New York Law Review

Tag: felony murder

  • People v. Matos, 83 N.Y.2d 509 (1994): Establishing Causation in Felony Murder

    People v. Matos, 83 N.Y.2d 509 (1994)

    A defendant is culpable for felony murder when their actions set in motion a chain of events that directly and foreseeably leads to another’s death, even if the defendant’s actions are not the sole or final cause of death.

    Summary

    Eddie Matos was convicted of felony murder after a police officer died while pursuing him on a roof following a burglary. Matos and accomplices broke into a McDonald’s, and a responding officer, Dwyer, fell to his death down an airshaft while in pursuit of Matos on the roof. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Matos’s actions initiated a foreseeable chain of events leading to Dwyer’s death. The court emphasized that the defendant’s conduct must be a sufficiently direct cause of the death and that the ultimate harm should have been reasonably foreseen, even if it wasn’t the most likely outcome.

    Facts

    In October 1989, Eddie Matos and two accomplices broke into a McDonald’s restaurant in Manhattan using a sledgehammer. They rounded up employees at gunpoint. A maintenance worker escaped and returned with three police officers. The officers saw Matos running towards the back of the restaurant and climbing a ladder to the roof. Officer Dwyer pursued Matos up the ladder. Shortly after, another officer found Dwyer lying dead at the bottom of an airshaft on the roof.

    Procedural History

    Matos was convicted in the trial court of second-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and attempted robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a fleeing felon’s actions are a sufficiently direct cause of another’s death when a police officer pursuing the felon dies during the pursuit, for the purposes of Penal Law § 125.25 (3), the felony murder statute.

    Holding

    Yes, because Matos’s actions set in motion a foreseeable chain of events that led to the officer’s death. His commission of a violent felony and subsequent attempt to escape directly caused the officer to pursue him onto the roof, where the officer fell to his death.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that for criminal responsibility to attach, a defendant’s actions must be an actual contributory cause of death. The defendant’s acts need not be the sole cause of death, but they must set in motion the events that ultimately result in the victim’s death. The court emphasized that the defendant’s conduct must be a “sufficiently direct cause” of the death, meaning the ultimate harm should have been reasonably foreseen.

    The court distinguished the case from situations where the causal link is too attenuated. Instead, the court relied on precedents like People v. Kibbe, where abandoning a victim on the side of the road led to a foreseeable fatal accident, and People v. Hernandez, where a shootout initiated by the defendant led to an officer’s death, even though the fatal shot was fired by another officer.

    The court stated, “[i]mmediate flight and attempts to thwart apprehension are patently within the furtherance of the cofelons’ criminal objective.” Foreseeability does not require the result to be the most likely event, only a reasonably possible one.

    The court concluded that it was foreseeable that an officer would pursue Matos onto the roof during his escape. Given those circumstances, it was also foreseeable that someone might fall during the pursuit across urban roofs at night.

  • People v. Smith, 79 N.Y.2d 434 (1992): Immediate Flight Rule in Felony Murder

    People v. Smith, 79 N.Y.2d 434 (1992)

    A homicide occurring during a high-speed chase 15-20 minutes and 1 1/2 to 2 miles away from an attempted robbery can constitute “immediate flight” for felony murder purposes, and the determination of whether the defendant reached a place of temporary safety is a factual question for the jury.

    Summary

    Smith was convicted of felony murder after a high-speed chase following an attempted robbery resulted in a fatal car crash. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the homicide occurred during the “immediate flight” from the attempted robbery and whether the trial court adequately ensured the defendant understood the risks of proceeding *pro se*. The Court held that the immediate flight issue was properly submitted to the jury but reversed the conviction due to the trial court’s inadequate inquiry regarding the defendant’s decision to represent himself during a suppression hearing.

    Facts

    Smith and accomplices attempted to rob a warehouse. An employee alerted the police, and the perpetrators fled in a van. Approximately 15 minutes later and 1 1/2 to 2 miles from the warehouse, police spotted the van based on a radio description. A high-speed chase ensued, culminating in a collision that killed a passenger in another vehicle. Smith was immediately apprehended.

    Procedural History

    Smith was indicted and a suppression hearing commenced. He expressed dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorney, which the court initially denied replacement. Later, Smith requested to represent himself during the hearing. The court allowed this without adequate inquiry. After trial with new counsel, Smith was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed, deeming the *pro se* error harmless. The Court of Appeals granted leave and reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for felony murder, specifically whether the homicide occurred during the immediate flight from the attempted robbery.

