People v. Jorgensen, 25 N.Y.3d 623 (2015)

A woman cannot be convicted of manslaughter in the second degree for reckless conduct during pregnancy that causes injury to the fetus, resulting in the child’s death after birth, because the legislature did not intend to criminalize such conduct.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a mother could be convicted of manslaughter for reckless actions while pregnant that injured her fetus, leading to the child’s death shortly after birth. The court held that the existing manslaughter statute did not apply because the legislature did not intend to hold pregnant women criminally liable for reckless conduct toward themselves and their fetuses, especially when such conduct did not involve an intentional abortional act. The court reversed the conviction, emphasizing that the statutory definition of a “person” as a human being “born and alive” did not encompass the mother’s prenatal actions leading to the child’s postnatal death.

Facts

Jennifer Jorgensen, 34 weeks pregnant, caused a car accident, resulting in the deaths of the occupants of the other vehicle. The accident caused injuries to her unborn child. She underwent an emergency C-section due to fetal distress, but the baby died six days later from injuries sustained in the accident. Jorgensen was indicted on multiple charges, including manslaughter in the second degree for the death of her child. The trial court found her not guilty on all charges except for the manslaughter in the second degree count related to the child’s death, which the Appellate Division affirmed.

Procedural History

Jorgensen was indicted, and a first trial ended in a hung jury. A second trial resulted in a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree for the death of her child. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to address the issue of statutory interpretation regarding the application of manslaughter laws to a pregnant woman’s actions that result in a child’s death after birth.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a woman can be convicted of manslaughter for reckless conduct that she engaged in while pregnant that caused injury to the fetus in utero where the child was born alive but died as a result of that injury days later.

Holding

1. No, because the legislature did not intend to hold pregnant women criminally responsible for reckless conduct that causes injury to a fetus that subsequently dies after being born alive.

Court’s Reasoning

The court’s reasoning centered on statutory interpretation, focusing on Penal Law § 125.15 (1), which defines manslaughter in the second degree, and Penal Law § 125.05 (1), which defines a person, for homicide purposes, as a human being born and alive. The court determined that the legislature’s intent, when enacting these statutes, was not to criminalize a mother’s reckless conduct toward her fetus, especially when that conduct did not constitute an intentional abortional act. The court considered the broader statutory scheme, noting that where the legislature intended to criminalize a pregnant woman’s conduct towards her fetus, it specifically enacted statutory prohibitions, such as those related to self-abortion. Furthermore, the court observed that had the fetus died in utero, Jorgensen could not have been prosecuted under the manslaughter statute because the fetus would not have met the definition of a “person.”

The court highlighted that the imposition of criminal liability for reckless conduct in this context should be explicitly defined by the legislature. The court cited the principle that penal responsibility cannot extend beyond the fair scope of the statutory mandate, as articulated in People v. Wood. The court was concerned that if the statute was applied as the state requested, it would create a perverse incentive for a pregnant woman to refuse a cesarean section, which would potentially harm the health of both the woman and her unborn child.

Judge Fahey dissented, arguing that the plain language of the Penal Law allowed for Jorgensen’s conviction, since the child was a person at the time of death, and that there was no temporal qualification in the statutes that would prevent applying the law in this situation. The dissent pointed out that Jorgensen’s reckless actions caused the baby’s death.

Practical Implications

This case sets a precedent that, under New York law, a mother cannot be charged with manslaughter for reckless actions during her pregnancy that cause injury to the fetus, resulting in the child’s death post-birth, absent an intentional abortional act. This clarifies the scope of manslaughter laws in New York concerning pregnant women. Lawyers must consider that the current legal interpretation does not hold a mother liable for the postnatal death of a child if the harmful conduct was reckless and occurred prenatally, aligning with the court’s view that criminal liability should not extend beyond the scope intended by the legislature.