59 N.Y.2d 914 (1983)

A juror’s observation of everyday occurrences is not considered misconduct unless it rises to the level of a conscious, contrived experiment designed to introduce new evidence into deliberations.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that a juror’s observations about visibility through a car window did not constitute misconduct. The juror made these observations while walking to dinner with other jurors and riding a bus. The court distinguished this behavior from a ‘conscious, contrived experimentation’ designed to introduce new evidence. The court emphasized that the juror’s actions were akin to an everyday experience and thus not grounds for overturning the conviction. The Court suggested that the better practice would be for trial judges to hold a hearing to ascertain the extent of a juror’s actions rather than to rely solely on attorney affidavits.

Facts

During the trial, a juror, while walking to dinner with fellow jurors, evaluated the ability to observe the interior of an automobile through its rear window. He repeated a similar evaluation while riding a bus with jurors to the hotel after being sequestered. These observations were later revealed and challenged as potential juror misconduct.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted at trial. The defendant appealed, arguing juror misconduct. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether a juror’s casual observations during everyday activities constitute misconduct that warrants overturning a conviction.

Holding

No, because the juror’s actions were considered everyday experiences and did not amount to a ‘conscious, contrived experimentation’ intended to introduce new evidence outside of the presented trial evidence.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the juror’s observations were akin to ordinary, everyday experiences and did not constitute the type of deliberate, contrived experimentation that would warrant a finding of misconduct. The court distinguished the case from People v. Brown, where the juror’s conduct was a ‘conscious, contrived experimentation.’ The court quoted United States ex rel. Owen v McMann, noting the difference between casual observations and intentional misconduct. The court suggested a hearing is the best practice for trial judges to determine what occurred in such situations. The court stated, “Rather, the juror’s evaluation of the ability to observe the interior of an automobile through its rear window, made while walking to dinner between deliberations and again while riding in a bus with jurors to the hotel after being sequestered, is properly classified as an everyday experience and, therefore, not misconduct.”