New York Law Review

Tag: Extreme Emotional Disturbance

  • People v. Gonzalez, 22 N.Y.3d 541 (2014): Notice Requirement for Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    22 N.Y.3d 541 (2014)

    A defendant who requests an Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED) jury charge based solely on evidence presented by the prosecution is not required to provide statutory notice under CPL 250.10.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after killing his boss. At trial, the prosecution introduced defendant’s confession, which included statements suggesting he “lost his mind” during the altercation. The defense initially filed notice of intent to present psychiatric evidence for an EED defense but later withdrew it. At the charge conference, the defense requested an EED charge based on the prosecution’s evidence. The trial court agreed to give the charge only if the prosecution could rebut it with its own psychiatric expert. The defense then withdrew the request. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPL 250.10 doesn’t require notice when a defendant relies solely on the prosecution’s evidence for an EED defense.

    Facts

    Defendant killed his boss, Wilfredo Lebrón, with a hammer and dismembered the body. He disposed of the body parts in garbage cans. The police found the body and defendant confessed. In a written statement and a videotaped confession, defendant claimed Lebrón had attacked him first. In the videotaped confession, the defendant stated that he had “lost [his] mind” and was “out of [his] mind”. He also stated that Lebrón had abused him for weeks prior to the killing.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree murder, manslaughter, and other related charges. Before trial, defendant filed a CPL 250.10 notice, indicating intent to present psychiatric evidence for an EED defense. He was examined by both the defense and prosecution’s psychiatrists. Prior to trial, the defense stated an intent to withdraw the CPL 250.10 notice. At trial, the prosecution introduced defendant’s confessions. The defense rested without presenting a case. At the charge conference, the defense requested an EED charge based on the prosecution’s evidence. The trial court agreed to give the charge, but only if the prosecution could rebut the evidence with their psychiatric expert. The defense withdrew the request for the charge. The jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder. The defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 250.10 requires a defendant to provide notice of intent to offer evidence in connection with an EED defense when the defendant offers no evidence at trial but requests an EED jury charge based solely upon evidence presented by the People.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPL 250.10 requires notice only when a defendant affirmatively presents psychiatric evidence, not when the defendant relies solely on the prosecution’s evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 250.10 requires notice when a defendant “intends to present psychiatric evidence.” The statute defines this as “evidence of mental disease or defect to be offered by the defendant in connection with” an EED defense. The court highlighted the active terms, “present” and “offer,” suggesting that the defendant must affirmatively seek to admit psychiatric evidence. Here, the defendant did not offer any evidence; he merely relied on the prosecution’s evidence. The court noted that the purpose of CPL 250.10 is to prevent unfair surprise to the prosecution. Here, the prosecution introduced the evidence themselves and could not claim surprise. The court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by conditioning the EED charge on the People’s presentation of their expert’s testimony. Because no notice was required, there was no statutory basis for allowing the People to use the psychiatric examination against the defendant. Quoting People v. Diaz, 15 NY3d 40, 46 (2010), the court stated “The statutory notice provision is grounded on principles of fairness and is intended ‘to prevent disadvantage to the prosecution as a result of surprise’ occasioned by the defendant’s sudden interposition of psychiatric evidence and an accompanying mental infirmity defense”.

  • People v. Mojica, 21 N.Y.3d 465 (2013): Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense Doesn’t Require Proof of Mental Infirmity

    People v. Mojica, 21 N.Y.3d 465 (2013)

    The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED) does not require proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder, but rather a reasonably explicable emotional disturbance so extreme as to result in a profound loss of self-control.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for fatally stabbing his fiancée. He requested the jury be charged on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED), which would allow for a verdict of first-degree manslaughter. The trial court denied the request, believing proof of a “mental infirmity” was required. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the EED defense does not require proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder. The court found that the evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, presented a triable question as to whether the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance.

