New York Law Review

Tag: Fellow Officer Rule

  • People v. Rosario, 78 N.Y.2d 583 (1991): Fellow Officer Rule and Probable Cause Based on Hearsay

    78 N.Y.2d 583 (1991)

    Under the fellow officer rule, an arresting officer can rely on information from a fellow officer to establish probable cause, even if that information is hearsay, provided the sending officer possessed the requisite probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on the fellow officer rule. The undercover officer’s radio transmission of a “positive observation,” which the arresting officer understood to mean a drug transaction, coupled with a detailed description of the participants, was sufficient to establish probable cause. The court found that the undercover officer’s observation of a drug transaction provided adequate grounds for the arrest, negating the need for the undercover officer to testify at the suppression hearing.

    Facts

    On October 16, 1991, undercover police officer Anthony Romano, a member of the Queens Tactical Narcotics Task Force (TNT), observed defendant Rosario exchanging what appeared to be drugs for money with two individuals. Romano radioed fellow officer Evelyn Cardenales, who was working as his backup, informing her that he had made a “positive observation.” He provided a detailed description of the participants’ clothing, physical characteristics, and location. Cardenales proceeded to the location and arrested Rosario and the other individuals.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arrested and charged with drug-related offenses. At a suppression hearing, the defendant argued that the police lacked probable cause for the arrest. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on the undercover officer’s radio transmission of a “positive observation” and a detailed description of the participants.

    Holding

    Yes, because under the fellow officer rule, an arresting officer is entitled to act on the strength of a radio bulletin from a fellow officer and to assume its reliability, and the undercover officer’s observation of the drug transaction established probable cause for the arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the fellow officer rule, which allows a police officer to act on the strength of a radio bulletin from a fellow officer and to assume its reliability (People v Lypka, 36 NY2d 210, 213). The court also cited People v Petralia, 62 NY2d 47, 52, stating that a court may rely on the hearsay testimony of the arresting officer alone to establish probable cause at a suppression hearing, without needing to produce the undercover officer. The court found that the arresting officer, Cardenales, was justified in relying on Romano’s personal observation of the crime.

    The court addressed the defendant’s argument that the phrase “positive observation” was insufficient to communicate the nature of the conduct observed. However, Cardenales testified that the phrase was commonly used among police officers to indicate an exchange of drugs for money, and she understood it to mean that Romano had personally witnessed such an exchange. The court drew an analogy to People v Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631, where a “positive buy” was deemed sufficient to establish probable cause.

    The court rejected the defendant’s attempt to distinguish the case from Maldonado, arguing that it involved a police officer’s mere observation of a drug transaction, rather than a purchase of narcotics by the undercover officer. The court stated that Romano’s observation of the exchange of drugs for money, standing alone, established probable cause, referencing People v McRay, 51 NY2d 594, 604: “[e]xchange of currency negates all but the most implausible explanations for the transaction, and thus conveys more than sufficient indicia of a drug sale to warrant an arrest.” The Court of Appeals emphasized that an experienced officer’s observation of a drug transaction provides sufficient probable cause for an arrest under the fellow officer rule, supporting effective law enforcement and efficient investigations.

  • People v. Martinez, 86 N.Y.2d 630 (1995): Sufficiency of Evidence for Escape in the First Degree

    People v. Martinez, 86 N.Y.2d 630 (1995)

    To secure an indictment for escape in the first degree, the prosecution needs to demonstrate that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the defendant committed a Class A or Class B felony; the ultimate disposition of the underlying charge is irrelevant.

    Summary

    Martinez was arrested for selling narcotics (a Class B felony) after an undercover officer radioed that a “positive buy” occurred. While being transported, Martinez escaped. Subsequent lab analysis revealed the substance sold was not narcotics. The Grand Jury indicted Martinez for escape in the first degree. The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecution only needed to establish that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe Martinez committed a Class B felony at the time of arrest, not that the underlying crime was actually committed. The officer’s reasonable belief, based on the undercover’s report, was sufficient.

