New York Law Review

Tag: Fact vs. Opinion

  • Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262 (2014): Defamation and the Fact vs. Opinion Distinction

    Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262 (2014)

    Statements that accuse someone of lying and acting with malicious intent can be considered statements of fact, especially when the speaker implies knowledge of undisclosed facts supporting their accusations.

    Summary

    Robert Davis and Michael Lang sued Syracuse University and its basketball coach, James Boeheim, for defamation after Boeheim publicly accused them of lying about being sexually abused by a former coach, Bernie Fine. The plaintiffs argued that Boeheim’s statements implied he had undisclosed facts supporting his accusations that they were motivated by money. The Court of Appeals held that Boeheim’s statements could be reasonably interpreted as conveying facts, not just opinions, especially considering his position of authority and access to information. This ruling reversed the lower court’s dismissal, allowing the case to proceed to discovery to fully evaluate the claims.

    Facts

    Davis and Lang alleged they were sexually abused by Bernie Fine, a Syracuse University basketball coach, starting in the 1980s. They reported the abuse to authorities and the university, but no action was taken. Years later, after the Penn State University scandal involving similar allegations, ESPN reported Davis and Lang’s claims. Boeheim, Fine’s long-time friend and colleague, publicly defended Fine and accused Davis and Lang of lying and seeking financial gain, implying they were motivated by the Penn State case.

    Procedural History

    Davis and Lang sued Boeheim and Syracuse University for defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7), arguing Boeheim’s statements were non-actionable opinion. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order, finding the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for defamation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Boeheim’s statements that Davis and Lang were liars seeking money constitute non-actionable opinion or potentially defamatory statements of fact or mixed opinion.

    Holding

    Yes, because Boeheim’s statements could be reasonably interpreted by a reader as conveying facts about the plaintiffs, specifically, that they lied about the abuse for financial gain, and that Boeheim’s statements implied a basis in undisclosed facts supporting those accusations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied a three-factor test to determine whether the statements were fact or opinion, considering: 1) whether the language had a precise, readily understood meaning; 2) whether the statements could be proven true or false; and 3) whether the context signaled opinion rather than fact. The court found the first two factors favored treating Boeheim’s statements as factual. On the third factor, the court considered the context: Boeheim was a respected figure within the university and community, and his statements implied access to information not available to the general public. Boeheim’s statements were made during a media investigation, lending more credibility to his assertions. The court noted, “[Boeheim’s] assertions that Davis previously made the same claims, for the same purpose, communicated that Boeheim was relying on undisclosed facts that would justify Boeheim’s statements that Davis and Lang were neither credible nor victims of sexual abuse.” While Boeheim denied knowledge of facts and used phrases like “I believe,” the court found that a reasonable reader could still interpret his statements as supported by undisclosed facts. The court emphasized that, at the motion to dismiss stage, the standard is whether *any* reasonable reading of the complaint supports a defamation claim. Because the complaint met this minimum pleading requirement, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and allowed the case to proceed.

  • Halstead v. Strauss, 16 N.Y.3d 557 (2011): Distinguishing Defamatory Fact from Opinion

    16 N.Y.3d 557 (2011)

    To determine whether a statement is a non-actionable opinion or an actionable fact in a defamation claim, courts consider (1) whether the statement has a precise, readily understood meaning; (2) whether the statement is capable of being proven true or false; and (3) whether the context signals to a reasonable listener that the statement is opinion rather than fact.

    Summary

    Halstead sued Strauss for defamation, alleging that Strauss falsely stated that Halstead raped and molested Strauss’s daughter. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of summary judgment to Strauss, holding that factual disputes existed regarding the content and context of the allegedly defamatory statements. The Court reasoned that if Strauss made unqualified statements accusing Halstead of specific sexual offenses, a reasonable listener could conclude that Strauss intended to label Halstead as a child rapist, making the statements actionable as fact, not opinion. The court remanded the case for further proceedings.

    Facts

    The Halsteads and the Strausses were acquainted. The Strausses’ daughter told her parents that Halstead had raped and molested her at a Vermont residence in 2002 and 2004. The Strausses reported this to Vermont law enforcement. The Strausses, along with two of Mrs. Halstead’s sisters, informed Mrs. Halstead of the allegations and that the Strausses intended to file a civil suit against Mr. Halstead. The content of this conversation was disputed. Mr. Halstead denied the allegations and sued the Strausses for defamation, claiming they falsely and maliciously stated he had raped and molested their daughter.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Strauss’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to Strauss, concluding the statements were opinions, not facts. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Supreme Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statements made by the defendants to the plaintiff’s wife regarding the plaintiff’s alleged sexual abuse of the defendants’ daughter constituted actionable statements of fact or protected statements of opinion for the purposes of a defamation claim.