    Facts

    The defendant and his fiancée, Tyffany Porter, had a heated argument. Porter refused to have sex with the defendant and disclosed she had been unfaithful with one of his friends. During the argument, the defendant retrieved a knife and stabbed Porter 47 times, killing her. The defendant then drove to a friend’s house, admitting he “just snapped” and appeared “spaced out.” He later called 911, stating he “just lost it” and “blacked out.” He confessed to the stabbing, explaining he was scared and panicked and that Porter had previously been abusive towards him.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in the trial court, which refused to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the defendant’s conduct inconsistent with the loss of self-control associated with the defense. The New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance because the defendant failed to prove he suffered from a mental infirmity.

    Holding

    No, because the extreme emotional disturbance defense does not require proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder; it requires a reasonably explicable emotional disturbance so extreme as to result in a profound loss of self-control.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant when judging whether to charge an affirmative defense. The charge must be given if there is evidence reasonably supportive of the defense, even if there is other evidence that would negate it. The court stated that the sheer number of knife wounds was indicative of the defendant’s loss of control. The court clarified that the term “mental infirmity,” as used in prior cases, does not tether the defense to proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder. The court noted that the subjective element of EED may be inferred from circumstances indicative of a loss of control and established without psychiatric evidence. The court found the defendant’s statements that he “snapped” and his demeanor after the event, along with the circumstances of the crime, sufficient to warrant the charge. Regarding the objective element (reasonableness of the explanation), the court stated that, viewing the evidence most favorably to the defendant, the jury should have determined whether the victim’s rejection and disclosure of infidelity precipitated an onrush of emotion leaving the defendant bereft of self-control. The court emphasized that its role is limited to excluding claims that are patently insufficient due to a lack of evidence or a speculative relation between the disturbance and the triggering circumstance or homicidal acts. The court stated, “The purpose [of the extreme emotional disturbance defense] was explicitly to give full scope to what amounts to a plea in mitigation based upon a mental or emotional trauma of significant dimensions.”

  • People v. Miller, 18 N.Y.3d 704 (2012): Verdict Sheet Annotations and Harmless Error

    18 N.Y.3d 704 (2012)

    A verdict sheet containing annotations beyond those authorized by statute (CPL 310.20(2)) constitutes reversible error, and harmless error analysis does not apply.

    Summary

    Jeffery Miller was convicted of second-degree murder. The verdict sheet included the question of whether the defendant established the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence. Miller appealed, arguing the verdict sheet violated CPL 310.20(2). The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that including the burden of proof on the verdict sheet was an unauthorized annotation under the statute. The Court further held that the error was not subject to harmless error analysis, adhering to prior precedent in People v. Damiano despite a 1996 amendment to CPL 310.20(2). This case clarifies the limitations on verdict sheet content and reinforces the strict application of CPL 310.20(2).

    Facts

    Miller was charged with second-degree murder for shooting his former girlfriend. At trial, Miller requested that the jury consider the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which, if proven, would reduce the charge to first-degree manslaughter. The trial court provided the jury with a six-page verdict sheet. On the first page, the jury was instructed to consider the extreme emotional disturbance defense only if they found Miller guilty of second-degree murder. The verdict sheet asked: “Has the Defendant established by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted under Extreme Emotional Disturbance?” Miller objected to this language.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Miller of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, finding a violation of CPL 310.20(2) that could not be considered harmless error (People v. Miller, 73 AD3d 1435 [4th Dept 2010]). The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the inclusion of language regarding the burden of proof for the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance on the verdict sheet violated CPL 310.20(2).

    Whether a violation of CPL 310.20(2) is subject to harmless error analysis.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the language constitutes an instruction on burden of proof, which is not authorized by CPL 310.20(2).

