New York Law Review

Tag: extradition

  • People v. Feliciano, 17 N.Y.3d 16 (2011): Duty to Promptly Execute a Violation of Probation Warrant

    People v. Feliciano, 17 N.Y.3d 16 (2011)

    A court’s failure to promptly execute a violation of probation (VOP) warrant for a defendant incarcerated out-of-state does not automatically divest the court of jurisdiction, especially when extradition is complex and the delay is partially attributable to the defendant’s actions.

    Summary

    Luis Feliciano pleaded guilty to a felony drug charge and received a split sentence of jail time and probation. He violated his probation by fleeing to Puerto Rico, prompting the court to issue a VOP warrant. Years later, while incarcerated in Pennsylvania for a separate crime, Feliciano requested resolution of the VOP. The New York court delayed the VOP hearing until Feliciano’s release from Pennsylvania due to extradition difficulties. After his release, Feliciano was resentenced to a prison term. The New York Court of Appeals held that the delay did not divest the court of jurisdiction because of the complexities of interstate extradition and the defendant’s initial flight, distinguishing the case from situations where a defendant is readily available within the state.

    Facts

    In 1992, Feliciano was sentenced to jail and probation for a drug felony.

    He violated probation by fleeing to Puerto Rico without permission.

    A VOP complaint was filed, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

    In 2000, he was arrested in Pennsylvania for homicide-related crimes.

    In 2002, he requested resolution of the outstanding VOP from New York.

    The District Attorney noted the difficulties of extraditing him from Pennsylvania.

    The court postponed the VOP hearing until his release from Pennsylvania.

    In 2007, after his release from Pennsylvania, the VOP warrant was executed, and he was resentenced.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially imposed a split sentence for the drug charge.

    After Feliciano violated his probation, the County Court declared him delinquent and issued an arrest warrant.

    After serving time in Pennsylvania, Feliciano was returned to Greene County, and the County Court revoked his probation and resentenced him.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the resentencing.

    Feliciano filed two CPL 440.20 motions, claiming jurisdictional defect and ineffective assistance of counsel, both of which were denied.

    His application for a writ of error coram nobis was denied by the Appellate Division, but leave to appeal was granted by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the five-year delay in adjudicating the VOP complaint, due to the defendant’s incarceration in another state and the difficulties of extradition, violated his statutory or constitutional rights and divested the County Court of jurisdiction to revoke his probation.

    Holding

    No, because the delay was not unreasonable given the complexities of interstate extradition, the defendant’s initial flight from New York, and the lack of a clear legal obligation for New York to prioritize his return for the VOP hearing while he was serving a sentence in Pennsylvania.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Horvath, where the probationer was incarcerated within New York and readily available. The court emphasized that CPL 410.30 requires the court to “promptly take reasonable and appropriate action,” but what constitutes “reasonable and appropriate action” depends on the circumstances.

    The court cited Carchman v. Nash and Moody v. Daggett, highlighting that the Supreme Court has drawn distinctions between detainers based on criminal charges and those based on probation violations, noting the reduced urgency and constitutional dimension of the latter.

    The court also distinguished this case from People v. Winfrey, where the People made no effort whatsoever to secure the defendant’s return from out-of-state. Here, the District Attorney investigated the possibility of extradition and determined it was impractical.

    The court stated, “The arguments that defendant asserts trial counsel should have advanced at the VOP hearing are not so strong that ‘no reasonable defense lawyer could have found [them] … to be not worth raising.’ They are, in fact, novel and call for an extension of or change in — not an application of — existing law.”

    Because the arguments were not clearly dispositive, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them.

  • People v. Romeo, 12 N.Y.3d 54 (2008): Prosecutorial Delay & Speedy Trial Rights

    12 N.Y.3d 54 (2008)

    A lengthy post-indictment delay, caused by the prosecution’s decision to defer to a foreign prosecution and failure to seek extradition, can violate a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Summary

    Romeo was indicted in New York for murder in 1987. He fled to Canada and killed a police officer there. Instead of seeking Romeo’s extradition on the New York murder charge, the prosecution deferred to Canadian authorities. Romeo was convicted in Canada and imprisoned. Twelve years after the indictment, Romeo moved to dismiss the New York indictment on speedy trial grounds. He was eventually brought back to New York, convicted of manslaughter, and appealed, arguing a violation of his speedy trial rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court’s decision to dismiss the indictment, holding that the prosecution’s delay in pursuing the case violated Romeo’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, based on the five factor test from People v. Taranovich.

