New York Law Review

Tag: Failure to Provide Safety Devices

  • Gallagher v. New York Post, 13 N.Y.3d 86 (2009): Duty to Provide Safety Devices Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    13 N.Y.3d 86 (2009)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), a property owner is liable for a worker’s injuries if adequate safety devices were not provided, unless the worker knew the devices were readily available, was expected to use them, and chose not to for no good reason, making their own negligence the sole proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    Hugh Gallagher, an ironworker, was injured when he fell through an opening while removing metal decking. He sued NYP Holdings, Inc. (New York Post), alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1) for failure to provide adequate safety devices. Gallagher and another worker stated no safety devices were provided. NYP argued safety devices were available and Gallagher’s prior injury was the sole cause. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting Gallagher summary judgment, holding that NYP failed to show Gallagher knew safety devices were available and chose not to use them, and that his prior injury could not be the sole cause of the fall.

    Facts

    Hugh Gallagher, an ironworker, was assigned to remove metal decking from a building owned by NYP. While using a powered saw, the blade jammed, propelling him through an uncovered opening, resulting in injuries. Gallagher contended no safety devices were provided at the work site. The assistant project manager testified safety harnesses were available and there was a standing order to use them, but could not confirm the order was communicated to the workers. Gallagher had a prior hand injury and the project manager testified that Gallagher told him that he had fallen as he reached to grab the jammed saw with his other hand.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied Gallagher’s motion for summary judgment, finding a factual question about the availability of safety devices. Upon reargument, the court acknowledged an affidavit stating no safety devices were provided but still denied the motion, suggesting Gallagher’s premature return to work and grip weakness might be the sole proximate cause. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding factual issues about the availability of safety devices and instruction to use them. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granting Gallagher summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether NYP violated Labor Law § 240(1) by failing to provide adequate safety devices to Gallagher, and if so, whether Gallagher’s actions or prior injury were the sole proximate cause of his injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because NYP failed to demonstrate that Gallagher knew safety devices were available and unreasonably chose not to use them. Further, Gallagher’s prior injury could not be the sole proximate cause of his fall.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Gallagher presented a prima facie case of a Labor Law § 240(1) violation through affidavits stating no safety devices were provided. The burden shifted to NYP to raise a factual question. Citing Montgomery v. Federal Express Corp., the court distinguished the case, noting there was no evidence Gallagher knew where to find safety devices or that he was expected to use them. The court emphasized that the assistant project manager’s testimony about a “standing order” was insufficient, as he couldn’t confirm it was communicated to workers. The foreman’s affidavit corroborated the lack of safety devices. The court stated that even if Gallagher’s grip was weakened due to a prior injury, it would only contribute to his loss of balance, not be the sole proximate cause of the fall. The court found that NYP failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether Gallagher knew of the availability of safety devices and unreasonably chose not to use them, thus reversing the Appellate Division and granting summary judgment to Gallagher.

  • Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 513 (1985): Establishes Absolute Liability for Failure to Provide Any Safety Devices Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    65 N.Y.2d 513 (1985)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), an owner or contractor is absolutely liable for injuries sustained by a worker when they fail to provide any safety devices at a building worksite, and this failure is the proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases concern the liability of owners and contractors under New York Labor Law § 240(1) for failing to provide safety devices at construction sites. In Zimmer, an ironworker was injured when he fell while erecting a steel skeleton. In Hunt, an ironworker fell from a roof while welding. In both cases, no safety devices were provided. The Court of Appeals held that an owner or contractor is absolutely liable under § 240(1) when they fail to provide any safety devices, and that failure proximately causes a worker’s injuries. Evidence of industry custom or the feasibility of safety devices is irrelevant when no devices are provided at all.

    Facts

    Zimmer:

    Plaintiff, an ironworker, was injured while erecting a steel skeleton for a building addition.

    He scaled a 31-foot column to direct a crane operator.

    He lost his grip and fell, striking a beam and landing in an excavation.

    No safety devices were provided, though ladders were present but not used for his specific task.

    Hunt:

    Plaintiff, an ironworker, fell 25 feet from a flat roof while welding corrugated decking.

    No safety devices were provided.

    Defendants presented evidence of industry custom and usage, arguing safety devices were not typically used on this type of building.

    Procedural History

    Zimmer:

    The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict, and the jury found for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Hunt:

    The trial court reserved decision on the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury. The jury found no cause of action. The trial court then granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability, which the Appellate Division affirmed.

    The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed the Appellate Division in Zimmer and affirmed in Hunt.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an owner or contractor is liable under Labor Law § 240(1) when they fail to provide any safety devices at a construction site, and that failure is the proximate cause of a worker’s injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors who fail to provide any safety devices to workers at a construction site when such failure proximately causes injury, irrespective of industry custom or the feasibility of such devices. The statute’s purpose is to protect workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety on owners and contractors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislative history of the Labor Law demonstrates an intent to protect workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety on owners and contractors. The Court emphasized that § 240(1) is to be construed liberally to accomplish this purpose. The Court distinguished between violations of specific statutory provisions like § 240(1) and violations of administrative rules promulgated under § 241(6). A violation of § 240(1), which contains specific safety measures, creates absolute liability, while a violation of § 241(6) does not. In cases where no safety devices are provided, industry custom and usage are immaterial. Evidence of custom and usage is admissible under sections 200 and 241(6) to determine the standard of care in a negligence context, but not for a section 240(1) violation because this section establishes its own unvarying standard. The court quoted Quigley v Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 68, stating that the statute “is one for the protection of workmen from injury and undoubtedly is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was thus framed.” The dissent argued that the statute should not impose liability when no safety devices were available or adaptable to the situation, and that proximate cause is a necessary element that is a jury question.