New York Law Review

Tag: eyewitness identification

  • People v. Branch, 28 N.Y.3d 1159 (2017): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Branch, 28 N.Y.3d 1159 (2017)

    The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony on factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, which must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial or harmful effects.

    Summary

    In this New York Court of Appeals case, the court addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The defendant was convicted of murder and robbery, in part based on eyewitness testimony. The trial court excluded expert testimony on factors affecting the reliability of the eyewitness identification, finding the testimony unnecessary because of corroborating evidence. The Appellate Division reversed, finding an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion. The Court emphasized the balancing test between probative value and prejudicial effects when assessing the admissibility of such expert testimony. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the expert testimony.

    Facts

    On December 27, 2008, an eyewitness was in front of a barbershop when a robbery and murder occurred. Four men entered the shop, demanding money and drugs. One man fatally shot the victim. Later, a witness identified the defendant in a lineup as one of the perpetrators. The getaway driver implicated the defendant in the crime. At trial, the defendant moved to introduce expert testimony on factors influencing eyewitness identification. The trial court initially denied the motion, but then granted permission to revisit the issue. After the prosecution presented its case, the defense renewed the motion to present the expert witness, which the trial court denied, concluding that the eyewitness testimony was corroborated by the getaway driver. The defendant was convicted on all counts.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a jury in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding the trial court abused its discretion by precluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding the defense from presenting expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court properly exercised its discretion in balancing the probative value of the expert testimony against its potential for prejudice or other harmful effects, given the corroborating evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The court reaffirmed that the admissibility of such expert testimony is within the trial court’s discretion. The court clarified that the trial court must weigh the request to introduce expert testimony against factors such as the centrality of the identification issue and the existence of corroborating evidence. The court emphasized that trial courts have the power to limit the amount and scope of evidence presented. The court found that, in this case, the trial court correctly balanced the probative value of the expert testimony against its potential for prejudice, particularly given the corroborating evidence from the getaway driver.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides a clear reminder of the trial court’s gatekeeping role in admitting expert testimony. Attorneys must be prepared to persuade the trial court that the expert testimony is necessary to assist the jury, considering the strength of other evidence. This case reinforces the importance of building a record that demonstrates the reliability of eyewitness identification, especially when corroborating evidence exists. The decision underscores that the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification is highly fact-dependent, with the trial court having broad discretion to make the ultimate decision. The decision can affect how attorneys prepare for trial, emphasizing the need to present clear arguments regarding the probative value and potential prejudice of proposed expert testimony.

  • People v. Berry, 25 N.Y.3d 116 (2015): Admissibility of Witness Testimony and Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    25 N.Y.3d 116 (2015)

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it permits a witness to be impeached by a prior inconsistent statement, provided the testimony at trial was adverse to the party calling the witness, nor does it abuse its discretion in excluding certain aspects of expert testimony, provided the expert testimony is not based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed several evidentiary issues in a murder case. The defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing a witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, by permitting impeachment of a witness with a prior inconsistent statement, and by excluding certain expert testimony. The Court held that the prosecutor did not call the witness solely to elicit the privilege. The Court further held the trial court properly allowed impeachment of the witness with a prior inconsistent statement because the testimony at trial was adverse to the prosecution. Finally, the Court affirmed the exclusion of certain expert testimony on eyewitness identification, holding that the excluded testimony on “event stress” was not generally accepted within the relevant scientific community and thus within the court’s discretion to exclude it.

    Facts

    In 2002, there was an altercation between the defendant and a passenger, Korin Bush, in a vehicle driven by Josiah Salley. Ninety minutes later, Salley and Bush approached the same intersection. Bush saw the defendant and another man by a fence. As the light changed, the defendant ran toward their vehicle and fired several shots, killing Salley. The defendant evaded capture for almost two years, but was eventually identified by Bush in a lineup. At trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. At a second trial, Kevin Kirven, who had been with the defendant on the day of the shooting, was called by the prosecution. Kirven invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege to several questions. Kirven then testified that he was at the park when the shooting occurred. The prosecutor then sought to impeach Kirven with his prior statement to the police. The defendant presented an expert in eyewitness identification. The court allowed testimony relative to weapon focus and witness confidence, but not event stress.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. At the second trial, the defendant was again convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the prosecution to call a witness to elicit his Fifth Amendment privilege?

