New York Law Review

Tag: eyewitness identification

  • People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234 (1986): Permissibility of Detaining and Transporting Suspects for Identification

    People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234 (1986)

    When police have reasonable suspicion to stop an individual, they may detain and transport the suspect a short distance to a crime scene for prompt identification by eyewitnesses if the detention is brief, the crime scene is nearby, and there are no less intrusive means available.

    Summary

    Police officers stopped two men suspected of robbery based on a radio report describing the perpetrators and their car. The men gave a suspicious explanation for their whereabouts. The officers transported the men, without handcuffs, to the robbery scene less than a minute away, where they were identified by victims. The New York Court of Appeals held that the brief detention and transportation to the crime scene for immediate identification did not constitute an unlawful arrest because the police action was a reasonable and minimally intrusive means of investigation under the circumstances to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicion. The Court emphasized the short duration of the detention, proximity of the crime scene, and the presence of eyewitnesses.

    Facts

    Around 4:00 a.m., police officers heard a radio report of a robbery involving two black men, about 5’5″ tall, in a green Pontiac with black trim. Minutes later, near the crime scene, they saw two black men in a grey and black Buick sedan appearing to be the described height. The men claimed to be coming from work at American Brass, which the officer knew was far away in the opposite direction. The officers told the men they matched the description and were being taken to the factory for identification, and would be released if not identified.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery. He challenged the stop, detention, transportation, showup identification, and vehicle search. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, limiting the issue to the legality of the stop, detention, and transportation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in the absence of probable cause, it is permissible for the police, having made a lawful stop based on reasonable suspicion, to detain the suspect and transport him to the crime scene for possible identification.

    Holding

    Yes, because the detention and transportation were a permissible incident of a lawful stop under the specific circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court determined the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion based on the radio report description, the suspects’ proximity to the crime scene, and their suspicious explanation. The Court clarified that the police action did not constitute an arrest because the defendant was not handcuffed, there was no show of force, he was allowed to park his car, the detention was brief, and he was informed of its limited purpose. The Court then reasoned that the transportation to the crime scene was a reasonable and minimally intrusive means of investigation to quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion. Key factors supporting the reasonableness of the detention were that a crime had actually been committed; the detention was less than 10 minutes; the crime scene was very close; eyewitnesses were present; and there were no significantly less intrusive means available. The Court emphasized the importance of on-the-scene identifications, stating, “A speedy on-the-scene viewing thus was of value both to law enforcement authorities and to defendant, and was appropriate here.” The Court rejected using a “totality of the circumstances” test, and instead emphasized that the findings of reasonable suspicion and reasonable detention must rest on articulable facts, credible objective evidence, and the rational inferences that flow therefrom.

  • People v. Alviti, 64 N.Y.2d 956 (1985): Harmless Error in Right to Counsel at Lineup

    People v. Alviti, 64 N.Y.2d 956 (1985)

    An error in admitting lineup identification evidence, even if it violates the right to counsel, may be deemed harmless if there is overwhelming independent evidence of guilt, such as multiple untainted in-court identifications by eyewitnesses and a confession used for impeachment.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. He challenged the introduction of a lineup identification by one of the victims, arguing it violated his right to counsel because his attorney did not attend the lineup. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that even if the lineup identification was admitted in error, the error was harmless. The court reasoned that there were three in-court identifications by eyewitnesses, and the defendant’s confession, though inadmissible in the prosecution’s direct case, was used to discredit his testimony. This constituted overwhelming evidence of guilt, making any error in admitting the lineup evidence harmless.