    Facts

    An undercover officer negotiated a drug purchase and signaled a “positive buy” to his backup team, describing the seller. Officer Combs, part of the backup team, arrested Martinez based on the description, for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (a Class B felony). Martinez was placed in a police van but escaped during transport. A lab analysis later revealed the substance sold was not narcotics.

    Procedural History

    The Grand Jury indicted Martinez for escape in the first degree (Penal Law § 205.15 [2]). The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment, finding insufficient evidence of the underlying narcotics crime. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment, concluding that probable cause for the underlying narcotics arrest was sufficient. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People presented sufficient evidence of the underlying narcotic crime to support an indictment for escape in the first degree, specifically, whether the People must prove the A or B felony or merely establish probable cause for the arrest of such felony.

    Holding

    No, because the People need only establish that the police had reasonable cause to believe at the time of the arrest that an A or B felony had been committed; the ultimate disposition of the underlying charge is irrelevant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute (Penal Law § 205.15 [2]) requires only that the defendant have been “arrested for, or charged with” an A or B felony. A person is in custody when restrained by a public officer following an authorized arrest. The key question is whether the police had probable cause to believe an A or B felony had been committed at the time of the arrest.

    The court rejected the argument that the prosecution must prove the underlying felony. The degree of escape is based not on the arrestee’s ultimate guilt, but on the potential impact on society of an escaped prisoner charged with a serious crime. The court distinguished cases involving larceny, where value must be proven to establish probable cause for grand larceny. In narcotics cases, the police don’t need to know the exact nature or amount of the drug before making an arrest for criminal sale.

    Probable cause exists when an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances “sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed” (People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423). The “fellow officer rule” allows an arresting officer to rely on information from another officer with probable cause. Here, Officer Combs relied on the undercover officer’s report of a “positive buy” to reasonably believe Martinez had sold narcotics. According to the court, “[a]lthough it was subsequently revealed that the substance purchased was not a narcotic…[the officers] could reasonably believe, based upon their experience and all the circumstances surrounding the transaction, that defendant had sold narcotics to the undercover.” This was sufficient to support the indictment for escape in the first degree.

  • People v. Rosario, 78 N.Y.2d 583 (1991): Application of Fellow Officer Rule to Auxiliary Police

    People v. Rosario, 78 N.Y.2d 583 (1991)

    The “fellow officer” rule, which allows a police officer to rely on information from another officer to make an arrest, can extend to auxiliary police officers when they possess sufficient training and information to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the “fellow officer” rule applies to auxiliary police officers. An auxiliary officer, Hernandez, received a radio dispatch about a murder suspect. Based on this and a tip, Hernandez identified a suspect, Rosario, who was then apprehended by uniformed officers based on Hernandez’s information. The Court held that the fellow officer rule did apply to auxiliary officers like Hernandez who had received training and possessed information establishing probable cause. This ruling affirmed Rosario’s conviction, finding the arrest lawful because the uniformed officers reasonably relied on Hernandez’s assessment.

    Facts

    Auxiliary Police Officer Hernandez, while on patrol, received a radio run describing a suspect in a recent fatal stabbing. The description included details of the suspect’s appearance and clothing. Shortly after, a civilian told Hernandez he had seen the suspect. Hernandez relayed this information to uniformed police officers. Minutes later, Hernandez spotted someone matching the suspect description. The individual, after noticing Hernandez, changed direction. Hernandez then directed Sergeant Belton, another officer, to the suspect, identifying him as a murder suspect. Belton apprehended the suspect, Wilfredo Rosario.

    Procedural History

    Rosario was arrested and subsequently convicted of second-degree murder. Prior to trial, Rosario moved to suppress evidence, including jewelry, his station house statement, and the lineup identification, arguing an illegal seizure. The hearing court denied the motion, finding probable cause based on Hernandez’s information. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Rosario appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the “fellow officer” rule was improperly applied to auxiliary officers.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “fellow officer” rule, which permits a police officer to rely on information from another officer to make an arrest, applies to auxiliary police officers who are not considered “police officers” or “peace officers” under all circumstances?

