New York Law Review

Tag: felony murder

  • People v. Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 417 (1980): Admissibility of Codefendant Confessions

    People v. Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 417 (1980)

    A codefendant’s confession is admissible and does not violate the defendant’s right to confrontation when the defendant has made a confession that is substantially similar to the codefendant’s, such that any prejudice is negligible.

    Summary

    Harry Berzups was convicted of felony murder, intentional murder, robbery, and other charges in connection with the killing of a pharmacist during a robbery. Berzups appealed, arguing that the admission of his codefendant Massurin’s confession violated his right to confrontation because Massurin did not testify. He also challenged the admissibility of his own confession and physical evidence. The New York Court of Appeals held that Massurin’s confession was admissible because Berzups’s own confession was substantially similar, rendering any prejudice negligible. The court also found that Berzups’s arrest was supported by probable cause, and the seizure of physical evidence was justified.

    Facts

    An elderly pharmacist was murdered during a drugstore robbery. The pharmacist’s body was discovered with multiple knife wounds, a broken jaw, a crushed eye socket, and a shattered skull. The police found an order slip that led them to Michael Massurin, who initially claimed he and Berzups had forced the druggist to the back of the store at knifepoint. Massurin later changed his story, stating that Berzups had stabbed the pharmacist. Massurin’s information led the police to Berzups, who initially denied any knowledge of the crime. However, after the police noticed bloodstains on his shoes and a cut on his finger, Berzups admitted that he and Massurin went to rob the drugstore, but claimed Massurin was the primary actor. A search of Berzups’ room pursuant to a warrant revealed trousers with bloodstains. A bloodstained jacket was also recovered that Berzups sold to a third party. At trial, both Berzups and a third party provided details about the events that transpired during the robbery and murder.

    Procedural History

    Berzups and Massurin were tried together and convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions but reversed the robbery conviction as to each defendant, reasoning that it was a lesser included count of felony murder. Berzups appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the admission of Massurin’s confession, the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, and the trial court’s refusal to charge assault as a lesser included offense. The prosecution cross-appealed the reversal of the robbery conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the admission of codefendant Massurin’s confession violated Berzups’s right to confrontation.
    2. Whether Berzups’s post-arrest confession and the seized physical evidence should have been suppressed.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge assault as a lesser included offense of intentional murder.
    4. Whether the underlying felony of robbery in the felony murder charge was a lesser included offense that merged in the conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because Berzups’s own confession was substantially similar to Massurin’s, making any prejudice negligible.
    2. No, because Berzups’s arrest was supported by probable cause and the seizure of physical evidence was justified under the circumstances.
    3. No, because the jury’s rejection of manslaughter charges indicated that they discredited the defense theory that Berzups acted without intent to kill.
    4. No, because the underlying felony of robbery is not a lesser included offense that merges with felony murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to confrontation is not violated when a codefendant’s confession is “almost identical” to the defendant’s confession (People v. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550, 552). While cautionary instructions are often insufficient to cure prejudice, the Court found that the confessions were so duplicative in their description of the crucial facts that Massurin’s confession was of no measurable consequence. The court emphasized the overlapping details regarding the willing participation in the robbery, the division of proceeds, and the joint striking of the victim. Regarding the suppression motion, the court found probable cause for Berzups’s arrest based on Massurin’s implication and accurate description of Berzups. The seizure of fingernail scrapings and bloodstained shoes was justified due to the exigency of easy eradication. As to the lesser included offense charge, the court noted that the jury’s rejection of manslaughter indicated they found Berzups acted with intent to kill, precluding a charge of assault. Finally, the court held that the underlying felony of robbery does not merge with felony murder because it serves as a replacement for the *mens rea* necessary for common-law murder, and the corpus of the crime is the killing of another. The court stated that the two crimes are “substantively and genetically entirely separate and disconnected offenses” (People v. Nichols, 230 N.Y. 221, 226).

  • People v. Irby, 47 N.Y.2d 894 (1979): Defining ‘Immediate Flight’ in Felony Murder

    People v. Irby, 47 N.Y.2d 894 (1979)

    Under New York’s felony murder statute, liability extends to deaths caused during the immediate flight from a felony, not just during the commission of the underlying felony itself; the determination of whether the killing occurred during the immediate flight is generally a question of fact for the jury.

