New York Law Review

Tag: Falling Object

  • Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 539 (2016): Clarifying the Scope of Labor Law § 240(1) and ‘Falling Objects’

    Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 539 (2016)

    Labor Law § 240(1) applies to falling object injuries only when the object is being hoisted or secured, or requires securing for the purposes of the undertaking, and the injury is proximately caused by the absence or inadequacy of a safety device enumerated in the statute.

    Summary

    An electrician, Runner, was injured when a conduit pipe fell on his hand while relocating a pencil box. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1), claiming the compression coupling securing the conduit was inadequate. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s denial of summary judgment for the defendants (building owner and general contractor), holding that the compression coupling was not a safety device within the meaning of the statute. The Court clarified that § 240(1) liability for falling objects requires proof that the object was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the task at hand, and that the injury resulted from the lack of, or inadequate, safety device listed in the statute. Here, the coupling’s purpose was support, not worker protection.

    Facts

    Runner, an electrician, was tasked with relocating a “pencil box” (access point for telecommunication wires) that was connected to conduit piping. The pencil box was affixed between two vertical sections of conduit. Runner cut the conduit above and below the pencil box, removed the box, and began drilling new holes to relocate the support. Approximately 15 minutes later, the top conduit section, which was connected to a horizontal conduit near the ceiling by a compression coupling, fell and injured Runner’s hand.

    Procedural History

    Runner sued the building owner (1095 Avenue of the Americas), the general contractor (J.T. Magen Construction), and the tenant (Dechert, LLP), among others, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). Supreme Court granted Runner’s motion for partial summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified, denying Runner’s motion but otherwise affirming. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order regarding the building owner and general contractor, granting their motion for summary judgment, and answered the certified question in the negative.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the compression coupling connecting the conduit pipe constituted a safety device within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1), such that its alleged inadequacy could give rise to liability for a falling object injury.

    Holding

    No, because the compression coupling was not a safety device intended to protect against falling objects, but rather a standard component used to support the conduit/pencil box assembly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability only where the failure to provide proper protection is a proximate cause of the worker’s injury. To prevail in a falling object case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the object was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purposes of the undertaking, and that the injury was due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device enumerated in the statute. The Court distinguished between devices meant to provide general support and those intended for worker protection from falling objects. Quoting Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., the court reiterated that a plaintiff must show that the object fell “because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute”. Here, the compression coupling’s function was to keep the conduit together, not to prevent it from falling and injuring workers. The court noted that the plaintiff’s argument would inappropriately extend the statute’s reach to any component that lends support to a structure. The Court also noted that the fact that plaintiff suggested a different type of coupling (set screw coupling) would have been better was of no moment, because both couplings serve the same purpose of support and neither is a safety device within the meaning of the statute.

  • Wilinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1 (2011): Clarifying ‘Falling Object’ Liability Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Wilinski v. 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 1 (2011)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) liability for falling objects is not categorically barred simply because the injured worker and the base of the falling object were at the same level; the key inquiry is whether the injury resulted from a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.

    Summary

    Antoni Wilinski, a demolition worker, was injured when unsecured metal pipes toppled onto him after being struck by debris from a nearby wall demolition. The pipes and Wilinski were on the same floor level. He sued under Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Wilinski on the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the accident was not elevation-related because the pipes and Wilinski were at the same level. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the “same level” is not a categorical bar to recovery. The Court emphasized that the central question is whether the injury stemmed from inadequate protection against risks involving a significant elevation differential, remanding for a determination of whether a safety device was required here.

    Facts

    Antoni Wilinski was demolishing brick walls at a warehouse owned by 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp. Two unsecured, 10-foot metal plumbing pipes stood vertically on the same floor where Wilinski worked. Earlier that day, Wilinski expressed concern about the pipes being unsecured during the demolition. No safety measures were taken. Debris from the wall demolition struck the pipes, causing them to fall four feet and hit Wilinski, causing injuries.

    Procedural History

    Wilinski sued, alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Wilinski on the § 240(1) claim and denied the defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division modified, denying Wilinski’s § 240(1) summary judgment motion and dismissing the § 240(1) claim, relying on Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division’s modification was proper.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) categorically bars recovery for injuries caused by a falling object when the injured worker and the base of the object are at the same level.

