New York Law Review

Tag: felony murder

  • People v. Couser, 37 N.Y.3d 370 (2021): Consecutive Sentences for Robbery and Attempted Robbery; Concurrent Sentencing for Felony Murder

    People v. Couser, 37 N.Y.3d 370 (2021)

    Under New York law, consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery are only permissible if the acts constituting the crimes are separate and distinct; sentencing for felony murder must run concurrently with the underlying felony.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two consolidated appeals concerning sentencing for robbery and attempted robbery, and for attempted felony murder. In the first appeal, the court considered whether consecutive sentences were permissible where a defendant committed both a completed robbery and several attempted robberies. The court held that because the taking of the victim’s purse was not a separate and distinct act of force, the sentences for robbery and attempted robbery must run concurrently. In the second appeal, the court addressed whether the sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder could run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the underlying felonies. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that a concurrent sentence was required. The court rejected the People’s argument that the attempted felony murder sentence could run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the underlying felony.

    Facts

    In the first appeal, the defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree. During the commission of the crimes, the defendant displayed what appeared to be a firearm and demanded money from the victims. One victim, complying with the defendant’s demands, placed her purse on the ground, which the defendant then directed his accomplice to take. The People sought consecutive sentences for the robbery and the attempted robberies, arguing that the taking of the purse constituted a separate act. In the second appeal, the defendant was also convicted of attempted first-degree felony murder. The People did not specify which underlying felony supported this charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences for the robbery and attempted robberies. The Appellate Division modified the sentence, ruling that concurrent sentences were required. In the second appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s act of taking a victim’s purse authorized consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery.
    2. Whether the sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder should run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the taking of the purse was not a separate and distinct act, the sentences must run concurrently.
    2. Yes, a sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the court relied on the New York Penal Law § 70.25 (2) which states that sentences imposed for multiple offenses committed through a single act or omission must run concurrently. The court also discussed the two-part test established in People v. Laureano, 87 N.Y.2d 640 (1996), determining whether consecutive sentences are permissible. The court found that the statutory elements of attempted robbery and robbery overlapped, and there was no separate and distinct act of force to warrant consecutive sentences. The taking of the purse was part of the same act of displaying a firearm to commit the robbery, and thus not a separate act. The court cited the case People v. Ramirez, 89 N.Y.2d 444 (1996) to support its conclusion that the mere taking of property, even through separate movements, did not justify consecutive sentences in this scenario. Regarding the second issue, the court held that, as a matter of law, a sentence imposed for attempted first-degree felony murder must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony. The court cited previous case law and statutory interpretation to support this. As the People could have corrected their failure to specify the underlying felony, the defendant’s plea was deemed rational and valid. The court emphasized that “it is the acts of the defendant, and not the intent with which he or she acted, that control for consecutive sentencing purposes.”

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance for practitioners on when consecutive sentences are permissible in New York. It clarifies the requirements for separate and distinct acts in robbery and attempted robbery cases. Lawyers should be mindful that a single act of force or threat of force that accomplishes the taking of multiple items of property from different individuals, or multiple attempts to rob multiple individuals, does not permit consecutive sentences. This case also affirms the long-standing rule that sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony should run concurrently. It also underscores the importance of properly charging and specifying underlying felonies in indictments, particularly in the context of plea bargains. The failure to specify the underlying felony will result in concurrent sentences for the felony murder and underlying felony charges.

  • People v. Cabrera, 27 N.Y.3d 295 (2016): Causation in Felony Murder – Foreseeability and Preexisting Conditions

    <strong><em>People v. Cabrera</em>, 27 N.Y.3d 295 (2016)</em></strong>

    For felony murder, the prosecution must prove the defendant’s actions were a direct cause of death and that the fatal result was reasonably foreseeable, even if the victim had a preexisting condition that contributed to their death.

    <strong>Summary</strong>

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting a felony murder conviction. The defendant, along with accomplices, committed a home invasion robbery, during which the victim was assaulted and suffered injuries, including blunt force trauma. The victim, who had pre-existing hypertensive cardiovascular disease, died from stress related to the assault. The court found the defendant’s actions were a direct, foreseeable cause of death, even considering the victim’s health issues, and upheld the conviction. The court emphasized the distinction between the cause and the manner of death, stating the jury was not bound by the autopsy’s “undetermined” manner of death determination.

