New York Law Review

Tag: Firefighter Disability Benefits

  • Farber v. City of Utica, 97 N.Y.2d 476 (2002): Clarifying ‘Amounts Received’ Under General Municipal Law § 207-a

    Farber v. City of Utica, 97 N.Y.2d 476 (2002)

    Under General Municipal Law § 207-a, a municipality’s obligation to a disabled firefighter is reduced by the total amount of disability pension benefits received, including supplemental allowances from the state retirement system, as these supplements are considered part of the ‘amounts received’ under the statute.

    Summary

    The case concerns the calculation of disability payments to a retired firefighter under General Municipal Law § 207-a. The City of Utica sought to reduce its payments to Arthur Farber, a disabled firefighter, by the amount of a supplemental retirement allowance Farber received from the state. The Court of Appeals held that the City could indeed reduce its payments, because the supplemental allowance constituted part of the total “amounts received” by Farber under his disability pension, as contemplated by § 207-a. The decision emphasizes the legislative intent to alleviate the financial burden on municipalities regarding disability payments to firefighters.

    Facts

    Arthur Farber, a City of Utica firefighter, was permanently disabled in the line of duty in 1973 and involuntarily retired in 1980. He received a disability pension from the New York State Retirement System under Retirement and Social Security Law § 363-c. He also received payments from the City of Utica under General Municipal Law § 207-a, representing the difference between his state pension and the salary of active firefighters. Farber also received a supplemental allowance from the state under Retirement and Social Security Law § 378. Upon learning of this supplemental allowance, the City reduced its § 207-a payments to Farber by the amount of the allowance and sought to recoup alleged overpayments.

    Procedural History

    Farber initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel the City to recalculate its § 207-a obligation. The City counterclaimed for reimbursement of overpayments. The Supreme Court granted Farber’s petition and denied the City’s counterclaim. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing Farber’s petition and reinstating the City’s counterclaim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the phrase “amounts received” in General Municipal Law § 207-a(2) includes supplemental entitlements received pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law § 378, thus allowing a municipality to reduce its payments to a disabled firefighter by the amount of the supplemental allowance.

    Holding

    Yes, because the supplemental allowance derives from Farber’s Retirement and Social Security Law § 363-c disability pension and is therefore part of the total “amounts received” for purposes of General Municipal Law § 207-a.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Legislature intended Retirement and Social Security Law § 378 to provide a cost-of-living adjustment to state retirement system pensioners. Since municipalities are already responsible for paying an active firefighter’s salary, including all salary increases, this pay adjustment eliminates the need for a distinct supplemental allowance. The Court emphasized that the 1977 amendment to General Municipal Law § 207-a aimed to alleviate the financial burden on municipalities. The Court quoted Mashnouk v. Miles, 55 N.Y.2d 80, 87 (1982): “the primary aim of the new statute was to shift a large portion of the financial burden generated by disabled fire fighters from the municipal payrolls to the appropriate retirement system or pension fund.” Permitting the City to deduct the supplemental allowance prevents a disabled firefighter’s benefits from exceeding an active firefighter’s salary, which would be contrary to the legislative intent. The supplemental allowances are not independent pensions but are contingent upon and computed based on the base pension amount. Therefore, the supplemental allowance should reduce the City’s obligation under General Municipal Law § 207-a.

  • Meyer v. Board of Trustees, 90 N.Y.2d 139 (1997): Establishes Standard for Reviewing Firefighter Disability Determinations

    Meyer v. Board of Trustees, 90 N.Y.2d 139 (1997)

    When a firefighter’s application for accidental disability retirement is denied by a tie vote of the Board of Trustees, a reviewing court can only overturn that decision if it determines, as a matter of law, that the disability was the natural and proximate result of a service-related accident, and the Board’s determination must stand if there is any credible evidence of a lack of causation.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard of judicial review applied when the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund Board of Trustees denies a firefighter’s application for service-related accidental disability retirement benefits due to a tie vote. In these consolidated cases, the Medical Board found the firefighters incapacitated but did not find a causal link between service-related injuries and the disability. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in overturning the Board’s decisions, emphasizing that as long as there is any credible evidence of lack of causation before the Board, its determination must stand. The Court clarified that the opinion of a nonexamining physician can constitute credible evidence.

    Facts

    Four firefighters applied for accidental disability retirement, claiming various service-related injuries caused their disabilities.

    Meyer claimed back pain from three service-related accidents.

    Hacker suffered neck and back injuries over his career, with the last injury occurring in August 1992.

    Sorrenti had a prior knee surgery before joining the Fire Department and experienced several incidents affecting his knee and back during his service.

