipal Law § 205-a, a firefighter can recover for injuries sustained in the line of duty if a property owner’s violation of a statute or regulation has a “practical or reasonable connection” to the injury; the firefighter need not prove proximate cause as in a common-law negligence action.

    Summary

    A firefighter, Giuffrida, sued Citibank under General Municipal Law § 205-a for injuries sustained battling a fire in a Citibank-owned building. Giuffrida alleged the fire was caused by grease accumulation and code violations related to the building’s fire protection system. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s summary judgment for Citibank, holding that Giuffrida presented enough evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Citibank’s code violations had a reasonable connection to his injuries. The Court emphasized that the statute only requires a “practical or reasonable connection” between the violation and the injury, not strict proximate cause.

    Facts

    Giuffrida, a New York City firefighter, responded to a fire at a doughnut shop in a building owned by Citibank. While fighting the fire, his air supply alarm indicated only six minutes of oxygen remained. As he and other firefighters evacuated, Giuffrida continued operating a water hose to cover their retreat. His oxygen supply ran out, and he suffered severe burns and smoke inhalation.

    Procedural History

    Giuffrida sued Citibank under General Municipal Law § 205-a. The Supreme Court granted Citibank’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no reasonable or practical connection between the alleged code violations and Giuffrida’s injuries. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the complaint against Citibank.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the firefighter failed to demonstrate a reasonable or practical connection between the defendant’s alleged code violations and the firefighter’s injuries, as required to sustain a claim under General Municipal Law § 205-a.

    Holding

    Yes, because the firefighter presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged code violations directly or indirectly caused his injuries, satisfying the causation requirement under General Municipal Law § 205-a, which requires only a “practical or reasonable connection,” not strict proximate cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reviewed the legislative history of General Municipal Law § 205-a, noting that it was enacted to mitigate the harshness of the “firefighter’s rule” and encourage compliance with safety statutes and regulations. The Court emphasized that the statute’s “directly or indirectly” language broadens the causation standard, requiring only a “practical or reasonable connection” between the violation and the injury, rather than traditional proximate cause. The Court found that Giuffrida presented sufficient evidence, including code violations related to the fire suppression system and a firefighter’s affidavit stating that the system did not appear to have activated, to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Citibank’s violations contributed to his injuries. The Court rejected Citibank’s argument that the firefighter’s injuries were solely caused by the depletion of his oxygen supply, stating that his oxygen depletion was a consequence of his efforts to protect other firefighters. The Court clarified that comparative fault principles do not apply in defense of a General Municipal Law § 205-a action, citing Mullen v. Zoebe, Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 135 (1995). According to the Court, to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the defendant had to show either that it did not negligently violate any relevant government provision or that, if it did, the violation did not directly or indirectly cause the plaintiff’s injuries. Defendant argued that there was no proximate cause between the alleged violations and plaintiff’s injuries, and thus failed to address the “indirect” causation element of General Municipal Law § 205-a.

  • Ciervo v. City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 465 (1999): Limiting the Firefighter’s Rule

    Ciervo v. City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 465 (1999)

    The common-law firefighter’s rule, which precludes firefighters and police officers from recovering damages for injuries sustained in the line of duty due to negligence that created the need for their services, does not extend to New York City sanitation workers.

    Summary

    Anthony Ciervo, a sanitation worker, sued the City of New York for negligence after he was injured by a defective sidewalk while collecting garbage. The City argued that the firefighter’s rule should bar recovery. The Court of Appeals held that the firefighter’s rule, which prevents firefighters and police officers from suing for injuries caused by the negligence that necessitated their presence, does not apply to sanitation workers. The Court emphasized that sanitation workers are not specially trained or expected to confront the same level of inherent dangers as police officers and firefighters. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision reinstating the jury verdict in favor of Ciervo.

