New York Law Review

Tag: Federal Felony

  • Matter of Cahn, 47 N.Y.2d 480 (1979): Determining if a Federal Felony Warrants Automatic Disbarment in New York

    Matter of Cahn, 47 N.Y.2d 480 (1979)

    When determining whether a federal felony conviction warrants automatic disbarment in New York, the court must determine if the elements of the federal crime are essentially similar to those of a New York felony.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a federal felony conviction should result in automatic disbarment in New York. Cahn, a former District Attorney, was convicted of making false statements, a federal felony. At the time, this triggered automatic disbarment under New York law. However, the law was amended to limit automatic disbarment to federal felonies that would also constitute felonies in New York. Cahn petitioned for vacatur of his disbarment. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division must determine if Cahn’s federal offense would be a felony under New York law, and if not, grant a hearing to consider appropriate relief. The federal felony need not be a mirror image of a New York felony, but must have essential similarity.

    Facts

    Appellant Cahn was admitted to the New York Bar in 1949 and served as Nassau County District Attorney for several years.
    In 1976, Cahn was convicted in federal court of making false statements, a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
    Under the then-existing New York Judiciary Law § 90(4), this federal felony conviction triggered automatic disbarment.

    Procedural History

    Due to the federal felony conviction, the Appellate Division ordered Cahn’s name stricken from the roll of attorneys.
    The New York Legislature amended Judiciary Law § 90 in 1979, limiting automatic disbarment to felonies in other jurisdictions that would also be felonies in New York.
    The amendment also allowed attorneys automatically disbarred under the prior law to seek vacatur or modification of the disbarment if the offense would not be a felony in New York.
    Cahn petitioned for vacatur of his disbarment under the amended law.
    The Appellate Division did not expressly determine whether Cahn’s federal offense would constitute a felony under New York law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division, when considering a petition for vacatur of disbarment based on a federal felony conviction, must first determine if the elements of the federal offense would constitute a felony under New York law before considering further relief.

    Holding

    Yes, because the amended statute requires the Appellate Division to make this threshold determination before considering further relief. If the federal offense would not be a felony under New York law, the Appellate Division must then grant a hearing to consider what relief is appropriate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of the 1979 amendment to Judiciary Law § 90, which narrowed the scope of automatic disbarment.
    The court stated that the Appellate Division must determine “if the offense for which the petitioner was convicted would be a felony under State law and, if not, grant a hearing to consider whether any relief would be appropriate.”
    The court clarified that the federal felony need not be a “mirror image” of a New York felony, perfectly corresponding in every detail. However, it must have “essential similarity.” The court cited Matter of Chu, 42 NY2d 490, 492, for this proposition.
    Because the Appellate Division failed to make this express threshold determination, the Court of Appeals remitted the matter for this determination and other proper proceedings.
    The decision emphasizes a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the out-of-state felony is sufficiently similar to a New York felony to warrant automatic disbarment.

  • Matter of Levy, 48 N.Y.2d 860 (1979): Automatic Disbarment for Federal Felony Conviction

    48 N.Y.2d 860 (1979)

    An attorney is automatically disbarred in New York upon conviction of a federal felony, even if that felony lacks a direct analogue in New York law, regardless of whether the conviction resulted from an admission of guilt or a plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford.

    Summary

    This case concerns the automatic disbarment of an attorney following a federal felony conviction. Levy was convicted of a federal felony under 15 U.S.C. § 645. The Appellate Division subsequently struck his name from the roll of attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Section 90(4) of the Judiciary Law mandates automatic disbarment upon felony conviction, irrespective of whether the federal felony has a direct counterpart in New York law or whether the plea was entered without admitting guilt under North Carolina v. Alford. The court clarified that while the recent amendment to Section 90 does not apply, Levy could seek relief from the Appellate Division under the amended statute.

    Facts

    Appellant Levy, an attorney, was convicted of a felony under Section 645 of Title 15 of the United States Code. Levy entered his plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, meaning he did not explicitly admit guilt but acknowledged that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to convict him.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division struck Levy’s name from the roll of attorneys following his federal felony conviction. Levy appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney is subject to automatic disbarment in New York State pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4) upon conviction of a federal felony, regardless of whether the federal felony has a direct analogue in New York law or whether the plea was entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford.

    Holding

    Yes, because Subdivision 4 of section 90 of the Judiciary Law mandates automatic disbarment upon conviction of a felony, and this applies to federal felonies even without a New York analogue, and regardless of whether the plea was entered pursuant to North Carolina v Alford.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the clear mandate of Judiciary Law § 90(4), which requires automatic disbarment upon conviction of a felony. The court emphasized that prior interpretations of this section established that an attorney is disbarred upon conviction of a federal felony, even if that felony does not have a direct equivalent under New York law. The court cited Matter of Thies, 45 NY2d 865 and Matter of Chu, 42 NY2d 490 to support this interpretation.