    Holding

    No, because Misseritti does not establish a categorical “same level” exclusion; the critical inquiry is whether the injury resulted from a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals clarified its prior holdings regarding Labor Law § 240(1), stating that its jurisprudence centers on providing adequate protection from reasonably preventable, gravity-related accidents. The court distinguished Misseritti, emphasizing that the lack of a causal nexus between the injury and the failure of a device prescribed by § 240(1), not the “same level,” was the basis for the Misseritti decision. The Court stated that the “same level” rule ignores the nuances of a § 240(1) analysis. The Court also distinguished the case from other cases, noting that the pipes were not themselves the target of demolition and should have been secured. Citing Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., the Court reiterated that “the single decisive question is whether plaintiffs injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential.” Here, the height differential between the pipes and Wilinski was not de minimis. The Court remanded the case for a factual determination of whether the injuries were proximately caused by the lack of a required safety device. Regarding the § 241(6) claim, the Court upheld the Appellate Division’s interpretation of 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(b)(3), stating that the plaintiff need not show that the pipes fell due to wind pressure or vibration. The court also found the defendants failed to show they complied with 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(c) regarding continuing inspections.

  • Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001): Scope of “Falling Object” Liability Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001)

    Under Labor Law § 240(1), “falling object” liability extends beyond objects being hoisted or secured, applying to inadequately secured objects used as makeshift supports, but the plaintiff’s own culpable conduct can preclude summary judgment.

    Summary

    Narducci sued Manhasset Bay Associates under Labor Law § 240(1) after being injured by falling planks used as a makeshift shelf. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division correctly denied summary judgment for the defendants. The court clarified that “falling object” liability isn’t limited to objects being hoisted or secured and can apply to inadequately secured objects. However, summary judgment was inappropriate here because there were triable issues of fact concerning whether the planks were adequately secured for their purpose and whether the plaintiff’s actions contributed to the accident.

    Facts

    Narducci, a construction worker, was injured when planks placed over open doorways, acting as a makeshift shelf, fell and struck him. The planks were intended to facilitate the installation of an air conditioner above the doorway. Narducci claimed the planks were inadequately secured. The defendants contended that Narducci was warned not to enter the doorway area and that his own actions in jostling the doors caused the planks to fall.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, denying partial summary judgment to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) liability for falling objects is limited to situations where the object is being hoisted or secured, or whether it extends to inadequately secured objects serving as makeshift supports.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 240(1) liability for falling objects is not limited to objects being hoisted or secured; it can extend to other inadequately secured objects, although the plaintiff’s own culpable conduct can preclude summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, referencing its holding in Outar v. City of New York, reiterated that falling object liability under Labor Law § 240(1) isn’t confined to instances where the object is actively being hoisted or secured. The court emphasized the remedial nature of the statute, designed to protect workers from elevation-related risks. The court found that the planks, used as a makeshift shelf, fell within the statute’s purview if they were inadequately secured. However, the court also highlighted the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s own actions in disregarding a warning and jostling the doors contributed to the accident. Because of the factual dispute regarding the adequacy of the securing and the plaintiff’s potential culpable conduct, summary judgment was deemed inappropriate. The court stated, “triable questions of fact preclude summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim, including whether the planks were adequately secured in light of the purposes of the plank assembly and whether plaintiff caused the accident by jostling the doors after disregarding a warning not to enter the doorway area.” This case underscores that while the statute is broadly construed to protect workers, the plaintiff’s own negligence can be a factor in determining liability. The concurrence is implicit as all judges concurred in the memorandum opinion.

  • Toefer v. General Electric, 95 N.Y.2d 74 (2000): Illustrating Limits of Labor Law § 240(1) Protection

    95 N.Y.2d 74 (2000)

    Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply when an object falls that is not being hoisted or secured and when a hoisting or securing device would not typically be necessary or expected for the task at hand.