    <strong>Facts</strong>

    The defendant, along with two accomplices, planned a robbery at the victim’s apartment. The accomplices, after gaining entry and assessing the premises, let the defendant into the building. The defendant, wearing a disguise, then violently assaulted the victim during the robbery. The victim suffered injuries including lacerations, jaw fractures, and eye hemorrhaging. The victim was found dead in the apartment a few days later. An autopsy determined the cause of death was hypertensive cardiovascular disease, with the contributing factor of obesity, and the manner of death as undetermined. The medical examiner testified that the stress of the assault accelerated the victim’s death.

    <strong>Procedural History</strong>

    The defendant was convicted of felony murder in the second degree and other charges. The Appellate Division reversed the felony murder conviction, finding that the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s death was reasonably foreseeable. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    <strong>Issue(s)</strong>

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s felony murder conviction, specifically regarding causation and foreseeability?

    2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for burglary and robbery, given the accomplice testimony?

    <strong>Holding</strong>

    1. Yes, because the evidence established a direct causal link between the assault and the victim’s death and that the death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence.

    2. Yes, because the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence connecting the defendant to the crimes.

    <strong>Court’s Reasoning</strong>

    The court applied a two-pronged test to determine causation: (1) the defendant’s actions must be a direct contributory cause of the death; and (2) the fatal result must be reasonably foreseeable. The court emphasized that the defendant’s actions were a direct cause, even though the victim had a pre-existing condition that contributed to the death. “[S]o long as ‘the necessary causative link is established, other causes, such as a victim’s preexisting condition, will not relieve the defendant of responsibility for homicide’” The court found that the evidence of the violent assault and the medical examiner’s testimony regarding the stress-induced cardiac event were sufficient to establish both direct causation and foreseeability. The court distinguished the cause of death, which was a medical finding, from the manner of death, which the jury was free to determine based on all the evidence of the circumstances. The court also found sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony through video surveillance and phone records.

    <strong>Practical Implications</strong>

    This case clarifies the standards for causation and foreseeability in felony murder cases. Attorneys should be prepared to show that the defendant’s actions were a direct, contributory cause of death and that the type of harm was reasonably foreseeable. The case illustrates that a victim’s pre-existing health conditions do not absolve a defendant of responsibility, so long as the defendant’s actions accelerated or contributed to the victim’s death. Expert testimony about the cause of death and the impact of stress on the victim is crucial. The court’s emphasis on the distinction between the cause and manner of death and the jury’s role in assessing foreseeability is a key takeaway. This case also offers guidance on what constitutes sufficient corroboration of accomplice testimony.

  • People v. Frederick, 17 N.Y.3d 912 (2011): Reinstatement of Original Indictment After Superseding Indictment Dismissal

    People v. Frederick, 17 N.Y.3d 912 (2011)

    When a superseding indictment is deemed a nullity, the original indictment can be reinstated, and a sentence for a crime in the reinstated indictment can run consecutively to sentences from a prior, separate criminal act.

    Summary

    Trevor Frederick attacked his former girlfriend and her date. He was initially indicted on multiple charges related to both victims, but the jury deadlocked on felony murder. The prosecution obtained a superseding indictment charging felony murder and manslaughter, but the trial court dismissed it. The court then reinstated the original indictment’s felony murder charge. Frederick was convicted of felony murder and sentenced consecutively to his prior sentences. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the reinstatement was proper since the superseding indictment was a nullity and the consecutive sentence was justified due to the separate nature of the crimes.

    Facts

    Trevor Frederick, enraged that his former girlfriend went on a date with the victim, forced his way into her dorm room. He stabbed the girlfriend in the neck, causing paralysis. Frederick then made a statement suggesting he was moving towards the victim who was standing near a window. The victim was later found dead in the courtyard below, having suffered blunt impact trauma and multiple stab wounds, including one to the neck.