    Facts

    On October 21, 1980, a man robbed a gas station attendant, John Taylor, and his cousin, James Alviti. The next day, Taylor and Alviti identified the defendant from photographs at police headquarters. A week later, the same man robbed Taylor and Vincent Rizzuto at the same station. Taylor informed police he recognized the defendant and both he and Rizzuto identified the defendant from a photographic array. The defendant was arrested on November 7, 1980, and confessed to both robberies. On May 19, 1981, the defendant was placed in a lineup after being indicted, and Rizzuto identified him. The other victims did not view the lineup. The defendant’s attorney was notified but did not attend.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress the identifications, finding the photo arrays and lineup were not unduly suggestive and each victim had an independent source for in-court identification. The court also found the defendant was not denied his right to counsel at the lineup because his counsel refused to attend. The defendant was convicted after trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the introduction of Rizzuto’s lineup identification violated the defendant’s right to counsel and, if so, whether that violation requires reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    No, because even if the introduction of Rizzuto’s lineup identification was an error, it was harmless given the overwhelming independent evidence of the defendant’s guilt, including multiple untainted in-court identifications and the defendant’s confession used for impeachment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals did not definitively rule on whether the lineup identification violated the defendant’s right to counsel. Instead, it assumed, arguendo, that there was an error. The court emphasized that the lower courts found that Taylor and Alviti’s identifications were untainted by any improper procedure. As for Rizzuto, his in-court identification was based on his observation of the defendant during the robbery itself, not the lineup. The court highlighted the significance of the three in-court identifications by eyewitnesses. The court reasoned that Rizzuto’s lineup identification added little to the already substantial evidence against the defendant. The court also noted the defendant’s confession, even though inadmissible in the prosecution’s direct case, was properly used to impeach his testimony. Citing People v. Maerling, 64 NY2d 134 and People v. Ricco, 56 NY2d 320, the court underscored the legitimacy of using the confession for impeachment purposes, even if it couldn’t be used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Given this evidence, the court concluded that any error in admitting the lineup evidence was harmless, citing People v. Adams, 53 NY2d 241, 252. This case illustrates the harmless error doctrine: an appellate court can affirm a conviction, even when an error occurred at trial, if that error did not affect the outcome. Here, the court found that the weight of evidence against Alviti was so overwhelming, that any error stemming from Rizzuto’s lineup identification, was not prejudicial. This case serves as a practical example of how appellate courts consider the totality of evidence when evaluating claims of reversible error.

  • People v. Brown, 56 N.Y.2d 621 (1982): Sufficiency of Evidence Based on Witness Identification

    People v. Brown, 56 N.Y.2d 621 (1982)

    When assessing the legal sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case based on eyewitness identification, the court must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

    Summary

    Brown was convicted of robbery based largely on a witness’s identification. The witness had ample opportunity to observe Brown during the crime and provided a detailed description, including a tattoo. Although the witness’s initial lineup identification was not definitive, a subsequent viewing of a photograph of Brown’s tattoo and later Brown’s actual tattoo at trial led to a positive identification. Brown appealed, arguing that the in-court identification was tainted by the photograph and thus the evidence was legally insufficient. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a rational jury could have concluded that the identification was based on the witness’s observations at the crime scene.

    Facts

    Defendant Brown was charged with robbery in the first degree.
    A key witness observed the perpetrator for five to six minutes under excellent lighting conditions.
    The witness provided a detailed description to the police immediately after the crime, including a partially exposed tattoo on the perpetrator’s arm.
    Brown was arrested the next day.
    At a lineup, the witness identified Brown, but with less than complete certainty, since none of the subjects had exposed arms.
    After the lineup, the witness was shown a photograph of an arm with a tattoo and stated that it appeared to be the assailant’s.
    At trial, Brown was instructed to show his tattooed arm to the jury and the witness, exposing it to the same extent as the robber’s arm during the crime.
    The witness then positively identified Brown as the robber.

    Procedural History

    Brown was convicted of three counts of robbery in the first degree.
    Brown appealed, arguing that the evidence of his guilt was legally insufficient.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, upholding Brown’s conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented was legally sufficient to support Brown’s conviction for robbery in the first degree, given that the witness’s positive identification at trial followed the witness’s viewing of a photograph of Brown’s tattoo prior to trial.
    Whether the jury was charged in a way that impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.

    Holding

    1. No, because applying the standard from Jackson v. Virginia, a rational trier of fact could have found that the witness’s identification stemmed from observations made at the crime scene and not solely from the photograph.
    2. No, because no objection to the jury charge or alternative instruction was made during trial, therefore the issue was not preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence as articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, stating that it must determine whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”.
    The court found it reasonable for the jury to infer that the witness’s in-court identification was based on observations made during the robbery, given the witness’s opportunity to observe the perpetrator, the detailed description provided immediately after the crime, and the identification of the tattoo. The court stated that the only rational inference was not that the identification was a result of seeing the photograph.
    Regarding the jury charge, the court cited People v. Cadorette, 56 N.Y.2d 1007 and People v. Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467, stating that because no objection or submission of an alternative instruction was made at trial regarding the jury charge, the issue was not preserved for review on appeal. This highlights the importance of timely objections to ensure issues are preserved for appeal.

