New York Law Review

Tag: Family Court Jurisdiction

  • H.M. v. E.T., 14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010): Family Court Jurisdiction in Same-Sex Parent Support Cases

    14 N.Y.3d 521 (2010)

    Family Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) to adjudicate a support petition brought by a biological parent seeking child support from their former same-sex partner, based on an assertion of parentage.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the Family Court has jurisdiction to hear a child support petition filed by a biological mother against her former same-sex partner. The mother, H.M., alleged that she and E.T. planned to conceive and raise a child together. E.T. performed the artificial insemination procedure. After the child’s birth, E.T. ended the relationship. H.M. then sought a declaration of parentage and child support in Canada, which was transferred to Family Court in New York under UIFSA. The Court of Appeals held that Family Court does have subject matter jurisdiction because it has the power to determine support obligations of parents, which includes the authority to determine if the respondent is in fact a parent.

    Facts

    H.M. and E.T. were in a romantic relationship from 1989 to 1995, cohabitating for much of that time. They planned to conceive and raise a child together. In 1993, H.M. became pregnant through artificial insemination, performed by E.T. H.M. gave birth in September 1994, with E.T. present and cutting the umbilical cord. Both parties initially participated in the child’s care. Four months after the birth, E.T. ended the relationship, and H.M. moved to Canada with the child. E.T. provided occasional gifts and monetary contributions after the separation.

    Procedural History

    H.M. filed an application in Ontario, Canada, seeking a declaration of parentage and child support, which was transferred to Family Court, Rockland County, New York, under UIFSA. The Family Court Support Magistrate dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Family Court reversed, ordering a hearing on equitable estoppel. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the dismissal. H.M. appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a support petition brought pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) by a biological parent seeking child support from her former same-sex partner.

    Holding

    Yes, because Family Court has jurisdiction to determine the support obligations of parents, which inherently includes the authority to ascertain in certain cases whether a respondent is, in fact, a child’s parent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Family Court, as the designated UIFSA tribunal in New York, must apply the procedural and substantive law generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in the state. The Court emphasized that Family Court has constitutional and statutory jurisdiction over proceedings to determine the support of dependents (except those incidental to marital actions in Supreme Court). Family Court Act § 413(1)(a) states that “the parents of a child…are chargeable with the support of such child.” The court stated, “Family Court indisputably has jurisdiction to determine whether an individual parent—regardless of gender—is responsible for the support of a child.” Furthermore, statutory jurisdiction carries with it ancillary jurisdiction necessary to fulfill the court’s core function. Because H.M. asserted that E.T. is the child’s parent and therefore chargeable with support, the case falls within Family Court’s Article 4 jurisdiction. The court did not address whether the case also falls under Article 5. The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that Family Court lacks the authority to grant equitable relief necessary to declare E.T. a parent. The court emphasized that Family Court and Supreme Court have coextensive authority over child support matters. The relevant statutes, Family Court Act § 413 and Domestic Relations Law § 240, can be enforced in a manner that does not disadvantage litigants in Family Court.

  • Matter of Raymond G., 93 N.Y.2d 533 (1999): Limits on Family Court Jurisdiction over Juvenile Offenders

    Matter of Raymond G., 93 N.Y.2d 533 (1999)

    Family Court’s jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile can be held criminally responsible is limited to cases transferred from criminal court; it does not have original jurisdiction over such cases.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of Family Court jurisdiction over juvenile offenders in New York. Raymond G., a 15-year-old, was charged with delinquency in Family Court for acts that would constitute first-degree assault if committed by an adult. The Court of Appeals held that Family Court lacks original jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile could be held criminally responsible unless the case is removed from a criminal court. The decision reinforces the legislative intent to treat serious juvenile offenses within the adult criminal justice system, reserving Family Court jurisdiction for cases where criminal court deems removal appropriate. This ensures a consistent approach to prosecuting serious juvenile crimes.

    Facts

    Raymond G., a 15-year-old, allegedly participated in an attack at a subway station.

    He was charged with multiple counts of assault, including two counts of first-degree assault, in a designated felony act petition filed in Family Court.

    Raymond G. moved to dismiss the first-degree assault counts, arguing that Family Court lacked jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile could be subject to criminal prosecution.

    Procedural History

    Family Court denied Raymond G.’s motion and asserted jurisdiction.