    2. No, because the 1996 amendment to CPL 310.20(2) did not alter the established precedent that harmless error analysis is inapplicable when a verdict sheet exceeds the statutory limitations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Spivey and People v. Damiano, which established that it is reversible error to provide a jury with a verdict sheet containing unauthorized annotations. The 1996 amendment to CPL 310.20(2) permits including dates, names of complainants, or specific statutory language to distinguish between counts, but does not authorize instructions on the burden of proof. The court rejected the argument that the 1996 amendment opened the door for harmless error analysis when a verdict sheet exceeds the statutory limits. The court stated, “legislative history cannot supply something that is just not in the statute.” The court contrasted the legislative response to People v. Ranghelle, where the legislature explicitly allowed for harmless error analysis in cases involving Rosario violations. The absence of similar language in the CPL 310.20(2) amendment indicated that the legislature did not intend to alter the existing rule against harmless error analysis in verdict sheet cases. The dissenting opinion argued that the 1996 amendment was specifically intended to countermand the strict precedent established in Spivey and Damiano and that the Governor’s Approval Memorandum supported this interpretation. The dissent concluded that the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Miller’s guilt and the weakness of his extreme emotional disturbance defense.

  • People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553 (2012): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts to Rebut Extreme Emotional Disturbance

    People v. Cass, 18 N.Y.3d 553 (2012)

    When a defendant raises the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, evidence of prior uncharged crimes or bad acts is admissible to rebut the defense, provided the evidence is directly relevant and its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for strangling his roommate. He raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, claiming the act resulted from a mental illness caused by prior sexual abuse. The prosecution introduced evidence of a prior similar strangulation committed by the defendant to rebut this defense. The New York Court of Appeals held that this evidence was admissible because it was directly relevant to rebut the defendant’s claim of acting under extreme emotional disturbance and showed a possible premeditated intent to target gay men, undermining the loss of control element of the defense.

    Facts

    Defendant strangled his roommate, Victor Dombrova, during an argument where Dombrova asked him to move out. Defendant admitted to the police that he “lost it” when Dombrova made sexual advances. He also admitted to a similar prior homicide, strangling Kevin Bosinski in Buffalo after Bosinski made sexual advances towards him. Both Dombrova and Bosinski had been told about the defendant’s history of sexual abuse. The police investigating Dombrova’s death discovered that the defendant was wanted for questioning in Buffalo concerning the Bosinski homicide.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree murder. Before trial, he indicated he would raise the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The People moved to introduce evidence of the Bosinski homicide to rebut the defense. The trial court granted the motion. The jury rejected the extreme emotional disturbance defense and convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged murder is admissible to rebut the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in a murder trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence is directly relevant to rebut the defendant’s claim of acting under extreme emotional disturbance, and its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the Molineux rule, stating that evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible if it only demonstrates the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged. However, such evidence is admissible if it is relevant to a specific material issue other than criminal propensity, such as motive, intent, or absence of mistake. The court applied a two-part inquiry: first, identifying a material issue other than criminal propensity; and second, weighing the probative value against the potential for prejudice.

    By asserting the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, the defendant placed his state of mind at the time of the killing directly in issue. The prior homicide was relevant because it tended to disprove the defendant’s claim of a “loss of control.” The court stated, “[t]his highly probative evidence is directly relevant to defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance defense in that it has a logical and natural tendency to disprove his specific claim that he was acting under an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the Dombrova homicide”. The similarity between the two incidents suggested a possible premeditated intent to target gay men. Even though the Bosinski and Dombrova homicides shared strikingly similar characteristics, and it can be argued that the admission of the Bosinski statement is overly prejudicial propensity evidence, “it is equally true that the repetition, duplication and similarity of defendant’s acts have a direct bearing on the question of premeditated intent”. The Court found the evidence highly probative, outweighing any potential prejudice. The Court also rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

  • People v. Diaz, 17 N.Y.3d 43 (2011): Notice Requirement for Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    17 N.Y.3d 43 (2011)

    A defendant must provide notice under CPL 250.10 when raising an extreme emotional disturbance defense, even if relying solely on lay testimony rather than expert psychiatric evidence.

    Summary

    Teofilo Diaz was convicted of second-degree murder for strangling his former girlfriend. Diaz sought to assert an extreme emotional disturbance defense, claiming he “went crazy” after the victim told him their son wasn’t his. The prosecution argued Diaz failed to provide the notice required by CPL 250.10(2). The trial court allowed late notice and an examination by the People’s psychiatrist. The New York Court of Appeals held that the notice requirement of CPL 250.10 applies even when the defendant intends to rely solely on lay testimony to prove the defense, as fairness dictates the prosecution have an opportunity to rebut such claims.