    Summary

    Irby was convicted of felony murder after her accomplice shot and killed a police officer during their escape from a burglary. Irby argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the burglary had to be ongoing at the time of the shooting for her to be guilty of felony murder, and that if she was in custody, she could not be guilty. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Irby’s conviction, holding that the jury instructions failed to adequately explain that felony murder liability extends to the immediate flight from the underlying felony and improperly removed from jury consideration the crucial factual question of whether the shooting occurred during the immediate flight.

    Facts

    Irby and her accomplice, MacKenzie, burglarized a clothing boutique. Irby acted as a lookout while MacKenzie entered the store and passed stolen merchandise to her through a window, which she placed in the trunk of their car. Police officers on patrol noticed the suspicious activity and approached Irby. While the officers questioned Irby, MacKenzie broke out of the front of the store and, in an attempt to escape, shot and killed an officer who tried to stop him. Irby was subsequently convicted of felony murder.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Irby of felony murder. The Appellate Division sustained the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed, but on reargument, reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the felony of burglary had to be ongoing at the time of the shooting for Irby to be guilty of felony murder.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that if Irby was in custody at the time of the shooting, she could not be guilty of felony murder.
    3. Whether the trial court improperly removed from the jury the factual question of whether the shooting occurred during the immediate flight from the burglary.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the charge, as a whole, was inadequate in that it did not provide for proper consideration by the jury of whether the shooting took place during the immediate flight from the burglary.
    2. The court did not reach this conclusion explicitly, but the reversal implies that this too was improperly presented to the jury.
    3. Yes, because the charge failed to submit to the jury for resolution the crucial factual question of whether, when the fatal shot was fired, MacKenzie was in immediate flight from the scene of the burglary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the statutory language of New York’s felony murder statute, which extends liability to deaths caused “in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom.” The court emphasized that the trial court’s instructions failed to adequately explain this concept of “immediate flight” to the jury. Specifically, the court found that the charge was deficient for failing to require the jury to determine whether MacKenzie was in “immediate flight” from the burglary when he shot the officer. The court stated, “[t]he charge failed to submit to the jury for resolution the crucial factual question of whether, when the fatal shot was fired, MacKenzie was in immediate flight from the scene of the burglary.”

    The court distinguished this case from others where the issue of immediate flight was so clear that it could be decided as a matter of law. Here, the court found that the facts presented a question for the jury to determine. Because the jury instructions did not adequately guide the jury in making this determination, the court reversed Irby’s conviction and ordered a new trial.

    The dissent argued that the majority was inappropriately interpreting the felony murder statute and ignoring precedent. The dissent emphasized that Irby willingly participated in the burglary and should be held responsible for the consequences, including the death of the officer during the escape. The dissent stated that the jury was properly instructed on the law, and there was no reason to reverse the conviction. The dissent cited People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440 (1967) as precedent.

  • People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302 (1975): Jury Instructions and Lesser Included Offenses in Felony Murder

    People v. Shuman, 37 N.Y.2d 302 (1975)

    In a felony murder case, a trial court is not required to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses (such as the underlying felony) unless there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would permit the jury to find the defendant not guilty of felony murder but guilty of the lesser included offense.

    Summary

    Charles Shuman was convicted of two counts of felony murder. The indictment alleged robbery and burglary as the predicate felonies. Shuman argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the underlying felonies as lesser included offenses. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a lesser included offense instruction is only required if there is a basis in the evidence for the jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense (felony murder) while convicting on the lesser offense. Here, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that the victim’s death resulted directly from the defendant’s actions during the commission of the felonies, precluding a finding of guilt on the underlying felonies without also finding guilt on felony murder.

    Facts

    Patrolman Levy found Alex Chafetz bound and gagged in his apartment. Chafetz died from asphyxiation due to the gag. Shuman confessed to entering Chafetz’s apartment with accomplices to commit robbery and burglary. During the crime, Shuman admitted to gagging Chafetz. The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was homicide by asphyxiation due to gagging. The defendant did not present any evidence to contradict this conclusion.

    Procedural History

    Shuman was indicted on two counts of felony murder, predicated on robbery and burglary. At trial, Shuman requested the judge to instruct the jury on the underlying felonies (robbery, attempted robbery, burglary, or attempted burglary) as lesser included offenses. The trial court refused. The jury convicted Shuman of both counts of felony murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Shuman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a felony murder trial, the trial court is required to instruct the jury on the underlying felonies (robbery and burglary) as lesser included offenses when there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the underlying felonies but did not cause the victim’s death.

