New York Law Review

Tag: Extortion

  • People v. Garland, 69 N.Y.2d 144 (1987): Tenant’s Right to Occupy Apartment is Property for Larceny Purposes

    People v. Garland, 69 N.Y.2d 144 (1987)

    A tenant’s legal right to occupy and possess an apartment, whether by lease or statute, constitutes “property” within the meaning of New York’s larceny statutes.

    Summary

    Defendant Garland was convicted of conspiracy and attempted grand larceny for attempting to deprive tenants of their rights to occupy their apartments through extortion. Garland argued that a tenant’s right to occupancy is not “property” under Penal Law § 155.00 (1), and thus, his actions were not criminal. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a tenant’s right to possess and occupy an apartment, whether through a lease or statutory protections like rent control, does constitute “property” under the larceny statutes. The Court emphasized that “property” includes any thing of value and that a tenant’s right to occupancy falls within this definition. The Court also noted that the interest need not be transferable to constitute property.

    Facts

    Defendant Garland, acting as an agent for the owner of an apartment building, engaged in a conspiracy to steal tenants’ rights to occupy their apartments. This was done through extortion tactics. The specific rights at issue included rights arising from leases, rent control laws, and rent stabilization laws. The prosecution argued that Garland’s actions constituted attempted grand larceny because he was trying to steal something of value from the tenants.

    Procedural History

    Garland was convicted after a nonjury trial of conspiracy in the fourth degree and two counts of attempted grand larceny in the first degree. He appealed, challenging the fundamental basis of the larceny-related charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Garland then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a tenant’s right to occupy and possess an apartment constitutes “property” as defined by Penal Law § 155.00 (1) for the purposes of larceny statutes.

    Holding

    Yes, because a tenant’s legal right to occupy and possess an apartment, whether by lease or under statute, is a thing of value and thus falls within the definition of “property” under Penal Law § 155.00 (1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its reasoning on the broad definition of “property” in Penal Law § 155.00 (1), which includes “any money, personal property, real property, computer data, computer program, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or any article, substance or thing of value”. The court relied on its prior decision in People v. Spatarella, 34 N.Y.2d 157 (1974), which held that a contractual right to service a restaurant was “property” for purposes of larceny by extortion, even if it was an intangible business relationship. The Court reasoned that when a lease is entered into, a landlord transfers the sole and exclusive right to possession to the tenant. Furthermore, rent-controlled and rent-stabilized tenants have a statutory right to continued possession. The court explicitly stated that “Tenants who have a legal right to occupy and possess an apartment, whether by lease or under statute, own ‘property’ as defined by Penal Law § 155.00 (1)”. The Court also dismissed the argument that an interest must be transferable to constitute property, citing Spatarella. The court’s decision underscores a broad interpretation of “property” to protect various rights and interests from theft and extortion.

  • Matter of Margiotta, 60 N.Y.2d 147 (1983): Determining ‘Essential Similarity’ for Attorney Disbarment Based on Federal Felony Convictions

    Matter of Margiotta, 60 N.Y.2d 147 (1983)

    For attorney disbarment purposes, a federal felony conviction warrants automatic disbarment in New York if it is ‘essentially similar’ to a New York felony, focusing on the protection of the public and the inherent coercion in actions taken under color of official right.

    Summary

    This case concerns the automatic disbarment of an attorney, Margiotta, following a federal felony conviction for mail fraud and extortion under the Hobbs Act. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the federal crimes were “essentially similar” to a New York felony, specifically larceny by extortion. The court affirmed the disbarment, holding that extortion under color of official right, even without explicitly instilling fear, is essentially similar to the New York crime, emphasizing the coercive nature of public office. This decision highlights the court’s focus on protecting the public and maintaining the integrity of the legal profession.

    Facts

    Margiotta, an attorney admitted to the New York Bar, was convicted in federal court of mail fraud and extortion under the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act convictions involved unlawfully affecting commerce by extortion. Following the conviction, the Appellate Division automatically disbarred Margiotta under Section 90(4) of the Judiciary Law. Margiotta appealed, arguing his federal conviction lacked a New York analogue, entitling him to a mitigation hearing.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division concluded Margiotta’s Hobbs Act violation was essentially similar to New York’s felony of larceny by extortion, warranting automatic disbarment. Margiotta appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the automatic disbarment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a federal felony conviction under the Hobbs Act for obtaining property “under color of official right” is essentially similar to the New York felony of larceny by extortion, even if the federal conviction does not require proof of instilling fear in the victim.