    Facts

    Teofilo Diaz strangled his former girlfriend, Felipa Santana, after she told him that their son wasn’t his. This occurred shortly after Diaz was released from prison for assaulting Santana, and violated an order of protection. Diaz fled to Florida and was apprehended a year later. He was charged with murder, criminal contempt, and endangering the welfare of a child.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed Diaz to file a late notice of intent to present an extreme emotional disturbance defense, and granted the prosecution time for a psychiatric examination of Diaz. Diaz was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the notice requirement of CPL 250.10 applies when a defendant intends to raise an extreme emotional disturbance defense relying solely on lay testimony.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute and principles of fairness require notice to the prosecution regardless of whether the evidence is expert or lay testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that “psychiatric evidence” as defined in CPL 250.10 encompasses any mental health evidence, including lay testimony. The purpose of the notice provision is to prevent unfair surprise and allow the prosecution an opportunity to acquire relevant information to counter the defense. Quoting People v. Berk, 88 N.Y.2d 257, 265 (1996), the Court stated that the notice provision is intended “to allow the People an opportunity to obtain any mental health evidence necessary to refute a defense of mental infirmity, it follows that it applies to any mental health evidence to be offered by the defendant in connection with such a defense.” The Court acknowledged that preclusion of a defense for failure to comply with the notice provision can implicate a defendant’s constitutional rights, and trial courts must balance these rights against the prejudice to the People. However, in this case, the court allowed the late notice and the defense was presented, mitigating any constitutional concerns. The court also determined that compelling the defendant to submit to examination by the People’s psychiatrist was authorized under CPL 250.10(3).

  • People v. Owens, 1 N.Y.3d 611 (2004): Admissibility of Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense Without Psychiatric Evidence

    People v. Owens, 1 N.Y.3d 611 (2004)

    A defendant asserting an extreme emotional disturbance defense must present sufficient evidence demonstrating a mental infirmity at the time of the homicide that impaired self-control, even if psychiatric testimony is not offered.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of intentional murder, felony murder, and robbery for the death of a 71-year-old victim. She claimed she suffered from extreme emotional disturbance due to a sexual relationship with the victim. The trial court excluded her testimony and layperson testimony offered to support this defense due to a lack of pretrial notice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that even without the notice issue, the defendant’s offer of proof was insufficient to establish the defense because it did not demonstrate a loss of self-control resulting from a mental infirmity at the time of the killing. This case underscores the evidentiary threshold for establishing the extreme emotional disturbance defense, even absent expert psychiatric testimony.

    Facts

    The 16-year-old defendant and a co-defendant went to the victim’s home with the intention to rob him. The defendant and the co-defendant choked and suffocated the 71-year-old victim, ultimately resulting in his death. Following the victim’s death, the defendant and co-defendant stole the victim’s automobile.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of intentional murder, felony murder, and robbery. She appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding her testimony and that of laypersons regarding her extreme emotional disturbance. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding the defendant’s offer of proof insufficient to warrant an extreme emotional disturbance charge to the jury.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant presented sufficient evidence to warrant a jury charge on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, absent psychiatric testimony, considering the defendant’s failure to provide pretrial notice of intent to offer psychiatric evidence?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s proffered testimony did not establish that she was affected by her relationship with the deceased to such a degree that a jury could reasonably conclude she acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while extreme emotional disturbance can be established without psychiatric testimony, the defendant must still demonstrate a mental infirmity, not rising to the level of insanity, that caused a loss of self-control at the time of the homicide. Citing People v. Roche, 98 N.Y.2d 70, 75 (2002), the court emphasized that the defense requires both a subjective element (that the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance) and an objective element (that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance), citing People v. Moye, 66 N.Y.2d 887, 890 (1985). The court found that the defendant’s testimony regarding her sexual relationship with the victim was insufficient to establish that she acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the killing, citing People v. White, 79 N.Y.2d 900, 903 (1992). The court declined to rule on whether pretrial notice under CPL 250.10(2) was required, as the offer of proof was insufficient regardless. The court held, “[D]efendant ‘cannot establish an extreme emotional disturbance defense without evidence that he or she suffered from a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity at the time of the homicide, typically manifested by a loss of self-control’”.