    2. Whether the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent statement?

    3. Whether the trial court deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial by precluding his identification expert from testifying about the effect of high stress on the accuracy of an identification?

    Holding

    1. No, because the People did not call Kirven for the sole purpose of eliciting his invocation of the privilege.

    2. No, because Kirven’s trial testimony affirmatively damaged the People’s case.

    3. No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding the expert testimony regarding the effect of event stress.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that it is reversible error for a trial court to permit the prosecutor to deliberately call a witness for the sole purpose of eliciting a claim of privilege. However, here, the Court found that the People did not call Kirven solely to elicit the privilege. The Court considered the scope of Kirven’s testimony. The trial court did not err in allowing the People to introduce Kirven’s redacted statement to impeach his credibility. The Court further held that the witness’s testimony that he heard only one shot and did not see the defendant firing at the car had the possibility of jeopardizing the charges of both second-degree murder and attempted murder and affirmatively damaged the People’s case. Finally, the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the expert’s testimony regarding event stress because the expert testimony was not based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. The Court acknowledged that the trial court permitted the expert to testify in two key areas — witness confidence and weapon focus.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on the limits of calling a witness for the purpose of eliciting a claim of privilege. Prosecutors and defense attorneys should be wary of the potential for improper inferences. The case underscores the importance of carefully evaluating whether a witness’s testimony is adverse enough to warrant impeachment with prior inconsistent statements. Attorneys should be prepared to argue that the trial court’s ruling was correct because the testimony was contrary to prior statements made by the witness. Finally, the case emphasizes the importance of establishing the scientific reliability of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. It also emphasizes the importance of making a record concerning reliability, so that an appellate court can review the trial court’s exercise of discretion.

  • People v. Holley, 25 N.Y.3d 548 (2015): Presumption of Suggestiveness in Photo Array Identification Procedures

    25 N.Y.3d 548 (2015)

    The failure to preserve a photo array, whether physical or computer-generated, shown to an identifying witness creates a rebuttable presumption that the array was unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    In People v. Holley, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the consequences of failing to preserve photo arrays used in eyewitness identification procedures. The court held that the failure to preserve such arrays, especially those generated by computer systems, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of suggestiveness. This means the prosecution must produce evidence to show the fairness of the procedure. The court determined that the prosecution in this case successfully rebutted the presumption, and the identification evidence was admissible because the police presented sufficient testimony about the photo array procedure to demonstrate its fairness.

    Facts

    Two women were assaulted on a subway platform. The perpetrator was described as a skinny Black male. The police used a computer-generated photo array to show potential suspects. The array was created using the police department’s photo manager system and the witness identified the defendant after viewing multiple pages of the photo array. The police did not preserve a record of all the photographs that were viewed by the witness. A lineup was later conducted, where the witness again identified the defendant. At a suppression hearing, the defendant sought to suppress the identification evidence arguing, among other things, that the photo array procedure was unduly suggestive due to the failure to preserve the photo array.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress the identification testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the failure to preserve a computer-generated photo array shown to a witness creates a presumption of suggestiveness, shifting the burden to the prosecution to prove the fairness of the procedure.

    2. If such a presumption exists, whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to rebut it in this case.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the court explicitly adopted the rule from the Appellate Division that the failure to preserve a photo array creates a rebuttable presumption of suggestiveness.

    2. Yes, because the court found that the People’s evidence of the photo array procedure was sufficient to rebut the presumption.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the established burden-shifting framework in evaluating the admissibility of identification evidence. First, the prosecution must produce evidence demonstrating the fairness of the identification procedure. If the prosecution meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the procedure was unduly suggestive. The court found that the failure to preserve the photo array, whether physical or computer-generated, creates a rebuttable presumption that the prosecution did not meet its initial burden of demonstrating fairness. The court endorsed the Appellate Division’s precedent that the failure to preserve a photo array gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of suggestiveness. The court reasoned that this presumption aligns with the burden-shifting framework and is necessary to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    The court further clarified that, despite the presumption, the prosecution can still meet its burden by providing detailed testimony about the procedures used and the context in which the identification took place. Here, the court held that the People presented sufficient testimony, including the volume of photos viewed and the fact that the police did not initially focus on the defendant, to rebut the presumption of suggestiveness and demonstrate the fairness of the photo array. The court also upheld the lineup identification.