    2. Whether the suppression hearing court conducted a sufficiently searching inquiry to ensure that the defendant understood the risks of proceeding *pro se*.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because given the proximity in time and distance between the robbery and the homicide, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was still in the course of “immediate flight.”

    2. No, because the hearing court failed to make the required searching inquiry of the defendant to ensure that he was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the felony murder conviction, the Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 125.25(3) and *People v. Gladman*, 41 NY2d 123. The Court reiterated that whether a homicide occurred in “immediate flight” is generally a factual question for the jury, unless the record compels the inference that the actor was not in immediate flight. Relevant factors include the distance between the felony and the homicide, the time interval, possession of the fruits of the crime, police pursuit, and whether the criminals reached a place of temporary safety. The Court found the jury could reasonably conclude the defendant was still fleeing, given the short distance and time frame, and the active police pursuit. “Given the circumstances and particularly the proximity in time and distance between the robbery and the homicide, we cannot say that the brief interruption in the flight from the crime scene and the van’s direction toward the scene when first observed by police were sufficient, as a matter of law, to preclude a conclusion that when the homicide occurred defendant and his accomplice were still in the course of ‘immediate flight’.”

    Regarding the *pro se* issue, the Court cited *People v. McIntyre*, 36 NY2d 10, and *Faretta v. California*, 422 US 806, emphasizing that a waiver of the right to counsel must be unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligent. The court must conduct a sufficiently searching inquiry to ensure the defendant understands the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. “the ‘court should undertake a sufficiently ‘searching inquiry’ of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the ‘dangers and disadvantages’ of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant”. Here, the court failed to make *any* inquiry, rendering the waiver ineffective. The Court also rejected the argument that the new counsel’s failure to seek reopening of the suppression hearing constituted abandonment of the claim or that the error was harmless, as the defendant was forced to proceed *pro se* at a critical stage of the hearing without understanding the implications.

  • People v. Stevens, 76 N.Y.2d 833 (1990): Admissibility of Victim Photographs at Trial

    People v. Stevens, 76 N.Y.2d 833 (1990)

    Photographs of a crime victim are admissible if they are relevant to a material fact in issue, such as demonstrating the intent of the assailant, but the decision to admit such evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.

    Summary

    Stevens was convicted of felony murder and manslaughter. The Appellate Division dismissed the manslaughter charge but upheld the felony murder conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting photographs of the deceased taken at the crime scene and during the autopsy to demonstrate the intent of the assailant, a key element of the manslaughter charge. While the court found the admission of a portrait of the victim taken before death to be erroneous because it was not relevant to any issue at trial, it deemed the error harmless in light of the other evidence presented.

    Facts

    The defendant, Stevens, was convicted of felony murder and manslaughter after a jury trial. The case involved a robbery in which Stevens allegedly participated, during which his brother killed the victim. The prosecution introduced photographs of the victim taken before death (a portrait), at the scene of the crime, and during the autopsy. The defendant objected to the admission of these photographs.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Stevens of felony murder and manslaughter. The Appellate Division dismissed the manslaughter count but affirmed the felony murder conviction. The defendant appealed the affirmation of the felony murder conviction to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that the admission of the photographs was prejudicial error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented was legally sufficient to sustain the felony murder conviction.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victim, including a portrait taken before death, and whether any error was harmless.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because on the record the jury could find that the defendant actively participated in a robbery during which his brother killed the victim and that he was therefore guilty of felony murder.

    2. No, with respect to the photographs taken at the scene and autopsy, because they tended to prove that the assailant acted with intent to inflict serious injury, an element of the manslaughter count. Yes, with respect to the portrait, because the victim’s appearance prior to the assault was not relevant to any issue at the trial; however, this error was harmless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the evidence legally sufficient to sustain the felony murder conviction, as the jury could reasonably conclude that Stevens participated in the robbery during which the victim was killed.

    Regarding the photographs, the court reiterated the principle from People v. Pobliner, stating that photographs of a victim’s corpse should not be admitted unless they tend to prove or disprove some material fact in issue. When relevance is demonstrated, the decision to admit such photos is within the trial court’s discretion. The court found that the photos of the victim’s body showed the nature of the injury and tended to prove that the assailant acted with intent to inflict serious injury, an essential element of the manslaughter count. The court stated, “The People were not bound to rely entirely on the testimony of the medical expert to prove this point and the photographs were admissible to elucidate and corroborate that testimony.”