    Pomilla suffered four documented service-related back injuries between 1972 and 1989.

    In each case, the Pension Fund Medical Board determined the firefighter was disabled but concluded the service-related injuries did not cause the disability, recommending ordinary disability retirement.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Trustees deadlocked on the issue of causation in each case, resulting in a denial of accidental disability retirement and an award of ordinary disability benefits.

    The firefighters filed CPLR Article 78 petitions for review.

    The Appellate Division concluded in each case that causation was established as a matter of law and ordered accidental disability retirement benefits.

    The Board of Trustees appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in determining that causation was established as a matter of law, thereby annulling the Board of Trustees’ denial of accidental disability retirement benefits.

    Whether the opinion of a non-examining medical expert can constitute credible evidence of a lack of causation in determining eligibility for accidental disability retirement benefits.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division erroneously ignored credible evidence of a lack of causation before the Board of Trustees in the form of articulated, rational, and fact-based medical opinions.

    Yes, because a non-examining physician’s expert opinion, based on a review of medical records and other data, is considered credible evidence and cannot be rejected solely because it is not based on a direct physical examination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the limited scope of judicial review in cases where the Board of Trustees denies accidental disability retirement benefits due to a tie vote. The Court stated that a reviewing court can only overturn the Board’s decision if causation is established as a matter of law, and the determination must stand if there is any credible evidence of a lack of causation.

    The Court rejected the Appellate Division’s implicit rule that the opinion of examining physicians on causation must be credited over the rationally based opinion of a non-examining physician. It noted that New York law generally accepts the testimony of non-examining physicians as medical experts in civil and criminal trials.

    The Court explained that credible evidence is evidence that proceeds from a credible source and reasonably tends to support the proposition for which it is offered. The Court found that articulated, rational, and fact-based medical opinions from the Medical Board constituted credible evidence of a lack of causation in each of the cases under review. For instance, regarding Firefighter Meyer, the Court pointed to the opinion of Dr. Jones, the Fire Department’s Chief Medical Officer, who based his opinion on Meyer’s medical records and his interpretation of an MRI. The Court found this to be credible evidence supporting the Board’s denial.

    The Court specifically stated, “As long as these opinions were otherwise credible, they could not be rejected solely because they were not based on direct physical examination of the petitioner.”

  • McDermott v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 79 N.Y.2d 403 (1992): Interpreting Statutory Presumptions for Firefighter Disability Benefits

    McDermott v. Board of Fire Commissioners, 79 N.Y.2d 403 (1992)

    The line-of-duty presumption for firefighters’ heart-related retirement disability benefits under Retirement and Social Security Law § 363-a(1) should not be read into General Municipal Law § 207-a, which governs firefighters’ sick leave benefits.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a statutory presumption that heart-related disabilities in firefighters are line-of-duty injuries applies to sick leave benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-a, in addition to retirement disability benefits under Retirement and Social Security Law § 363-a. The Court of Appeals held that the presumption does not extend to section 207-a benefits. The court reasoned that the legislative history and statutory context of section 363-a indicate it was intended to apply solely to retirement benefits, not to broaden the scope of sick leave benefits under section 207-a. This decision clarifies the distinct disability systems and their differing coverage and consequences.

    Facts

    The petitioner, McDermott, a firefighter, began his employment in January 1971 after passing a physical exam. He was suspended in May 1984 on charges of misconduct. While suspended, in June 1984, he experienced chest pain and was hospitalized, diagnosed with a nontransmural myocardial infarction. Further examination revealed coronary artery disease and angina, rendering him unable to perform his firefighting duties. McDermott applied for full salary and medical expenses under General Municipal Law § 207-a.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Fire Commissioners denied McDermott’s application. He then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to annul the Board’s determination. Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division, which granted the petition, relying on Traver v. City of Poughkeepsie, and remitted the matter for calculation of back pay. The Appellate Division concluded that the presumption in Retirement and Social Security Law § 363-a(1) applied to section 207-a claims. The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the line-of-duty presumption contained in Retirement and Social Security Law § 363-a(1) applies to firefighters seeking disability benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-a.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative intent and statutory context demonstrate that the presumption in section 363-a(1) applies only to retirement benefits and not to sick leave benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-a.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that statutory interpretation must discern and apply the will of the Legislature, considering the statutory context and legislative history. The court noted that section 363-a was initially limited to retirement matters. While a 1973 amendment removed explicit limitations to retirement claims, this did not implicitly amend General Municipal Law § 207-a. The court reasoned that if the legislature intended to broaden the scope of section 207-a, it would have amended that section directly. Sections 207-a and 363-a represent separate disability systems with differing coverage and consequences. Section 207-a applies to members of an organized fire company or fire department, while section 363-a applies to “members” of a retirement system. Additionally, benefits under 207-a are paid by the municipality, whereas section 363 benefits are paid by the retirement system. The legislative history of the 1973 amendment contains no reference to General Municipal Law § 207-a. The court distinguished this case from Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v Beekman, where a presumption was found in General Municipal Law § 207-k due to extensive legislative history and consistent practical application. The Court stated, “Unlike the General Municipal Law, article 8 of the Retirement and Social Security Law (containing § 363-a) — entitled ‘New York State Policemen’s and Firemen’s Retirement System’ — specifically governs retirement matters.” Therefore, the court concluded that the Appellate Division erred in reading the section 363-a presumption into General Municipal Law § 207-a.