    Practical Implications

    This case reinforces the importance of preserving records of photo array identification procedures, including those using computer-generated systems. Prosecutors and law enforcement should create and preserve a record of all photo arrays viewed by witnesses, including the order and arrangement of the photos. Failure to do so will trigger a presumption of suggestiveness, potentially leading to suppression of the identification evidence. The case also highlights the importance of detailed testimony about the identification process to rebut the presumption and demonstrate fairness. Defense attorneys should aggressively challenge the admissibility of identification evidence when the prosecution fails to preserve photo arrays. The case also has implications for police departments implementing photo array procedures.

  • People v. Thomas, 15 N.Y.3d 924 (2010): Admissibility of Codefendant Identification to Bolster Eyewitness Testimony

    People v. Thomas, 15 N.Y.3d 924 (2010)

    Evidence of an eyewitness’s identification of a codefendant, who is not on trial, is admissible to bolster the witness’s in-court identification of the defendant if it is probative of the witness’s ability to accurately observe and identify the perpetrators of the crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that testimony regarding a witness’s showup identification of a codefendant was admissible to support the accuracy of the witness’s in-court identification of the defendant. The court distinguished this case from prior rulings that restricted third-party testimony about pretrial identifications. Here, the eyewitness himself testified about identifying both the defendant and the codefendant, whose possession of the stolen cell phone made the identification highly relevant. The court reasoned that the witness’s accurate identification of the codefendant was probative of the witness’s overall ability to observe and recall the events of the robbery, thus bolstering the reliability of his identification of the defendant.

    Facts

    Oscar Magallanes was robbed by two men outside his apartment. The well-lit landing allowed Magallanes to clearly see the faces of his attackers. Police officers nearby noticed Daniel Thomas and Victor Cruz running from the scene. Cruz was found with Magallanes’s cell phone and cash. Magallanes identified both Thomas and Cruz in a showup. Prior to trial, the showup identification of Thomas was suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. However, Magallanes was permitted to identify Thomas in court based on an independent source.

    Procedural History

    Thomas was convicted of robbery in the second degree. He appealed, arguing that the evidence of Magallanes’s showup identification of Cruz was inadmissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding any error harmless. A dissenting justice granted Thomas leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether testimony concerning an eyewitness’s pretrial identification of a codefendant, who is not on trial, is admissible to bolster the witness’s in-court identification of the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the eyewitness’s accuracy in identifying the person who possessed the stolen property (the codefendant) was relevant to the eyewitness’s ability to observe and accurately identify the other attacker (the defendant) at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Monroe, which involved improper bolstering of identification by a third party. Here, the eyewitness himself testified about the identification. The court also distinguished this case from the Trowbridge rule, which prohibits third-party testimony about a witness’s prior identification of a defendant. The Court emphasized that the concerns underlying Trowbridge—namely, the improper bolstering of an identification by a third party—were not present. The court stated that “[t]he repetition of an identification by a third party may ‘improperly influence the jury’s belief in the reliability of the identification…The testimony of the third party is not probative of whether the defendant was the person who committed the crime, but it could at best establish that the eyewitness, prior to trial, identified the defendant in the presence of others’ (People v Bolden, 58 NY2d 741, 743 [1982, Gabrielli, J., concurring]).”

    Instead, Magallanes’s testimony concerning his identification of Cruz was probative of whether Thomas had attacked Magallanes. This is because Magallanes’s accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing at 124 East 103rd Street were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial. The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, because “Magallanes’s accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing at 124 East 103rd Street were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial.” Thus, the testimony was deemed relevant and admissible.

  • People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661 (2011): Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661 (2011)

    In cases that hinge on eyewitness identification, expert testimony on the reliability of such identifications should be admitted when there is little or no corroborating evidence, and the testimony concerns relevant, generally accepted scientific principles beyond the ken of the average juror.