    Holding

    No, because under no view of the evidence could a jury find the defendant not guilty of felony murder but guilty of the underlying felonies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the “some basis in the evidence” test (derived from People v. Mussenden) to determine whether a lesser included offense instruction was warranted. This test, now codified in CPL 300.50 as a “reasonable view of the evidence” test, requires the instruction of a lesser included offense only when there is a basis for the jury to find the defendant not guilty of the greater crime but guilty of the lesser crime. The court emphasized that “every possible hypothesis” except the higher crime must be excluded to warrant a refusal to submit lower degrees or included crimes. The court noted that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. Here, Shuman’s confession and the medical examiner’s testimony established a direct causal link between Shuman’s act of gagging the victim and the victim’s death by asphyxiation. Because there was no contradictory evidence presented, the court concluded that “under no view of the evidence could a jury find defendant not guilty of the crime charged and yet find him guilty of any crime necessarily included in that charged in the indictment.” Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the underlying felonies as lesser included offenses. The court implicitly suggests that the key is whether the act leading to the felony is separate in time or effect from the act causing the death. Here, the two were inextricably intertwined.

  • People v. Usher, 29 N.Y.2d 234 (1971): Scope of Felony Assault Predicate Felonies

    People v. Usher, 29 N.Y.2d 234 (1971)

    The felony assault statute, unlike the felony murder statute, does not limit the predicate felonies to only those that are inherently dangerous; any felony can serve as the basis for a felony assault conviction if physical injury results during its commission.

    Summary

    Usher, while driving a stolen car and being chased by police, crashed into a taxi, injuring the occupants. He was convicted of criminal possession of stolen property, felony assault, and other charges. Usher appealed, arguing that the felony underlying the assault (possession of stolen property) was not a dangerous felony and therefore could not support a felony assault conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the felony assault statute does not limit predicate felonies to only dangerous felonies, distinguishing it from the felony murder statute. The court also rejected Usher’s due process argument, stating that the legislature can hold a felon criminally accountable for injuries proximately caused during the commission of any felony.

    Facts

    Defendant Usher was in possession of a stolen automobile.
    While being pursued by the police, Usher crashed the stolen vehicle into a taxicab.
    Two occupants of the taxicab sustained physical injuries as a result of the collision.

    Procedural History

    Usher was convicted at trial of criminal possession of stolen property, two counts of felony assault, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and possession of a dangerous instrument.
    Usher appealed the conviction, arguing that the felony assault conviction was invalid because the underlying felony (criminal possession of stolen property) was not a dangerous felony.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    Usher appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the felony of criminal possession of stolen property can serve as a predicate for a felony assault conviction under Penal Law § 120.05(6).
    Whether the felony assault statute, as applied to a nonviolent felony such as possession of stolen property, is unconstitutional.

    Holding

    Yes, because the language of the felony assault statute is clear and unambiguous, and does not specify that only violent felonies can serve as a predicate. The legislature intended to distinguish between the felony murder and felony assault statutes.
    No, because due process does not preclude a legislative determination that a felon who proximately causes injury to another during the commission of a felony can be held criminally accountable, regardless of the nature of the underlying felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislative intent could be inferred from the specific language of the statute. The felony assault statute states that a person is guilty of assault in the second degree when, during the commission of a felony, they cause physical injury to another person. The statute does not limit the predicate felonies to violent crimes, unlike the felony murder statute, which specifically enumerates the felonies that can serve as a predicate.

    The Court noted that the felony murder statute was intentionally revised to narrow its scope, while the felony assault statute was not. The court stated that “the change from the former law was deliberate, its effect ameliorative, and brought the law of felony murder into line with that in the vast majority of other jurisdictions by specifically limiting its application to felonies involving violence or substantial risk of serious injury and death.”

    The Court rejected Usher’s argument that the felony assault statute was unconstitutional as applied to nonviolent felonies. The court stated, “we do not think that due process precludes a legislative policy determination that the felon who proximately causes injury to another, irrespective of the nature of the underlying felonious act, may be held criminally accountable.”

    The Court acknowledged the criticism of constructive malice in felony murder, but maintained its permissibility as a legislative policy choice.

    Finally, the Court noted that Usher’s argument regarding error in submitting the criminal possession of stolen property and unauthorized use of a vehicle charges to the jury was not preserved for review because no objection was made at trial.

