New York Law Review

Tag: Failure to Preserve Evidence

  • People v. Jardin, 88 N.Y.2d 956 (1996): State’s Duty to Preserve Evidence for DNA Testing

    People v. Jardin, 88 N.Y.2d 956 (1996)

    The state does not violate a defendant’s due process rights by failing to gather and preserve evidence for DNA testing unless the evidence was material and possessed an exculpatory value that was evident before its destruction, loss, or failure to preserve, and the defendant was unable to obtain comparable evidence by reasonable means.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for first-degree rape, rejecting his claim that the prosecution’s failure to gather and preserve a semen sample for DNA testing violated his due process rights. The complainant testified to forcible penetration, while the defendant admitted to consensual oral sex but denied intercourse. The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the potential DNA evidence was material and possessed exculpatory value before the failure to preserve it, and that he could not obtain comparable evidence. Because identification was never an issue, and the People did not introduce DNA evidence, no due process violation occurred.

    Facts

    The complainant, familiar with the 60-year-old defendant, visited his apartment late at night to assist him with homework on June 27, 1990. After helping him, she attempted to leave, but the defendant allegedly forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. A neighbor, witnessing part of the incident through a window, reported a possible rape to the police, who arrived while the complainant was still in the apartment. Subsequent testing confirmed the presence of sperm in the complainant’s vagina, but the quantity was insufficient for DNA testing.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree rape following a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s failure to gather and adequately preserve a sample of semen for DNA testing violated his due process rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s failure to gather and adequately preserve a sample of semen sufficient for DNA testing violated the defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the potential evidence was material and possessed exculpatory value before its destruction, loss, or failure to preserve, and that the defendant was unable to obtain comparable evidence by reasonable means.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard articulated in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) and People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375 (1987), which requires a defendant to demonstrate that the potential evidence was material, meaning it possessed an exculpatory value evident before its destruction, loss, or failure to preserve. The court emphasized that the defendant also needed to show he could not obtain comparable evidence by reasonable means. The court noted that identification was never an issue in the case, and the People did not offer any DNA evidence. The court found that the defendant failed to meet the burden of showing the semen sample had exculpatory value before its failure to be preserved. As such, the lower courts did not err by denying a hearing and precluding cross-examination on the failure to conduct DNA testing. The decision highlights the importance of establishing the materiality and exculpatory nature of unpreserved evidence to support a due process claim. The Court referenced California v Trombetta, 467 US 479, 489; People v Alvarez, 70 NY2d 375.

  • People v. Bryce, 88 N.Y.2d 124 (1996): Prosecution’s Duty to Preserve and Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

    88 N.Y.2d 124 (1996)

    The prosecution has a duty to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence and to disclose such evidence to the defense; failure to do so, even in good faith, may warrant a new trial if there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence been disclosed.

    Summary

    Bryce was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his infant son. The prosecution argued that Bryce inflicted fatal injuries, while Bryce claimed the death was accidental. Key to the prosecution’s case was evidence of a skull fracture, which their experts claimed could not have been accidental. Prior to trial, Bryce requested the skull and brain tissue for examination but received only a small bone fragment and unrelated organs. After conviction, the infant’s body was exhumed, revealing that the skull had not been preserved and showed no frontal fracture. Bryce moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that the prosecution failed to preserve and disclose exculpatory evidence. The Court of Appeals held that a hearing was required to determine if the prosecution misrepresented the availability of the skull and whether the skull constituted Brady material, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Bryce’s seven-week-old son died from a brain hemorrhage due to a fractured skull. The prosecution’s theory was that Bryce inflicted the injuries while caring for the child. Bryce admitted to dropping and shaking the infant but claimed it was accidental. The prosecution’s medical experts testified that the skull fracture could not have been accidental and resulted from excessive force. Bryce’s experts testified that they found no evidence of a frontal bone fracture and that the injuries were consistent with an accident.

    Procedural History

    Bryce was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. After exhuming the infant’s body and discovering the skull had not been preserved and showed no frontal fracture, Bryce moved to vacate the judgment. County Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case for a hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution misrepresented to defense counsel that the skull and brain tissue had been preserved and would be available for examination before trial.

    Whether the skull constituted Brady material, and if so, whether a new trial is required.

    Holding

    Yes, a hearing is required to determine whether the District Attorney misrepresented the availability of the skull. Yes, because if the skull constituted Brady material and was improperly withheld, a new trial may be required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant has a constitutional right to discover favorable evidence in the prosecution’s possession that is material to guilt or punishment, as established in Brady v. Maryland. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed to the defense, the outcome of the trial would have been different. The Court emphasized that this rule applies regardless of the prosecutor’s good or bad faith. Here, Bryce argued that the prosecutor prejudiced his ability to obtain exculpatory evidence by misrepresenting that the skull and brain tissue had been preserved and would be available for examination. The Court found that if the skull was Brady material and representations were made that it had been preserved when it had not, a new trial may be warranted. The Court stated, “Whether other, sufficient evidence of guilt was produced in response to defendant’s discovery demand is irrelevant if the skull was Brady material and representations were made that it had been preserved, when it had not, and was available for trial, when it was not.” Therefore, the Court remitted the case for a hearing to determine the validity of Bryce’s claims.