    Facts

    Anthony Ciervo, a New York City Department of Sanitation employee, was injured when he stepped into a hole in a defective sidewalk while carrying garbage bags. The Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Corporation had notified the City of the defective condition of the sidewalk before the incident. As a result of the injury, Ciervo retired.

    Procedural History

    Ciervo sued the City of New York for negligence. The jury found the City 83% negligent and Ciervo 17% comparatively negligent. The Supreme Court granted the City’s motion to set aside the verdict, extending the firefighter’s rule to sanitation workers. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the rule did not apply to sanitation workers and remitted the case for a trial on damages. The Supreme Court then entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The City appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the common-law firefighter’s rule, which bars firefighters and police officers from recovering damages for injuries sustained in the line of duty due to negligence, should be extended to New York City sanitation workers.

    Holding

    No, because sanitation workers are not the experts engaged, trained, and compensated by the public to confront emergencies and hazards to the same degree as firefighters and police officers; thus, the public policy rationale behind the firefighter’s rule does not extend to sanitation workers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the firefighter’s rule is based on public policy considerations, specifically that firefighters and police officers are “the experts engaged, trained and compensated by the public to deal on its behalf with emergencies and hazards often created by negligence.” The court emphasized that the determinative factor is whether the injury is related to the particular dangers that police officers and firefighters are expected to assume as part of their duties. Unlike police officers and firefighters, sanitation workers are not expected or trained to assume the hazards routinely encountered by those public safety officers. Sanitation workers are not required to pick up garbage in situations that compromise their safety. The Court distinguished the role of sanitation workers from that of police officers and firefighters whose employment requires them to confront emergencies on behalf of the public. The Court stated, “One would be hard pressed to imagine any occupation in which a subordinate employee would not be required to follow the directions of a supervisor or risk termination. In that instance, sanitation workers are no different from any employees in other occupations.” Allowing recovery by police officers and firefighters against the State for injuries sustained by the very experts it employs to deal with such situations would create an anomaly. Extending the firefighter’s rule to sanitation workers would “abrogate the rule’s underlying policy rationale.”

  • Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Commission, 85 N.Y.2d 423 (1995): Defining the Scope of the Firefighter’s Rule and Section 205-a Claims

    Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Commission, 85 N.Y.2d 423 (1995)

    The Firefighter’s Rule bars negligence claims when the performance of a police officer’s or firefighter’s duties increased the risk of the injury happening, and did not merely furnish the occasion for the injury; under General Municipal Law § 205-a liability can be asserted against property owners or those with control of the premises where the firefighting takes place if the negligence violates a safety provision.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals consolidated three cases concerning the application of the firefighter’s rule and General Municipal Law § 205-a. The court addressed when the firefighter’s rule bars negligence claims and against whom statutory claims can be asserted. It clarified that the firefighter’s rule applies when the performance of the officer’s duties increased the risk of injury. Regarding General Municipal Law § 205-a, the court found that liability extended to owners and those in control of the premises, but not to contractors who completed their work before the injury. The court affirmed the dismissal of the common-law negligence claims in all three cases and reinstated the statutory claims against the property owner in one case.

    Facts

    In Zanghi, a police officer slipped on an icy metal plate while approaching a picketer. In Raquet, firefighters were injured in a building collapse during a fire; the plaintiffs sued the building owner and contractors. The plaintiffs alleged the building was not constructed properly. In Ruocco, police officers were injured when they slipped on wet stairs while responding to a call in a subway station and sued the NYCTA.