    Facts

    In November 1985, a fatal shooting occurred in Suffolk County, New York. A gun belonging to Romeo was identified as the murder weapon. In February 1987, Romeo was ordered to provide a DNA sample. Before providing the sample, Romeo fled to Canada. In Canada, he killed a police officer. He was apprehended and held on a Canadian warrant. Suffolk County authorities obtained hair and blood samples from Romeo, which matched evidence from the New York crime scene.

    Procedural History

    Romeo was indicted in Suffolk County, NY in March 1987. He demanded a speedy trial. The Suffolk County Court denied Romeo’s application to be produced for arraignment before extradition to Canada, suggesting any delay could be addressed later. Romeo was extradited to Canada, convicted, and sentenced. In 1999, Romeo moved to dismiss the NY indictment based on speedy trial grounds; this was denied. In 2005, he was brought back to Suffolk County. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter and appealed, arguing a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s lengthy postindictment delay occasioned by delaying their prosecution in favor of a Canadian prosecution violated defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People’s decision to defer to the Canadian prosecution, coupled with their failure to make a good-faith effort to extradite Romeo, resulted in an excessive delay that prejudiced Romeo’s ability to defend himself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the five-factor balancing test from People v. Taranovich to determine if Romeo’s speedy trial rights were violated: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of defendant’s defense. The Court found the 12-year delay between indictment and the speedy trial motion to be extraordinary. The primary reason for the delay was the People’s decision to defer to the Canadian prosecution and their failure to seek extradition. The Court noted that while the underlying charge of murder was serious, it didn’t excuse the delay. While Romeo was incarcerated, it was due to the Canadian charges. However, the Court found it highly likely that the delay impaired Romeo’s ability to defend himself, especially given his incarceration in a foreign prison. The Court emphasized that the People had been warned that deferring prosecution could cause a speedy trial violation. The Court distinguished this case from others where extradition would clearly be futile, stating, “The fact that a defendant is incarcerated outside of the state makes it incumbent upon the People to make diligent, good faith efforts to secure his presence in the state for arraignment and trial.” Because the People failed to make such efforts, Romeo’s speedy trial rights were violated.

  • People ex rel. Hinton v. Von Holden, 41 N.Y.2d 342 (1977): Extradition When the Accused Was Not in the Demanding State

    People ex rel. Hinton v. Von Holden, 41 N.Y.2d 342 (1977)

    When the accused was not in the demanding state at the time of the alleged crime, extradition requires a prima facie showing that the accused’s actions in the asylum state would constitute a crime in the asylum state if the consequences had occurred there.

    Summary

    This case concerns the extradition of Guy Hinton from New York to California for felony nonsupport of his children. Hinton had left California in 1962, and in 1972, California sought his extradition. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the requirements of CPL 570.16 were met, which governs extradition when the accused was not in the demanding state at the time of the alleged crime. The court held that while the extradition papers alleged an intentional act in New York resulting in a crime in California, they failed to establish prima facie that Hinton had the ability to support his children, a necessary element of the New York nonsupport statute. Therefore, the extradition warrant was vacated.

    Facts

    In 1962, Guy Hinton left his wife and children in California. His wife later applied for public assistance in California, claiming nonsupport from Hinton. A felony complaint was filed in California in October 1972, alleging that Hinton willfully failed to support his minor children. Hinton was arrested in New York in November 1972, where he resided, pending extradition proceedings. The California Governor requested Hinton’s return, stating that Hinton committed acts outside California intentionally resulting in the crime of nonsupport within California. The New York Governor then issued a warrant for Hinton’s arrest and surrender.