    The court rejected Levy’s argument that the North Carolina v. Alford plea should preclude automatic disbarment. The court reasoned that, regardless of whether Levy admitted guilt, the conviction itself triggered the statutory sanction. The court stated: “Although appellant did not admit his guilt, nonetheless he stood convicted of a felony.”

    While the court acknowledged a recent amendment to Section 90, it clarified that the amendment did not apply to this specific appeal. However, the court noted that Levy could petition the Appellate Division for relief under the amended statute if he so chose.

    The court explicitly declined to address the issue of whether the federal offense had a New York counterpart, deeming it unnecessary to the disposition of the case and suggesting the Appellate Division should consider the question anew if a proper application were made.

  • Matter of Ginsberg, 43 N.Y.2d 260 (1977): Mandatory Disbarment for Attorneys Convicted of Federal Felonies

    Matter of Ginsberg, 43 N.Y.2d 260 (1977)

    A New York attorney’s conviction of a federal felony mandates automatic disbarment, regardless of whether the equivalent conduct would constitute a felony under New York law.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a New York attorney’s conviction for a federal felony automatically triggers disbarment under New York Judiciary Law, even if the underlying conduct wouldn’t be a felony under New York law. The Court of Appeals held that it does, extending the automatic disbarment rule to all federal felony convictions. The majority reasoned that prior case law interpreting the statute mandates this result, while the dissent argued for a more nuanced approach that considers the gravity of the offense and mitigating circumstances.

    Facts

    Ginsberg, an attorney admitted to practice in New York, was convicted of a federal felony. The specific nature of the federal felony is not detailed in this opinion. The issue before the court was solely whether this federal felony conviction automatically required his disbarment in New York.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals to determine the proper application of Judiciary Law § 90(4) regarding the disbarment of attorneys convicted of felonies.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction for any federal felony mandates automatic disbarment of a New York attorney, irrespective of whether the conduct would constitute a felony under New York law.

    Holding

    Yes, because prior interpretations of Judiciary Law § 90(4) mandate automatic disbarment for any felony conviction, including federal felonies, without regard to whether the equivalent conduct is a felony under New York law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court majority based their decision on the precedent set by Matter of Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, which interpreted Judiciary Law § 90(4) to require automatic disbarment upon felony conviction. They extended this rule to all federal felony convictions, stating that the statute’s language and prior judicial interpretations left no room for considering whether the underlying conduct would constitute a felony under New York law. The Court emphasized the need for a clear and consistently applied rule. The dissenting judges argued that the majority’s decision was an unwarranted extension of the disbarment rule and a direct overruling of the spirit, if not the letter, of Donegan. They contended that the gravity of the offense and mitigating circumstances should be considered before imposing such a severe penalty as disbarment, stating that a rigid, per se rule is needlessly harsh. The dissent argued for a more flexible approach that allows for consideration of individual circumstances, quoting the concurring opinion in Matter of Chu, 42 N.Y.2d 490, 495, which advocated for firm discipline without sacrificing fairness and reason. The dissent predicted that the majority’s inflexible rule would lead to aberrant results that could only be avoided by legislative action.

  • Matter of Gutman, 43 N.Y.2d 467 (1977): Defining ‘Felony’ for Attorney Disbarment Purposes

    Matter of Gutman, 43 N.Y.2d 467 (1977)

    An attorney’s conviction for criminal conduct deemed a felony by Congress warrants automatic disbarment in New York, even if the corresponding state law doesn’t precisely mirror the federal statute.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an attorney’s federal felony conviction mandated automatic disbarment under New York Judiciary Law. Gutman was convicted in federal court for making false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Bar Association sought his disbarment, arguing the federal crime was equivalent to a New York felony. The Appellate Division denied automatic disbarment, finding the state crime required ‘intent to defraud the state,’ absent in the federal offense. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a federal felony conviction, particularly when a substantially similar state felony exists, is sufficient grounds for automatic disbarment to protect the public.

    Facts

    Respondent Gutman, an attorney, was indicted on 14 counts of federal felonies related to procuring permanent residency for aliens through arranged marriages. He was convicted on 10 counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for making false statements and submitting fraudulent documents to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He received a suspended sentence, probation, and a fine.