    Procedural History

    The trial courts in the three cases denied motions to dismiss the common-law negligence claims based on the firefighter rule. The Appellate Divisions reversed, dismissing the negligence claims. In Raquet, the Appellate Division also dismissed the statutory claims against all defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claims in all three cases. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the statutory claims against the property owner, Leonard Zane, in Raquet.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the firefighter’s rule bars a common-law negligence claim when the injury occurred while performing police or firefighting duties.
    2. Whether, under General Municipal Law § 205-a, the contractors are subject to liability when the alleged negligence occurred years prior to the fire.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the firefighter rule bars recovery when the police or firefighting duties increased the risk of the injury.
    2. No, because liability under General Municipal Law § 205-a is limited to the owner and those in control of the premises at the time of the injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reaffirmed the firefighter’s rule, which prevents firefighters and police from suing for negligence in situations that give rise to their services. The court emphasized that the determinative factor is “whether the injury sustained is related to the particular dangers which police officers [and firefighters] are expected to assume as part of their duties.” The court held the necessary connection is present “where the performance of the police officer’s or firefighter’s duties increased the risk of the injury happening, and did not merely furnish the occasion for the injury.” For the common-law negligence claims, the Court found that the officers’ injuries in all three cases resulted from risks inherent in their duties, and thus, the claims were properly dismissed. For the statutory claims, the court held that the Appellate Division erred by dismissing the claims based on building code violations. The court stated, “So long as the plaintiff also establishes the necessary connection between the violation and the injury… violations of building code safety provisions provide a sound predicate for General Municipal Law § 205-a liability.” The court held that General Municipal Law § 205-a liability is limited to those having control over the premises, which did not include the contractors. The court cited the legislative history of General Municipal Law § 205-a and § 205-e to support its conclusion that the legislature intended to limit liability to those with control over the premises.

  • Ruotolo v. City of New York, 740 N.E.2d 586 (1993): Application of the Firefighter’s Rule to Police Officers

    Ruotolo v. City of New York, 740 N.E.2d 586 (1993)

    The “firefighter’s rule,” which generally prevents firefighters and police officers from recovering damages for injuries resulting from the special risks inherent in their duties, applies to injuries sustained while responding to emergency calls, even if the injury is caused by the negligence of a fellow officer, provided the injury is related to the inherent risks of police duty.

    Summary

    A police officer, Ruotolo, was injured when the police vehicle in which she was riding collided with another vehicle while responding to an emergency call. She sued the City, alleging negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the “firefighter’s rule” (extended to police officers via Santangelo v. State of New York) barred her claim because her injuries resulted from a risk inherent in police duties—responding to emergencies. The court rejected the argument that the negligence of a fellow officer created an exception to the rule, clarifying that the critical factor is the connection between the injury and the special hazards assumed as part of police duties. The ruling emphasizes the policy that police officers are trained and compensated to confront such risks.

    Facts

    On December 14, 1984, Ruotolo was working as a police officer, serving as a recorder in a patrol car driven by Officer Bakal.
    Responding to a top-priority “officer in need of assistance” call (“1013” call), the officers drove at approximately 40 mph with flashing lights and sirens.
    Their vehicle collided with a car stopped at a red light; Ruotolo sustained injuries.
    Conflicting evidence existed regarding whether the other driver had changed lanes improperly prior to the impact.

    Procedural History

    Ruotolo sued the City of New York, Officer Bakal, and the driver of the other vehicle. The City moved to dismiss based on the Santangelo rule, but the trial court denied the motion.
    The jury found Officer Bakal solely negligent and exonerated the other driver. The trial court denied the City’s renewed motion to dismiss but reduced the damages award.
    The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the complaint, applying the Santangelo rule.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the “firefighter’s rule” (as extended to police officers) bars recovery for injuries sustained while responding to an emergency call, even when the injury is caused by the negligence of a fellow officer?

    2. Whether a “separate and distinct” exception to the firefighter’s rule exists when the negligence causing the injury is distinct from the event necessitating the emergency response?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the injury was related to a particular risk that she had assumed as part of her duties, specifically the possibility of injury while rushing to the scene of an emergency.

    2. No, because such an exception would be inconsistent with the rationale of Santangelo. The determinative factor is whether the injury sustained is related to the particular dangers which police officers are expected to assume as part of their duties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court based its reasoning on the principles established in Santangelo, which extended the “firefighter’s rule” to police officers. The rule is grounded in the public policy that officers, trained and compensated to confront dangers, should not recover for injuries stemming from the situations that necessitate their services. The court emphasized that responding to emergencies inherently involves risks, such as collisions, which officers are expected to assume.