  • People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241 (1981): Admissibility of Suggestive Pretrial Identifications Under the State Constitution

    53 N.Y.2d 241 (1981)

    Under the New York State Constitution, evidence of a suggestive pretrial identification procedure is inadmissible, even if there is an independent source for an in-court identification; however, the erroneous admission of such evidence may be deemed harmless error if there was proper identification at trial by eyewitnesses and an independent basis for the in-court identification.

    Summary

    Robert Adams appealed his robbery conviction, arguing that a suggestive station house showup tainted the victim’s identifications and that the prosecutor improperly refused to grant immunity to a defense witness. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the showup was unduly suggestive and evidence of it should have been excluded under the state constitution, the error was harmless because there was an independent basis for the in-court identifications and other eyewitness testimony. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the prosecutor’s refusal to grant immunity to the witness.

    Facts

    Three men robbed a stationery store. During the robbery, one man held a gun to the owner’s wife’s head. The robbers fled with $42, pursued by the owner, his nephew, and others. A security guard and a police officer on patrol witnessed the escape. One robber, Sanabria, was apprehended with the stolen money. Adams and Gaston were arrested later in an apartment, based on information from Sanabria. The store owners and nephew identified Adams and the other men at a station house showup where the police told the victims that they had the robbers.

    Procedural History

    Adams moved to suppress the station house identification and prevent in-court identifications. The trial court suppressed Mrs. Mangoubi’s pretrial identification but denied the motion otherwise, finding an independent source for the in-court identifications. At trial, the three victims and two eyewitnesses identified Adams. Adams presented an alibi defense and called Sanabria, who recanted his prior statement implicating Adams. Gaston refused to testify without immunity, which the prosecutor denied. The jury convicted Adams of robbery, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s refusal to grant immunity to a defense witness deprived the defendant of his right to call witnesses on his behalf.
    2. Whether the station house showup was so suggestive as to violate the defendant’s due process rights under the Federal and State Constitutions, requiring suppression of the pretrial and in-court identifications.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecutor’s discretion to grant immunity was not abused, as there was no evidence of bad faith or that the prosecutor built the case using immunized witnesses while denying the defendant a similar opportunity.
    2. Yes, the station house showup was unduly suggestive, and evidence of it should have been excluded under the state constitution; however the error was harmless because there was an independent basis for the in-court identifications and other eyewitness testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the prosecutor has discretion to grant immunity, reviewable only for abuse. No abuse occurred because there was no indication of bad faith or that the prosecutor built the case on immunized witnesses while denying the defendant a similar opportunity. The Court stated that “to permit a defendant to override the prosecutor’s discretion under those circumstances could itself lead to abuses of the immunity statute.”

    Regarding the showup, the Court found it undeniably suggestive, noting the victims were told they had the robbers, the suspects were held by officers, and the victims viewed the suspects as a group. The Court distinguished the New York State Constitution from the federal standard articulated in Manson v. Brathwaite, stating that the state constitution provides additional protections. The court emphasized that the rule excluding suggestive showups aims to ensure a reliable determination of guilt or innocence, and that “Permitting the prosecutor to introduce evidence of a suggestive pretrial identification can only increase the risks of convicting the innocent.”

    Despite finding the showup evidence inadmissible, the Court deemed the error harmless because five eyewitnesses, including two who did not attend the showup, identified Adams at trial. Furthermore, there was an affirmed finding of an independent basis for the victims’ in-court identifications. Chief Judge Cooke concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority’s creation of a state constitutional standard, arguing that applying harmless error analysis largely negates the standard.

  • People v. Joyiens, 39 N.Y.2d 176 (1976): Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification After Photographic Display

    People v. Joyiens, 39 N.Y.2d 176 (1976)

    A prior photographic identification is admissible if the photographic display was not suggestive and the witness had an adequate independent basis for identification.

    Summary

    Kim Joyiens was convicted of attempted murder and assault for shooting two police officers. The key evidence was the eyewitness identification of Joyiens by one of the officers, Scarabino, who had previously identified Joyiens in a photographic display. Joyiens argued the photographic identification was suggestive and tainted Scarabino’s in-court identification. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the photographic display was not unduly suggestive, and Scarabino had an independent basis for his identification stemming from his clear view of Joyiens during the shooting. The court emphasized the jury’s role in assessing credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence.