  • Klonowski v. Department of Fire of City of Auburn, 58 N.Y.2d 398 (1983): Entitlement to Wage Supplement After Voluntary Retirement

    Klonowski v. Department of Fire of City of Auburn, 58 N.Y.2d 398 (1983)

    A fireman who applies for accidental disability retirement before voluntary retirement is effective is entitled to the difference between regular salary and the disability allowance from the date of voluntary retirement, once the disability retirement is granted.

    Summary

    Joseph Klonowski, a fireman, injured himself in the line of duty and applied for accidental disability retirement. Subsequently, he submitted a notice for voluntary retirement. After his voluntary retirement became effective, his application for accidental disability benefits was approved. He then sought payment under General Municipal Law § 207-a, which provides for the difference between his regular salary and the disability allowance. The city initially granted the request but later terminated payments, arguing that he was not receiving § 207-a benefits at the time he was granted accidental retirement benefits. The Court of Appeals held that Klonowski was entitled to the wage supplement, clarifying the rights of voluntarily retired firemen under § 207-a after the 1977 amendments.

    Facts

    Klonowski worked as a fireman from 1947 to 1978.
    He sustained a work-related injury in February 1977.
    He applied for accidental disability retirement on May 8, 1978.
    He voluntarily retired on May 10, 1978.
    His application for accidental disability benefits was approved on September 6, 1978.
    The City of Auburn initially provided wage supplement payments but terminated them in January 1979.

    Procedural History

    Klonowski initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel payment of the wage supplement.
    The Supreme Court severed the issue of the wage supplement and dismissed it, finding that Klonowski’s right to § 207-a benefits vested at the time of his injury, but he waived these benefits by voluntarily retiring.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, citing Matter of Weber v. Department of Fire of City of Syracuse.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a fireman who applies for accidental disability retirement benefits before his voluntary retirement becomes effective is entitled to receive the wage supplement under General Municipal Law § 207-a after the accidental disability retirement is granted.

    Holding

    Yes, because the 1977 amendments to General Municipal Law § 207-a, particularly subdivision 4, indicate a legislative intent to provide wage supplements to disabled firemen receiving accidental disability benefits, regardless of whether they voluntarily retire.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed the legislative history of General Municipal Law § 207-a and the impact of the 1977 amendments. It highlighted that the amendments aimed to shift the financial burden of disabled firefighters from municipalities to the retirement system without reducing the amount of payments to the firefighters. The court noted that prior to the amendments, municipalities sought ways to remove disabled firemen from their payrolls, often unsuccessfully. The 1977 amendments allowed municipalities to involuntarily retire firemen eligible for accidental disability retirement and pay the difference between their regular salary and retirement benefits. The court emphasized the second sentence of subdivision 4, which states: “Where such a fireman retires or is retired under any procedure applicable to him… he shall thereafter… continue to be entitled to medical treatment and hospital care necessitated by reason of such injury or illness.” The court reasoned that this provision demonstrates the legislature’s intent to provide benefits to disabled firemen, whether they voluntarily retire or are involuntarily retired. The court explicitly stated that Matter of Weber v. Department of Fire of City of Syracuse, which held that a voluntarily retired fireman was not entitled to § 207-a benefits, is no longer good law in light of the amendments. The court also cited Matter of Mashnouk v. Miles and Cook v. City of Binghamton, noting that the primary aim of the 1977 statute was to shift the financial burden without reducing the amount of payments. The court concluded that Klonowski was entitled to the wage supplement because he was eligible for accidental disability benefits at the time of his voluntary retirement, and the subsequent award of benefits confirmed his eligibility retroactive to his retirement date. The court found that Klonowski, despite his voluntary retirement, remained entitled to the § 207-a differential allowance until he reached the normal retirement age. The court interpreted the words “then entitled” in subdivision 4 to mean “at the time of retirement.”