People v. Sabella, 35 N.Y.2d 158 (1974)

A perjury conviction requires proof of a false assertion, and the corroboration of that assertion must directly support its falsity, not merely demonstrate the incorrectness of an inference drawn from the assertion.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s perjury conviction, holding that the corroborating evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient under Penal Law § 210.50. The defendant was indicted for perjury based on his Grand Jury testimony regarding who attended a meeting. The prosecution’s corroborating witness testified in a way that undermined an inference the defendant made in his testimony, but it did not directly corroborate the falsity of the testimony of another witness who denied the meeting ever took place. The court emphasized that perjury requires a false assertion, not merely an incorrect inference.

Facts

In 1973, Defendant Sabella testified before a Grand Jury. Sabella’s testimony included statements about a meeting in 1966 and who was present. During the testimony, Sabella inferred that a particular District Attorney, Marchese, ‘could have been’ present at the meeting. The prosecution alleged that Sabella’s testimony was perjurious.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted of perjury. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the second count of the indictment related to the perjury charge.

Issue(s)

Whether the prosecution presented sufficient corroborating evidence, as required by Penal Law § 210.50, to sustain a conviction for perjury based on the defendant’s Grand Jury testimony?

Holding

No, because the corroborating witness’s testimony only showed that the defendant’s inference about who attended the meeting was incorrect, but did not corroborate the falsity of the testimony of another witness who stated the meeting never happened.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals focused on the statutory requirement of corroboration in perjury cases, specifically Penal Law § 210.50. The court emphasized that the corroboration must support the falsity of the defendant’s *assertion*, not merely the incorrectness of an *inference* he drew. The court stated, “Perjury depends upon a false assertion, not upon an inference stated to be such and which turns out to be incorrect.” The former Assistant District Attorney’s testimony (Judge Marchese), intended as corroboration, only served to suggest that Sabella’s inference about Marchese’s presence at the meeting might have been wrong. However, it did not corroborate the testimony of another witness, denying that any meeting had ever taken place. The court implicitly acknowledges the high bar for perjury convictions, requiring direct and substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of truthfulness afforded to sworn testimony. The court held the purported corroboration related to an inference drawn by defendant in his 1973 Grand Jury testimony regarding who-was present at a 1966 meeting was insufficient because the testimony of the corroborating witness tended to establish that defendant incorrectly inferred who had been at the meeting, but did not corroborate, as required by law, the testimony of the other witness denying that any meeting had ever taken place.