People v. Bryant, 92 N.Y.2d 216 (1998)

Under New York’s statutory double jeopardy provision, a subsequent state prosecution is not barred if the state and federal offenses each contain a distinct element and are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.

Summary

Defendants were involved in an armed bank robbery, leading to a high-speed chase and shootout with police. They were initially prosecuted and convicted on federal charges. Subsequently, the state brought charges stemming from the same incident. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the state charges were barred by statutory double jeopardy. The Court held that the state prosecution was permissible under an exception to New York’s double jeopardy statute (CPL 40.20[2][b]) because the state and federal offenses each contained distinct elements and were designed to prevent different kinds of harm.

Facts

On June 18, 1993, Michael Jones, Dennis Sims, and John Bryant committed an armed robbery at a Marine Midland Bank in Pearl River, New York. During their escape, they engaged in a shootout with police, including Officer Steven Gentile, and a high-speed chase ensued. The defendants were eventually apprehended.

Procedural History

The defendants were initially charged and convicted in federal court on charges including bank robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, and firearms offenses. Subsequently, a Rockland County Grand Jury indicted the defendants on state charges, including attempted murder of Officer Gentile and weapons possession. The County Court dismissed some of the state charges but allowed the attempted murder and weapons possession charges to proceed. Following a trial, Jones and Sims were convicted on weapons possession charges, and Bryant was convicted of attempted assault and weapons possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the subsequent state prosecution for attempted murder and weapons possession was barred by statutory double jeopardy under CPL 40.20(2) because of the prior federal prosecution arising from the same criminal transaction.

2. Whether the sentences imposed on the state weapons possession convictions should run consecutively to each other and to the federal sentences.

Holding

1. No, because the state and federal offenses each contain a distinct element, and the statutory provisions defining those offenses are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm or evil.

2. No, because the acts of possessing the defaced weapons were distinct, and neither act was a material element of the other offense.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals analyzed New York’s statutory double jeopardy provision, CPL 40.20, which generally prohibits successive prosecutions for offenses based on the same criminal transaction. However, the Court emphasized the exception in CPL 40.20(2)(b), which permits subsequent prosecutions if each offense contains a distinct element and the statutes are designed to prevent very different kinds of harm. The Court found that the federal bank robbery charges required proof of elements such as forceful taking from a federally insured institution, which were not elements of the state charges. Conversely, the state weapons possession charges required proof that the weapons were defaced, an element not present in the federal charges. The attempted murder charge also required proof that the intended victim was a police officer engaged in official duties. The Court also found that the federal statutes aimed to protect financial institutions, while the state statutes aimed to curtail the availability of defaced firearms and prevent the killing of police officers. "[T]he kinds of harm or evil sought to be regulated under the Federal and State statutes are ‘very different’" (CPL 40.20[2][b]). Regarding consecutive sentencing, the Court relied on People v. Laureano, clarifying that consecutive sentences are permissible where separate acts have occurred, and neither act is a material element of the other. Possessing one defaced weapon and aiding in possessing another were distinct acts.