    The court noted that the same principles apply to portraits of the victim taken before death, citing People v. Winchell. These portraits may arouse the jury’s emotions and should not be admitted unless relevant to a material fact to be proved at trial. Here, the court found that the portrait of the victim was improperly admitted because the victim’s appearance prior to the assault was not relevant to any issue at trial. The Court stated that the trial court’s admission of the portrait was “clearly erroneous.”

    However, the court concluded that the error was harmless because, considering all the other properly admitted evidence, the admission of the portrait was not so prejudicial as to require a new trial. The court emphasized that the relevance of such photographs must be independently established, and the relevance of post-mortem photos does not automatically make pre-mortem photos admissible.

  • People v. Close, 73 N.Y.2d 779 (1988): Sufficiency of Evidence for Felony Murder Conviction

    People v. Close, 73 N.Y.2d 779 (1988)

    Sufficient evidence to support a robbery conviction, and thus a felony murder conviction, exists where the jury can reasonably disbelieve the defendant’s claim of being an innocent bystander based on circumstantial evidence suggesting participation in the underlying felony.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for two counts of felony murder and one count of robbery. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to prove he was an accessory to the robbery that led to the victims’ deaths. The Court of Appeals held that the jury was entitled to disbelieve the defendant’s claim of being merely present during the robbery, given evidence that he anticipated earning money that night and displayed a large sum of money after the murders, and testimony from a friend that Close admitted to striking one of the victims. Because there was sufficient evidence to support the underlying felony of robbery, the felony murder convictions were also upheld. The court also found that consecutive sentences were permissible because the deaths resulted from separate acts.

    Facts

    Warren and Mary Lynch were found bludgeoned to death in their store and residence on January 26, 1983. The next day, the defendant, Close, gave a statement recounting the events, claiming that he and Ronald Dingman went to the store to find marihuana, and that Dingman said he was going to “hit” the store. Close claimed Dingman struck Warren Lynch with a lead pipe, and then struck Mary Lynch after Close “froze” when asked to do so. Close said Dingman took money from the register and offered Close half, which Close refused. A co-worker testified that Close said he might earn extra money towing cars that night. The day after the murders, Close told the same co-worker that he had a “rough night working” and displayed a wad of money. Another friend testified Close told him that he and Dingman entered the store, Close pretended to buy an axe handle, then struck the old woman with it. Dingman then pushed Close aside and “finished off the old lady.”

    Procedural History

    Close was acquitted of intentional murder but convicted of two counts of felony murder and one count of robbery in the trial court. He received consecutive sentences of 18 years to life for the felony murder convictions. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the convictions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Close was an accessory to the robbery of the store, thereby supporting the felony murder convictions.

    2. Whether the imposition of consecutive sentences for the two felony murder convictions was illegal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to disbelieve Close’s claim of being an innocent bystander and to conclude he was a participant in the robbery.

    2. No, because the deaths of Warren and Mary Lynch resulted from separate acts, neither of which was a material element of the other.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the jury had a basis to disbelieve Close’s statement to the police that he was merely an innocent bystander. The court pointed to the co-worker’s testimony that Close anticipated earning money that night and displayed a large sum of money afterward, consistent with receiving proceeds from the robbery. The court also emphasized the friend’s testimony that Close admitted he feigned purchasing an axe handle and struck the old woman with it, which provided evidentiary support for finding Close participated in the robbery. Because there was sufficient evidence to support Close’s guilt of robbery in the first degree, and because the deaths occurred during that crime, the felony murder convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. The court noted that Close did not establish an affirmative defense to felony murder.

    Regarding the sentences, the court reasoned that although the deaths occurred during a single transaction (the robbery), they resulted from separate acts. Neither act was a material element of the other. Therefore, consecutive sentences were permissible under Penal Law § 70.25(2). The court acknowledged that the lower courts had the discretion to impose concurrent sentences, but they were not required to do so. “it was separate acts that caused the deaths of the two victims, and neither act was a material element of the other”.

  • People v. Ingram, 67 N.Y.2d 897 (1986): Establishing Causation in Felony Murder Cases

    People v. Ingram, 67 N.Y.2d 897 (1986)

    In a felony murder case, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions during the commission of the felony directly caused the victim’s death, but the exact manner of death need not be foreseeable.