  • People v. Roche, 98 N.Y.2d 70 (2002): Establishing Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    98 N.Y.2d 70 (2002)

    A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance unless sufficient evidence is presented to support both the subjective element (that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance) and the objective element (that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance).

    Summary

    Roche was convicted of second-degree murder for the stabbing death of his common-law wife. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED). The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to warrant an EED charge. The Court clarified that both subjective (defendant’s mental state) and objective (reasonableness of the disturbance) elements must be supported by sufficient evidence, and the brutal nature of the crime alone is insufficient to establish EED. Defendant’s actions and statements before, during, and after the crime did not demonstrate the required loss of self-control or mental infirmity.

    Facts

    Lillian Rivera was found stabbed to death in her apartment, which she shared with Roche. Roche told neighbors Rivera had killed herself. He also told another acquaintance, Bell, that he killed Rivera because she was “going crazy.” Roche changed his story multiple times, initially claiming his wife had committed suicide. At no point did he claim to have lost control or been mentally disturbed at the time of the killing. The defense focused on the theory that someone else committed the murder.

    Procedural History

    Roche was convicted of second-degree murder in the first trial; this was reversed on appeal due to an improper jury charge. At the second trial, Roche requested the judge instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter based on extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court denied this request. The jury again convicted Roche of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the trial court should have instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, where the defendant was charged with second-degree murder in connection with the stabbing death of his wife.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support either the subjective or objective elements of the extreme emotional disturbance defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a defendant is entitled to an extreme emotional disturbance charge only when sufficient evidence supports both elements of the defense. The subjective element requires evidence that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, typically shown by a loss of self-control due to a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity. The objective element requires a reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance, viewed from the defendant’s perspective at the time. The Court found no evidence that Roche suffered from a mental infirmity or loss of self-control during the stabbing. His actions after the crime (attempting to conceal evidence, fabricating a suicide story) indicated a calculated effort to avoid responsibility, not a disturbed state of mind. The Court stated, “Defendant cannot rely on his statements to the police to establish the presence of an extreme emotional disturbance since he asserted that he had not harmed his wife in any respect.” The Court rejected the argument that the brutality of the crime, alone, indicated an extreme emotional disturbance. While the nature of the wounds can be relevant, it must be linked to other compelling evidence of emotional disturbance. “Where we have referenced the nature or severity of the wounds, the probative value of such evidence has been linked to other compelling evidence of extreme emotional disturbance.” The Court concluded that the arguments and errands cited by the defense were insufficient to constitute a reasonable explanation or excuse for extreme emotional disturbance.

  • People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 43 (1996): Hearsay Exception for Witness Unavailability Due to Defendant’s Misconduct

    People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 43 (1996)

    The exception to the hearsay rule for a witness’s unavailability due to the defendant’s misconduct does not apply unless the defendant’s actions were motivated, at least in part, by a desire to prevent the witness from testifying.

    Summary

    Kenneth Maher was convicted of murder for killing his estranged girlfriend. The prosecution introduced the victim’s hearsay statements about Maher’s prior violent acts, arguing they were admissible because Maher caused her unavailability. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the ‘unavailable witness’ exception exists, it doesn’t apply unless the defendant’s actions were motivated by preventing testimony. Here, there was no evidence Maher killed the victim to prevent her from testifying; therefore, the statements were improperly admitted. However, the Court found the error harmless because of overwhelming evidence of intent and premeditation.