    Holding

    Yes, because based on the conflicting testimony, it is possible that the defendants made statements that a reasonable listener would perceive as factual accusations of criminal conduct, rather than protected opinion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the three factors used to distinguish between fact and opinion in defamation cases: (1) whether the words have a precise and readily understood meaning; (2) whether the statement can be proven true or false; and (3) whether the context signals to readers or listeners that the statement is opinion, not fact. The court noted the difficulty in distinguishing between fact and opinion, especially when accusations involve serious criminal conduct. The court found that because there were conflicting recollections of what was said and the context in which the statements were made, the defendants had not met their burden of demonstrating their entitlement to summary judgment. According to Mrs. Halstead, the Strausses made unqualified statements that Mr. Halstead sexually assaulted their daughter, accompanied by specific details of his threats and actions. The court found that these statements had a precise meaning (rape and molestation), could be proven true or false, and the context in which the utterances were made (threat of a lawsuit, expression of belief that the daughter was assaulted, and statement about wanting to shoot Mr. Halstead) were indicative of factual assertions. The court stated, “Under these circumstances, a reasonable listener would have understood that defendants intended to label plaintiff as a child rapist. Hence, the statements would be actionable even if they were couched in the form of an opinion (‘I think plaintiff sexually assaulted my child’), rather than fact (‘plaintiff sexually assaulted my child’)” (citing Gross, 82 NY2d at 155). The Court also noted that the repetition of an accusation originating from a third party does not automatically furnish a license to repeat it without regard to its accuracy or defamatory character (citing Brian v Richardson, 87 NY2d at 54). The Court explicitly declined to address the issue of qualified privilege as it was not raised in the summary judgment motion.

  • Gross v. New York Newsday, 623 N.E.2d 841 (N.Y. 1993): Distinguishing Fact from Opinion in Defamation Claims

    Gross v. New York Newsday, 623 N.E.2d 841 (N.Y. 1993)

    In a defamation action, whether a statement is one of fact or opinion depends on whether a reasonable reader or listener would understand the complained-of assertion as opinion or a statement of fact, considering the context of the entire publication.

    Summary

    Gross sued New York Newsday for defamation over a statement in an editorial that he “admits he doesn’t expect to win and is relieved by the prospect” of losing an election. Newsday moved for summary judgment, arguing the statement was opinion. The Supreme Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that a reasonable reader would interpret the statement as opinion, especially considering the editorial’s context and tenor. Additionally, Gross, as a public figure, failed to prove Newsday acted with actual malice.

    Facts

    Gross, a candidate for the New York State Assembly, was the subject of an editorial in New York Newsday. The editorial evaluated candidates and stated that Gross “admits he doesn’t expect to win and is relieved by the prospect.” Gross conceded that he told a reporter he had children in college and the Assembly salary was $57,000. However, he denied saying he would be relieved to lose. The published editorial used the word “admits,” while an earlier draft used the word “seems.”

    Procedural History

    Gross sued New York Newsday for defamation in the Supreme Court, which granted Newsday’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the complaint. The Appellate Division granted Newsday leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division’s reversal was proper.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the allegedly defamatory statement is one of fact or opinion.

    2. Whether the plaintiff, a public figure, demonstrated that the defendant acted with actual malice.

    Holding

    1. No, because a reasonable reader would interpret the statement as an opinion when viewed within the context of the entire editorial.

    2. No, because the plaintiff did not demonstrate with convincing clarity that the defendant acted with knowledge that the allegedly defamatory statement was false or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that determining whether a statement is fact or opinion is a question of law, depending on how a reasonable reader would perceive it. The court considered the context of the statement, noting its appearance on the editorial page and the editorial’s overall tenor, which included an assertion that Gross “hasn’t a clue about government.” The court emphasized that Newsday did not directly quote Gross but used “admits,” signaling an interpretation of his words. Because opinions are protected from defamation claims, summary judgment was appropriate. The court cited Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 381, stating the test is “whether a reasonable reader or listener would understand the complained-of assertions as opinion or statements of fact”. Moreover, the Court found Gross, as a public figure, failed to demonstrate actual malice. “The substitution of ‘admits’ in the published version of the editorial, for ‘seems,’ which appeared in an earlier draft, does not, by itself, demonstrate that defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement or with the knowledge that the statement was untrue.” The court referenced New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 279-280, 285-286, regarding the actual malice standard.

  • Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46 (1995): Determining Fact vs. Opinion in Defamation Cases

    Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46 (1995)

    In defamation cases, determining whether a statement is a non-actionable opinion requires examining the immediate and broader social context of the publication to ascertain if a reasonable reader would perceive the statement as conveying facts about the plaintiff.

    Summary

    This case concerns a defamation action brought by Dr. Earl W. Brian against Elliot Richardson for an article published in the New York Times Op-Ed page. The article suggested Brian was involved in a conspiracy. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the article, when considered in its full context, would be understood by a reasonable reader as the author’s opinion, not a statement of fact. The court emphasized the importance of considering the publication’s forum and overall tone when distinguishing between fact and opinion in defamation law.