    Holding

    Yes, because for purposes of attorney disbarment under Judiciary Law § 90(4), obtaining property “under color of official right” pursuant to the Hobbs Act is essentially similar to larceny by extortion under New York Penal Law § 155.05(2)(e), as the coercive element is implied from the public official’s position of authority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the Hobbs Act allows for conviction based on either instilling fear or acting under color of official right, the latter is essentially similar to the New York crime. The court emphasized that disciplinary proceedings aim to protect the public, differing from criminal sentencing’s focus on individual punishment. It stated, “the perspective with which the sentencing of convicted criminals is approached — the imposition of individual punishment — is quite different from that involved in professional disciplinary proceedings — the protection of the public.” The court noted that the “color of official right” element in the Hobbs Act reflects the common-law understanding that extortion by a public official inherently involves coercion. Quoting United States v Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124, the court stated that “[t]he language, ‘under color of official right,’ is consonant with the common law definition of extortion, which could be committed only by a public official taking a fee under color of his office, with no proof of threat, force or duress required.” The court concluded that the coercive element is supplied by the existence of the public office itself. Chief Judge Cooke dissented, arguing the “essential similarity” test lacks a cognizable standard and advocated for a hearing to ensure fairness.

  • People v. Court, 43 N.Y.2d 817 (1977): Bribery Requires Corroboration of Accomplice Testimony

    People v. Court, 43 N.Y.2d 817 (1977)

    In bribery cases, the testimony of an accomplice (e.g., the person paying the bribe) must be corroborated by independent evidence to sustain an indictment.

    Summary

    This case concerns an indictment of a police officer, Court, for bribery. The primary evidence against Court was the testimony of Tripodi, an admitted policy operator who claimed to have been paying Court for police protection. The key issue was whether Tripodi was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. The Court of Appeals held that Tripodi was an accomplice because the payments constituted bribery, not extortion, and his testimony lacked the necessary corroboration. Thus, the indictment against Court should have been dismissed. The dissent argued that the prosecution failed to demonstrate extortion, thus requiring corroboration of Tripodi’s testimony, which was absent.

    Facts

    Tripodi, a policy operator, testified before a Grand Jury that he had been paying police officers, including Court, for protection since the 1950s. The payments were made to prevent police enforcement of the law against his illegal gambling operation. Tripodi’s testimony regarding Court only concerned an isolated incident between May 1968 and June 1971 related to a failure to pay an alleged bet made by Court, not the broader protection payments. No evidence of threats was presented regarding Court.

    Procedural History

    The Grand Jury indicted Court based on Tripodi’s testimony. The lower courts upheld the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine if the indictment was proper given the nature of the testimony against the defendant.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Tripodi’s testimony should be considered accomplice testimony requiring corroboration to sustain the bribery indictment against Court.

    Holding

    No, because Tripodi was an accomplice, and his testimony was not sufficiently corroborated, the indictment should be dismissed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Tripodi’s payments constituted bribery, not extortion, because there was no evidence of threats made by Court to Tripodi. The court emphasized that while fear of law enforcement is inherent in bribery, extortion requires a specific threat of adverse action if payment is not made. Since Tripodi was a willing participant in the bribery scheme, he was an accomplice under CPL 60.22, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The court cited People v. Mullens, 292 NY 408, 414 to support this principle. Because Tripodi’s testimony was not corroborated by independent evidence, the indictment against Court was deemed unsustainable.

  • People v. Spatarella, 34 N.Y.2d 157 (1974): Extortion and the Delivery of Intangible Property

    People v. Spatarella, 34 N.Y.2d 157 (1974)

    The crime of larceny by extortion can be established when a person compels another, through fear of physical injury, to relinquish a business advantage or customer relationship, even if that relationship is not a tangible asset.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for grand larceny by extortion, holding that the forced relinquishment of a business customer under threat of physical harm constitutes the delivery of “property” within the meaning of the extortion statute. The defendant, Spatarella, threatened a competitor, Ugenti, demanding that he cease servicing a particular restaurant. The Court reasoned that the business relationship with the restaurant was a valuable intangible right, the deprivation of which, through threats, satisfied the elements of extortion. The court also addressed the admissibility of certain tapes, finding no basis for suppression.

    Facts

    Spatarella managed All American Refuse Removal Corporation, and Ugenti was the president of North Shore Sanitation. Ugenti’s company began servicing a restaurant, Mei-Ting, previously serviced by Spatarella’s company. In January 1970, Spatarella confronted Ugenti and threatened him with physical harm if he did not stop servicing Mei-Ting by the following month. Ugenti, believing the threat, ceased servicing the restaurant. All American then resumed servicing Mei-Ting.

    Procedural History

    Spatarella was convicted of criminal mischief, criminal possession of stolen property, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, grand larceny by extortion, and petit larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Spatarella appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging primarily his conviction for grand larceny by extortion and the admissibility of certain tape recordings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the successful demand, made by Spatarella on Ugenti, to relinquish a business customer (Mei-Ting restaurant) through fear of physical injury constitutes the delivery of “property” under New York’s larceny by extortion statute.