    Raymond G. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and placed in a limited secure facility.

    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Family Court lacked jurisdiction absent an order of removal from a criminal court.

    The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has original jurisdiction over offenses for which a juvenile can be held criminally responsible, absent an order of removal from a criminal court pursuant to CPL article 725.

    Holding

    No, because Family Court’s jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile can be held criminally responsible is limited to transferrals from criminal court where prosecution was commenced there and subsequently removed to Family Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, emphasizing that the 1978 amendments to the Family Court Act and Penal Law divested Family Court of original jurisdiction over certain serious crimes committed by juveniles. These amendments “criminalized” specific acts committed by 13-, 14-, and 15-year-olds. The Court noted that the legislature intended to subject certain juveniles to criminal prosecution to control violent juvenile crime, which was considered a failure of traditional means. The Court reasoned that the definition of “juvenile delinquent” in the Family Court Act excludes those who are criminally responsible for their conduct by reason of infancy unless the case is removed from a criminal court. The Court rejected the presentment agency’s argument for concurrent jurisdiction, clarifying that while Penal Law § 30.00(3) mentions infancy as a defense, § 30.00(2) expressly eliminates this defense for juvenile offenders. Regarding the designated felony act provisions, the Court explained that these provisions remain relevant for cases transferred from criminal court and for offenses that are designated felonies but do not give rise to juvenile offender status (where infancy defense is still available). Allowing the District Attorney to initially charge a juvenile offender in Family Court would circumvent the legislative directive to have juvenile offenses criminally prosecuted except where a court finds removal appropriate. The Court quoted from Matter of Vega v Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 551, stating that youngsters accused of certain criminal activities are now “automatically prosecuted within the adult criminal justice system unless there exist certain special circumstances warranting more lenient treatment and transfer to the Family Court.”

  • Brescia v. Fitts, 56 N.Y.2d 132 (1982): Modifying Child Support Orders Based on Changed Circumstances

    Brescia v. Fitts, 56 N.Y.2d 132 (1982)

    A court may modify a child support order when there’s a change in circumstances warranting modification, particularly when the child’s right to adequate support is at issue, irrespective of a separation agreement.

    Summary

    In Brescia v. Fitts, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Family Court could modify a child support order based on changed circumstances, despite a pre-existing separation agreement incorporated into a divorce decree. The court held that Family Court has the power to modify child support when the child’s right to adequate support is asserted and a change in circumstances is demonstrated. The court clarified that while separation agreements are generally binding, they don’t diminish a child’s right to adequate support. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for further proceedings to determine if the evidence showed a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant modification.

    Facts

    The parties, married in 1964, entered into a separation agreement in 1975, granting custody of their two children to the mother (petitioner) and providing for declining maintenance and support. A 1977 divorce judgment incorporated the separation agreement and retained concurrent jurisdiction in Supreme Court and Family Court for enforcement or modification. After the mother remarried in 1978, the father’s (respondent’s) support obligation was reduced to $3,000 per child annually. The mother then sought an increase in child support in Family Court, alleging increased needs of the children and an increase in the father’s financial means. The father conceded his ability to pay any deemed inadequate support.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court ordered an upward modification of child support, finding the original separation agreement unfair and not reflective of the children’s future needs. The Appellate Division reversed, citing Matter of Boden v. Boden, holding that a generalized claim of increased needs and increased income was insufficient to warrant modification. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has the power to modify a child support order based on changed circumstances when a pre-existing Supreme Court order directs child support payments and grants concurrent jurisdiction in Family Court to enforce or modify the order.

    Holding

    Yes, because Family Court can order an increase in child support if the petitioner demonstrates a change of circumstances warranting an upward modification when a pre-existing Supreme Court order directs child support payments and grants concurrent jurisdiction in Family Court to enforce or modify the order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Matter of Boden v. Boden, clarifying that Boden applies primarily to disputes solely regarding readjusting parental obligations, not where the child’s right to adequate support is at issue. The court emphasized that Family Court Act § 461 provides that a separation agreement doesn’t diminish a parent’s duty to support their child. Since the Supreme Court order granted concurrent jurisdiction to Family Court, the Family Court could modify the support order upon a showing of changed circumstances. The court stated: “the principles enunciated in Boden are not applicable in every case in which increased child support is sought in the face of a separation agreement.” The court emphasized that the primary goal is to determine the best interests of the children, considering factors like increased needs, cost of living, parental income changes, and the children’s lifestyle. The court noted that the Family Court possesses jurisdiction to modify child support orders when concurrent jurisdiction exists, in contrast to situations where the challenge is to the underlying separation agreement itself, which would require equitable jurisdiction beyond the scope of Family Court. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine if the evidence presented demonstrated a sufficient change in circumstances to justify modifying the child support order, based on the specified guidelines.