    Summary

    This case concerns the scope of liability under New York Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for injuries to workers caused by gravity-related risks at construction sites. The plaintiff, an asbestos removal employee, was injured when a piece of asbestos, deliberately dropped from a chemical tank above, struck him. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that § 240(1) did not apply because the asbestos was not being hoisted or secured, and no hoisting or securing device was necessary or expected in this situation. This decision clarifies that the statute’s protections are not limitless and require a nexus between the injury and the specific risks associated with elevation-related tasks involving hoisting or securing.

    Facts

    The plaintiff was an employee of an asbestos removal company working at premises owned by General Electric Company. During the asbestos removal process, a piece of asbestos was cut and intentionally dropped from a chemical tank approximately 12 feet above the ground. This piece of asbestos then fell and struck the plaintiff, causing him injury.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff and his wife sued General Electric Company, alleging, among other things, absolute liability under Labor Law § 240(1). The Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the § 240(1) cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with two justices dissenting. General Electric appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to CPLR 5601(d), challenging the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury caused by a piece of asbestos that was deliberately dropped from a height of 12 feet, where the asbestos was not being hoisted or secured at the time it fell.

    Holding

    No, because the asbestos that fell on the plaintiff was not a material being hoisted or a load that required securing for the purposes of the undertaking, and a hoisting or securing device would not have been necessary or expected in this situation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on its prior holding in Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 268 (2001) (Note: the Narducci cite in the original opinion is incorrect, but this brief fixes it.). The court emphasized that the determinative factor is whether the falling object was being hoisted or secured at the time of the accident. The Court reasoned that the purpose of Labor Law § 240(1) is to protect workers from elevation-related risks where hoisting or securing devices are necessary to prevent injuries. Here, the asbestos was intentionally dropped, not hoisted or secured, and the task did not inherently require such devices. The court stated: “This was not a situation where a hoisting or securing device of the kind enumerated in the statute would have been necessary or even expected.” Because the asbestos was not being hoisted or secured, and the situation did not require such measures, the Court concluded that Labor Law § 240(1) was inapplicable. This case demonstrates that not every injury sustained at a construction site falls under the purview of Labor Law § 240(1); the injury must be connected to the specific hazards the statute aims to address: falling objects that should have been hoisted or secured. The key takeaway is that the mere presence of a height differential is insufficient; the injury must arise from a failure to use appropriate safety devices for hoisting or securing materials. The court focused on the nature of the task being performed and whether the injury stemmed from the absence of necessary safety equipment for that task.

  • Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001): Scope of ‘Falling Object’ Liability Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001)

    Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for injuries caused by falling objects only when the objects are being hoisted or secured and fall due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device enumerated in the statute; it does not apply to general workplace hazards or pre-existing structural elements.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address the scope of liability under Labor Law § 240(1) in the context of falling objects. In Narducci, a window frame fell on a worker. In Capparelli, a light fixture fell on an electrician during installation. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 240(1) only applies when the falling object is related to a significant risk inherent in the elevation at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured, and when the object falls because of inadequate safety devices. The court found that neither case involved such risks, limiting the statute’s application to situations involving the hoisting or securing of materials.

    Facts

    In Narducci, Alex Narducci, an employee of Atlantic Windows, was removing steel window frames from a fire-damaged warehouse. While standing on a ladder, a piece of glass from an adjacent window fell and injured him. The glass was part of the pre-existing building structure. In Capparelli, Louis Capparelli, Jr., an electrician, was installing light fixtures into a dropped ceiling. While on a ladder, a light fixture he was installing began to fall, and he injured his hand trying to stop it. Plaintiff did not fall from the ladder in either case.

    Procedural History

    In Narducci, the Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. In Capparelli, the Supreme Court denied cross-motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division modified, granting summary judgment to the third-party defendant, holding that the injury was caused by the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site, not the extraordinary elevation risks covered by Labor Law § 240(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to injuries caused by falling objects that are not being hoisted or secured at the time of the accident.

    2. Whether the fact that a worker is at an elevation when injured by a falling object brings the scenario within the ambit of Labor Law § 240(1) if the object was not being hoisted or secured.

    Holding

    1. No, because Labor Law § 240(1) applies only where the falling of an object is related to a significant risk inherent in the relative elevation at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured, and the object falls due to the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute.