    Procedural History

    Hinton sought to vacate the Governor’s warrant, arguing that the supporting documents did not meet the requirements of CPL 570.16. The Suffolk County Supreme Court granted the motion, treating it as an application for habeas corpus. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the affidavits submitted with the California complaint contained sufficient information to satisfy CPL 570.08 and 570.16. Hinton then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the requirements of CPL 570.16 have been met, specifically:

    1. Whether the California felony complaint, even with supporting affidavits, establishes that any acts committed by Hinton would constitute a crime in New York?
    2. Whether the felony complaint is defective for failing to allege that Hinton committed an act in New York that intentionally resulted in the commission of a crime in California?

    Holding

    1. No, because the extradition papers failed to establish prima facie that Hinton had the ability to support his children, an essential element of the New York nonsupport statute.
    2. No, the Governor’s demand and accompanying affidavits showing that the defendant committed an act in New York intentionally resulting in a crime in the demanding State satisfies this requirement of CPL 570.16.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between extradition of fugitives from justice and extradition of individuals not physically present in the demanding state during the alleged crime. The latter depends on comity between states, as the U.S. Constitution only mandates the extradition of actual fugitives. New York’s adoption of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act allows for extradition in cases where the accused was not in the demanding state, but it includes safeguards to prevent abuse. The court noted that CPL 570.16 requires that the acts for which extradition is sought would be punishable by New York law if the consequences had occurred in New York.

    While the California complaint charged Hinton with willfully omitting to furnish support, the court found a critical deficiency in the extradition papers. The court explained, “On this record there is nothing of an evidentiary nature showing that the defendant had the ability to furnish support out of his financial resources or by means of his earning capacity.” The court explicitly rejected the argument that a prior Family Court order established this ability because that order did not contain any findings on Hinton’s resources or earning capacity. Because a prima facie showing of ability to pay was required, the extradition was improper. Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment vacating the Governor’s warrant.

  • People v. Walls, 35 N.Y.2d 419 (1974): Jurisdiction Despite Illegal Extradition

    People v. Walls, 35 N.Y.2d 419 (1974)

    A state court has jurisdiction over a defendant even if the defendant’s return to the state was not in compliance with the extradition laws of another state, provided the officers acted in good faith and had probable cause for the arrest.

    Summary

    New York City police officers, after observing the defendants commit crimes, apprehended them just over the state line in New Jersey. The defendants argued that because the officers failed to comply with New Jersey’s fresh pursuit statute regarding extradition, New York lacked jurisdiction and the evidence seized during the arrest should be suppressed. The New York Court of Appeals held that the illegal extradition did not deprive the New York courts of jurisdiction, especially where the officers acted in good faith and had probable cause for the arrest. The court also ruled that the search incident to the arrest was valid under the circumstances.

    Facts

    New York City police officers and a federal narcotics agent were conducting an undercover operation. The officers attempted to arrest the defendants for narcotics possession and attempted sale. As one defendant was apprehended, others in a nearby car shot at the officers and fled toward the Hudson River. The officers pursued the defendants into the Lincoln Tunnel, where they were arrested just over the New Jersey state line. A search of the vehicle revealed weapons and illegal drugs.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were tried and convicted in New York. They appealed, arguing that New York lacked jurisdiction over them because they were arrested in New Jersey and were not properly extradited under New Jersey law. They also sought to suppress the evidence found in the car. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York courts lack jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant’s return to New York from another state violated that state’s extradition laws.

    2. Whether evidence seized incident to an arrest in another state should be suppressed when the arresting officers failed to comply with the other state’s extradition procedures.

    Holding

    1. No, because the illegal extradition does not deprive the New York courts of jurisdiction, especially when the officers acted in good faith.

    2. No, because the arrest and incidental search were valid since the officers had probable cause and reasonably, though mistakenly, believed their actions were authorized.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the principle that an illegal extradition does not necessarily strip a court of jurisdiction. While the state could decline to exercise jurisdiction if officers exploited unauthorized conduct, it was not warranted here, particularly since the trial court found the officers acted in good faith without knowingly disregarding the law. The court cited Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519, in support of this proposition.

