Genesis of Mount Vernon, N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Mount Vernon, 81 N.Y.2d 741 (1993)
A zoning ordinance is facially unconstitutional if its definition of a prohibited use is so broad that it includes uses expressly permitted by the ordinance, thus inviting arbitrary application.
Summary
Genesis of Mount Vernon, a non-profit, sought to build housing for the elderly. The City denied a permit, claiming the project was a “boarding house,” a prohibited use. The New York Court of Appeals held that the city’s definition of “boarding house” was unconstitutionally overbroad because it could include a traditional family, a permitted use under the ordinance. The Court remanded the issue of whether the proposed housing met the definition of “family” back to the Zoning Board, as that issue had not been previously decided by the board.
Facts
Genesis of Mount Vernon, a not-for-profit corporation, planned to construct a congregate housing facility for the elderly in a two-family house. The facility would consist of two units, each housing six unrelated elderly residents of Mount Vernon. The property was a vacant lot in a blighted area. The Mount Vernon Building Department denied Genesis’s building permit application, arguing that the project was a “boarding house,” which was prohibited under the city’s zoning ordinance, and that the construction violated setback requirements.
Procedural History
The Mount Vernon Zoning Board of Appeals upheld the Building Department’s classification of the proposed facility as a “boarding house” and denied Genesis’s request for a use variance. Genesis then filed a CPLR article 78 petition and declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court, which declared the definitions of “boarding house” and “family” in the zoning ordinance unconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted the respondents’ motion for leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the Zoning Ordinance’s definition of “boarding house” is unconstitutional.
2. Whether the Zoning Ordinance’s definition of “family” is similarly unconstitutional and properly before the Court for decision.
Holding
1. Yes, because the definition of “boarding house” is so broad that it could include a traditional family, which is an expressly permitted use under the zoning ordinance.
2. No, because the Building Department and Zoning Board of Appeals never denied the building permit on the basis that the proposed project did not fall under the definition of “family.”
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals stated that a zoning ordinance must (1) further a legitimate governmental purpose and (2) be reasonably related to achieving that purpose. While the Mount Vernon ordinance served legitimate purposes such as reducing traffic and controlling population density, the definition of “boarding house” was not reasonably related to these goals. The ordinance defined “boarding house” as:
“a building other than a hotel in which accommodations are offered for [h]ire and/or hired out for the lodging of four (4) or more persons either individually or as families, with separate cooking facilities or with central kitchen or dining room for the preparation and service of meals to said persons.”
The Court found that this definition was so broad that it could include a traditional family renting a house or apartment, an expressly permitted use under the zoning ordinance’s definition of “family.” Because the prohibition against a “boarding house” could include a family, the definition of “boarding house” was overbroad, inviting arbitrary application and lacking a rational relationship to legitimate goals. The Court quoted McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay, stating that such a definition is facially unconstitutional.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the “family” definition because the Building Department and Zoning Board of Appeals never denied the permit on that basis. The Court emphasized the importance of deciding constitutional questions only in actual factual settings, quoting Pennell v San Jose: “[g]iven the ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]’ involved * * * we have found it particularly important * * * to adhere to our admonition that ‘the constitutionality of statutes ought not to be decided except in an actual factual setting that makes such a decision necessary.’” Because the lower bodies had not addressed whether the proposed project qualified as a “family,” it was premature for the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of that definition. The Court directed the Supreme Court to remand the case to the Zoning Board of Appeals to consider Genesis’s argument that the project fell within the zoning ordinance’s definition of “family.”