  • Matter of La Scala, 36 N.Y.2d 328 (1975): Family Court Jurisdiction Over Expired Alimony Decrees

    Matter of La Scala, 36 N.Y.2d 328 (1975)

    The Family Court lacks jurisdiction to modify a foreign divorce decree under Family Court Act § 466(c) when the alimony or support provision in that decree has already expired by its own terms.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Family Court has jurisdiction to modify a Mexican divorce decree after the alimony provisions within that decree had expired. The wife sought to modify the decree to extend alimony payments beyond the original three-year term specified in the separation agreement (incorporated but not merged into the divorce decree). The Court of Appeals held that the Family Court’s jurisdiction under Family Court Act § 466(c) is limited to decrees with currently effective support provisions. Since the original alimony term had expired, the Family Court lacked the power to order new or continued support. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Family Court’s dismissal of the petition, emphasizing that the Family Court’s jurisdiction is limited by statute.

    Facts

    In 1970, a husband and wife entered into a separation agreement where the husband agreed to pay the wife $1,250 per month for three years.

    The separation agreement was subsequently incorporated, but not merged, into a bilateral Mexican divorce decree.

    After the three-year alimony term expired, the wife initiated a proceeding in Family Court.

    The wife sought to modify the Mexican decree to require the husband to continue monthly payments of $1,250 until her death or remarriage.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the wife’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s decision.

    The Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Mexican divorce decree, after the expiration of its specified alimony term, constitutes a decree “granting alimony or support” sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Family Court to enforce or modify the decree under Family Court Act § 466(c).

    Holding

    No, because the Family Court’s jurisdiction under Family Court Act § 466(c) is limited to decrees that have a currently effective support or alimony provision at the time the modification proceeding is commenced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and its powers are defined strictly by statute.

    The court interpreted Family Court Act § 466(c) to require a currently effective support or alimony provision in the foreign decree for the Family Court to have jurisdiction to modify it. The court stated, “In our view it is not sufficient that the decree at one time provided for support or alimony payments.”

    The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind § 466(c) was to provide a quick remedy for spouses needing adjustments to existing support levels under foreign decrees, not to empower the Family Court to create new support obligations where none currently exist. The court stated, “We do not think that the Legislature intended to empower the Family Court to order support or alimony in a situation where the spouse is not currently entitled to any support or alimony at all under the existing foreign divorce decree.”

    The Court explicitly limited its holding to the narrow issue of Family Court jurisdiction and did not address any other issues raised by the parties, stating that resolution of those issues would be proper in another forum. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Family Court’s dismissal of the petition.

  • People v. Nuernberger, 25 N.Y.2d 179 (1969): Family Court’s Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Intra-Family Assaults

    People v. Nuernberger, 25 N.Y.2d 179 (1969)

    The Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over any proceeding concerning acts that would constitute an assault between parent and child, even if the assault is charged as a felony in criminal court.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of assault and impairing the morals of a minor after a trial in County Court. The charges stemmed from actions against his 11-year-old daughter. The assault charge was a felony because it was alleged to have been committed with the intent to commit incest. The defendant argued that the County Court lacked jurisdiction because the Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over intra-family assaults. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Family Court did have exclusive original jurisdiction over the assault charge, even though it was a felony, and modified the judgment accordingly.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on charges of incest, assault in the second degree, and impairing the morals of a minor. The charges arose from acts committed against his 11-year-old daughter. The assault charge was elevated to a felony because the prosecution alleged it was committed with the intent to commit incest. The case was brought directly in Erie County Court. The defendant was acquitted of incest but convicted of both assault and impairing the morals of a minor.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in Erie County Court. The defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree and impairing the morals of a minor. The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the County Court lacked jurisdiction over the assault charge because the Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction. A related appeal was filed concerning the denial of habeas corpus. The New York Court of Appeals modified the judgment, reversing the assault conviction and transferring that charge to the Family Court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court had jurisdiction over the assault charge, given that it involved an assault between a parent and child, when the Family Court is statutorily granted “exclusive original jurisdiction” over such matters.

