New York Law Review

Tag: Federal Prosecution

  • McNeil v. Supreme Court, 73 N.Y.2d 563 (1989): Double Jeopardy and Federal vs. State Prosecutions

    McNeil v. Supreme Court, 73 N.Y.2d 563 (1989)

    Under New York’s statutory double jeopardy protections, a prior federal conspiracy conviction for stealing funds does bar a subsequent state prosecution for larceny based on the same underlying theft, as the federal government is not considered “another state” under CPL 40.20(2)(g).

    Summary

    Thomas McNeil was indicted in New York for grand larceny. He had previously been convicted in federal court for conspiracy to transport stolen property interstate, based on the same underlying theft. McNeil sought to dismiss the state charges, arguing double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the state prosecution was barred. The Court reasoned that the federal conviction was based on the same criminal transaction as the state charges, and that the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(g), which allows prosecution for a “result offense” after a conspiracy prosecution in “another state”, did not apply to prior federal prosecutions. Therefore, the writ of prohibition barring Thomas McNeil’s prosecution was granted.

    Facts

    Thomas McNeil and his brother were charged in New York with stealing funds from their respective companies, Triad and Everest. Prior to being apprehended on the state charges, McNeil was indicted federally for interstate transportation of stolen property and conspiracy to commit that crime, for stealing funds from Triad and Everest and transporting them to Switzerland. McNeil pleaded guilty to the federal charges. He was then arraigned on the State charges.

    Procedural History

    McNeil moved to dismiss the state charges based on statutory double jeopardy grounds (CPL 40.20). The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding an exception applied. McNeil then sought a writ of prohibition from the Appellate Division to prevent the state prosecution, but the Appellate Division denied the petition. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the federal and state prosecutions were based on the same criminal transaction, triggering double jeopardy protections under CPL 40.20(2)?
    2. Whether the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(g), for conspiracy prosecutions in “another state,” applies to prior federal conspiracy convictions, thus permitting the state prosecution?
    3. Whether the exceptions in CPL 40.20(2)(a) or (b) apply, permitting the state prosecution despite the federal conviction?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the federal conspiracy charge encompassed the same underlying theft that formed the basis of the state larceny charges.
    2. No, because the term “another state” in CPL 40.20(2)(g) does not include the federal government.
    3. No, because the offenses did not have substantially different elements, and the statutes were not designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the federal conspiracy charge, which included the theft of funds as an overt act, was part of the same criminal transaction as the state larceny charges. The court emphasized that “the significant inquiry is not what overt acts were actually charged as part of the conspiracy but whether ‘the particular activity for which the State seeks to hold defendants responsible could have been alleged to support the [Federal] conspiracy charge’” (citing People v. Abbamonte). The Court rejected the argument that the federal and state prosecutions were not based on the same criminal transaction, stating that the conspiracy count charged the very conduct that constitutes the crime of larceny.

    Regarding CPL 40.20(2)(g), the Court held that the plain language of the statute limits the exception to prior prosecutions in “another state,” which does not include the federal government. The Court reasoned that when the Legislature intends to broaden the scope of an exception to the double jeopardy bar, it does so explicitly, as seen in other subdivisions of CPL 40.20(2). The court stated, “[w]hen the language of a statute is unambiguous, it is to be construed ‘according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction.’”

    The Court also rejected the People’s argument that CPL 40.20(2)(a) and (b) permitted the state prosecution. It found that the acts establishing the state and federal offenses were not clearly distinguishable. The Court stated, “it is the same theft ‘charged and proved and for which a conviction was had’” that constitutes the state larceny charges. Additionally, the Court held that the federal and state offenses were designed to prevent the same evils (theft and protecting property owners), thus making the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(b) inapplicable.

  • People v. Barber, 67 N.Y.2d 587 (1986): Right to Counsel Only Applies to State Interrogation

    People v. Barber, 67 N.Y.2d 587 (1986)

    A defendant’s right to counsel is not violated when, although represented by counsel in a state court prosecution, the defendant testifies without counsel on behalf of a friend in a federal prosecution on related charges, provided there was no state interrogation.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s right to counsel was not violated when he testified in federal court, even though he was represented by counsel in a related state case. The defendant’s testimony in federal court, given to help a friend, was later used against him in the state prosecution. The Court reasoned that the right to counsel protects against state interrogation, and because the federal proceeding was independent and not a facade for state action, the testimony was admissible. The Court emphasized that the incriminating statements were made in response to a private attorney’s questions, not as a result of state coercion or inducement.

    Facts

    Defendant Barber and Raphael Rosario were arrested in a shared apartment where police found illegal weapons. Barber was charged in state court with weapon possession and forgery, and attorney Oscar Gonzalez-Suarez filed a notice of appearance on Barber’s behalf. Rosario was indicted in federal court for possessing a pistol. Rosario’s attorney, Raymond Sussman, subpoenaed Barber to testify at Rosario’s federal trial. Barber, without consulting Gonzalez-Suarez, spoke with Sussman privately. At the federal trial, Barber testified that he possessed the pistol. This testimony was later used to indict Barber in state court for criminal possession of a weapon.

    Procedural History

    After Barber was indicted in state court, he moved to suppress his federal court testimony, arguing that it violated his right to counsel because he had not received Miranda warnings. The People sought to disqualify Sussman due to a conflict of interest. The hearing court denied the People’s motion but granted Barber’s suppression motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals challenging the suppression ruling.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s right to counsel in a state criminal proceeding is violated when the defendant, while represented by counsel in that proceeding, testifies without counsel in a related federal proceeding?

    Holding

    No, because the incriminating statements were not obtained through interrogation by the state police or prosecutor; therefore, the statements were improperly suppressed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the scope of the right to counsel, stating that it protects individuals from incriminating statements made as a result of governmental interrogation. The Court emphasized that the right to counsel minimizes the imbalance between the accused and the State. “The right to counsel, quite simply, requires the exclusion of statements obtained from a person whose right to counsel has attached, through interrogation by agents of the State; statements induced by nongovernmental entities, acting privately, do not fall within the ambit of this exclusionary rule.” The Court clarified that “interrogation” extends beyond direct questioning to more subtle forms of state inducement. However, in this case, the incriminating statements were made in response to Sussman’s questions during the federal trial, not as a result of state coercion. The Court rejected the argument that the INS agent’s involvement or the federal courtroom setting transformed the testimony into state interrogation. Because the state did not use Sussman to elicit the statements, and Barber cooperated privately with Sussman, the right to counsel was not violated. The court found no evidence of collusion between the state and federal authorities to circumvent Barber’s right to counsel. Therefore, Barber’s motion to suppress was denied.