Ferres v. City of New Rochelle, 68 N.Y.2d 446 (1986)

General Obligations Law § 9-103, which limits landowner liability for recreational use of property, does not apply to claims against a municipality for negligence in the operation and maintenance of a supervised public park and recreational facility.

Summary

Plaintiff Dean Ferres was injured while riding his bicycle into a chain strung across Hudson Park Road at the entrance of a municipal park in New Rochelle. He sued the city, alleging negligence. The city argued that General Obligations Law § 9-103 shielded it from liability. The Court of Appeals held that § 9-103 does not apply to a municipality’s duty to maintain a supervised public park, because the statute’s purpose is to encourage landowners to open their property for recreational use, an incentive that is not needed for public parks already open to the public. Applying the statute to a supervised municipal park would drastically reduce the municipality’s responsibility without serving any discernible public interest.

Facts

Dean Ferres rode his bicycle into a chain strung across Hudson Park Road at the entrance of a municipal park operated by the City of New Rochelle. The park was a suburban, regulated facility with a Recreation Supervisor and staff, including a parking area, guard house, beach, and other recreational amenities. Ferres sustained injuries as a result of the incident.

Procedural History

Ferres sued the City of New Rochelle for negligence. The trial court refused to dismiss the complaint based on General Obligations Law § 9-103, and the jury found in favor of Ferres. The Appellate Division affirmed. The City of New Rochelle appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether General Obligations Law § 9-103 applies to a claim based on a breach of duty by a municipality in the operation of a supervised public park and recreational facility.

Holding

No, because the statute’s purpose is to encourage private landowners to open their property for recreational use, and this purpose is not served by applying it to supervised municipal parks already open to the public.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the sole purpose of General Obligations Law § 9-103 is to induce property owners to permit persons to come on their property for specified recreational activities, by granting them immunity from liability. The statute offers two inducements: (1) immunity from the duty to keep the premises safe and to warn of hazards, and (2) assurance that by giving permission, the owner does not assume a duty of care to invitees. The court stated, “It would be contrary to reason to assume that the Legislature could have intended that the statute apply in circumstances where neither the basic purpose of the statute, nor, indeed, any purpose could be served — as in the case of the supervised park here where the municipality has already held its recreational facility open to the public and needs no encouragement to do so from the prospective immunity offered by the statute.”

Furthermore, the court analyzed the legislative history of the statute, noting that it originated in the Conservation Law to encourage landowners to allow hunting, trapping, and fishing. Subsequent amendments expanded the scope, but the underlying purpose remained the same: to encourage landowners to open their properties for recreational use. The court emphasized that applying the statute to a supervised city park would result in a drastic reduction in the municipality’s responsibility without a corresponding public benefit, which is inconsistent with the statute’s aim of encouraging landowners to permit recreational activities.

The court distinguished this situation from cases where § 9-103 appropriately applies, such as hunting or fishing on private land where the landowner’s permission is given in return for statutory immunity. In contrast, a city park is already open to the public, and the municipality has already assumed a duty of reasonable care. “If the statute is applied in such case, the result is an immediate reduction of this higher duty to one which requires the municipality to do no more than refrain from a malicious act or omission. The municipality would give up nothing but gain immunity.” The court also found that the statute’s application would be arbitrary based on the activity in which the injured person was engaged. The court concluded that the broad reading urged by the defendant, which produces such an unreasonable result, should be avoided.