    Summary

    Ingram was convicted of felony murder and burglary after Melvin Cooper died of a heart attack shortly after Ingram burglarized his home. Cooper, who had a history of heart trouble, collapsed after confronting Ingram, who had broken into his residence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove that Ingram’s actions during the burglary caused Cooper’s death. The court also noted that the defense failed to preserve objections regarding the foreseeability of the manner of death and the severity of the sentence.

    Facts

    Ingram and his companions surveyed Melvin Cooper’s house before breaking in to determine if anyone was home. Their activities awakened Cooper, who confronted Ingram inside the house with a gun. Cooper ordered Ingram to lie down and then called the police. After the police arrested Ingram, Cooper collapsed and died shortly afterward at the hospital. Cooper had a pre-existing heart condition. The prosecution argued that the stress of the burglary caused Cooper to suffer a fatal myocardial infarction.

    Procedural History

    Ingram was convicted of felony murder and burglary in the trial court. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove causation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Ingram then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People presented sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant caused the victim’s death during the course of a burglary.
    2. Whether the defendant may be guilty of felony murder only if the fact of death and the manner in which it occurred was a foreseeable consequence of the burglary.
    3. Whether the defendant’s sentence constituted cruel and inhuman punishment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the People presented sufficient medical evidence linking the stress of the burglary to the victim’s myocardial infarction.
    2. This issue was not preserved for review because the defense failed to object to the jury charge or request additional instructions.
    3. This issue was not properly before the court because the defendant failed to challenge his sentence before the trial court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution’s medical expert provided sufficient evidence to link the burglary to Cooper’s death. The expert testified that Cooper’s myocardial infarction was precipitated by the stress of finding a burglar in his home. The court stated that the expert’s testimony was not “so baseless or riddled with contradiction that it was unworthy of belief as a matter of law” (citing People v Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 281; People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 699). The court found it insignificant that there was a lack of postmortem clinical signs of an infarction. The expert clarified that such signs do not appear unless death occurs at least 12 hours after the incident.

    Regarding foreseeability, the Court found that the defendant’s argument wasn’t preserved, because his counsel didn’t challenge the given charge or request supplementary directions. Similarly, his claim that the sentence was cruel and inhumane wasn’t reviewed as it wasn’t raised initially in the trial court.

  • People v. Townsend, 67 N.Y.2d 815 (1986): Premature Jury Instructions on Elements of Crime

    People v. Townsend, 67 N.Y.2d 815 (1986)

    Distributing a written outline of the elements of charged offenses to jurors at the beginning of trial, before the presentation of all evidence and final jury instructions, constitutes reversible error because it invites premature analysis of the evidence.

    Summary

    Townsend was convicted of felony murder. Prior to trial, the court gave jurors written instructions outlining the elements of the charged offenses, encouraging them to refer to the instructions during the trial. The defense argued the defendant’s statements were involuntary and challenged witness credibility. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that providing jurors with a written outline of the elements of the charges at the beginning of trial invited piecemeal, premature analysis of the evidence, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair trial. The court reasoned that the jury might conclude the defendant was guilty before the defense had a chance to present its arguments and evidence, particularly concerning voluntariness and credibility, which were not included in the preliminary instructions.

    Facts

    Townsend and a co-defendant were convicted of felony murder for shooting a limousine driver during a robbery.

    Much of the prosecution’s case rested on statements made by Townsend and his co-defendant admitting their participation in the robbery and the shooting.

    The defense argued that these statements were made involuntarily and attacked the credibility of witnesses who claimed to have heard them.

    The trial court gave preliminary instructions that gave the jury an overview of trial procedure and their duties.

    The court read the elements of the crimes charged, including second-degree murder, felony murder, and first-degree robbery. The court also described the elements of the affirmative defense to the felony murder charge at the defendant’s request.

    The court gave each juror written instructions outlining the elements of the charged offenses and the affirmative defense, explaining the written instructions were only an aid to help the jury place the testimony in context.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of felony murder at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by distributing a written outline of the elements of the charged offenses to the jury at the beginning of the trial, prior to the presentation of all evidence and final jury instructions?

    Holding

    No, because by providing the written outline, the court invited piecemeal, premature analysis of the evidence, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the laudable objective of enhancing jury understanding and the desirability of preliminary general instructions, as outlined in CPL 270.40.

    However, the court held that distributing a written outline of the elements of the charges in this case was an error because it invited a premature evaluation of the evidence, which should only occur after the summations and final charge.