    The court rejected the “separate and distinct” exception, stating it was inconsistent with Santangelo. The critical factor is the relationship between the injury and the inherent risks of police duty. The court stated that, “the determinative factor is whether the injury sustained is related to the particular dangers which police officers are expected to assume as part of their duties.”

    Regarding the fellow-servant argument, the court clarified that abrogating the common-law fellow-servant doctrine does not automatically create liability for all fellow-servant negligence claims. It emphasized that the Santangelo rule bars claims arising from the special hazards inherent in police functions, regardless of whether the negligence is by a third party or a fellow officer. To carve out such an exception, would create an “obvious anomaly” according to the court.

    The Court emphasized the narrow scope of the ruling, specifying that it only applies to claims arising from the special hazards inherent in police functions and doesn’t impact other negligence claims outside the scope of the Santangelo rule.

  • Santangelo v. State, 71 N.Y.2d 393 (1988): The “Firefighter’s Rule” and Public Policy

    Santangelo v. State, 71 N.Y.2d 393 (1988)

    Police officers generally cannot recover damages from the State for injuries sustained while apprehending an escaped mental patient, based on public policy considerations similar to the “firefighter’s rule.”

    Summary

    Two police officers, Santangelo and Kirschenheiter, were injured while apprehending Brian Bordes, an escaped mental patient. They sued the State, alleging negligence in allowing Bordes to escape and violating regulations regarding notification of his escape and dangerousness. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ denial of recovery, holding that public policy precludes recovery for injuries sustained by police officers in the line of duty when confronting situations they are specifically trained and compensated to handle. This decision extends the rationale of the “firefighter’s rule” to police officers confronting negligently created emergencies.

    Facts

    Brian Bordes, with a history of mental illness and escapes from Kings Park Psychiatric Center, was involuntarily committed after firing a rifle. Police requested notification upon his discharge due to outstanding warrants. Bordes escaped, and though the family and police were notified initially, the hospital later marked him “discharged” after 30 days, removing the alarm from police records. Bordes’ uncle informed Officer Santangelo of Bordes’ presence at his grandparents’ home. Santangelo and Kirschenheiter, unaware of Bordes’ escape status in their current records, responded. Bordes, found at the residence, produced a knife, and in the ensuing struggle to subdue him, both officers were injured.

    Procedural History

    The officers sued the State in the Court of Claims, alleging negligence and regulatory violations. The Court of Claims found the State negligent but denied recovery based on public policy. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police officers injured while apprehending an escaped mental patient can recover damages from the State for negligence in connection with the patient’s escape and the failure to properly notify the police of the patient’s dangerousness and escape status.

    Holding

    No, because public policy considerations, similar to those underlying the “firefighter’s rule,” preclude recovery for injuries sustained by police officers when confronting the very types of emergencies they are trained and compensated to handle.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals grounded its decision on public policy, drawing an analogy to the “firefighter’s rule,” which generally prevents firefighters from recovering damages for injuries sustained while fighting fires caused by negligence. The Court reasoned that like firefighters, police officers are experts trained and compensated to deal with emergencies and hazards, often created by negligence. Permitting recovery in such cases would result in the public paying damages for injuries sustained by the very professionals it employs to handle those situations. The court stated: “Apprehending an escaped mental patient— who may well have escaped owing to negligent supervision, and may well be dangerous — is a function particularly within the scope of duty of police officers.” They also noted that police officers receive training to minimize dangers and compensation/benefits to cover injuries sustained in the line of duty. The Court rejected the argument that the risk confronted exceeded what the officers assumed, clarifying that its decision was not based on comparative fault but on the policy considerations inherent in the nature of police work. The court emphasized the anomaly of allowing recovery against the State for injuries incurred while performing a core function of their job.