New York Law Review

Tag: felony conviction

  • Matter of Cohen v. Cuomo, 77 N.Y.2d 936 (1991): Disqualification from Holding Office After Felony Conviction

    Matter of Cohen v. Cuomo, 77 N.Y.2d 936 (1991)

    A public officer who is removed from office due to a felony conviction under Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e) is barred from seeking election to the same office for the remainder of the term from which they were removed.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that a State Senator, Cohen, who was removed from office due to a federal felony conviction for making a false statement on a loan application, was ineligible to seek election to the unexpired term of the same office. The court reasoned that Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e) considers the term of office an integral part of the office itself. Therefore, removal under this section bars the officer from seeking the same office for the duration of the term from which they were removed.

    Facts

    Appellant Cohen was a New York State Senator elected from the 32nd Senatorial District. Cohen was convicted of a federal felony for making a false statement on a loan application in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. Upon his felony conviction, Cohen’s public office automatically became vacant as per Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e).

    Procedural History

    Following Cohen’s removal from office, he attempted to seek election to the unexpired term of the same State Senate seat. The Appellate Division ruled that Cohen was precluded from seeking this election. Cohen appealed this ruling to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public officer, removed from office due to a felony conviction under Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e), is barred from seeking election to the same office for the remainder of the term from which they were removed.

    Holding

    Yes, because Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e) considers the term of an office an integral part of the office itself, and removal under this section bars the officer from seeking the same office for the duration of the term from which they were removed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected Cohen’s argument that the precedent set in People v. Ahearn, 196 N.Y. 221 should not apply to elected officials, but only to appointed officials. The court in Ahearn stated that “the right to enjoy for a certain period the privileges and profits of a given position is an important element of [that] office.” (Id. at 230). The Court of Appeals found that this logic was applicable in Cohen’s case as well.

    The Court stated that its prior holding in Ahearn is consistent with the intent of Public Officers Law § 30 (1)(e), which states that “the term of an office should be considered an integral part of the office itself and that a removal effected by operation of that section should result in a bar to an officerholder’s seeking the same office for the duration of the ‘certain period’ or term for which the officer had been elected.” The court emphasized the ineligibility to run again for the very term that was forfeited due to the conviction. The court implied the importance of maintaining integrity in public office and preventing individuals removed for malfeasance from immediately returning to the same position. Essentially, the court focused on the idea that the penalty for the felony conviction included the loss of the ability to serve out the term for which the officer was elected. The court did not discuss potential dissenting opinions.

  • Matter of Graham v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 807 (1985): Public Officer’s Felony Conviction Creates Automatic Vacancy

    64 N.Y.2d 807 (1985)

    A public office automatically becomes vacant upon the officer’s conviction of a felony, as mandated by New York Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e), and this termination does not require a pre-termination hearing.

    Summary

    Graham, a New York City police officer, was convicted of a felony, leading to the automatic termination of his position under Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e). Even though the conviction was later reversed, the Court of Appeals held that the initial conviction created an automatic vacancy, and no pre-termination hearing was required. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language and legislative intent necessitate immediate cessation of governmental functions following a felony conviction, irrespective of potential appellate reversals. This rule reflects a policy choice prioritizing uninterrupted governmental operations over the individual plight of a wrongfully convicted officer.

    Facts

    Petitioner Graham was a police officer employed by the City of New York.

    Graham was convicted of a felony.

    As a result of the felony conviction, Graham’s employment as a police officer was automatically terminated pursuant to Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e).

    Graham’s felony conviction was subsequently reversed on appeal.

    Graham sought reinstatement to his position as a police officer.

    Procedural History

    The lower court initially ruled in favor of Graham, ordering his reinstatement.

    The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the automatic vacancy created by the felony conviction precluded reinstatement without a hearing.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public officer’s position is automatically vacated upon felony conviction pursuant to Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e), thereby negating the requirement for a pre-termination hearing, even if the conviction is subsequently reversed on appeal.

    Holding

    Yes, because New York Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) mandates that a public office automatically becomes vacant upon an officer’s conviction of a felony, and this provision’s application is not defeated by the possibility of a later reversal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the precedent set in Matter of Toro v. Malcolm, 44 N.Y.2d 146, which interpreted Public Officers Law § 30. The court emphasized the statute’s clear and unqualified directive that every public office becomes vacant upon the officer’s felony conviction. The court stated, “[t]he directive contained in section 30 of the Public Officers Law is clear and unqualified: every public office becomes vacant upon the officer’s conviction of a felony.”

    The court reasoned that the statute reflects a legislative decision to prioritize the continuous performance of governmental functions. Allowing an office to remain potentially encumbered pending appellate review would disrupt government operations. The court acknowledged the potential hardship for innocent officers unjustly convicted but maintained that the statute’s plain meaning and legislative intent must prevail.

    The court noted the legislature’s awareness of the court’s prior interpretations of the statute and its decision not to amend the law to carve out exceptions for wrongful convictions. This inaction reinforced the court’s interpretation of the statute’s absolute effect.

    The court concluded that upon Graham’s felony conviction, his position was terminated, and he no longer possessed a protectable property interest in the office that would necessitate a reinstatement hearing. The court explicitly referenced the Second Circuit’s decision in Greene v. McGuire, 683 F.2d 32, reinforcing the principle that state law defines constitutionally protected property rights in public office.

  • Matter of Steinberg v. Meisser, 50 N.Y.2d 77 (1980): Judge’s Right to Salary After Felony Conviction & Disbarment

    Matter of Steinberg v. Meisser, 50 N.Y.2d 77 (1980)

    A judge convicted of a felony and disbarred before the 1976 constitutional amendments is not entitled to judicial salary for the period following disbarment because continued qualification as an attorney is an implied condition of receiving that salary.