    The court reasoned that the outline served as a checklist against which jurors could measure the evidence as it came in, creating a danger that jurors would conclude the defendant was guilty even before he could present his evidence or argument.

    This danger was heightened because the issues of voluntariness and credibility, central to the defense, were not part of the outline.

    The court concluded that this error deprived the defendant of a fair trial and, therefore, could not be considered harmless error, citing People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 238.

    The court emphasized the importance of the timing of instructions: “An evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence presented should be made only when the jurors retire to deliberate, after summation by counsel and charge by the court.”

  • People v. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d 61 (1985): Interlocking Confessions Exception to Bruton Rule

    People v. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d 61 (1985)

    The interlocking confession exception to the Bruton rule allows the admission of a codefendant’s confession at a joint trial, even if the codefendant does not testify, provided the defendant’s own confession is substantially similar and covers the major elements of the crime.

    Summary

    Eulogio Cruz and Belton Brims were convicted of murder in separate cases but tried jointly with codefendants. They appealed, arguing that the admission of their codefendants’ confessions violated their rights under Bruton v. United States. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the confessions were “interlocking” because they were substantially similar and covered all the major elements of the crimes. The court reasoned that because the defendants had already confessed, the codefendants’ statements did not have a “devastating effect” and the interlocking confession exception to the Bruton rule applied.

    Facts

    In People v. Cruz, Eulogio Cruz and his brother, Benjamin, were charged with felony murder. Eulogio confessed to Norberto, a friend, that he and Benjamin intended to rob a gas station. During a struggle, the attendant shot Eulogio, and Benjamin then shot the attendant. Benjamin later gave a video-taped confession to the police. Norberto testified at trial about Eulogio’s confession.

    In People v. Brims, Belton Brims was convicted of murder and other charges related to a burglary and homicide. Brims confessed to his cousin, Willie Brims, and to a fellow inmate, John Riegel, about planning the robbery with the victim’s daughter and killing the victims. The daughter, Sheryl Sohn, also confessed to police about helping Brims and Sheffield enter her parents’ home. Willie Brims and John Riegel testified at trial about Brims’s confessions to them. Sheryl Sohn’s confession was also admitted into evidence.

    Procedural History

    Both Cruz and Brims moved for severance, arguing that the admission of their codefendants’ confessions violated their rights under Bruton. The trial courts denied the motions. Cruz and Brims were convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession violates a defendant’s right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States when the defendant has also confessed to the crime?
    2. Whether the interlocking confession exception to the Bruton rule applies when the confessions differ in reliability?

    Holding

    1. No, because the interlocking confession exception to the Bruton rule applies when the defendant’s own confession is substantially similar to the codefendant’s and covers the major elements of the crime. Appropriate limiting instructions are sufficient to protect the defendant’s rights in such cases.
    2. Yes, because the interlocking confession exception applies even when the confessions differ in reliability, as long as they are substantially similar regarding the material facts of the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the confessions in both cases “interlocked” because they were substantially similar and covered all the major elements of the crimes. The court explained that the Bruton rule prohibits the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession because of the substantial risk that the jury will consider it against the defendant, despite limiting instructions. However, this risk is minimized when the defendant has also confessed, because the codefendant’s statement is no more inculpating than the defendant’s own. The court emphasized that the confessions need not be identical, but must be “essentially the same” as to motive, plot, and execution of the crimes.

    The court rejected the argument that the interlocking confession exception does not apply when the confessions differ in reliability. It noted that prior decisions have tolerated differences in scope and reliability, such as one confession being oral and the other written, or one being made to police officers and the other to lay witnesses. The court stated that credibility is a question for the jury once admissibility is determined by the court.

    Regarding the defendants’ fair trial claims, the court held that a defendant’s right to a fair trial is not impaired when there is substantial independent evidence of guilt or when the defendant has made substantially identical inculpatory admissions. The court concluded that the trial courts properly denied severance because there was no substantial risk that the jury would use the codefendants’ statements to fill gaps in the evidence against the defendants. The court emphasized that the primary concern is whether the joint trial prevented the defendant from presenting exculpatory evidence or resulted in substantial prejudice by filling gaps in the evidence against him.

  • People v. Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839 (1984): Depraved Indifference Murder and Accessorial Liability

    People v. Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839 (1984)

    A defendant can be convicted of depraved indifference murder as an accomplice under Penal Law § 20.00, even if they did not fire the fatal shot, provided they acted with the required mental culpability and in concert with the shooter.