    Procedural History

    Frederick was initially indicted on multiple charges related to both the girlfriend and the victim. At the first trial, the depraved indifference murder count was dismissed, and a mistrial was declared after a juror was unable to continue deliberating. A second trial resulted in convictions on all counts except felony murder, on which the jury deadlocked, leading to a mistrial on that count. The People then obtained a superseding indictment charging Frederick with felony murder and first-degree manslaughter. The trial court dismissed the superseding indictment and reinstated the original indictment. Frederick was convicted of felony murder in a bench trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. He appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court had the authority to reinstate the original indictment’s felony murder charge after dismissing a superseding indictment.
    2. Whether the trial court could impose a sentence for felony murder that ran consecutively to sentences previously imposed for crimes against the girlfriend.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because if the superseding indictment is a nullity, any consequences flowing from it are also a nullity. The trial court possessed inherent authority to reinstate the original indictment in the absence of any constitutional or statutory double jeopardy bar.
    2. Yes, because the crimes against the girlfriend and the victim were separate and distinct acts in an extended criminal rampage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that since Frederick himself argued that the superseding indictment was a nullity, the dismissal of the original indictment, which was a consequence of the superseding indictment, was also a nullity. The court emphasized that the Criminal Procedure Law does not expressly preclude the reinstatement of an indictment in such circumstances. The court cited Matter of Lionel E., 76 NY2d 747, 749 (1990), indicating the trial court’s inherent authority to reinstate the original indictment. The court stated that “logically, if the superseding indictment is a nullity—as defendant himself argued and Supreme Court held to be the case—then any action or consequence that flowed from its filing—here, the dismissal of the original indictment—was necessarily a nullity as well.”

    Regarding the consecutive sentence, the court relied on People v. Ramirez, 89 NY2d 444, 451 (1996), which allows for consecutive sentences for separate and distinct acts. The court found that the attack on the girlfriend and the subsequent killing of the victim were separate acts, justifying the consecutive sentence. Distinguishing People v. Parks, 95 NY2d 811 (2000) and People v. Alford, 14 NY3d 846 (2010), the court emphasized that because this was a bench trial, the judge, as factfinder, knew the facts and could determine whether they supported a consecutive sentence without any uncertainty arising from a lack of specificity in a jury charge.

  • People v. Diaz, 11 N.Y.3d 212 (2008): “Double Counting” in Felony Murder Requires Separate Criminal Intent

    People v. Diaz, 11 N.Y.3d 212 (2008)

    In a felony murder case, the “double counting” prohibition articulated in People v. Cahill requires that the underlying felony involve a criminal intent distinct from the intent to kill required for the murder charge itself; the mere fact that a single factual element is common to both crimes does not violate this principle.

    Summary

    Diaz was convicted of first-degree murder for killing a victim during a kidnapping where the victim died. He argued that the indictment was insufficient because it improperly “double counted” the victim’s death, using it as an element of both the first-degree murder charge (killing in furtherance of kidnapping) and the first-degree kidnapping charge (abduction resulting in death). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prohibition against double counting, as established in People v. Cahill, applies only when the same criminal *intent* underlies both the murder and the predicate felony. Here, the intent to abduct was distinct from the intent to kill, satisfying the requirement for an aggravated murder charge.

    Facts

    Diaz abducted Patrick Bhola. During the abduction, Diaz intentionally killed Bhola by stabbing and beating him. Diaz was subsequently indicted for several crimes related to the abduction and death, including first-degree murder.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Diaz’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Diaz then pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and second-degree murder, waiving his right to appeal with an exception for the “double counting” argument. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment for first-degree murder is legally insufficient when it uses the victim’s death as an element of both the first-degree murder charge (killing in furtherance of kidnapping) and the underlying first-degree kidnapping charge (abduction resulting in death), thereby “double counting” the death in violation of People v. Cahill?

    Holding

    No, because the prohibition against double counting as articulated in People v. Cahill is not violated where the murder and the predicate felony arise from two distinct criminal intents. The intent to abduct is separate and distinct from the intent to kill. It is of no moment that a factual circumstance other than the defendant’s intent—in this case, the victim’s death—is an element of both the murder and the predicate felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Cahill, where the defendant’s intent to commit murder was the sole intent underlying both the murder charge and the predicate burglary charge. In Cahill, the court reasoned that the legislature, in defining first-degree murder, required murder plus an additional aggravating factor and that using the “very same mens rea – the intent to kill” to define both the murder and the aggravating factor failed to narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.