    Facts

    Two police officers, Scarabino and Rollins, were shot by three men. Scarabino identified Kim Joyiens as one of the shooters. Scarabino testified that the lighting was good, he was close to the shooters, and he looked directly at Joyiens’ face during the shooting. Ten months later, Scarabino identified Joyiens from a photographic array. Joyiens presented an alibi defense and claimed scars on his body were from shrapnel in Vietnam, not from bullet wounds sustained during the shooting. Rebuttal witnesses contradicted the testimony of Joyiens’ alibi witness regarding the timing of Joyiens’ arrival at her home on the night of the shooting and his physical condition.

    Procedural History

    Kim Joyiens was indicted on multiple charges, including attempted murder and assault. Following a trial, the jury found Joyiens guilty on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Joyiens appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the photographic identification was suggestive and violated his due process rights.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the photographic identification procedure was so suggestive as to taint the in-court identification and violate the defendant’s due process rights.

    Holding

    No, because the photographic display was not suggestive, and the witness had an independent basis for his identification based on his observations during the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the photographic display was not suggestive. The court noted that all the photographs were similar in size and type, depicted individuals of the same race and build, and Scarabino did not view the back of the photographs. The court deferred to the lower court’s assessment of credibility regarding the circumstances of the photographic identification. More importantly, the court emphasized Scarabino’s clear and prolonged opportunity to view Joyiens during the shooting. Scarabino testified to excellent lighting conditions, close range, direct eye contact, and a two-to-three-minute encounter. This provided an independent basis for his identification, untainted by any potential suggestiveness in the photographic display. The court stated that “Scarabino made positive identification of appellant at the time of the shooting and that the photographic identification was not suggestive.” The court also noted that issues of credibility were primarily for the jury to decide, and there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The court dismissed other alleged errors, finding no basis for reversal.

  • People v. Anderson, 33 N.Y.2d 172 (1973): Reasonable Suspicion Justifying a Stop and Frisk Based on Eyewitness Report

    People v. Anderson, 33 N.Y.2d 172 (1973)

    A police officer may conduct a stop and frisk based on reasonable suspicion when an eyewitness provides a specific description of a suspect and the crime, even if the eyewitness’s identity is not fully verified.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk a suspect based on an eyewitness report of an attempted robbery. The eyewitness provided a description of the suspect and the crime, and identified the suspect to the officer shortly after the event. The court reasoned that the totality of the circumstances, including the eyewitness’s report, the suspect’s proximity to the crime scene, and the suspect’s behavior when approached, justified the officer’s actions. The court emphasized that while an unsubstantiated report of mere firearm possession is insufficient, a report of firearm use in a crime provides stronger justification.

    Facts

    At 8:00 PM, an unidentified teenager approached Patrolman Anderson in New York City, reporting he witnessed an attempted robbery. The teenager described the robber as tall, wearing a black leather jacket, bearded, and with a slight afro. Shortly after, the teenager pointed out the defendant, who matched the description and was in the vicinity, as the perpetrator. The teenager confirmed his identification to the officer.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with a crime related to the gun found during the frisk. He moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing the stop and frisk were illegal. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, upholding the legality of the stop and frisk. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, based on an eyewitness report of an attempted robbery and the suspect’s subsequent identification, a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the suspect, even without further verification of the eyewitness’s identity or corroboration of the information provided.

    Holding

    Yes, because the totality of the circumstances, including the eyewitness’s detailed description of the suspect and the crime, the proximity of the suspect to the crime scene shortly after the event, and the suspect’s actions upon being approached by the officer, provided reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe a frisk was appropriate based on the eyewitness’s report of an attempted robbery at gunpoint, coupled with the specific identification of the defendant shortly thereafter. The court distinguished this situation from a mere report of firearm possession, stating, “There is a difference of significant degree between a report only that a person has a gun in his possession and another report that a person not only has a gun but that he has just used it for the commission of crime.”

    The court acknowledged the importance of protecting citizens from unwarranted police intrusion based on unsubstantiated reports, stating, “A citizen walking our streets should not, without more, be exposed to physical assault by a police officer on the basis of an unsubstantiated report of the mere possession of firearms volunteered by a stranger. To condone such conduct would be to expose innocent persons to harassment by pranksters and irresponsible meddlers.” However, the court found that the specific facts of this case, including the report of a crime involving a firearm and the eyewitness’s identification, provided sufficient justification for the officer’s actions.