    Summary

    Brathwaite was convicted of depraved indifference murder and felony murder for his role in a grocery store robbery where three people, including one of his accomplices, died in a shootout. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating Brathwaite’s conviction for depraved indifference murder and consecutive sentences for felony murder. The court held that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Brathwaite acted with depraved indifference, even though it wasn’t proven he fired the fatal shot, and that the felony murder sentences could run consecutively because they resulted from separate acts.

    Facts

    Brathwaite and three others robbed a grocery store. Brathwaite held a gun to a clerk’s head while another accomplice held a gun to a second clerk. Two other men pointed guns at the owner and a third clerk. As Brathwaite took money from the register, the owner yelled, “Call the police.” A shootout ensued, with Brathwaite firing shots toward the owner and a clerk. The owner, a clerk, and one of Brathwaite’s accomplices (Gray) died from gunshot wounds. Brathwaite claimed he was at a bar with his girlfriend during the incident.

    Procedural History

    Brathwaite was convicted in the trial court of depraved indifference murder and two counts of felony murder. He received consecutive sentences for the felony murder convictions and a concurrent sentence for the depraved indifference murder conviction. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the conviction for depraved indifference murder and ordering the felony murder sentences to run concurrently. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the original convictions and sentences, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant can be convicted of depraved indifference murder when a co-perpetrator is killed during the commission of an armed robbery, even if the defendant did not fire the fatal shot.

    2. Whether, under Penal Law § 70.25, sentences for two felony murder convictions must run concurrently when the deaths occurred during a single transaction but resulted from separate acts.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because if the evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to find that a defendant acted “with the mental culpability” required for depraved indifference murder, he may be found guilty of such a charge under Penal Law § 20.00, even if he didn’t fire the fatal shot.

    2. No, because although the deaths occurred during a single transaction (the robbery), they resulted from separate “acts,” and neither death was a material element of the other.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a defendant can be held liable for depraved indifference murder as an accomplice if they acted with the required mental culpability, regardless of whether they fired the fatal shot. The court found sufficient evidence of Brathwaite’s prior planning and active participation in the “furious and wanton shoot-out” to support the jury’s finding of guilt. The jury instructions stated that the People had to prove that either Brathwaite or his accomplice knew of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death and consciously disregarded that risk, showing a great deviation from reasonable conduct. The circumstances surrounding the defendant’s conduct had to “evince a depraved indifference to human life” and be “so wanton, so deficient in moral sense and concern, so devoid of regard for the life or the lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal responsibility… as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes the death of another.” Because the defense did not object to this charge, the conviction was proper.

    Regarding the felony murder sentences, the Court held that Penal Law § 70.25(2) did not require concurrent sentences because the deaths of the owner and the clerk resulted from separate acts. The Court emphasized that the deaths were not caused by the same shot and that neither death was a material element of the other.

  • People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 1036 (1979): Consecutive Sentencing After Guilty Plea to Manslaughter

    People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 1036 (1979)

    A defendant who pleads guilty to a lesser charge to avoid a greater charge cannot later challenge the sentence by arguing as if he had been convicted of the greater charge.

    Summary

    Defendant Jackson was indicted for felony murder. After a hung jury in the first trial, he pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter. He was sentenced to consecutive terms for burglary and manslaughter. He then appealed, arguing that the sentences should run concurrently because the burglary was a material element of felony murder, and thus, under Penal Law § 70.25(2), the sentences must be concurrent. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, not felony murder, he could not claim the benefit of the concurrent sentencing rule that would apply to a felony murder conviction. He bargained for a lesser sentence and could not later argue that the sentence was illegal as if he had been convicted of the greater charge.

    Facts

    Defendant was indicted for felony murder. The first trial ended with a hung jury on the felony murder charge. Prior to a second trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree in satisfaction of the felony murder indictment. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms for his burglary conviction and the manslaughter plea.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed the sentence, arguing that consecutive sentences were illegal under Penal Law § 70.25(2). The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether consecutive sentences for burglary and manslaughter are illegal when the defendant pleads guilty to manslaughter in satisfaction of a felony murder indictment, where burglary would have been a material element of felony murder.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, not felony murder, he cannot claim the benefit of the concurrent sentencing rule applicable to felony murder. The Court reasoned that the plea bargain waived the right to argue the sentence as if he had been convicted of felony murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, thereby avoiding the risk of a felony murder conviction. The court reasoned that although the burglary would be a material element of felony murder, it is not a material element of manslaughter. Therefore, Penal Law § 70.25(2), which requires concurrent sentences when one act constitutes two offenses or is a material element of another, does not apply because the defendant was not convicted of felony murder.