    Facts

    Elliot Richardson, former Attorney General, wrote an Op-Ed piece for the New York Times concerning Inslaw, Inc., a software company he represented. The article alleged that the Department of Justice illegally copied Inslaw’s software and that Dr. Earl W. Brian was linked to a scheme to use the stolen software for illicit purposes. The article cited claims from various sources, including one Michael Riconosciuto, about Brian’s involvement with the stolen software and the Iran hostage situation. Richardson admitted his sources weren’t ideal but found their story credible. The article ended by advocating for an independent investigation into the Inslaw matter.

    Procedural History

    Brian sued Richardson for defamation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding the article was a non-actionable expression of opinion. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing Gross v. New York Times Co. and Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statements in Richardson’s article, specifically those implicating Brian in illegal activities, constitute actionable assertions of fact or non-actionable expressions of opinion under New York defamation law.

    Holding

    No, because the article, when considered in its immediate and broader context, would be understood by a reasonable reader as the author’s opinion and allegations, not assertions of fact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that a libel action must be premised on published assertions of fact, not opinion. Distinguishing between fact and opinion involves considering (1) whether the language has a precise, readily understood meaning; (2) whether the statements are capable of being proven true or false; and (3) the full context of the communication, including the broader social context. Citing Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, the court stated that it must consider the content, tone, and apparent purpose of the communication as a whole. The court noted the article appeared on the Op-Ed page, a forum for expressing ideas, which signals to readers that the content is opinion. The court observed that Richardson disclosed his prior attorney-client relationship with Inslaw, further suggesting a lack of objectivity. The court noted the article’s tone was “rife with rumor, speculation, and seemingly tenuous inferences.” The purpose of the article was to advocate for an investigation, which necessitated reciting existing charges and rumors. The court concluded that a reasonable reader would interpret the statements as allegations requiring investigation, not as established facts. The court acknowledged that repeating accusations from other sources does not automatically shield a publisher from liability, but in this case, the repetition was to demonstrate the need for an investigation. “In sum, both the immediate context of the article itself and the broader context in which the article was published made it sufficiently apparent to the reasonable reader that its contents represented the opinion of the author and that its specific charges about plaintiff were allegations and not demonstrable fact.”

  • Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283 (1986): Distinguishing Actionable Fact from Protected Opinion in Defamation

    68 N.Y.2d 283 (1986)

    An expression of pure opinion is not actionable in a defamation claim, while a mixed opinion, implying the speaker knows undisclosed facts justifying the opinion, is actionable.

    Summary

    Louise Steinhilber sued the Communications Workers of America and union officers for defamation based on a recorded message calling her a “scab” and a banner with similar language. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that both the recorded message and the banner were expressions of pure opinion, protected under the First Amendment. The court emphasized the importance of considering the context of the communication, including the circumstances of a labor dispute, in distinguishing between actionable fact and protected opinion.

    Facts

    Louise Steinhilber, a member of the Communications Workers of America, Local 1120, worked during a union strike in violation of union rules. She later resigned from the union. The union fined her for working during the strike, and authorized steps to collect the unpaid fine. A tape-recorded message, played to union members, referred to Steinhilber as a “scab” and made unflattering remarks about her. A banner displayed during picketing labeled her as “#1 SCAB.” Steinhilber sued for defamation.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the first cause of action against Schatzel and the second against Martini but otherwise denied the motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division modified the order, dismissing the complaint in its entirety, concluding that both communications were statements of pure opinion. The dissent would have allowed the first cause of action, arguing that the taped message contained mixed fact and opinion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the statements in the tape-recorded message and on the banner were expressions of pure opinion, protected under the First Amendment, or actionable statements of fact or mixed opinion.

    Holding

    Yes, because both the taped message and the banner were expressions of pure opinion, considering their context within a labor dispute and the use of rhetorical hyperbole.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that an expression of pure opinion is not actionable under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. because there is no such thing as a false idea. A pure opinion is a statement of opinion accompanied by a recitation of the facts upon which it is based, or, if unaccompanied by a factual recitation, does not imply that it is based on undisclosed facts. A mixed opinion, on the other hand, implies that it is based upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those reading or hearing it, and is actionable. The court emphasized that determining whether a statement is fact or opinion is a question of law for the court, based on how the average person would understand the communication. The court considered the context of the communications, including the circumstances of a labor dispute, where “exaggerated rhetoric” is commonplace. The court found that the tape-recorded message, with its heavy-handed and nonsensical humor, and the scurrilous banner would be understood as pure opinion, not as assertions of fact. The court referenced Letter Carriers v. Austin, noting that even the term “traitor” could be considered rhetorical hyperbole in the context of a labor dispute. The court stated, “even apparent statements of fact may assume the character of statements of opinion, and thus be privileged, when made in public debate, heated labor dispute, or other circumstances in which an ‘audience may anticipate [the use] of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole’”.