New York Law Review

Tag: false statement

  • Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, 85 N.Y.2d 373 (1995): Standard for Defamation Based on False Statements of Fact

    Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, 85 N.Y.2d 373 (1995)

    In a defamation action based on allegedly false statements of fact, the court must determine whether the contested statements are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation, giving the language a fair reading in the context of the entire publication.

    Summary

    Michael Armstrong, an attorney, sued Simon & Schuster for libel based on a paragraph in the book “Den of Thieves.” The paragraph described Armstrong’s representation of Craig Cogut, alleging Armstrong presented Cogut with a false affidavit to exonerate another client, Lowell Milken, which Cogut refused to sign. Armstrong claimed the paragraph was false and defamatory. The Court of Appeals held that the statement, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, was susceptible of a defamatory meaning because it implied Armstrong attempted to procure a perjured oath. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

    Facts

    Armstrong represented Lowell Milken and later Craig Cogut, an attorney who worked with Lowell. Cogut was subpoenaed during an investigation of Wall Street dealings. Armstrong prepared an affidavit for Cogut intended to exonerate Lowell Milken. Cogut consulted other attorneys, then signed a revised affidavit. Armstrong then submitted the affidavit to the U.S. Attorney on behalf of Lowell Milken. The book “Den of Thieves” contained a paragraph stating Armstrong presented Cogut with an affidavit containing untrue facts, which Cogut angrily refused to sign, leading Cogut to seek new lawyers.

    Procedural History

    Armstrong sued Simon & Schuster for libel. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the statements were true or substantially true, protected by the “opinion” defense, and the “single instance” rule. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the allegedly defamatory statements in “Den of Thieves” concerning Armstrong’s conduct are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning.

    Holding

    Yes, because viewing the statements favorably to the plaintiff, the statement that Cogut refused to sign the affidavit because the facts weren’t true is susceptible of a defamatory meaning, implying Armstrong deliberately presented a false affidavit for Cogut to sign in order to exculpate Lowell, resulting in Cogut’s angry discharge of Armstrong and the retention of new counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on whether the statements were reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning. The Court emphasized that it must give the disputed language a fair reading within the context of the publication. While defendants argued the paragraph was substantially true, the Court found Armstrong’s claim that he never prepared a false affidavit created a factual dispute. The Court stated, “Viewing the statements at issue most favorably to plaintiff, as we must on a dismissal motion, we conclude that this sentence, in the context in which it appears, is susceptible of a defamatory meaning: that Armstrong deliberately presented a false affidavit for one client (Cogut) to sign in order to exculpate another client (Lowell), resulting in Cogut’s angry discharge of Armstrong and the retention of new counsel.” The Court distinguished this case from defamation by implication, emphasizing that Armstrong alleged false statements of verifiable fact, not merely implications arising from truthful statements. The Court noted that Armstrong bears the burden of proving the alleged falsity. Because the court found the statement was potentially defamatory, the case could proceed.

  • In re Valvo, 56 N.Y.2d 116 (1982): Defining ‘Willful’ False Statements in Unemployment Benefits Cases

    In re Valvo, 56 N.Y.2d 116 (1982)

    In unemployment insurance cases, a ‘willful’ false statement requires evidence that the claimant knew their actions constituted employment, and the agency’s interpretation of ’employment’ must align with a common understanding of the term.

    Summary

    This case consolidates three appeals regarding unemployment insurance benefits. In each case, the claimant received benefits and failed to report performing occasional services, leading the agency to determine they made false and willful statements and must repay benefits with penalties. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the claimants’ actions constituted employment, whether their statements were false, and critically, whether they acted willfully. The court emphasized that the agency’s definition of ’employment’ must be reasonably understood by laypersons to support a finding of willfulness and that the agency must prove that the claimant knew their actions constituted employment. The court affirmed in Valvo and reversed in Loll and Polvino.

    Facts

    Grace Valvo, laid off seasonally, wrote a few checks monthly for her friend’s father-in-law’s business without compensation. Debra Loll, laid off from a cashier job, occasionally helped at her father’s drugstore, even after being warned it constituted employment. Josephine Polvino, intermittently laid off from her sons’ construction company, continued clerical duties at home without pay during unemployment periods. All three claimants certified weekly that they were unemployed.

    Procedural History

    The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board initially determined all claimants made false statements and acted willfully, imposing penalties and requiring repayment. The Appellate Division modified in all cases, annulling the penalty and repayment provisions, finding a lack of proof of willfulness. The agency appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Division had relied on a distinction between false factual statements and erroneous conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals reviewed each case separately.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the claimants made false statements when they certified they were unemployed.
    2. Whether the claimants acted willfully in making those statements.
    3. Whether, if the statements were false but not willful, the agency could recover benefits under Labor Law § 597(4) for a ‘false statement’.