    2. Whether the trial court properly admitted certain tape recordings into evidence, despite the District Attorney’s alleged failure to provide adequate pretrial notice and claims of inaudibility or lack of exculpatory material.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the term “property” under the extortion statute is construed broadly to include intangible rights such as advantageous business relationships. The deprivation of such a relationship through threats constitutes extortion.

    2. Yes, because the defendant did not allege involuntariness regarding the tapes, and therefore, there was no legal basis for a suppression hearing. Furthermore, the claims of surprise and inaudibility should have been raised in a discovery motion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on prior cases like People v. Barondess and People ex rel. Short v. Warden of City Prison, which interpreted “property” broadly in the context of extortion statutes to include intangible rights. The Court stated, “[B]usiness is property, as much so as the articles themselves which are included in its transactions.” The court reasoned that depriving someone of a business relationship through threats is as destructive as damaging physical property. The court found that Spatarella’s demand for the business itself was more egregious than simply demanding money. The Court emphasized the logic of the statute’s application to the facts, stating that “Ugenti possessed an advantageous business relationship…which because of Spatarella’s forceful and illegal behavior, deprived Ugenti of that business arrangement, the advantage of which was obtained by and accrued to the defendant directly in consequence of his extortive activity.” Regarding the tapes, the court noted that the defendant’s motion to suppress did not allege involuntariness, a necessary predicate for triggering a suppression hearing under the Criminal Procedure Law. The court rejected arguments of surprise and inaudibility, noting those issues should have been raised in pre-trial discovery.

  • People v. Rosenfeld, 11 N.Y.2d 290 (1962): Prosecutorial Misconduct and Fair Trial Rights

    People v. Rosenfeld, 11 N.Y.2d 290 (1962)

    A criminal conviction will be reversed, even with sufficient evidence for conviction, when prosecutorial misconduct deprives the defendant of a fair trial, undermining fundamental due process rights.

    Summary

    Rosenfeld, a lawyer, and two police detectives, Buckles and Kelly, were convicted of attempted extortion. The prosecution alleged they conspired to extort money from Tamari by threatening narcotics charges. The trial featured controversial evidence, including Minifon recordings of conversations and implications of the defendants’ suspension from the police force. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the prosecutor’s repeated introduction of inadmissible evidence and suggestions of additional undisclosed evidence prejudiced the jury, denying the defendants a fair trial, regardless of the evidence against them.

    Facts

    Detectives Buckles and Kelly investigated Nichols for marijuana sales, finding a book with Tamari’s name. Tamari testified he bought marijuana from Nichols. The detectives searched Tamari’s apartment, finding marijuana. Tamari claimed the detectives demanded money to drop the charges. Tamari then met Rosenfeld, who allegedly demanded money for himself and Nichols. Tamari, after consulting a lawyer, went to the District Attorney and was equipped with a hidden recorder for subsequent meetings with Rosenfeld. Tamari met Rosenfeld and refused to pay unless an officer was present. Rosenfeld was arrested after another meeting with Tamari.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in General Sessions. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, addressing primarily the alleged prejudicial conduct of the Assistant District Attorney. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and ordered a new trial for all three appellants.

    Issue(s)

    Whether repeated prosecutorial actions, including references to inadmissible evidence and suggestions of undisclosed proof of guilt, deprived the defendants of a fair trial, warranting reversal of their convictions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecutor’s conduct created an impression with the jury that significant evidence damaging to the defendants was being withheld, and because the prosecutor repeatedly emphasized the suspension of the officers suggesting an internal determination of guilt by the Police Department, thus depriving the defendants of their right to a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the prosecutor’s repeated attempts to introduce Minifon recordings that the trial court had deemed inadmissible due to incompleteness and lack of clarity. The prosecutor referred to these recordings as a “third witness” during summation, implying they contained damaging evidence against the defendants, even though they were never presented to the jury. The Court emphasized the prejudice caused by suggesting undisclosed corroboration of Tamari’s testimony, especially given that Tamari’s credibility was disputed. Furthermore, the Court cited People v. Cioffi and People v. Malkin, noting that informing the jury that the defendant police officers had been suspended suggested that the Police Department had already determined their guilt. The Court found this to be serious error, as it prejudices the jury. The Court stated, “[W]e could affirm only if we were to announce a doctrine that the fundamentals of a fair trial need not be respected if there is proof in the record to persuade us of defendant’s guilt”. The Court refused to establish such a doctrine, citing People v. Mleczko and People v. Marendi, emphasizing the importance of upholding the fundamentals of a fair trial, even in the presence of substantial evidence of guilt.