    The court stated: “Defendant bargained for the benefits he thought would flow from pleading guilty to manslaughter, a crime which mandates a lesser sentence than felony murder. He cannot now seek to benefit from the statutory protection he arguably would have received pursuant to subdivision 2 of section 70.25 of the Penal Law if he had risked conviction or entered a plea on the felony murder charge.”

    Furthermore, the court cited People v. Clairborne, 29 N.Y.2d 950, 951, stating the bargained plea “makes unnecessary a factual basis for the particular crime.” The court also relied on People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150, 154, stating that even if a plea is theoretically inconsistent with the crime charged, “such a plea should be sustained on the ground that it was sought by defendant and freely taken as part of a bargain which was struck for the defendant’s benefit.”

    The court emphasized that a defendant cannot accept the benefits of a plea bargain (a lesser charge and sentence) and then attempt to invalidate the sentence by arguing as if he had been convicted of the greater charge he avoided.

  • People v. Smalls, 53 N.Y.2d 413 (1981): Admissibility of Interlocking Confessions and Harmless Error Analysis

    People v. Smalls, 53 N.Y.2d 413 (1981)

    The admission of a co-defendant’s confession that is not truly interlocking and implicates the defendant in the crime, coupled with an erroneous jury instruction on the presumption of intent, can constitute reversible error unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Summary

    Defendants Smalls and McGee were convicted of felony murder. McGee’s confession, admitted at their joint trial, implicated Smalls as a knowing participant in the robbery, while Smalls’ own statement merely placed him at the scene without admitting to any criminal intent. The trial court also erroneously charged the jury on the presumption of intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Smalls’ conviction, finding that the admission of McGee’s confession violated Smalls’ right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States, and the error in the intent charge was not harmless. McGee’s conviction was affirmed because the court found the error in the intent charge to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of his intent.

    Facts

    Smalls and McGee, along with Mary Jenkins and Phillip Green, were involved in an attempted robbery of Pedro Pratt’s apartment. During the robbery, Pratt was shot and later died. McGee made statements to the police implicating himself and Smalls in the crime. Smalls also made statements, but these statements primarily placed him at the scene without explicitly admitting to participating in the robbery or being aware of its planning. Smalls’ motion to sever his trial from McGee’s was denied.

    Procedural History

    Smalls and McGee were jointly tried and convicted of felony murder. The Appellate Division affirmed their convictions. Smalls appealed, arguing that the admission of McGee’s confession violated his right to confrontation, as established in Bruton v. United States, and that the jury charge on intent was erroneous. The Court of Appeals reversed Smalls’ conviction and affirmed McGee’s conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the admission of McGee’s confession at the joint trial violated Smalls’ right to confrontation, considering that McGee did not testify and Smalls’ own confession was not truly interlocking.

    2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because McGee’s confession implicated Smalls directly as a knowing participant in the robbery, while Smalls’ statement merely placed him at the scene. This discrepancy made the confessions not truly interlocking, violating Smalls’ right to confront witnesses against him.

    2. Yes, the charge was erroneous, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to McGee. As to Smalls, the Court did not determine if it was harmless, as his conviction was reversed on other grounds.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Bruton rule, which prohibits the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession that implicates the defendant, was violated because McGee’s confession directly implicated Smalls, while Smalls’ statement did not admit to the crime. The Court found that the statements were not truly “interlocking” because of the significant difference in their content regarding Smalls’ participation and intent. The Court stated, “the danger is great that the jury might have resolved these ambiguities by reference-to McGee’s statement and its indication that Smalls was informed of the details of the robbery.” This error was deemed not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence against Smalls was not overwhelming.

    Regarding the jury charge on intent, the Court acknowledged that such a charge was erroneous under Sandstrom v. Montana. However, the Court held that a harmless error analysis is proper where there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s intent. The Court found that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to McGee because there was overwhelming evidence of his intent to commit the robbery, citing McGee’s planning of the robbery with Jenkins and Green, and his own statements indicating his intent. The court noted, “a person is presumed to intend that which he actually does,” was an incorrect statement of law.