    Summary

    Edwin Santiago was convicted of assault based largely on eyewitness identification. The trial court denied Santiago’s request to present expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness reliability. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion. The Court emphasized that when a case relies heavily on eyewitness testimony and lacks corroborating evidence, expert testimony on eyewitness identification is crucial to educate the jury about potential pitfalls in eyewitness memory and perception. The Court outlined a two-stage inquiry for determining admissibility: (1) whether the case turns on eyewitness accuracy with little corroboration and (2) relevance, general acceptance in the scientific community, qualification of the expert, and whether the testimony is beyond the ken of the average juror.

    Facts

    A woman was attacked at a subway station. The assailant’s face was partially concealed. The victim described the assailant to police. Two other witnesses, Edwin Rios and Pablo Alarcon, also saw the assailant. Police created a sketch based on the victim’s description. Alarcon saw the assailant put away a knife. Nine days later, police arrested Edwin Santiago for selling Metrocard swipes. The victim identified Santiago in a photo array and a lineup. Alarcon initially claimed he didn’t recognize anyone in the photo array but later identified Santiago with 80% confidence. Rios identified Santiago in a lineup after the initial trial motion.

    Procedural History

    Santiago was indicted for first-degree assault. He moved to introduce expert testimony on eyewitness identification, which was denied by the trial court without a Frye hearing. After a suppression hearing, Santiago was convicted of assault. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Santiago’s motion to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification when the case turned on the accuracy of a single eyewitness identification.

    2. Whether the subsequent identifications by Rios and Alarcon constituted sufficient corroborating evidence to negate the need for expert testimony on eyewitness identification.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the proposed expert testimony concerned relevant, generally accepted scientific principles beyond the ken of the average juror, and the case initially rested solely on the victim’s identification.

    2. No, because the corroborating identifications were not sufficiently reliable to obviate the need for expert testimony, given that Alarcon’s identification was uncertain and potentially tainted, and Rios’s identification may have been influenced by the police sketch.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-stage inquiry established in People v. LeGrand. Initially, the case turned on the victim’s identification alone. The Court emphasized the importance of expert testimony in cases where eyewitness identification is crucial and lacks corroboration, citing People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28, 31 (2006) (“courts are encouraged … in appropriate cases” to grant defendants’ motions to admit expert testimony on this subject). The Court found that testimony concerning the lack of correlation between confidence and accuracy, confidence malleability, and the effects of post-event information was relevant and beyond the ken of the average juror, citing People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009) and LeGrand. “Trial error is only harmless when there is overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt and no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant were it not for the error” People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242 (1975). The Court distinguished People v. Allen, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009), where a second, highly reliable eyewitness identification existed. Here, the corroborating identifications were questionable. The Court held that the trial court should have considered testimony on unconscious transference, given that Alarcon and Rios had seen images of Santiago before identifying him. The Court stated that the errors were not harmless because proof of defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming. The Court reversed the order and ordered a new trial.

  • People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009)

    When a case hinges on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications with minimal corroborating evidence, excluding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is an abuse of discretion if the testimony is relevant, scientifically accepted, offered by a qualified expert, and addresses topics beyond the average juror’s understanding.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification reliability in two cases, Abney and Allen. In Abney, where a robbery conviction rested solely on a 13-year-old victim’s identification, the court held it was an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness accuracy, particularly regarding witness confidence. In Allen, where corroborating evidence existed, the court upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude such testimony. The court emphasized that expert testimony should be admitted when it can aid the jury in understanding factors affecting eyewitness reliability that are beyond common knowledge, but its exclusion may be appropriate when other evidence supports the conviction.

    Facts

    In Abney, Farhana U. was robbed at knifepoint in a subway station. She identified Quentin Abney from a photo array and later in a lineup. At trial, Abney presented an alibi defense. In Allen, Gregory Allen was convicted of robbing a barbershop. Two witnesses, Bierd and Almonte, identified Allen. Bierd recognized Allen from the neighborhood. Allen refused to participate in a lineup without masks for all participants.