    Procedural History

    The Bar Association petitioned for Gutman’s disbarment based on the felony conviction. The Appellate Division denied the petition for automatic disbarment, appointing a referee for disciplinary proceedings. The Bar Association appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether conviction of an attorney for a federal felony, specifically violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, mandates automatic disbarment under New York Judiciary Law § 90(4), even if the elements of the federal crime and a comparable New York state felony (offering a false instrument for filing) are not identical.

    Holding

    Yes, because conviction of an attorney for criminal conduct judged by Congress to be a felony is sufficient ground to invoke automatic disbarment, especially when there is a New York State felony of substantially the same elements. The court determined that the purpose of attorney discipline is to protect the public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the focus of attorney disciplinary proceedings is protecting the public, unlike criminal sentencing which is focused on individual punishment. While acknowledging past reliance on comparisons between federal and state felonies in disbarment cases, the court moved away from requiring an exact mirror image between the federal and state crimes. The Court stated, “When it is the underlying conduct of the attorney which calls for disciplinary response, it makes little sense to say that although that conduct has been defined as felonious throughout the Nation under Federal law, the attorney is not to be automatically disbarred unless our State Legislature has enacted a precisely matching felony statute. To accord determinative significance to such statutory discrepancy would be to elevate insignificance.”

    The court found a close parallelism between the federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 1001) and the New York State felony of offering a false instrument for filing (Penal Law § 175.35). Although the state law requires ‘intent to defraud the state,’ the court held that the core of both offenses is the willful filing of a false statement in a governmental office, knowing it to be false. The court effectively lowered the bar, stating: “[W]hatever may have been the proper evaluation of a felony conviction in courts other than those of our own State in 1940 when Donegan was decided, we now perceive little or no reason for distinguishing between conviction of a Federal felony and conviction of a New York State felony as a predicate for professional discipline.”

  • In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285 (1940): Defining ‘Felony’ for Attorney Disbarment Purposes

    In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285 (1940)

    For the purposes of automatic disbarment under New York Judiciary Law, the term “felony” only includes federal felonies that are also felonies under New York law, not federal felonies that would only be misdemeanors under New York law.

    Summary

    An attorney was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to use the mails to defraud, a felony under federal law. New York law, however, generally treats conspiracy as a misdemeanor. The Appellate Division disbarred the attorney, interpreting New York Judiciary Law to require automatic disbarment upon conviction of any federal felony. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the term “felony” in the Judiciary Law refers only to those federal felonies that would also be felonies under New York law. This interpretation avoids the severe consequence of automatic disbarment for conduct that New York considers a less serious offense. The court emphasized that while disbarment isn’t technically punishment, it carries severe consequences and thus the statute must be strictly construed.

    Facts

    The appellant, an attorney, was convicted in federal court for conspiracy to use the mails to defraud, a violation of federal law. Under federal law, this crime is classified as a felony. However, under New York law, conspiracy is generally classified as a misdemeanor, unless specific provisions dictate otherwise. The Appellate Division, relying on its interpretation of the Judiciary Law, automatically disbarred the appellant based solely on the federal felony conviction.

    Procedural History

    The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted the appellant. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, and the President of the United States denied a petition for pardon. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department, then disbarred the appellant based on the federal conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “felony,” as used in the New York Judiciary Law sections mandating automatic disbarment upon conviction of a felony, includes an offense defined as a felony by federal statute, but which would only be a misdemeanor under New York law.

    Holding

    No, because the term “felony” in the context of Judiciary Law sections 88 and 477 only includes those federal felonies that are also considered felonies under New York law. Strict construction of the statute requires this interpretation, especially considering the severe consequences of automatic disbarment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the term “felony” lacks a universal definition and varies across jurisdictions. While the Judiciary Law references presidential pardons (suggesting inclusion of some federal crimes), it doesn’t explicitly define “felony.” The court noted that historically, New York courts have interpreted similar statutes (e.g., those concerning witness disqualification and fiduciary appointments) to apply only to crimes classified as felonies under New York law. In Sims v. Sims, the court held that disqualification as a witness only applied to convictions within New York State. The court also emphasized that while disbarment isn’t strictly a punishment, it carries significant consequences akin to punishment, requiring strict construction of the statute. The court stated, “Strict construction of section 88, subdivision 3, and section 477 of the Judiciary Law requires that the term ‘felony’ include only those Federal felonies which are also felonies under the laws of this State, and exclude such Federal felonies as are ‘cognizable by our laws as a misdemeanor or not at all.’” Finally, the court clarified that its decision doesn’t limit the Appellate Division’s discretion to discipline attorneys under other provisions of the Judiciary Law, and that the federal conviction serves as prima facie evidence of guilt.