    Holding

    No, because the Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over assault proceedings between parent and child, and that jurisdiction is not circumvented by charging the assault as a felony in criminal court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the explicit language of the Family Court Act, which grants the Family Court “exclusive original jurisdiction” over proceedings involving acts constituting an assault between parent and child. The court cited prior precedent, People v. Johnson, which held that this exclusive original jurisdiction applies to aggravated and felonious assaults within a family group. The court emphasized that this jurisdiction is subject to transfer by the Family Court itself, but it must originate there. The court stated, “If there is to be a prosecution for an assault within the enumerated family group of any degree or for any purpose, the prosecution must begin in the Family Court.” The court reasoned that the intent behind the assault (in this case, allegedly to commit incest) does not alter the jurisdictional requirement. While the court affirmed the conviction for impairing the morals of a minor, it did so because that offense was considered “a different crime” from assault and disorderly conduct. The dissenting judges argued that impairing the morals of a child should also be considered within the Family Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, viewing it as an assault upon the child’s spirit, referencing amendments to the Family Court Act broadening the definition of assault. The dissent further argued that even if impairing morals wasn’t always an assault, the inextricable relation between the charges would still mandate Family Court jurisdiction, citing People v. Fowlkes.

  • People v. Williams, 24 N.Y.2d 274 (1969): Defining ‘Family’ for Family Court Jurisdiction in Assault Cases

    People v. Williams, 24 N.Y.2d 274 (1969)

    The Family Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction over assault and disorderly conduct cases between family members extends only to relationships characterized by a shared living arrangement and significant social, economic, or legal interdependence.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the scope of the Family Court’s jurisdiction over assault and disorderly conduct offenses occurring between individuals defined as “family” or “household” members. The Court of Appeals addressed three separate cases to determine when a dispute falls within the Family Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction, as opposed to the criminal courts. The court held that the term “family” requires a unity of living arrangement and social, economic, or legal interdependence. The court affirmed the criminal conviction of a nephew who assaulted his uncle, finding the incident stemmed from a landlord-tenant relationship rather than a familial one. It also found the Family Court does not extend to living-apart divorced spouses. Finally, the court determined that when assault and non-assault charges are inextricably related, the matter falls under Family Court jurisdiction.

    Facts

    Williams Case: Williams, 30, was convicted of assaulting his uncle after a dispute over eviction from a house owned by the uncle, where Williams lived with his mother and grandparents. The uncle did not reside in the house. The uncle testified that Williams threatened him with a knife during the argument over Williams’ tenancy. Williams paid rent to his grandparents.

    Balassy Case: Balassy was convicted of assaulting his ex-wife. The assault occurred two hours after she served him with a summons for disorderly conduct. Balassy and his ex-wife had a history of reconciliations after their divorce, but they were not living together at the time of the assault.

    Fowlkes Case: Fowlkes was convicted of attempted assault after breaking into his wife’s apartment and stabbing her. He was indicted on assault, burglary, and weapon possession charges. The People conceded the Family Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the assault counts.

    Procedural History

    Williams Case: Williams was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York; the Appellate Term affirmed.

    Balassy Case: Balassy was convicted in the Supreme Court; the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Fowlkes Case: Fowlkes was convicted in the Supreme Court; the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an assault by a nephew against his uncle, where they do not reside in the same household and the dispute arises from a landlord-tenant relationship, falls within the Family Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction?

    2. Whether an assault by a divorced husband upon his former wife falls within the Family Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction?

    3. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over burglary and weapon possession charges when the underlying intent element is to commit an assault for which the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction?

    Holding

    1. No, because the uncle and nephew did not share a common living arrangement, and the assault stemmed from a landlord-tenant dispute rather than a familial one.

    2. No, because divorce dissolves the special matrimonial or family considerations that make the Family Court the appropriate forum; the object of saving the marriage is gone.