    Regarding the evidence suppression argument, the court emphasized the absence of bad faith. The officers had probable cause for the arrest and reasonably believed they were authorized to act as they did. This distinguishes the case from situations where officers act without probable cause or willfully disregard required procedures. The court analogized the situation to Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797, where a good-faith mistake did not invalidate an arrest. The Court stated that “when they arrested the defendants and returned them to New York they reasonably —- although mistakenly — believed they were authorized to act as-they did. Under these circumstances the arrest and incidental search were valid.”

  • People v. Wilson, 21 N.Y.2d 134 (1967): Duty to Secure Defendant’s Return for Trial

    People v. Wilson, 21 N.Y.2d 134 (1967)

    A state has a duty to make a good-faith effort to secure the return of a defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction for trial; failure to do so violates the defendant’s right to a speedy trial and due process.

    Summary

    Wilson was arrested in 1958 on forgery and petit larceny charges, but was already incarcerated in Alabama. A detainer warrant was filed, but no action was taken to extradite him. Five years later, an indictment was issued. After Wilson was released in Alabama and returned to New York, he moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of prosecution. The Court of Appeals held that the state’s failure to attempt to secure Wilson’s return from Alabama violated his right to a speedy trial, even though he was incarcerated elsewhere. The court emphasized the state’s obligation to actively pursue prosecution once initiated, and the lack of valid justification for the lengthy delay.

    Facts

    In April 1958, Wilson allegedly committed forgery and petit larceny in Nassau County, New York, leading to an arrest warrant.

    In June 1958, Wilson was imprisoned in Alabama for violating his probation on a prior burglary conviction.

    The Nassau County District Attorney filed a detainer warrant with Alabama authorities in July 1958 but made no attempt to extradite Wilson.

    An indictment was handed down in New York in January 1963, charging Wilson with forgery and petit larceny.

    In September 1963, Alabama authorities notified Nassau County of Wilson’s impending release.

    Wilson waived extradition in October 1963 and was returned to New York.

    Procedural History

    In January 1964, Wilson moved to dismiss the indictment under Section 668 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    The County Court granted the motion in August 1964.

    The Appellate Division reversed the County Court’s order in July 1966.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the four-and-a-half-year delay in prosecuting Wilson, after the initiation of criminal proceedings but before indictment, violated his due process rights and right to a speedy trial when the delay was due to his incarceration in another state and the prosecution made no effort to secure his return.

    Holding

    Yes, because the State had a duty to make a good-faith effort to secure Wilson’s return for trial and failed to do so without adequate justification, thereby violating his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the delay in bringing Wilson to trial was unreasonable because the Nassau County authorities failed to take any steps to secure his release from Alabama, either before or after the indictment.

    The court rejected the Appellate Division’s conclusion that such action was unnecessary, finding no support in the record for the assertion that the administrative process would have been time-consuming or that Alabama would have been uncooperative.

    The court emphasized that a post-indictment delay is not justified solely because the defendant is imprisoned elsewhere, citing precedents involving both federal and state prisoners. The court noted that procedures exist for securing the release of prisoners in other jurisdictions for trial on pending charges.

    The court dismissed the argument that Alabama’s lack of participation in the Uniform Agreement on Detainers excused the state’s inaction, pointing out that Alabama law (Ala. Code, tit. 15, § 66) allows the Governor to transfer defendants to other states.

    “There is no proper criminological purpose served in holding several prosecutions over a defendant’s head. Neither correction nor deterrence is thus served, especially when the prosecutions withheld are for crimes of much lesser degree than those for which the defendant has been serving time.”

    The court concluded that the People failed to establish good cause for the delay, thereby violating Wilson’s right to a speedy trial and due process.

    The court noted that the delay was particularly unreasonable considering the relatively minor nature of the crimes and the staleness of the nine-year-old charges.

    The decision emphasizes the state’s affirmative obligation to advance prosecution once initiated and rejects the notion that imprisonment in another jurisdiction automatically justifies delay.