    2. No, because working at an elevation does not increase the risk of being hit by an improperly hoisted load; the hazard posed by working at an elevation is that the worker might be injured in a fall. The different risks arise from different construction practices, and the hazard from one type of activity cannot be transferred to create liability for a different type of accident.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) is intended to protect workers from elevation-related risks stemming from the failure to use adequate safety devices such as scaffolds, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, and ropes. The Court emphasized that the statute’s protections extend to falling objects only when the falling object is related to “a significant risk inherent in * * * the relative elevation * * * at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured.” In Narducci, the falling glass was part of the pre-existing building structure and was not being hoisted or secured. The absence of a hoisting or securing device did not cause the glass to fall; thus, it was a general workplace hazard. In Capparelli, there was no height differential between the plaintiff and the falling object, meaning the injury wasn’t due to an elevation-related risk within the statute’s scope. The Court stated, “Even ‘a violation of [Labor Law § 240 (1)] cannot “establish liability if the statute is intended to protect against a particular hazard, and a hazard of a different kind is the occasion of the injury.”’” The Court distinguished between risks inherent in working at an elevation (falling from a height) and risks associated with falling objects (improper hoisting or securing). It clarified that the statute does not cover every gravity-related accident; courts must discern the Legislature’s intended application. The Court found that the scissor jack was designed to protect the worker from falling, an entirely different risk. Here, the plaintiff was adequately secured, and the only risk was the glass. Since the glass was not an object being hoisted or secured, Labor Law § 240(1) does not apply.

  • Narducci v. Con Edison, 88 N.Y.2d 905 (1996): Establishing Limits on “Falling Object” Claims Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Narducci v. Con Edison, 88 N.Y.2d 905 (1996)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1), concerning elevation-related risks, is not implicated simply because an object falls due to gravity; the object must be elevated above the worksite for the statute to apply.

    Summary

    Narducci, an employee of a general contractor, was injured when a steel plate being moved by a backhoe fell on his foot and shoulder. He sued Con Edison, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), which concerns risks related to elevation differentials at construction sites. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 240(1) did not apply because the steel plate was either resting on the ground or hovering slightly above it, and was not elevated above the worksite, thus not presenting the type of elevation-related risk the statute was designed to protect against. The court emphasized that the mere involvement of gravity is insufficient to trigger § 240(1); the object must be elevated.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Narducci was employed by a general contractor performing excavation work. At the end of each day, workers covered unfilled trenches with heavy steel traffic plates. On the day of the accident, Narducci and a co-employee were directing the placement of a steel plate using a backhoe. The plate was attached to the backhoe’s shovel by a chain with hooks. As the plate was being maneuvered, one of the hooks became unfastened, and the plate toppled over, falling onto Narducci’s foot and striking his shoulder.

    Procedural History

    Narducci sued Con Edison, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The Supreme Court granted Con Edison’s cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing the cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. Narducci appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury caused by a falling object when that object was not elevated above the worksite but was either resting on the ground or hovering slightly above it.

    Holding

    No, because the protections of Labor Law § 240(1) are not implicated simply because an injury is caused by the effects of gravity upon an object; the object must be elevated above the worksite to present the elevation-related risks the statute aims to address.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, emphasizing that Labor Law § 240(1) is intended to address “exceptionally dangerous conditions posed by elevation differentials at work sites.” The court noted that while gravity may have caused the steel plate to fall, the plate was not elevated above the worksite. The court distinguished the case from situations where the statute applies, namely, cases involving “a difference between the elevation level of the required work and a lower level or a difference between the elevation level where the worker is positioned and the higher level of the materials or load being hoisted or secured.” Because the steel plate was resting on the ground or hovering slightly above it, the court concluded that the statute did not apply. The court relied on precedent, specifically citing Misseritti v Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 NY2d 487, 490-491, emphasizing that the statute prescribes safety precautions for workers laboring under unique gravity-related hazards arising from elevation differentials. The court also cited Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 to underscore that not all gravity-related incidents fall under the protection of Labor Law § 240(1). The decision clarifies that a crucial element for a § 240(1) claim involving falling objects is the object’s elevation relative to the worksite.