  • People v. Streiff, 41 A.D.2d 259 (1973): When a Joint Trial Unduly Prejudices a Defendant

    People v. Streiff, 41 A.D.2d 259 (1973)

    A defendant is entitled to a separate trial when a co-defendant’s statement, inadmissible against the defendant, is so incriminating that it substantially prejudices the defendant’s right to a fair trial, especially when the evidence against the defendant, standing alone, is weak.

    Summary

    Charles Streiff was convicted of felony murder along with co-defendants Davis and Payne. Streiff appealed, arguing he was prejudiced by the joint trial because Payne’s statement, which implicated all three men in an attempted rape that led to the victim’s death, was admitted into evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Streiff’s conviction, holding that the joint trial prejudiced Streiff because Payne’s statement filled critical gaps in the prosecution’s case against Streiff, and without it, a conviction for felony murder would have been unlikely. The court affirmed the convictions of Davis and Payne.

    Facts

    Martha Kirk went missing, and her car was found at Merrill’s restaurant. Her body was later discovered, and an autopsy revealed she had been strangled. Streiff, Davis, and Payne were identified as patrons of Merrill’s on the night Kirk disappeared. Initially, they denied involvement, but later signed statements admitting some degree of involvement and implicating each other. The statements generally agreed that they found Kirk drunk and unconscious in her car, moved her to their vehicle, and drove to a secluded area. However, their accounts of what happened in the secluded area differed significantly, particularly between Streiff and Payne. Payne’s statement included graphic details implying an attempted rape, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder charge.

    Procedural History

    Streiff moved for a severance and separate trial, which was denied. All three defendants were tried together and convicted of felony murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Streiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the denial of his motion for a separate trial was prejudicial error.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Streiff’s motion for a separate trial, thereby prejudicing his right to a fair trial due to the admission of a co-defendant’s (Payne’s) statement that was highly incriminating but inadmissible against Streiff.

    Holding

    Yes, because without Payne’s statement, the possibility of Streiff’s conviction for felony murder was remote, and Payne’s statement so clearly and ineradicably charted the course to guilt. “In a case where, without the existence of a confession by one defendant, the evidence against another would be too weak to justify a conviction or even where a conviction would be doubtful, our review of the judgment would compel us to conclude that an abuse of discretion had been committed.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the decision to grant a separate trial is discretionary, appellate courts can review whether that discretion was abused and resulted in injustice. The court acknowledged that the introduction of a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant could violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses, but this right was not violated here because the co-defendants testified. However, the court emphasized that the right to a separate trial is broader than the right to confrontation. The court recognized the risk that a jury might consider evidence against all defendants collectively, despite instructions to consider each defendant separately. While the possibility of prejudice is discounted when the defendant’s own statement is nearly identical to the co-defendant’s or when independent proof of guilt is substantial, neither condition was met in Streiff’s case.

    The court found that Streiff’s own statement, even if it established criminal conduct, did not definitively establish the attempted rape necessary for a felony murder conviction. Payne’s statement, however, filled this gap. The court stated, “From a purely legal standpoint, Payne’s admission that he lay next to the naked girl with his erect penis exposed, shows that he at least ‘carr[ied] the project forward within dangerous proximity to the criminal end to be attained.’” The court concluded that it could not confidently say the jury disregarded Payne’s statement when convicting Streiff, particularly because Payne implicated Streiff by claiming Streiff was present during the attempted rape. Therefore, the joint trial substantially prejudiced Streiff’s rights, necessitating a separate trial. As the court put it, “Cast out the [codefendant’s] confessions and the result would need to be the same” and this was not the case here.

  • People v. Victory, 33 N.Y.2d 75 (1973): Affirmative Defense in Felony Murder and Witness Impeachment

    People v. Victory, 33 N.Y.2d 75 (1973)

    In felony murder cases, the burden of proving an affirmative defense rests on the defendant, and a witness’s prior omission of a fact can only be used for impeachment if their attention was specifically drawn to that fact during the prior statement.

    Summary

    Albert Victory and Robert Bornholdt were convicted of felony murder after Bornholdt shot and killed a police officer during an altercation following a traffic stop. The New York Court of Appeals upheld Victory’s conviction, ruling that the affirmative defense in the felony murder statute did not violate his constitutional rights and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the use of a witness’s prior statements for impeachment. The court emphasized that the burden of proving an affirmative defense lies with the defendant and that prior omissions can only impeach a witness if they were specifically asked about the omitted fact previously.