    The court also considered the defendant’s behavior, noting that he “sort of turned and looked in [the officer’s] direction and started walking away” as the officer approached. While this action alone may not have been sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, it contributed to the totality of the circumstances that justified the stop and frisk.

    The court emphasized that the determination of reasonable suspicion is highly fact-dependent, stating, “The proper determination in cases of this sort must necessarily turn on the facts in each individual case.” The court also cautioned that this case approached the limit for a finding of reasonable suspicion.

  • People v. Whitmore, 28 N.Y.2d 826 (1971): Admissibility of Identification Testimony After Suggestive Showup

    People v. Whitmore, 28 N.Y.2d 826 (1971)

    Where a pretrial identification procedure is suggestive, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification is based on independent recollection and not influenced by the prior suggestive procedure.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of an in-court identification following a potentially suggestive showup. Whitmore was convicted of attempted rape and robbery. The key issue was the reliability of the victim’s identification, especially considering a prior showup where Whitmore was presented to the victim without a lineup after being implicated in other high-profile crimes to which he confessed (confessions later proven false). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the prosecution had demonstrated that the victim’s in-court identification was based on her independent recollection of the event, untainted by the suggestive showup. The dissent argued that the suggestive showup and the subsequent retraction of his other confessions undermined the reliability of the identification.

    Facts

    On April 23, 1964, a woman was attacked and nearly raped on a street in Kings County. A police officer witnessed part of the assault but the assailant fled. The officer initially described the suspect as a Black male, 5’8″-5’9″, 165 lbs, wearing a tan coat. The victim described her assailant as a light-skinned Black male, 5’7″, 135 lbs, pockmarked, and wearing a tan coat. The next day, the officer saw Whitmore, who fit parts of the description, in a laundromat. Whitmore gave a false name and employment. He was later arrested and shown to the victim, who identified him. Whitmore then confessed to this crime, and also to two other infamous rape-murders. He was later exonerated of the other crimes after his confessions were proven false.

    Procedural History

    Whitmore was convicted in the trial court. An earlier appeal led to a post-trial identification hearing to determine if the victim’s in-court identification was tainted by the showup. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of the hearing. The trial court determined the identification was untainted. The Appellate Division then affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the victim’s in-court identification of Whitmore was admissible, given the potentially suggestive nature of the pre-trial showup, and the later retraction of Whitmore’s confessions to other crimes?

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the victim’s in-court identification was based on her independent recollection of the crime, untainted by the suggestive showup.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the potential for suggestiveness in the showup procedure. However, the Court emphasized that the hearing court found the victim’s trial testimony on identification was untainted by the showup or any other improper suggestion. The court applied the rule that when a pretrial identification is potentially tainted, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification has an independent source. The court deferred to the trial court’s finding that the prosecution met this burden. The dissent strongly disagreed, arguing that the conflicting descriptions, the false confessions, and the suggestive showup made the identification unreliable, stating “The positiveness of the Borrero identification is no better than the positiveness of the untrustworthy confessions. The positiveness in each instance is undermined or belied by ineradicable and contradictory facts of record and history.” The dissent highlighted the danger of relying on a witness’s positive identification when that identification might have been influenced by external factors, especially in light of the fact that Whitmore had falsely confessed to other crimes. The dissent further stated that the proof on the hearing must be “clear and convincing ”, that is, the proof must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the pretrial impropriety did not influence the in-court identification.

  • People v. Gonzalez and Castellano, 27 N.Y.2d 53 (1970): Admissibility of Identification Testimony Following Suggestive Pretrial Procedures

    People v. Gonzalez and Castellano, 27 N.Y.2d 53 (1970)

    Pretrial identification procedures that are unnecessarily suggestive and create a substantial likelihood of misidentification can taint subsequent in-court identifications, rendering them inadmissible unless the prosecution proves by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification has an independent source.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether in-court identifications of the defendants were tainted by suggestive pretrial identification procedures. The dissent argued that a showup where police told witnesses “we caught this man, the robber of your store” and showing witnesses photographs of the defendants shortly before trial (16 months after the robbery) were impermissibly suggestive. The dissent concluded that the case should be remanded to determine whether the in-court identifications were influenced by these tainted procedures, especially since the witnesses’ initial observations were brief and made during a stressful robbery.