    Holding

    1. Yes, in all three cases, the claimants made false statements, because their activities technically constituted employment within the meaning of the statute.
    2. No, in Valvo’s case because there was no reasonable inference she realized writing a few checks constituted employment. Yes, in Loll’s and Polvino’s cases because Loll was warned about her activities, and Polvino’s activities and familial relationship suggested manipulation of employment periods.
    3. No, in Valvo’s case because § 597(4) applies only to false statements of fact, not errors of law. The claimant’s certification of unemployment represented an error of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while the agency’s interpretation of ’employment’ was rational, it didn’t align with common understanding, especially for unskilled laypersons. The agency conceded that to prove ‘willfulness,’ it must show the claimants knew their actions constituted employment. The Court found that in Polvino, the claimant performed the same services while ‘unemployed’ as when ’employed,’ suggesting she knew her actions constituted employment. In Loll, the claimant was warned that her drugstore activities constituted employment, so continuing them demonstrated willfulness. However, in Valvo, there was no evidence to suggest she realized writing a few checks equated to disqualifying employment. The court distinguished its prior decision in Matter of Maguire (Ross) (54 NY2d 965) on the ground that the petitioner’s activities in that case obviously constituted employment.

    Regarding Labor Law § 597(4), the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling that the statute only applies to ‘false statements of fact,’ not erroneous legal conclusions. Therefore, Valvo was not required to repay benefits under this section. The court stated, “section 597 permits recovery of benefits received within the past year when the claimant has made a false statement of fact even though unintended. However, when claimant has in good faith received benefits to which he or she was not entitled because of a mistake of law on the part of the claimant or the agency, none of the benefits may be recovered.”

  • People v. Trozzo, 40 N.Y.2d 837 (1976): Perjury Requires Intentional False Statement

    People v. Trozzo, 40 N.Y.2d 837 (1976)

    A perjury conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally made a false statement that they did not believe to be true.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s perjury conviction, holding that the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally made a false statement under oath. The defendant, called before a grand jury investigating police corruption, denied making a statement to police officers that he was “on for” policy or numbers. The court found that the prosecutor’s questioning, while sharp, was not entrapping or deceptive, and that the defendant’s denial was purposeful and not the result of trickery or misunderstanding.

    Facts

    The defendant was called as a witness before a Bronx County Grand Jury investigating New York City police corruption.

    At trial, two police officers testified that the defendant had stated in their presence that he was “on for” policy or numbers, but not bookmaking.

    Before the grand jury, the defendant was repeatedly asked if he had made the statement attributed to him by the officers and initially claimed he could not remember.

    The prosecutor then asked the defendant directly whether he had told the officers, in words or substance, that he was paying off police officers by saying he was “on for policy,” to which the defendant answered “No.”

    When pressed further, the defendant added, “How could I say that if I was never on?” and affirmed that he did not make the statement because he was never involved in policy.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of perjury in the trial court.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally made a false statement that he did not believe to be true, thus supporting his conviction for perjury.

    Holding

    Yes, because the jury was privileged to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally made a false statement which he did not believe to be true, based on his grand jury testimony and the surrounding circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied Penal Law § 210.15, which defines perjury and requires proof that the defendant made a false statement that they did not believe to be true.

    The court reasoned that, despite the defendant’s initial claims of memory lapse, his ultimate denial of having made the statement, coupled with his rhetorical question, “How could I say that [I was on for policy] if I was never on?”, demonstrated a purposeful and unequivocal denial.

    The court rejected the defendant’s argument that he was entrapped or tricked by the prosecutor’s questioning, finding that the examination, while “sharp and exacting,” was not deceptive.

    The court emphasized that reading the defendant’s testimony as a whole, it was apparent that his denial was purposeful, not unintended, and certainly not tricked.

    The dissent argued that the witness was tricked by a logic he could not understand and by questions that could not prevail over objections in an adversary proceeding to make an assertion he never intended to make.

    The majority opinion highlights the importance of the defendant’s unequivocal denial and subsequent bolstering statement. This shows the distinction between a simple inability to recall (which might not be perjury) and a deliberate false statement. A key element was the defendant adding “How could I say that if I was never on?”, indicating he wasn’t just forgetting, but affirmatively denying the statement’s truth and implying he never would have said it.