    Facts

    Patrolman Varecha pursued a speeding car driven by Victory with Bornholdt as a passenger. He stopped them near a discotheque. An altercation ensued when Varecha asked for Victory’s license and registration. Victory kneed Varecha in the groin, and both Victory and Bornholdt physically assaulted him. Varecha announced their arrest. As Victory backed away, Bornholdt shot Varecha multiple times, resulting in his death. Both were apprehended shortly after.

    Procedural History

    Victory and Bornholdt were jointly tried and convicted of felony murder and intentional murder respectively. Victory was sentenced to 25 years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of an Associate Judge.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Victory’s guilt of felony murder was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
    2. Whether the affirmative defense provision in the felony murder statute is constitutional.
    3. Whether the trial court properly denied Victory’s motion for severance.
    4. Whether the court’s rulings limiting the use of prior statements on cross-examination were proper.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was sufficient eyewitness testimony to prove all elements of felony murder, including Victory’s participation in the underlying felony of escape.
    2. Yes, because due process does not prevent shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant for affirmative defenses, especially when the relevant facts are within the defendant’s knowledge.
    3. No, because Victory did not adequately show the need for his co-defendant’s testimony or that it would exculpate him, and the motion was untimely.
    4. No, because Victory failed to show that the witness’s attention was specifically called to the omitted facts during prior statements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found ample evidence to support Victory’s felony murder conviction, stating that Victory participated in the assault and subsequent escape attempt during which Bornholdt killed the officer. The court rejected the constitutional challenge to the affirmative defense, stating that “the components of the statutory defense before us are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, and are matters upon which he may be fairly required to adduce supporting evidence.” The court reasoned that requiring the prosecution to disprove these elements would unduly enlarge the scope of their proof. Regarding the severance motion, the court stated that Victory failed to show how Bornholdt’s testimony would aid his defense and that the motion was untimely. “A motion for a separate trial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to review only for an abuse thereof.”

    Finally, the court addressed the limitation on cross-examination, stating that while prior inconsistent statements can be used to impeach a witness, “a witness may not be impeached simply by showing that he omitted to state a fact, or to state it more fully at a prior time. It need also be shown that at the prior time the witness’ attention was called to the matter and that he was specifically asked about the facts embraced in the question propounded at trial.” The court reasoned that unless specifically asked, a person may naturally omit facts from a narrative description. Victory failed to meet this requirement.

  • People v. Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371 (1973): Defining an Accomplice and the Need for Corroboration

    People v. Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371 (1973)

    A witness is considered an accomplice as a matter of law if their undisputed actions demonstrate participation in the preparation or execution of a crime, with the intent to assist in its commission, requiring their testimony to be corroborated for a conviction.

    Summary

    Beaudet was convicted of felony murder for his role in a bank robbery. The key issue on appeal was whether a prosecution witness, Berube, should have been deemed an accomplice as a matter of law, which would necessitate corroboration of his testimony. The Court of Appeals held that Berube was indeed an accomplice because his actions, including stealing the getaway car and handling weapons, demonstrated his intent to facilitate the crime. Failure to instruct the jury that Berube was an accomplice was reversible error, requiring a new trial.

    Facts

    Beaudet, along with Pilón, Dupuis, Couture, and Berube, planned to rob a bank in the U.S. Berube stole a car for $100, hid it, and later installed stolen license plates with Beaudet. Berube also transported sawed-off carbines and tested a pistol with Beaudet, knowing the plan involved firearms to overcome resistance. Although Berube declined to participate directly in the robbery, he expected a “gift” for his assistance. After the robbery, Beaudet was found with American currency, some of which matched serial numbers from the stolen bank funds.