    3. No, because when assault and non-assault charges are inextricably related by a common element (intent), the matter lies in the first instance within the jurisdiction of the Family Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Family Court’s “family jurisdiction” was intended to address disputes arising in relationships characterized by “a unity of living arrangement, and of social, economic, and, perhaps, legal interdependence.” The Court emphasized that this jurisdiction was primarily meant to handle inter-spousal conflicts and similar strife within a family unit, where mediation and ameliorative measures are more appropriate than criminal sanctions.

    In the Williams case, the Court found the uncle-nephew relationship insufficient to trigger Family Court jurisdiction because they did not live together, and the assault was rooted in a landlord-tenant issue.

    In the Balassy case, the Court held that divorce terminates the special matrimonial considerations that warrant Family Court intervention. The Court found, “By divorce, the parties have procured the dissolution of the special matrimonial or family considerations that would otherwise make the Family Court the appropriate forum for the resolution of disputes. The object of saving the marriage is gone.” However, the court required proof of the divorce decree.

    In the Fowlkes case, the Court determined that the burglary and weapon possession charges were inextricably linked to the assault because the intent to commit assault was a necessary element of those crimes. Allowing the Supreme Court to proceed on those charges would circumvent the purpose of the Family Court Act, which grants the Family Court exclusive original jurisdiction over assault cases between spouses. The court stated, “Consequently, when assault and non-assault charges are inextricably related by a common element in the offenses, and not otherwise, the transaction lies in the first instance within the jurisdiction of the Family Court.”

  • Matter of Steinberg v. Steinberg, 18 N.Y.2d 492 (1966): Impact of DRL §236 on Support Obligations for Separated Spouses

    Matter of Steinberg v. Steinberg, 18 N.Y.2d 492 (1966)

    Section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law (DRL) broadened the scope of spousal support obligations, impacting Family Court jurisdiction to award support on a “means” basis even when spouses live apart by mutual consent.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the Family Court has jurisdiction to compel a husband to pay support to his wife beyond what is necessary to prevent her from becoming a public charge when they are living separately by mutual consent. Prior to DRL § 236, support on a “means” basis was generally unavailable in such situations. The Court of Appeals held that DRL § 236 altered the public policy of the state, allowing both the Supreme Court and the Family Court to award support based on the parties’ circumstances, even with a consensual separation. This decision eliminates the prior requirement that a wife offer to return to the marital home before seeking support.

    Facts

    The husband and wife were living separately by mutual consent. The wife sought support from the husband in Family Court on a “means” basis, not merely to avoid becoming a public charge. The husband argued that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to order support beyond public charge levels due to the consensual separation and the absence of an offer by the wife to resume marital relations.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court ordered the husband to pay support. The Appellate Division affirmed. The husband appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law applies to proceedings in the Family Court, authorizing it to award support on a “means” basis to a wife living separately from her husband by mutual consent, even without her offer to return to the marital home.

    Holding

    Yes, because section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law reflects a shift in public policy, granting the Supreme Court authority to order support even when spouses are separated by mutual consent, and this policy extends to the Family Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that prior to DRL § 236, the Supreme Court could not grant alimony to a wife who had lost a separation action due to an agreement to live apart unless she offered to resume marital relations. The Family Court Division of the Domestic Relations Court mirrored this limitation. DRL § 236, effective September 1, 1963, broadened the Supreme Court’s authority in actions for annulment, separation, or divorce, allowing the court to direct support as justice requires, even if the wife’s action fails. While technically applicable only to actions for annulment, separation, or divorce, the Court held that section 236 established a public policy that should be followed by courts in related areas. The Court reasoned that the Family Court could examine facts germane to matrimonial actions for the purpose of deciding support questions, without overstepping its jurisdiction. Citing Michalowski v. Ey, 4 N.Y.2d 277, 282 and Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 86, the court underscored that “a policy so declared sometimes has to be followed by the courts in areas beyond the express reach of the statute for the sake of consistency in the administration of the law”. The Court quoted with approval the Second Department’s decision in St. Germain (23 A.D.2d 763), stating that DRL § 236 “in effect eliminated the husband’s nonliability for support on that ground and thus removed the basis for those pre-1963 holdings”. The Court concluded that DRL § 236 authorizes the Supreme Court to compel a husband to support a wife defeated in a separation action due to a separation agreement, and this applies to the Family Court, authorizing it to award support on a “means” basis under Family Court Act § 412, even with mutual consent separation.