    Summary

    This case concerns a Family Court Judge, Steinberg, convicted of perjury in 1974, resulting in automatic disbarment. He sought to recover his judicial salary for the period of 1975-1976, arguing that no formal removal proceedings had been initiated. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions in favor of Steinberg, holding that a judge who is disbarred due to a felony conviction prior to the 1976 constitutional amendments is not entitled to receive a judicial salary because continued qualification as an attorney is an implied condition of holding judicial office and receiving its associated compensation. The Court emphasized policy considerations, arguing it would damage the public’s perception of the justice system to allow a disbarred judge to continue receiving a salary.

    Facts

    Steinberg was appointed a Family Court Judge in Nassau County in 1972 and elected to a full term commencing in 1973.

    In 1974, he was indicted and subsequently suspended with pay.

    On December 27, 1974, Steinberg was convicted of first-degree perjury, a felony, leading to the cessation of his salary payments on December 31, 1974.

    His conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division, and leave to appeal was denied.

    No proceedings were ever brought to formally remove him from his judicial office.

    Procedural History

    Steinberg sued to recover his judicial salary for the period between January 1, 1975, and August 31, 1976.

    Special Term granted summary judgment in favor of Steinberg, awarding him the salary but denying interest, based on the precedent of Matter of La Carrubba v. Klein.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment but modified it to include interest from August 31, 1976.

    The Court of Appeals heard the case as a matter of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judge, convicted of a felony and automatically disbarred before the effective date of the 1976 constitutional amendments, is entitled to receive the salary of that judicial office when no proceedings to remove him from office have been initiated.

    Holding

    No, because being qualified to practice law is a continuing requirement to receive a judicial salary, and a judge who is disbarred due to a felony conviction has disqualified himself from receiving that salary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from Matter of La Carrubba v. Klein, which held that the Public Officers Law does not apply to judicial officers regarding removal for misconduct. Here, the disqualification arose not from the Public Officers Law, but from Section 90(4) of the Judiciary Law, which mandates automatic disbarment upon felony conviction. The court emphasized that Steinberg’s conviction occurred before the 1976 constitutional amendments.

    The Court reasoned that while Article VI, Section 20(a) of the Constitution requires a person to have been admitted to practice law for at least ten years to “assume the office of judge,” this requirement implies a continuing obligation to remain qualified as an attorney to continue receiving the salary of judicial office. Citing Thaler v. State of New York, the Court emphasized that it was a continuing requirement that “the occupant of the office must continue to be an attorney admitted to practice law in the State.”

    The Court also considered policy implications. Quoting Matter of Mitchell, the Court stated it “would invite scorn and disrespect for our rule of law” if a convicted judge continued to receive a salary while incarcerated. The court addressed concerns about diminishing a judge’s compensation during their term (Article VI, Section 25(a)), arguing that it is not a diminishment when a judge disqualifies themselves and fails to perform the functions of their office. The provision against diminishment protects judicial independence from legislative control, not from a judge’s own disqualifying actions.

    The Court stated that the Constitution should be construed to give its provisions practical effect and that the requirement to be a lawyer imports not only experience but also “the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney”.

  • Matter of Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153 (1976): Disbarment Based on Felony Conviction Pending Appeal

    Matter of Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153 (1976)

    An attorney may be disbarred upon conviction of a felony, even while an appeal of that conviction is pending, without violating due process rights.

    Summary

    John N. Mitchell, a former Attorney General of the United States and an attorney admitted to practice in New York, appealed an order from the Appellate Division disbarring him following his conviction on multiple felony counts in federal court. Mitchell argued that disbarment based on a conviction not yet reviewed on appeal violated his due process rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the disbarment, holding that immediate disbarment upon felony conviction, even pending appeal, is permissible and does not violate due process, as the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the legal profession outweighs the attorney’s interest in continuing to practice.

    Facts

    John N. Mitchell, an attorney, was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury. Mitchell conceded that his federal perjury conviction was equivalent to a class D felony under New York law. The Appellate Division struck Mitchell’s name from the roll of attorneys based on the felony conviction, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4).
    Mitchell appealed, arguing his disbarment was premature as his criminal conviction was still under appellate review.

    Procedural History

    The United States District Court for the District of Columbia convicted John Mitchell of federal felonies. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court disbarred Mitchell based on the felony conviction. Mitchell appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the disbarment was premature pending the outcome of his federal appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it is constitutionally permissible to disbar an attorney when the sole basis for the disbarment is a felony conviction that is currently subject to appellate review.

    Holding

    No, because due process does not require that a conviction be affirmed by an appellate court before it can serve as the basis for disbarment, and the public interest in protecting the integrity of the legal profession outweighs the attorney’s interest in continuing to practice while the appeal is pending.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Judiciary Law § 90(4), which mandates disbarment upon felony conviction. Citing Matter of Ginsberg and Matter of Barash, the court emphasized that disbarment is ipso facto upon conviction. The Court weighed the attorney’s due process rights against the public interest. The Court stated that the primary concern in disbarment is “the protection of the public interest”. The court reasoned that allowing a convicted felon to continue practicing law would undermine the integrity of the legal system. Quoting People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, the court emphasized that attorneys are “an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.” The Court also cited Matter of Wall, stating, “Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws…”. The court held that due process does not require appellate review before disbarment, citing Griffin v. Illinois. The court emphasized that the conviction is presumed valid unless reversed on appeal, stating, “A strong presumption of regularity attaches to that judgment of conviction”. The court analogized the situation to a convicted person’s lack of constitutional right to be at liberty pending appeal. The Court also noted, quoting Matter of Rouss, that “Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with many conditions.”