    Procedural History

    In Abney, the trial court denied Abney’s motion to present expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing corroborating evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed. In Allen, the trial court denied Allen’s motion to admit expert testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision as well.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Abney, whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification when the case turned on the accuracy of a single eyewitness and there was little to no corroborating evidence.
    2. In Allen, whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to adduce expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification when there were multiple eyewitnesses and some corroborating evidence.

    Holding

    1. In Abney, yes, because the case hinged on a single eyewitness identification with no corroborating evidence, and the expert testimony concerned topics beyond the ken of the average juror.
    2. In Allen, no, because the case did not depend exclusively on one eyewitness’s testimony and corroborating evidence existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior decisions in People v. Lee, People v. Young, and especially People v. LeGrand, which established a framework for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. In Abney, the court emphasized that when a case rests solely on eyewitness testimony, excluding expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness accuracy is an abuse of discretion if the testimony is relevant, scientifically accepted, offered by a qualified expert, and addresses topics beyond the average juror’s understanding. The court found the trial court erred in not allowing testimony on witness confidence and should have held a Frye hearing on other factors. In Allen, the court found the presence of multiple eyewitnesses and corroborating evidence (Allen’s use of nicknames given to police by a witness, Allen’s knowledge that robbers wore masks) distinguished it from LeGrand and supported the trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony. The court stated that because the case did not turn entirely on one uncorroborated eyewitness, it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the expert testimony. The court also noted that factors such as stress and disguise were within the jury’s common sense understanding, and did not require expert explanation.

  • People v. Marte, 13 N.Y.3d 583 (2009): Limits of Exclusionary Rule for Suggestive Identifications

    13 N.Y.3d 583 (2009)

    The state constitutional rule excluding unnecessarily suggestive police-arranged identifications does not extend to identifications where the suggestion originates from private citizens.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the rule excluding suggestive police-arranged identifications does not apply when the suggestiveness originates from a private citizen. The victim, Peter L., was robbed and shot. Months later, his sister, Margaret, who knew the defendant, told Peter she thought the defendant was the shooter and showed him the defendant’s picture. Peter then identified the defendant in a police lineup. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the exclusionary rule is primarily aimed at deterring police misconduct and does not extend to private communications.

    Facts

    Peter L. was robbed and shot. He was shown hundreds of photographs by police but made no identification. Six months later, Peter’s sister, Margaret, met the defendant, who told her, “I actually shot someone on this block.” Margaret later told Peter she thought she knew who shot him and showed him the defendant’s picture. Peter initially rejected the idea but then identified the defendant from the picture. Margaret reinforced this with a letter describing the defendant as “[t]he kid that everyone thinks shot you.”

    Procedural History

    The victim and his sister then went to the police, who arranged a lineup where Peter identified the defendant. The defendant’s motion to suppress the identification was denied, and he was convicted of robbery and assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the state constitutional rule excluding unnecessarily suggestive police-arranged identifications extends to identifications where the suggestiveness originates from a private citizen.

    Holding

    No, because the primary goal of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, and this goal cannot be advanced by extending the rule to cases where the suggestion comes from private citizens.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the exclusionary rule for suggestive identifications, as established in People v. Adams, is designed to enhance the truth-finding process and prevent wrongful convictions by influencing police procedures. The court stated: “The exclusionary rules were fashioned to deter improper conduct on the part of law enforcement officials which might lead to mistaken identifications”. Extending this rule to private communications would not deter such communications, as family and friends are unlikely to regulate their conduct based on court rules of evidence suppression.

    The court distinguished this case from federal cases and cases in other states, noting that those cases either involved police or prosecutor actions or dealt with non-constitutional evidentiary issues. The court emphasized that its decision was based on a constitutional issue and declined to extend a per se constitutional rule of exclusion to cases where a private citizen’s communication results in an identification.

    The court acknowledged the risk of misidentification due to suggestiveness, regardless of its source. However, it emphasized that suggestiveness is just one potential source of error. The court noted that the proper remedy when law enforcement is not the source of the suggestive identification is to rely on cross-examination, counsel’s arguments, and other evidence to allow juries to assess the reliability of eyewitnesses.