    The Court emphasized that Cahill concerned the double counting of a single criminal *intent*, not the mere presence of a common factual element. In this case, the intent to abduct the victim was separate and distinct from the intent to kill him. The Court stated, “Here, the murder defendant committed and the predicate crime that serves as an aggravation arise from two distinct intents—the intent to kill the victim and the intent to abduct him.” This distinct intent adequately aggravated the crime of murder to first-degree murder status.

    The Court also noted the illogical result that would follow if it accepted Diaz’s argument. The Court stated, “Indeed, that intention is an unlikely one to attribute to the Legislature—an intention to punish one of the most heinous of crimes, kidnapping accompanied by murder of the victim, less severely than many other murders.”

  • People v. Parks, 95 N.Y.2d 811 (2000): Concurrent Sentences Required When Predicate Felony for Felony Murder is Undefined

    People v. Parks, 95 N.Y.2d 811 (2000)

    When a defendant is convicted of felony murder, and the indictment and jury charge do not specify which underlying felony served as the predicate for the felony murder conviction, sentences for the felony murder and any potential predicate felonies must run concurrently.

    Summary

    Joseph Parks was convicted of felony murder and multiple counts of robbery. The indictment and jury charge failed to specify which robbery (of Iscoe or Colello) served as the predicate for the felony murder. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the robbery of Colello, arguing it was a separate act. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the predicate felony for the felony murder was not specified, it was impossible to determine if the robbery of Colello was a separate and distinct act, thus requiring concurrent sentences for all charges related to the incident. This ruling protects defendants from potentially excessive punishment when the basis for a felony murder conviction is ambiguous.

    Facts

    Joseph Parks entered a bagel shop, pulled out a gun, and announced a robbery. Three people were present: the manager (Colello), an employee (Johannes), and a customer (Iscoe). Parks ordered Iscoe to place his wallet on the counter and instructed Colello to empty the cash register into a bag. Colello complied, also placing Iscoe’s wallet in the bag at Parks’ direction, followed by his own wallet. Iscoe then attempted to subdue Parks, and Parks shot and killed him. Parks then fled, taking the bag with the stolen money and wallets.

    Procedural History

    Parks was indicted on multiple counts of murder and robbery. The jury convicted him of felony murder, four counts of first-degree robbery, and criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court sentenced Parks to consecutive sentences for the robbery convictions related to Colello. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, ordering all sentences to run concurrently, finding that the robbery and felony murder were part of the same act. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the robbery convictions related to Colello, where the indictment and jury charge failed to specify which robbery served as the predicate felony for the felony murder conviction.

    Holding

    No, because under Penal Law § 70.25(2), sentences must run concurrently when a single act constitutes two offenses or when a single act constitutes one offense and a material element of the other, and the People failed to prove the robbery of Colello was a separate and distinct act from the felony murder of Iscoe.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 70.25(2), which mandates concurrent sentences when offenses arise from a single act or when one act is a material element of another offense. The court emphasized that the defendant benefits if either prong of the statute is met, and the prosecution bears the burden of disproving both. The court stated that “[u]nder Penal Law § 70.25 (2), a sentence imposed ‘for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other * * * must run concurrently.’” The court found that the People failed to establish the robbery of Colello as a separate and distinct act from the felony murder because the indictment and jury instructions did not specify which robbery (Iscoe or Colello) served as the predicate for the felony murder charge. As the jury could have based the felony murder conviction on either robbery, the court could not determine if the Colello robbery was a separate act. This ambiguity required the sentences to run concurrently. The court referenced prior cases such as People v. Day, noting the prosecution’s burden to prove the offenses are based on separate and distinct acts to justify consecutive sentences. Because the People did not meet this burden, the Appellate Division’s modification to concurrent sentences was affirmed.

  • People v. Fullan, 92 N.Y.2d 690 (1998): Attempted First-Degree Kidnapping as a Cognizable Crime

    People v. Fullan, 92 N.Y.2d 690 (1998)

    Attempted kidnapping in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime when the underlying conduct establishes an attempt to abduct, and the statute imposes strict liability for the aggravating circumstance (death of the victim) that elevates the crime to the first degree.