    Facts

    A robbery occurred, and sixteen months later, witnesses were shown photographs of the defendants just before they were to identify them in court. One witness initially gave the police a wrong description of one of the defendants. Another defendant, Castellano, had a full beard at the time of the robbery but was clean-shaven in the photograph shown to the witness before trial. Two witnesses viewed Castellano in a showup where police stated, “[w]e caught this man, the robber of your store.” One witness admitted he would not have been able to identify Castellano in court without the pretrial procedures.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of robbery based, in part, on eyewitness identifications. The dissenting judge in the New York Court of Appeals argued that the pretrial identification procedures were so suggestive that the in-court identifications were potentially tainted, requiring a hearing to determine the admissibility of the identification testimony.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the pretrial identification procedures (a showup and the showing of photographs shortly before trial) were so suggestive as to taint the subsequent in-court identifications, requiring a hearing to determine the independent source of the in-court identifications.

    Holding

    No, because the majority found that, on the present record, the in-court identifications were based on observations made at the scene of the crime, and the dissent failed to demonstrate that the identifications were tainted by the unnecessarily suggestive pretrial procedures.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Chief Judge Fuld, in dissent, argued that the pretrial identification procedures were highly suggestive and prejudicial. The dissent emphasized that the witness, Mrs. D’Amora, had only a brief and frightening encounter with Gonzalez, and she initially gave a wrong description to the police. Regarding Castellano, the dissent highlighted the suggestive showup where the police declared, “this was the robber of your store,” and the fact that the witnesses were shown photographs of Castellano just before entering the courtroom. The dissent quoted United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d 912, stating:

    “Lapse of time between the crime and the confrontation is also important; the longer the interval, the greater the dangers that the initial image will have dimmed and that the second image will play a significant role. Also, a long interval between the initial observation and the trial coupled with an improper confrontation a comparatively short time before the witness appears in court enhances the danger that he may be relying on his most recent encounter.”

    The dissent believed that the prosecution failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identifications had independent sources. Referencing Foster v. California, 394 U. S. 440, 442, supra; Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 384; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302; the dissent contended that there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, warranting a hearing to determine the impact of the pretrial procedures on the in-court identifications. The dissent emphasized that the witnesses’ observations occurred “but for a few minutes during a frightening and upsetting episode.”

  • People v. Burwell, 26 N.Y.2d 331 (1970): Admissibility of In-Court Identification After Suggestive Pre-Arraignment Lineup

    People v. Burwell, 26 N.Y.2d 331 (1970)

    Where a pre-arraignment lineup is unduly suggestive, an in-court identification is admissible only if the prosecution can establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identification was based on observations independent of the suggestive lineup.

    Summary

    Defendants Burwell, McMoore, and Washington were convicted of assault. The Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of their confessions and in-court identifications following a suggestive pre-arraignment lineup. The court held that while the confessions were admissible due to the defendants’ ability to cross-examine confessing co-defendants and the substantial similarity of the confessions, the suggestive nature of the pre-arraignment lineup necessitated a hearing. This hearing was to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent basis from the suggestive lineup. The court modified Burwell’s conviction to include this hearing and reinstated the convictions of McMoore and Washington, also directing a hearing on the in-court identifications for them.

    Facts

    The defendants were arrested in the early morning hours of December 27, 1962, and questioned throughout the day concerning an assault that occurred approximately one week prior. A lineup was held that afternoon, viewed by the surviving victims of the attack. The lineup consisted of the three defendants placed alongside four police officers and one civilian. The defendants, aged 17-19, were notably younger than the police officers, who ranged from 27 to 48 years old. Furthermore, one of the defendants, Washington, who was initially described as bald, appeared in the lineup with a shiny rag on his head. A second lineup, held shortly after the first, added two more police officers to the group.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted after trial. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions of McMoore and Washington. Burwell’s conviction was appealed separately. The Court of Appeals consolidated the issues, modifying Burwell’s judgment to include a hearing on the in-court identification and reversing the Appellate Division’s reversal of McMoore and Washington’s convictions, reinstating them but also ordering a hearing on the in-court identifications.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the in-court identifications of the defendants were impermissibly tainted by the suggestive pre-arraignment lineup, thus requiring a hearing to determine if an independent basis for the in-court identifications existed.