    Ultimately, the Court refused to extend the Adams rule because its primary purpose is to influence police conduct, and such influence is impossible when private citizens are the source of the suggestion. The Court suggested expert testimony on eyewitness fallibility may be admissible in certain cases and did not foreclose the possibility that a court could exclude testimony that is more prejudicial than probative under common-law rules of evidence.

  • People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007)

    Where a case hinges on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications with little corroborating evidence, excluding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability, if relevant, generally accepted, and beyond the ken of the average juror, is an abuse of discretion.

    Summary

    Joaquin Liriano was murdered in 1991. The case stalled until 1998 when the defendant, LeGrand, was identified as a suspect based on a composite sketch made shortly after the crime. The People’s case rested solely on eyewitness identifications made nearly seven years after the crime. LeGrand sought to introduce expert testimony regarding factors affecting eyewitness reliability, which the trial court precluded after a Frye hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the exclusion of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion given the lack of corroborating evidence and the centrality of eyewitness identification.

    Facts

    Joaquin Liriano was stabbed to death in Manhattan in June 1991, and his assailant fled. Four people witnessed the attack and created a composite sketch. Two years later, LeGrand was identified as a possible suspect because he resembled the sketch. The case remained dormant until 1998, when LeGrand was arrested for burglary. The authorities then located the witnesses; one identified LeGrand as the killer, two tentatively identified him, and two could not identify him. There was no forensic or physical evidence connecting LeGrand to the stabbing.

    Procedural History

    LeGrand was charged with second-degree murder in 1999. His first trial in 2001 ended in a mistrial. Prior to his second trial, LeGrand moved to introduce expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The trial court conducted a Frye hearing and precluded the testimony. The jury found LeGrand guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in precluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications after determining that the proposed testimony was based on novel scientific principles not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community, where the case turned on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there was little or no corroborating evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because where the case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications if that testimony is (1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized an emerging trend of admitting expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification, noting that such testimony can provide much-needed guidance to juries. The Court emphasized the trial court’s discretion in determining whether jurors would benefit from the specialized knowledge of an expert witness, considering the centrality of the identification issue and the existence of corroborating evidence.

    The Court referenced Frye v. United States, emphasizing that the thing from which a deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. The Court distinguished its prior holdings in People v. Lee and People v. Young, emphasizing that, unlike those cases, there was no corroborating evidence connecting LeGrand to the crime. The Court found that the expert’s testimony regarding the correlation between confidence and accuracy, the effect of post-event information, and confidence malleability met the Frye standard, while the effect of weapon focus did not. The Court emphasized, “Once a scientific procedure has been proved reliable, a Frye inquiry need not be conducted each time such evidence is offered [and courts] may take judicial notice of reliability of the general procedure.”

    Ultimately, the Court concluded that the exclusion of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion, warranting a new trial. However, it reiterated that the admissibility of such evidence also depends upon the existence of sufficient corroborating evidence to link the defendant to the crime. In the event sufficient corroborating evidence is found to exist, an exercise of discretion excluding eyewitness expert testimony would not be fatal to a jury verdict convicting defendant.

  • People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40 (2006): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40 (2006)

    A trial court has discretion to admit or deny expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, but that discretion should lean towards admission when identification evidence is weak and uncorroborated.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The defendant was convicted of robbery and burglary based on a witness’s identification, which was preceded by a suppressed lineup identification. The trial court denied the defendant’s request to present expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness reliability. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. However, the dissent argued that the expert testimony should have been admitted given the weakness of the eyewitness identification and lack of corroborating evidence. This case highlights the complexities and judicial discretion involved in determining the reliability of eyewitness testimony.

    Facts

    William and Lisa Sykes were victims of a home invasion in March 1991. The perpetrator wore a scarf and blanket, obscuring his face but revealing his eyes, forehead, and part of his nose. Lisa Sykes described the assailant to police. She could not create a composite sketch or identify anyone in a photo array. She later identified the defendant, Young, in a lineup. Young’s initial conviction was reversed due to a lack of probable cause for his arrest, leading to suppression of the lineup identification.