    Facts

    Kenneth Maher and Ann Kotel had a tumultuous relationship. After several violent incidents, Kotel contacted the police and moved out of their shared apartment. Maher was arrested after an altercation on April 30. On June 3, Maher, dressed in black and armed, broke into Kotel’s apartment and fatally shot her three times. He claimed he lacked the intent to commit murder due to medication and invoked the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.

    Procedural History

    Maher was convicted of intentional murder, felony murder, and criminal contempt in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, upholding the admissibility of the victim’s statements. Maher appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the hearsay statements were improperly admitted.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the victim’s hearsay statements regarding the defendant’s prior violent acts were admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for instances where the defendant caused the witness’s unavailability.

    Holding

    No, because the ‘unavailable witness’ exception to the hearsay rule does not apply where there is no evidence that the defendant’s actions were motivated, even in part, by a desire to prevent the victim from testifying against him. However, the error was harmless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the exception established in People v. Geraci, allowing the admission of out-of-court statements when a defendant wrongfully procures a witness’s unavailability. However, the Court emphasized this exception is narrow and based on necessity to prevent witness tampering. The Court reasoned that expanding the exception to all homicide cases, where the victim’s unavailability is inherent, would eviscerate the traditional dying declaration exception and require the trial court to preemptively decide the ultimate issue of the defendant’s guilt during a Sirois hearing. The Court stated, “[T]he Geraci exception cannot be invoked where, as in the instant case, there is not a scintilla of evidence that the defendant’s acts against the absent witness were motivated, even in part, by a desire to prevent the victim from testifying against him in court.”

    Despite finding the admission of the statements erroneous, the Court applied the harmless error standard, assessing whether there was a “significant probability” that the jury would have acquitted Maher absent the hearsay. The Court concluded there was no such probability. The evidence of Maher’s premeditation, including purchasing the shotgun, dressing in black, cutting phone lines, and reloading the gun between shots, strongly negated his claims of diminished intent and emotional disturbance. Additionally, Maher’s own admissions corroborated the victim’s statements, rendering the hearsay cumulative. Therefore, the Court affirmed the conviction.

  • People v. Bradley, 88 N.Y.2d 901 (1996): Defendant’s Right to Control Their Defense Strategy

    People v. Bradley, 88 N.Y.2d 901 (1996)

    A defendant has the right to control their defense strategy, and it is prejudicial error for a trial court to submit an affirmative defense to the jury over the defendant’s objection when it undermines their chosen defense.

    Summary

    Bradley was charged with second-degree murder. He asserted a defense of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, arguing a progressive mental illness prevented him from appreciating his actions’ moral and legal import. The prosecution requested the court submit first-degree manslaughter based on extreme emotional disturbance. Over the defense’s objection, the court instructed the jury to consider first-degree manslaughter if they found Bradley legally sane but acting under extreme emotional disturbance. The jury convicted Bradley of first-degree manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that imposing the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance over Bradley’s objection was prejudicial error because it undermined his chosen defense strategy and shifted the burden of proof.

    Facts

    Bradley was charged with second-degree murder. His defense strategy centered on demonstrating that he was not responsible for his actions due to a mental disease or defect. The core of his defense was that he suffered from a progressive mental illness that had worsened in the months leading up to the shooting. Bradley argued that, at the time of the shooting, his paranoid thought processes prevented him from understanding the moral and legal implications of his actions. At trial, the prosecution requested that the court also submit to the jury the option of finding Bradley guilty of first-degree manslaughter, arguing that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. Bradley objected to the inclusion of this affirmative defense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, over the defendant’s objection, instructed the jury on first-degree manslaughter as an alternative to second-degree murder, based on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The jury found Bradley guilty of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in submitting the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the jury over the objection of the defendant.
    2. Whether the submission of such an affirmative defense prejudiced the defendant’s chosen defense strategy.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a defendant has the right to chart their own defense, and that right is infringed when an affirmative defense is submitted over defense objection.
    2. Yes, because the interposition of an inconsistent defense creates a risk of juror confusion and may taint a defendant’s credibility in the eyes of the jury. Furthermore, it increases the danger of prejudice because of the resulting shift in the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. DeGina, which established that “a defendant… has the right to chart his own defense.” The Court reasoned that Bradley’s defense of not being responsible due to mental disease or defect was inherently incompatible with the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court explained that extreme emotional disturbance would require a temporary loss of control by someone otherwise capable of appreciating the nature of their actions, whereas Bradley’s defense hinged on a lack of appreciation due to a progressive mental illness.