    Procedural History

    Beaudet was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Beaudet appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that Berube was an accomplice as a matter of law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the prosecution witness, Berube, was an accomplice as a matter of law, requiring corroboration of his testimony for the defendant’s conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because Berube’s undisputed actions in preparing for the armed robbery—stealing a car, providing a place to store it, changing the license plates, handling weapons, and expecting payment—demonstrated his intent to facilitate the commission of the crime, thereby making him an accomplice as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under the former Code of Criminal Procedure, a conviction cannot be based solely on an accomplice’s testimony without corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime. An accomplice is someone so connected to the crime that they could have been convicted as a principal or accessory before the fact, meaning they participated in the crime’s preparation or execution with intent to assist. The court stated, “To be an accomplice the witness must have taken part in the preparation or perpetration of the crime, with intent to assist in the crime.” Even if Berube did not participate in the actual robbery, his actions facilitated the crime, demonstrating his intent to aid in its commission. The court distinguished this case from others where the witness’s involvement was less direct or their intent less clear. The court emphasized that Berube’s conduct was “not attenuated,” and his knowing participation in preparation was a “substantial factor” in effecting the ultimate crime. Since the evidence established Berube as an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial court’s failure to so instruct the jury was prejudicial error, requiring a new trial. The court noted that accomplices are inherently motivated to shift blame to others, making corroboration essential.

  • People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157 (1973): Burglary Predicate for Felony Murder

    People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157 (1973)

    A burglary based on the intent to commit assault can serve as the predicate felony for a felony-murder conviction, particularly when the assault occurs within a dwelling.

    Summary

    The case concerns whether a burglary predicated on the intent to commit assault can support a felony-murder conviction. Miller unlawfully entered an apartment, armed with a knife and spray can, and attacked one of the occupants, subsequently killing another who came to the victim’s aid. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the burglary, based on the intent to assault, satisfied the requirements for felony murder. The court reasoned that the heightened risk of homicide within a dwelling during the commission of a felony justifies including such burglaries as a predicate for felony murder.

    Facts

    On October 25, 1970, Miller went to the apartment below his, armed with a butcher knife and a spray can. When Robert Pennell opened the door, Miller sprayed Pennell’s face and stabbed him in the arm. Miller followed Pennell into the apartment, continuing the attack. Rasul Aleem, Pennell’s roommate, attempted to help Pennell. Miller then stabbed Aleem in the chest, killing him.

    Procedural History

    Miller was indicted for felony murder and common-law murder of Aleem, and attempted murder of Pennell. He was convicted of felony murder for Aleem’s death, manslaughter in the second degree under the common-law murder count, and assault in the first degree for the attempted murder of Pennell. The trial judge set aside the felony-murder conviction, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the underlying felony of burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The People then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a burglary, predicated upon the intent to commit an assault, can serve as the underlying felony for a felony-murder conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Legislature recognized that individuals within their homes are at greater risk when someone enters with criminal intent, and the felony-murder statute aims to reduce accidental homicides during the commission of enumerated felonies; thus, burglary based on intent to assault falls within the statute’s purview.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the felony-murder statute includes burglary as a predicate felony. Burglary requires knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein. The evidence supported the finding that Miller unlawfully entered Pennell’s apartment with the intent to assault him, thus satisfying the elements of burglary. The court rejected extending the merger doctrine, which prevents an assault from serving as the predicate felony for felony murder when the assault is integral to the homicide. The Court emphasized that the revised Penal Law specifically lists felonies involving violence or substantial risk of physical injury as predicates for felony murder. The legislative intent was to exclude accidental fatalities during non-violent felonies, not to exclude burglaries involving the intent to commit violent crimes such as assault. The court stated, “Where, as here, the criminal act underlying the burglary is an assault with a dangerous weapon, the likelihood that the assault will culminate in a homicide is significantly increased by the situs of the assault.” The court further reasoned that victims within their homes are more likely to resist and less likely to escape, increasing the risk of homicide. Quoting the Practice Commentary, the court noted that the definition of burglary is satisfied “if the intruder’s intent, existing at the time of the unlawful entry or remaining, is to commit any crime.” The court explicitly rejected the reasoning of People v. Wilson, a California case reaching a contrary conclusion.

  • People v. Hicks, 287 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 1972): Establishing Intent for Felony Murder

    People v. Hicks, 287 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 1972)

    For a conviction of felony murder to stand, the intent to commit the underlying felony must precede or be concurrent with the killing; the felony cannot be merely an afterthought.

    Summary

    The case of People v. Hicks concerns the critical element of intent in a felony murder charge. Hicks was convicted of felony murder for killing Albert Hicks during a robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the jury instructions allowed for a conviction even if the intent to rob arose after the killing. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, adequately conveyed that the intent to commit the robbery must have existed before or during the killing for a felony murder conviction to be valid. The court emphasized that the act of robbery must be connected to the act of killing to constitute felony murder.