    Procedural History

    1. Defendant was initially convicted in 1992.
    2. The conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division in 1998 due to an unlawful arrest.
    3. Prior to the second trial, the trial court held an independent source hearing to determine if Mrs. Sykes had a basis to identify Young independent of the tainted lineup.
    4. Defendant was convicted again in January 2000.
    5. The Appellate Division affirmed the second conviction.
    6. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, with a dissent.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, given that the primary identification evidence was potentially tainted and uncorroborated.

    Holding

    No, because the decision to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification rests within the trial court’s discretion, and in this instance, the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of that discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals majority found that the trial court was within its discretion to exclude the expert testimony. However, the dissent argued that excluding the testimony was an error, especially given the circumstances of the identification. The dissent emphasized that Mrs. Sykes could not initially create a composite sketch or identify Young in a photo array, and her identification only occurred after the illegal lineup. The dissent cited People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 (2001), noting that while trial courts have discretion, the trend favors admitting expert testimony on eyewitness identification when it would assist the jury. The dissent pointed out that, unlike People v. Lee, where the witness made multiple identifications, Mrs. Sykes’s identification was more tenuous. The dissent quoted People v. Mooney, 76 NY2d 827, 829 (1990), stating that “the emerging trend today is to find expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification sufficiently reliable to be admitted, and the vast majority of academic commentators have urged its acceptance”. The dissent argued that when eyewitness identification is attenuated and uncorroborated, courts should be more inclined to allow expert testimony. The expert’s testimony was intended to show the weak correlation between witness confidence and accuracy, the difficulty of remembering a face when the mind cannot encode all the features at once, and the possibility of memory source confusion. Allowing it would have assisted the jury in assessing the reliability of Mrs. Sykes’ identification.

  • People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28 (2006): Limits on Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28 (2006)

    While expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification is admissible under certain circumstances, a trial court’s jury instruction stating that such testimony cannot be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony is erroneous when read in isolation, but may not require reversal if the charge as a whole conveys the correct standard.

    Summary

    Drake was convicted of assault after an eyewitness identified him as the perpetrator of a brick attack. The trial court allowed expert testimony regarding factors affecting eyewitness identification but instructed the jury that this testimony could not be used to either discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony. The New York Court of Appeals held that this specific instruction, taken by itself, was erroneous, but that, viewing the jury charge in its entirety, the jury was properly instructed on how to consider expert testimony. Thus, the conviction was upheld.

    Facts

    Nicole Barrett was seriously injured when struck in the head with a brick in Manhattan. Several eyewitnesses were present. Defendant Drake was arrested and charged with the assault after an investigation. At trial, the key issue was identification. Some eyewitnesses identified Drake as the attacker, while others did not, or were uncertain.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted defendant’s pretrial motion to admit expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, subject to limitations. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury that the expert testimony could not be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony, to which the defendant objected. Drake was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury instruction stating that expert testimony on eyewitness identification cannot be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony constitutes reversible error.

    Holding

    No, because while the instruction was erroneous when read in isolation, the court’s charge, taken as a whole, conveyed to the jury the correct standard as to the proper use of expert testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the challenged jury instruction was “improper and should not have been used” (People v. Fields, 87 NY2d 821, 823 [1995]). The court reasoned that the instruction could have been taken to mean that the expert testimony could not be considered for any purpose. The court emphasized that jurors are always free to accept or reject expert evidence. It clarified that jurors must be permitted to apply the identified psychological factors to the facts of the case in deciding whether they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identifications if they accept the expert’s testimony. The court then focused on the charge as a whole. It noted that the charge expressly instructed the jury that the expert testimony was admitted to provide factors relevant to a person’s ability to perceive and remember, and that the jury was the sole judge of the reliability and credibility of the eyewitness testimony. The court concluded that no reasonable juror could have concluded that the expert’s testimony had been effectively stricken from the case. The court cited People v. Russell, 266 NY 147, 153 (1934) for the proposition that “[t]he test is always whether the jury, hearing the whole charge, would gather from its language the correct rules which should be applied in arriving at decision”.