    Holding

    Yes, because the auxiliary officer possessed sufficient training and information to reasonably believe that the defendant had committed the homicide, thereby establishing probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the “fellow officer” rule allows officers to rely on information from other officers or departments, assuming the source possesses the necessary probable cause. When challenged, the prosecution must prove the transmitting officer had probable cause. The Court acknowledged auxiliary officers’ training isn’t as extensive as regular police officers’, but their training and role in assisting law enforcement justify applying the rule. The Court emphasized the auxiliary officer’s function as the “eyes and ears” of the police department. The Court distinguished this case from situations involving untrained civilians, highlighting the structured training and defined role of auxiliary officers. The Court noted that “the training they receive and the purposes they serve in aiding law enforcement provide sound policy reasons for applying the ‘fellow officer’ rule to auxiliary officers and militate against denying the police the benefit of their aide and assistance”. Finally, the court stated that while the auxiliary officer may only be considered a peace officer under limited circumstances, this lack of general arrest authority did not preclude application of the fellow officer rule, similar to how the rule applies to out-of-state law enforcement officers.

  • People v. Muriell, 68 N.Y.2d 294 (1986): Probable Cause Based on Undercover Officer’s Report

    People v. Muriell, 68 N.Y.2d 294 (1986)

    Probable cause for an arrest can be established by the arresting officer’s testimony regarding information received from an undercover officer who personally witnessed the crime, without requiring the undercover officer to testify at the suppression hearing, unless the defense raises specific issues necessitating the undercover officer’s testimony.

    Summary

    Muriell was arrested for selling drugs to an undercover officer. At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified that the undercover officer radioed him with a description of the seller, the vehicle he entered, and the location of the stash. The trial court suppressed the evidence, requiring the undercover officer’s testimony to establish probable cause. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the arresting officer’s testimony about the undercover officer’s firsthand observations was sufficient to establish probable cause unless the defense presents specific challenges that necessitate the undercover officer’s presence. This decision distinguishes situations where the sending officer’s knowledge is based on unknown or unreliable sources.

    Facts

    A New York City police narcotics team conducted a “buy and bust” operation. An undercover officer purchased heroin from Muriell. The undercover officer radioed Detective McCarthy, a backup officer, describing Muriell (male white, approximately 25, six feet, 150 pounds, blue jacket, black pants), the black Ford vehicle Muriell entered with its license plate number, and that “the stash was in the trunk”. Detective McCarthy followed the vehicle, arrested Muriell, and searched him and the trunk. He found previously reported “buy money” in Muriell’s pocket and heroin in the trunk.

    Procedural History

    Muriell was indicted for criminal possession and sale of a controlled substance and moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court initially denied the motion. Upon reargument, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, citing Appellate Division precedent requiring the undercover officer’s testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People, as a matter of law, failed to meet their burden of showing probable cause for the arrest when the arresting officer testified that he relied on information from an undercover police officer who reported that he had just purchased drugs from the defendant, without the undercover officer also testifying.

    Holding

    No, because when an arresting officer relies on information from another officer who personally witnessed the crime, that testimony, if credited, establishes probable cause for the arrest. The People do not need to produce the undercover officer to support a finding of probable cause unless substantial issues are raised regarding the validity of the arrest, which the undercover officer’s testimony would help resolve.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Lypka and People v. Havelka, where the sending officer’s information was based on unknown or unreliable sources. Here, the undercover officer personally witnessed the crime. Quoting United States v. Ventresca, the court stated, “Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.” The court reasoned that a per se rule requiring the undercover officer’s testimony in every case is unwarranted and could jeopardize the officer or ongoing investigations. The defendant is free to cross-examine the arresting officer and present evidence to challenge probable cause. However, absent a specific showing that raises substantial questions about the legality of the arrest, requiring the People to produce the undercover officer is unnecessary and potentially harmful. The court emphasized a flexible rule to balance the defendant’s interests with the practical needs of “buy and bust” operations. The Court stated that the defendant is not barred from challenging the arrest as “defendant is always free to cross-examine the arresting officer and any other witnesses produced by the prosecution and may, of course, call his own witnesses or testify on his own behalf with respect to his conduct prior to the arrest.”