    Facts

    The defendant, Hicks, while in the company of friends, stated he needed money and might have to kill someone to get it. Shortly after, Hicks encountered Albert Hicks. The two entered a building together. Upon exiting, Hicks attacked Albert Hicks, stabbing him fatally. Hicks then took change from the victim’s pocket. Police found the victim’s body with a pocket turned inside out.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Hicks of felony murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict even if the intent to rob arose after the killing. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be convicted of felony murder where the intent to commit the underlying felony (robbery) arose after the killing.

    Holding

    No, because a person can only be convicted of felony murder if the killing occurs during the attempted execution of the underlying felony, and the intent to commit that felony must exist before or during the killing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the original conviction. The court emphasized that the trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury that the injury resulting in death must have been inflicted “during the commission of a robbery, or an attempted robbery, and while the killer was engaged in committing such act.” The court highlighted the importance of the connection between the act of killing and the intent to commit the robbery, stating, “To constitute felony murder the injury which resulted in death must have been inflicted during the commission of a robbery, or an attempted robbery, and while the killer was engaged in committing such act.” The court acknowledged the Appellate Division’s concern regarding the trial judge’s response to a jury question about whether robbery could be committed on a dead person. However, the court concluded that the judge’s overall instructions made it clear that the killing had to be perpetrated “for the purpose” or “in the course” of a robbery. In essence, the jury had to find that Hicks intended to rob Albert Hicks at the time he stabbed and killed him to convict him of felony murder. The court found the instructions as a whole were sufficient to inform the jury of this requirement. The court thus reinforced the principle that the intent to commit the underlying felony must precede or be concurrent with the killing for a felony murder conviction to stand.

  • People v. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550 (1969): Admissibility of Interlocking Confessions in Joint Trials

    People v. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550 (1969)

    The rule in Bruton v. United States, which prohibits the admission of a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant in a joint trial, does not apply where the defendant has also made a full and voluntary confession that is substantially similar to the co-defendant’s confession.

    Summary

    Defendants McNeil and others were convicted of felony murder. Each defendant had voluntarily made detailed confessions implicating themselves and the others. At trial, these confessions were admitted with limiting instructions that each confession was only to be considered against the declarant. The defendants argued on appeal that admitting the confessions violated their rights under Bruton v. United States. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that Bruton is inapplicable when each defendant has made a full and voluntary confession that is almost identical to the confessions of their co-defendants. The court reasoned that the devastating risk of relying on a co-defendant’s confession is absent when the jury has also heard the defendant’s own confession.

    Facts

    Defendants McNeil, along with other co-defendants, were indicted and tried for the murder of a New York City Police Detective Donald Rolker.
    Following their apprehension, each defendant voluntarily provided detailed confessions implicating themselves and each other in the murder.
    The confessions were substantially similar in their accounts of the crime.

    Procedural History

    At trial, the defendants’ confessions were admitted into evidence. The trial court gave limiting instructions to the jury, stating that each confession should only be considered against the defendant who made it.
    The jury convicted McNeil and the other defendants of felony murder but could not reach a verdict for one co-defendant.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments of conviction.
    The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of a judge of that court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the rule in Bruton v. United States, which prohibits the admission of a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant in a joint trial, applies when each defendant has made a full and voluntary confession that is substantially similar to the confessions of their co-defendants.

    Holding

    No, because the rationale of Bruton is inapplicable when each defendant has made a full and voluntary confession that is almost identical to the confessions of their co-defendants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished the case from Bruton v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that admitting a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant at a joint trial violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment, even with limiting instructions.
    The Court of Appeals relied on the reasoning in United States ex rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi, which held that the Bruton rule does not apply when the defendant himself has confessed and his confession interlocks with and supports the confession of the co-defendant. The court quoted Catanzaro: “Where the jury has heard not only a codefendant’s confession but the defendant’s own confession no such ‘devastating’ risk attends the lack of confrontation as was thought to be involved in Bruton.”
    The court reasoned that the limiting instructions were sufficient to protect the defendants’ rights in this case because each defendant had already confessed to the crime. The risk that the jury would improperly rely on a co-defendant’s confession was minimized because the jury also had before it each defendant’s own confession, which was substantially similar.
    The court found the defendants’ other contentions to be without merit and affirmed the judgments of conviction.