    Summary

    Fullan hired individuals to kidnap Alpert, who was owed money by Fullan, with the intent to kill him. The kidnapping attempt resulted in Alpert’s death. Fullan was convicted of, among other things, attempted kidnapping in the first degree and felony murder predicated on that attempted kidnapping. The Appellate Division reversed these convictions, relying on a prior case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that attempted kidnapping in the first degree is a cognizable crime because the core crime is the abduction, and the death of the victim is an aggravating circumstance that elevates the crime to first degree, similar to the reasoning in People v. Miller regarding attempted robbery.

    Facts

    Fullan hired Cepeda and Esquilin to abduct Alpert, a business associate to whom Fullan owed $150,000. The plan was to kidnap Alpert, take him to a specific location, and kill him. During the abduction attempt, Alpert struggled, and the gun of one of the perpetrators discharged, hitting Alpert. Esquilin then shot Alpert twice more, killing him. Fullan, who was present, took promissory notes from Alpert’s body.

    Procedural History

    Fullan was tried with Esquilin and convicted of three counts of second-degree murder (including two counts of felony murder predicated on attempted kidnapping and robbery), attempted first-degree kidnapping, and first-degree robbery. Esquilin’s conviction was modified by the Appellate Division, which reversed the attempted kidnapping and related felony murder counts based on People v. Campbell. Prior to Fullan’s appeal, the Court of Appeals decided People v. Miller, distinguishing Campbell. The Appellate Division, without mentioning Miller, granted Fullan the same relief as Esquilin. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals. Fullan cross-appealed, seeking a new trial based on an alleged jury instruction error.

    Issue(s)

    Whether attempted kidnapping in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime in circumstances where the defendant attempts to abduct another person, and that person dies during the abduction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the core crime is the abduction, and the death of the victim is an aggravating circumstance which elevates the severity of the crime to first degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the construction of Penal Law § 135.25(3), which defines first-degree kidnapping, parallels the interpretation given to Penal Law § 160.15 in People v. Miller regarding robbery. The court stated, “[t]he core crime here is undeniably the abduction of another person. It is that to which the culpable mental state adheres. Thus, the conduct tending to effect the abduction constitutes the attempt. The death of the victim need not be intended; that additional attribute is the strict liability aggravating circumstance which elevates the severity of the already egregious crime of kidnapping to first degree.” The court found the logic of Miller controlling and held that attempted kidnapping in the first degree qualifies as a cognizable crime. The court distinguished this case from People v. Campbell, similar to how Miller distinguished itself from Campbell. The court stated, “[t]he logic and rationale of Miller (supra), thus, ineluctably control, and dictate this Court’s further conclusion that attempted kidnapping in the first degree qualifies as a cognizable crime in these circumstances.”

  • People v. Slacks, 89 N.Y.2d 852 (1996): Jury Instructions and Burden of Proof

    225 A.D.2d 805, 89 N.Y.2d 852 (1996)

    A trial court’s instruction to the jury that a trial is “a search for the truth” does not necessarily undermine the proper burden of proof when viewed in the context of the jury instructions in their entirety.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of felony murder, robbery, and criminal possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing that the trial court’s jury instructions were flawed, specifically the instruction that the trial was a “search for the truth” and the refusal to instruct that mere presence at the scene is insufficient for criminal liability. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the “search for the truth” instruction, when viewed in context, did not undermine the burden of proof. The court also found no error in refusing the mere presence instruction, as no reasonable view of the evidence supported it, and the court properly instructed on accessorial liability.

    Facts

    The defendant, along with unapprehended individuals, robbed two men in a parked car. During the robbery, one of the men in the car was fatally shot. The defendant was subsequently indicted and convicted of felony murder, two counts of first-degree robbery, and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. At trial, the defendant objected to the court’s jury instructions.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court’s jury instructions warranted reversal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the trial was “a search for the truth” undermined the People’s burden of proof.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that mere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient to establish criminal liability.

    Holding

    1. No, because reviewing the statement in the context of the jury instructions in their entirety, there is no basis for concluding that the proper burden of proof upon the People was undermined or less than adequately conveyed.

