New York Law Review

Tag: extraordinary remedy

  • Morgenthau v. Altman, 74 N.Y.2d 733 (1989): Limits on the Use of Prohibition to Review Criminal Court Actions

    74 N.Y.2d 733 (1989)

    The extraordinary remedy of prohibition is available only where a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers, and is not a means to review arguable errors of law in pending criminal actions.

    Summary

    Morgenthau sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a lower court from allegedly acting improperly in a criminal case. The New York Court of Appeals held that prohibition was not the appropriate remedy because the trial court had jurisdiction over the criminal matter. The Court emphasized that prohibition is reserved for instances where a court lacks jurisdiction or acts in excess of its powers, not for correcting potential legal errors. Furthermore, the Court declined to convert the proceeding into a declaratory judgment action because a necessary party, the District Attorney’s office, was not before the court.

    Facts

    The specific underlying facts of the criminal action are not detailed in this decision. The key fact is that a party (presumably a defendant in a criminal case) sought certain actions from the criminal court, and the District Attorney, Morgenthau, sought to prohibit the court from taking those actions.

    Procedural History

    Morgenthau, likely in his official capacity as District Attorney, initiated a special proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition in the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. Morgenthau then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition against the trial court’s actions in the underlying criminal matter.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court had jurisdiction over the criminal actions and the authority to issue orders relating to the disposition of those actions; therefore, prohibition is not available to collaterally review an arguable error of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal, emphasizing the limited scope of the remedy of prohibition. The court reiterated the established principle that prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers. The court noted that prohibition is not a tool for correcting arguable legal errors within a pending criminal action. Even when a court arguably oversteps its bounds, the issuance of a writ of prohibition is discretionary. The court emphasized that the lower court had jurisdiction over the criminal case and the authority to issue orders related to it. The Court specifically stated: “Prohibition is generally not available to collaterally review an arguable error of law committed in a pending criminal action.” The court also declined to convert the proceeding into a declaratory judgment action, pointing out that the District Attorney’s office, a crucial party with a significant interest, was not properly before the court. This procedural defect prevented the court from considering declaratory relief. The court explicitly avoided expressing any opinion on the merits of the petitioner’s claim that the trial court acted improperly, clarifying that its decision was based solely on the inappropriateness of prohibition as a remedy.

  • Matter of Hassan v. Johnson, 96 N.Y.2d 446 (2001): Limits on Prohibition as a Remedy for Procedural Errors

    Matter of Hassan v. Johnson, 96 N.Y.2d 446 (2001)

    Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only to prevent a court from exceeding its authorized powers, not to correct mere procedural errors.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of the remedy of prohibition in New York. Hassan sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a court from enforcing an order regarding the order of witness presentation before a grand jury. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s decision regarding the order of witnesses was a procedural matter within its supervisory jurisdiction, not an excess of power that would justify the extraordinary remedy of prohibition. The Court emphasized that prohibition is reserved for instances where a court acts entirely without jurisdiction, not merely commits an error of law.

    Facts

    An individual, Hassan, was the subject of a grand jury investigation. The court ordered that the People’s witnesses be presented to the Grand Jury before Hassan, who had requested to appear pursuant to CPL 190.50 (subd 5, par [a]). Hassan sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the court from enforcing this order, arguing it was an improper exercise of the court’s authority.

    Procedural History

    The lower court denied Hassan’s request for a writ of prohibition. The Appellate Division affirmed that denial. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s order regarding the order of witness presentation before the grand jury constituted an excess of its authorized powers, thus warranting the remedy of prohibition.

    Holding

    No, because the order in which witnesses are presented before the Grand Jury is a matter of procedure, within the supervisory jurisdiction of the court, and does not constitute an excess of power justifying the extraordinary remedy of prohibition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that prohibition is an extraordinary remedy reserved for instances where a court acts in excess of its jurisdiction, not merely commits an error of procedure or substantive law. The court cited prior cases, including Matter of Dondi v Jones, for the principle that the excess of power must go to “the very authority or power and, thus, jurisdiction of the officer, not to a mere mistake or ‘an error in procedure or substantive law’”. The court reasoned that the order in which witnesses are presented before the Grand Jury is a procedural matter falling within the supervisory jurisdiction of the court, which, along with the District Attorney, is a “legal advisor” of the Grand Jury (CPL 190.25, subd 6). The court distinguished this case from others where prohibition was deemed appropriate, such as Matter of Proskin v County Ct. of Albany County, where the order involved a “gross, unprecedented, and even suspect as to motivation, direction” procedural error. Here, the order requiring the People’s witnesses be presented before Hassan, who requested to appear pursuant to CPL 190.50 (subd 5, par [a]), did not rise to that level. The court explicitly stated, “The order in which witnesses are presented before the Grand Jury is a matter of procedure, within the supervisory jurisdiction of the court”. The court explicitly declined to rule on the merits of the underlying order, focusing solely on whether prohibition was the proper remedy. The practical takeaway is that attorneys challenging court orders must carefully consider whether the alleged error is jurisdictional in nature or merely a procedural or substantive error, as prohibition is only available in the former case. Attempts to use prohibition to correct ordinary errors will be unsuccessful.