New York Law Review

Tag: Felony Complaint

  • People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988): Interpreting Speedy Trial Rules When Felony Complaint is Replaced by Misdemeanor Indictment

    People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988)

    When a criminal action commences with a felony complaint that is later replaced by a misdemeanor indictment, the applicable speedy trial period is determined by the accusatory instrument that initiated the action, not the final charge.

    Summary

    Defendant Lomax was convicted of reckless endangerment in the second degree. The case began with a felony complaint, but the Grand Jury indicted her on a misdemeanor. Lomax argued the People had to be ready for trial within 90 days of the misdemeanor indictment under CPL 30.30. The People contended they had six months, arguing that the initial felony complaint controlled. The Court of Appeals agreed with the People, holding that CPL 30.30(5)(c) doesn’t include misdemeanor indictments when listing accusatory instruments that trigger the shorter 90-day speedy trial period. Therefore, the six-month period applied, and Lomax’s speedy trial rights weren’t violated.

    Facts

    Lomax, a hospital volunteer, disconnected the life support of an AIDS patient, believing prayer had healed him.

    She was initially arraigned on a felony complaint for reckless endangerment in the first degree.

    The Grand Jury subsequently filed a misdemeanor indictment charging her with reckless endangerment in the second degree.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Court held that the six-month speedy trial period applied.

    The Appellate Division affirmed.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under CPL 30.30, when a criminal action commences with a felony complaint that is later replaced by a misdemeanor indictment, the applicable speedy trial period is 90 days from the filing of the misdemeanor indictment or six months from the initial felony complaint.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 30.30(5)(c) does not include misdemeanor indictments in the list of accusatory instruments that trigger the 90-day speedy trial period; thus, the six-month period applies from the initial felony complaint.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the plain language of CPL 30.30(5)(c), which specifies the accusatory instruments that trigger the 90-day speedy trial period when a felony complaint is replaced or converted. Misdemeanor indictments are notably absent from this list.

    The Court rejected Lomax’s argument that the legislature intended a distinction between felonies and lesser offenses for speedy trial purposes, stating that courts must give effect to the statute as written, not as they think it should have been written: “‘must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as the court may think it should or would have been written if the Legislature had envisaged all the problems and complications which might arise’.” (quoting Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ., 60 NY2d 539, 548-549).

    The court applied the principle that the exclusion of a matter from a statute indicates intentional exclusion: “The failure of the Legislature to include a matter within a particular statute is an indication that its exclusion was intended” (citing Pajak v Pajak, 56 NY2d 394, 397).

    Because the legislature didn’t include misdemeanor indictments, the court concluded the six-month period applied from the date of the initial felony complaint. This decision emphasizes the importance of strictly interpreting statutes and not adding provisions the legislature omitted. The practical impact is that prosecutors have more time to prepare when a felony complaint is later reduced to a misdemeanor indictment.

  • People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218 (1980): Waiver of Right to Counsel After Felony Complaint

    People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218 (1980)

    Once a felony complaint is filed and an arrest warrant is issued, a defendant’s right to counsel attaches, and any waiver of that right obtained in the absence of counsel is invalid, rendering any subsequent statements inadmissible.

    Summary

    Samuels was arrested and questioned about a robbery after a felony complaint was filed against him. He waived his Miranda rights outside the presence of counsel and made incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the felony complaint initiated formal adversarial proceedings, Samuels’s right to counsel had indelibly attached. Therefore, his waiver of counsel in the absence of an attorney was invalid, and his statements were inadmissible. The court emphasized that once a formal accusation is made, the matter becomes a legal controversy requiring the presence of counsel to safeguard the defendant’s rights.

    Facts

    On September 4, 1975, a store robbery occurred in Nassau County. Several days later, an investigating officer filed a felony complaint in the District Court, charging Samuels with the crime. An arrest warrant was issued based on the complaint. On October 5, 1975, police arrested Samuels at his mother’s home. Before arraignment, Samuels was taken to the local precinct for “processing.” At the police station, he was advised of his Miranda rights and questioned about the robbery without counsel present. He made oral and written statements admitting involvement, but claimed coercion.

    Procedural History

    Samuels moved to suppress his statements, arguing he wasn’t properly advised of his rights and was coerced. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. He was subsequently convicted of robbery. On appeal, Samuels argued that the confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained without counsel after the felony complaint was filed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can validly waive their right to counsel in the absence of an attorney after a felony complaint has been filed in court and an arrest warrant has been issued.

    Holding

    No, because once a felony complaint is filed and an arrest warrant is issued, the right to counsel attaches, and any waiver of that right in the absence of counsel is invalid.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the right to counsel attaches at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution and commences with the filing of an accusatory instrument, including a felony complaint. The court distinguished this case from situations where the police were merely investigating a crime. It stated, “The sole function of a warrant of arrest is to achieve a defendant’s court appearance in a criminal action for the purpose of arraignment upon the accusatory instrument by which such action was commenced.” Once a formal accusation is made, the matter is no longer simply an investigation but a legal controversy. Quoting People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 163-164, the court noted, “Once a matter is the subject of a legal controversy any discussions relating thereto should be conducted by counsel: at that point the parties are in no position to safeguard their rights.” The court emphasized that the defendant has a right to counsel at all preliminary proceedings, including arraignment on a felony complaint. Since “all that stands between the entry of counsel into the proceedings and nonrepresentation is the ministerial act of arraignment, there may be no waiver of the right to counsel unless an attorney is present.” Therefore, Samuels’ statements obtained in the absence of counsel after the felony complaint was filed should have been suppressed.