People v. Brown, 20 N.Y.2d 238 (1967)
Evidence of a prior identification is admissible, and a claim of unfairness in the identification process will only warrant reversal if prejudice to the defendant is shown.
Summary
The defendant, Brown, was convicted of grand larceny. He appealed, arguing that evidence of false representations was improperly admitted and that the identification procedure was unfair. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the complaining witness was not induced to part with her money through false pretenses, and the identification procedure, while not ideal, did not prejudice the defendant. The court reasoned that the false pretenses occurred after the theft, and the identification by the complaining witness was reliable enough to uphold the conviction.
Facts
Jennie Finch withdrew $200 from a bank to purchase a money order for taxes. Outside the bank, she met Brown, who asked her for directions. Meyers then joined them, and they all looked for an address in a telephone book. Finch entered their car, and after driving around, returned to the bank and withdrew an additional $800 for her granddaughter’s hospital bill. Upon exiting the bank a second time, she was pushed back into the car. Brown and Meyers then stole $950 from her bag. Afterward, Brown made false statements about the money being food stamps, not a bank book. Finch later identified Brown at the police station.
Procedural History
Brown was convicted of grand larceny in the first degree. He appealed the conviction, arguing that evidence of false representations or pretenses was illegally introduced, violating Penal Law § 1290-a, and that the identification procedure was unfair. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s judgment, upholding Brown’s conviction.
Issue(s)
1. Whether evidence of false representations or pretenses was improperly admitted against Brown in violation of Penal Law § 1290-a, where the representations occurred after the theft.
2. Whether the identification procedure used by the police was so unfair as to warrant reversal of Brown’s conviction.
Holding
1. No, because the false representations occurred after the larceny had already been committed, and thus, did not induce the victim to part with her money.
2. No, because under the specific circumstances of this case, the identification procedure did not result in prejudice to the defendant.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that Penal Law § 1290-a prohibits the admission of evidence of false representations or pretenses only if they were used to accomplish, aid, or facilitate a theft. Here, the false statements made by Brown occurred after Finch had already been pushed into the car and her money had been taken. Therefore, they could not have induced her to part with her money. The court emphasized that Finch’s testimony indicated the theft occurred through force, not deception.
Regarding the identification, the court acknowledged the United States Supreme Court cases of United States v. Wade, Stovall v. Denno, and Gilbert v. California, which addressed the right to counsel at police lineups. However, the court noted that these cases were not retroactive and, therefore, did not directly apply to Brown’s appeal. Furthermore, the court addressed the defense’s argument that the lineup consisting of only two black defendants and one white detective was inherently unfair. It held that despite this fact pattern, the defendant had not shown actual prejudice. The court implicitly found that Finch’s initial encounter with Brown provided an independent basis for her identification, mitigating any potential unfairness in the lineup procedure. “Under the circumstances of this case there was no prejudice in the identification of appellant by the complainant.”