    2. No, because under the circumstances of this case, no reasonable view of the evidence supported such a charge, and the court properly instructed on accessorial liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the “search for the truth” instruction, the Court of Appeals relied on People v. Coleman, 70 N.Y.2d 817, 819, stating that when viewed in the context of the entire jury instruction, the instruction did not undermine the burden of proof. The Court also noted that the defendant’s claim relating to the cumulative effect of the “search for the truth” instruction was unpreserved for review because no objection was raised before the trial court on that specific ground.

    Regarding the refusal to instruct on mere presence, the Court reasoned that no reasonable view of the evidence supported such a charge. The court emphasized that the defendant’s concern about potential guilt based solely on presence was mitigated by the court’s recitation of Penal Law § 20.00, which included the requirement of acting with the mental culpability required for the commission of the crime charged. The court stated that “acting in concert liability requires acting with the mental culpability required for the commission of the crime charged.”

  • People v. Nieves, 88 N.Y.2d 618 (1996): Establishes Jurisdiction for Felony Murder When Death Occurs in New York, Even if Underlying Felony Occurred Elsewhere

    People v. Nieves, 88 N.Y.2d 618 (1996)

    New York State has jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant for felony murder when the homicide takes place within the state, even if the underlying felony is committed in another state, because the death within the state constitutes an element of the felony murder offense.

    Summary

    Orlando Nieves and John Stokes were convicted of felony murder after a robbery they committed in Connecticut led to a high-speed chase into New York, where their getaway car struck and killed a pedestrian. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that New York had jurisdiction because the death, an element of felony murder, occurred within the state. The Court reasoned that New York has a valid interest in prosecuting dangerous acts resulting in death within its borders, regardless of where the underlying felony occurred. This ruling clarifies the scope of New York’s criminal jurisdiction in interstate felony murder cases.

    Facts

    Defendant Nieves and a woman robbed a convenience store in Greenwich, Connecticut. Defendant Stokes drove the getaway car. Police pursued them into New York. During the high-speed chase in New York, Stokes drove recklessly to evade police. The getaway car swerved to avoid a truck and crashed into a bus shelter, killing Gladys Davis, a woman waiting there. After the crash, Nieves, Stokes, and the woman fled on foot and were apprehended by police.

    Procedural History

    Nieves and Stokes were charged in New York with, among other crimes, second-degree murder based on the felony murder provision of the Penal Law. Both were convicted by a jury. They appealed, arguing that New York lacked jurisdiction because the underlying felony (robbery) occurred in Connecticut. The Appellate Division rejected their arguments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York has jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant for felony murder when the underlying felony is committed in another state (Connecticut), but the homicide occurs in New York.

    Holding

    Yes, because the death of a nonparticipant in New York, during the immediate flight from a designated felony, constitutes an element of the crime of felony murder and thus satisfies New York’s jurisdictional requirements under CPL 20.20(1)(a).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court based its decision on CPL 20.20(1)(a), which states that New York courts have jurisdiction when conduct within the state establishes an element of the offense. Felony murder requires the commission of a felony and the death of a non-participant “in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom” (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]). The Court emphasized that the death in New York was an element of the felony murder, thus establishing jurisdiction. The Court cited People v. Berzups, stating, “the underlying felony is not so much an element of the crime but instead functions as a replacement for the mens rea or intent necessary for common-law murder.” The Court reasoned that New York has a strong policy interest in deterring and punishing acts that result in death within its borders. The Court distinguished the felony murder statute from merely a sentence enhancement for the underlying felony, stating that the “language of Penal Law § 125.25 (3) evinces the Legislature’s desire to extend liability broadly to those who commit serious crimes in ways that endanger the lives of others” (citing People v. Hernandez, 82 NY2d 309, 318). The court noted, “[i]mmediate flight and attempts to thwart apprehension are patently within the furtherance of the cofelons’ criminal objective”.

  • People v. DeFreitas, 88 N.Y.2d 824 (1996): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Failure to Request Affirmative Defense Instruction

    People v. DeFreitas, 88 N.Y.2d 824 (1996)

    A defense counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on an affirmative defense does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel; the determination depends on the totality of the circumstances.