    Holding

    Yes, because the pre-arraignment lineup was improperly suggestive, a hearing is required to determine whether the in-court identifications were influenced by the lineup and, if so, whether those identifications had an independent basis stemming from observations other than the lineup.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found the pre-arraignment lineup to be “highly likely” to cause identification by suggestion, given the age discrepancies between the defendants and the police officers and the distinctive appearance of Washington. Recognizing that the lineup occurred before the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Wade, Gilbert v. California, and Stovall v. Denno, which established stricter rules regarding the right to counsel at post-arraignment lineups, the court nevertheless applied the principles underlying those cases. The court emphasized that because the victims’ opportunity to observe their assailants was limited to “seconds or at most a minute,” the potential for the suggestive lineup to influence the in-court identifications was significant. Quoting People v. Ballott, 20 N.Y.2d 600, 606-607, the court stated that in-court identifications are only admissible “if the prosecution can establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identifications were based on observations other than the lineups.” The court also noted the importance of this issue given that two of the defendants had repudiated their confessions, meaning that the in-court identifications played a crucial role in their convictions. The court distinguished the admissibility of the confessions of co-defendants by citing People v. Anthony (24 Y 2d 696, 702-703) because confessing co-defendants testified and were available for cross-examination. It also applied the rule in People v. McNeil (24 Y 2d 550, 552-553) regarding the similar nature of the confessions.

  • People v. Logan, 25 N.Y.2d 186 (1969): Admissibility of Prompt Showup Identification

    People v. Logan, 25 N.Y.2d 186 (1969)

    A prompt, on-the-scene identification of a suspect shortly after the crime is not unnecessarily suggestive and does not violate due process, especially when coupled with other corroborating evidence connecting the suspect to the crime.

    Summary

    In 1964, Logan was convicted of robbery and possession of a weapon. The key issue was the fairness of a pretrial identification. The loan manager, Murtha, identified Logan at the police station shortly after the robbery. Logan argued that the identification was unduly suggestive, violating due process. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the prompt identification by Murtha was proper police practice, not suggestive, and supported by substantial evidence (the getaway car and weapon) connecting Logan to the crime, negating any substantial risk of mistaken identification. The court emphasized that the identification was made shortly after the crime, not months later, and that Logan wasn’t forced to wear specific clothing or recite specific words.

    Facts

    On October 22, 1964, a loan company in Queens was robbed by a lone gunman. Regis Murtha (loan manager), George Wise (assistant manager), and Joanne Mason (secretary) were present. The robber, carrying a briefcase, demanded money and fled. Wise saw the robber leaving, noted the license plate of his getaway car (QC2250). Murtha described the robber to the police. The police discovered that the car was loaned to Logan. About an hour after the robbery, police arrested Logan and found $327 in his pocket, along with the car registration. The car, parked nearby, contained a briefcase with a loaded pistol.

    Procedural History

    Logan was convicted in the Supreme Court, Queens County, for first-degree robbery and possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Logan appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the pretrial identification was unfair and violated due process.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the pretrial identification of Logan at the police station was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to violate due process of law.

    Holding

    No, because the identification was prompt, conducted shortly after the crime, and was corroborated by other evidence linking Logan to the robbery, thus not violating due process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the “totality of the circumstances” test from Stovall v. Denno to determine the fairness of the pretrial identification. The court distinguished this case from People v. Ballott, where the identification was held a year after the crime and involved suggestive actions by the police. Here, Logan was arrested soon after the robbery, and the police didn’t force him to wear clothing or say specific words. The court emphasized the importance of the car and weapon found in it, linking Logan to the crime. The court found the identification was prompt and reliable, thus admissible. The court stated that the Wade-Gilbert standards were “not designed to frustrate good police work which produces the prompt or instantaneous and therefore the most reliable identification of culprits.” The court emphasized that suggestion from the police is what causes a violation of due process, and that this case did not contain any such suggestion. The court also noted the happenstance identification by Wise did not violate due process as it was not occasioned by law enforcement. The evidence, including the getaway car and weapon, was sufficient to establish Logan’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Any errors during the trial were deemed harmless. The court noted a parallel to People v. Moore, in which there was a valid prompt station house identification connected with an automobile identified by license number after the crime.