    The court emphasized the prejudice suffered by Bradley: “[W]hen the defensive theory that the court interjects constitutes an affirmative defense there is an increased danger of prejudice because of the resulting shift in the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense and the attendant risk that the jury will believe that the defendant has assumed a burden beyond the defense.” Although defendants are generally entitled to present inconsistent defenses, the court held that the strategic risks associated with such a choice should not be imposed on a defendant against their will. The court concluded that the imposition of an affirmative burden of proof and the undermining of Bradley’s chosen defense strategy constituted serious prejudice, warranting reversal.

  • People v. Petrovich, 87 N.Y.2d 961 (1996): Defendant’s Right to Decide Jury Instructions Over Counsel’s Objection

    People v. Petrovich, 87 N.Y.2d 961 (1996)

    A defendant, represented by counsel, has the ultimate authority to make fundamental decisions regarding the case, including whether to request submission of an affirmative defense to the jury, even over the objections of counsel.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of murdering his parents. At trial, he asserted an insanity defense. The trial court inquired whether the defendant wanted an instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which would reduce the charges to manslaughter. Initially, the defendant agreed, but later changed his mind, against his counsel’s advice, fearing it would preclude a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court, after a colloquy with the defendant, honored the defendant’s wishes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the decision to submit the affirmative defense rested with the defendant, not counsel, as it was a fundamental decision about the case’s presentation.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murdering his parents. His defense was that he lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the criminal consequences of his actions due to a mental disease or defect.
    After both sides rested, the court inquired whether the defendant wanted an instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce the murder charges to manslaughter. Initially, the defendant agreed to the instruction. The next day, the defendant changed his mind and informed the court that he only wanted three possible verdicts submitted to the jury: guilty of murder, not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, or not guilty. The defendant believed that submitting the extreme emotional disturbance defense would preclude a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of murder after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial judge violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by allowing him to override his counsel’s advice regarding the extreme emotional disturbance defense without conducting a “searching inquiry.” The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, represented by counsel, has the right to decide whether to request submission of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the jury, even when counsel advises against it.

    Holding

    Yes, because the decision of whether to request submission of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance rests with the defendant, as it concerns a fundamental decision regarding the case that impacts the potential verdict and the defendant’s fate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant retains the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding their case, even when represented by counsel. These decisions include whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify on their own behalf, or take an appeal. The court analogized the decision of whether to submit the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to these fundamental decisions, emphasizing its potential impact on the verdict.
    The court noted that the defendant’s decision was not simply a matter of trial strategy or tactics. Rather, the defendant perceived that charging the jury on both murder and manslaughter provided two opportunities for the jury to convict, and he calculated that eliminating consideration of manslaughter increased his chance for an acquittal. The court found that the trial court was under no obligation to conduct a “searching inquiry” because the defendant was not forfeiting his Sixth Amendment right. The trial court’s inquiry was sufficient to establish that the defendant understood the nature of his request to limit the charges submitted to the jury. The court stated, “Manifestly, a verdict is dispositive of a defendant’s fate and, as this defendant recognized, the submission of the extreme emotional disturbance defense to the jury could indeed be determinative of the verdict.”
    The court cited Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, noting that a defendant retains ultimate authority over certain fundamental decisions. The court concluded that the defendant could not later complain that his miscalculation translated into a forced relinquishment of his right to counsel, especially since counsel repeatedly voiced disagreement and continued to actively represent the defendant throughout the trial. The court referenced People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722, 730-731, highlighting that no “searching inquiry” was required under these circumstances. Ultimately, because the defendant understood the ramifications of his request, the trial court properly acceded to it.