    Summary

    DeFreitas was convicted of felony murder for his role in a robbery where two employees were killed. His appeal centered on his lawyer’s failure to request a jury instruction on the affirmative defense to felony murder. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the failure to request the instruction, in itself, did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. The court emphasized that the determination of ineffective assistance is based on the entire context of the case, not on a single error or omission. The court also found the defendant’s claims regarding sentencing unpreserved.

    Facts

    DeFreitas participated in a robbery during which another individual shot and killed two shop employees. He was subsequently convicted of two counts of felony murder. During the trial, his defense counsel did not explicitly request a jury instruction regarding the affirmative defense to felony murder, as outlined in Penal Law § 125.25[3].

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted DeFreitas. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel based on his lawyer’s failure to request the affirmative defense instruction. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, rejecting the ineffective assistance claim. DeFreitas then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defense counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on the affirmative defense to felony murder, in and of itself, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the totality of the circumstances.

    Holding

    No, because under the entire circumstances of the case, the defense counsel’s failure to request the affirmative defense instruction does not, in itself, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on prior precedent, citing People v. Hobot, People v. Flores, and People v. Baldi, to support its decision that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. The court explicitly stated, “We agree with the Appellate Division that defense counsel’s failure to request the affirmative defense instruction does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, in and of itself, under the entire circumstances of this case.” The court explicitly stated it was only assuming, but not deciding, whether the defendant would have been entitled to the instruction even if it had been requested. This suggests the court considered the strength of a potential affirmative defense in its analysis, even without directly ruling on its applicability. The court also found that DeFreitas’s arguments regarding the sentencing court’s actions were not properly preserved for appellate review, meaning he didn’t raise them appropriately in the lower courts. This highlights the importance of raising objections and arguments at the trial level to preserve them for appeal.

  • People v. Brown, 83 N.Y.2d 791 (1994): Prejudice from Evidence on Acquitted Charges

    83 N.Y.2d 791 (1994)

    A defendant’s conviction on valid, independent charges should not be overturned on the basis of prejudice stemming from evidence related to charges on which the defendant was acquitted, unless it can be shown that such prejudice nullified the valid conviction.

    Summary

    Alexander Brown was convicted of robbery and attempted murder. The Appellate Division reversed, arguing that the introduction of evidence related to felony murder charges (of which Brown was acquitted) prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the robbery and attempted murder charges. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the introduction of evidence pertaining to a charge for which the defendant was acquitted does not automatically nullify a conviction on other independent charges, unless the prejudice is so great as to deny a fair trial on those charges. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for factual review.

    Facts

    Alexander Brown and an accomplice stole a gold chain. When the victim gave chase, Brown displayed a gun. Brown and his accomplice fled in a car with two other occupants. The victim and a friend chased Brown’s vehicle. The victim broke the rear window of Brown’s car with a baseball bat, and Brown fired two shots in response. Police officers joined the chase, which ended when Brown’s vehicle crashed. Brown then stole a police car. Responding to the report of the stolen police car, other officers collided with an ambulance, resulting in an officer’s death. Brown was apprehended and indicted on numerous charges, including felony murder related to the officer’s death.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Brown’s motion to dismiss the felony murder and first-degree assault counts. After a jury trial, Brown was acquitted of the felony murder and first-degree assault counts but convicted of robbery and attempted murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in denying Brown’s motion to dismiss the felony murder counts and that the introduction of evidence related to felony murder prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the counts on which he was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the introduction of testimony regarding the felony murder count so prejudiced the jury as to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial on separate and unrelated charges for which he was convicted.

    Holding

    No, because prejudice does not nullify an independent, validly secured robbery and attempted murder conviction as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Appellate Division’s ruling that the introduction of evidence related to the felony murder charge, for which Brown was acquitted, automatically prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the robbery and attempted murder charges. The Court found that the Appellate Division erred in ruling “as a matter of law that prejudice nullified an independent, validly secured robbery and attempted murder conviction.” The Court implied that a valid conviction should only be overturned if the prejudice stemming from evidence related to the acquitted charge was so significant that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial on the other charges. The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for further factual review, implying that the Appellate Division should determine whether the prejudice was, in fact, so significant as to warrant a new trial.