New York Law Review

Tag: Expert Witness

  • Matter of New York Presbyterian Hosp., 12 N.Y.3d 829 (2009): Scope of Cross-Examination on Mental Health Treatment

    Matter of New York Presbyterian Hosp., 12 N.Y.3d 829 (2009)

    A trial court’s limitations on cross-examination of an expert witness will only be overturned for abuse of discretion where the excluded evidence was material to the disputed issues in the case.

    Summary

    This case concerns the scope of permissible cross-examination in a hearing regarding the administration of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) to a psychiatric patient without their consent. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the patient’s cross-examination of the state’s psychiatric expert, because the cross examination as a whole allowed the patient’s attorney to make clear to the court all the claimed weaknesses in the psychiatrist’s testimony. The court emphasized that the limitations did not exclude evidence material to the central issue of whether the proposed treatment was narrowly tailored to the patient’s liberty interest.

    Facts

    The acting director of Creedmoor Psychiatric Center sought court permission to administer electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) to a patient who was at the center, without the patient’s consent. The patient opposed the application.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the hospital’s application to administer ECT. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, with two justices dissenting. The patient appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Supreme Court improperly limited the patient’s cross-examination of the State’s psychiatric expert witness, thereby warranting reversal of the order allowing ECT.

    Holding

    No, because when viewed as a whole, the record shows no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s limitations on cross-examination, and the patient’s attorney was able to highlight the weaknesses of the testimony to the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division majority that the cross-examination, when viewed in its entirety, did not demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The court acknowledged that while specific evidentiary rulings could be debated, the patient’s attorney was afforded the opportunity to, and did, communicate the purported weaknesses in the psychiatrist’s testimony to the court. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the record did not indicate that the Supreme Court excluded any evidence that was material to the crucial issue at hand: whether the proposed ECT treatment was narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to the patient’s liberty interest, while considering all relevant circumstances, as required by Rivers v. Katz, 67 NY2d 485, 497-498 (1986). The court implicitly recognized the trial court’s broad discretion in managing the scope of cross-examination, particularly concerning expert testimony, and declined to disturb the lower court’s ruling in the absence of a clear showing of prejudice to the patient’s rights.

  • People v. Santana, 80 N.Y.2d 92 (1992): Right to Consult Expert During Trial

    People v. Santana, 80 N.Y.2d 92 (1992)

    A trial court’s restriction on a defendant’s right to consult with their psychiatric expert during cross-examination of the prosecution’s expert, and concerning potential surrebuttal testimony, constitutes reversible error when the defendant’s mental state is the primary issue at trial.

    Summary

    Santana was convicted of rape, robbery, and sexual abuse after pleading not guilty by reason of insanity. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court improperly restricted the defendant’s right to consult with his psychiatric expert during the cross-examination of the People’s expert and regarding surrebuttal testimony. The court reasoned that this restriction significantly impaired the defendant’s ability to effectively present his insanity defense. However, the Court rejected the defendant’s speedy trial claim, finding the period during which he was deemed incompetent to stand trial was excludable.

    Facts

    Santana was charged with multiple offenses related to three separate incidents. At trial, he conceded to committing the acts but argued he lacked the mental capacity to be held responsible due to mental disease or defect. The defense presented Dr. Teich, a psychiatrist, who testified Santana suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder stemming from childhood sexual abuse and combat experience in Vietnam. Dr. Teich opined that Santana lacked substantial capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his actions. Following Dr. Teich’s testimony, the prosecution sought and was granted permission to have their expert, Dr. Parson, examine Santana.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially found Santana unfit to stand trial, committing him to the Commissioner of Mental Health. After a period of treatment and evaluation, Santana was found competent in New York County proceedings and pleaded guilty to charges there. Subsequently, he was returned to Queens County for the instant trial. Santana moved to dismiss the charges based on a speedy trial violation, which was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the trial court’s limitations on expert consultation. Santana appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by restricting defense counsel’s ability to consult with his psychiatric expert during the cross-examination of the People’s expert and regarding surrebuttal testimony.

    2. Whether the defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated under CPL 30.30.

    3. Whether the trial court was required to permit defense counsel to audiotape the examination of his client by the People’s clinical psychologist.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the restriction interfered with Santana’s right to effectively present his affirmative defense of insanity.

    2. No, because the period during which Santana was legally incompetent to stand trial is excludable under CPL 30.30(4)(a).

    3. No, because CPL 250.10(4) does not mandate tape-recording of psychiatric examinations; it is within the trial court’s discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that restricting defense counsel’s ability to consult with his psychiatric expert placed Santana at a serious disadvantage. The court cited Ake v. Oklahoma, emphasizing the importance of psychiatric assistance in presenting a defense related to mental condition and in preparing cross-examination of the State’s psychiatric witnesses. Preventing the expert from knowing the basis of the other expert’s opinion was incompatible with the legislative policy of ensuring each party has access to relevant psychiatric information. The Court distinguished this situation from cases involving witness exclusion, noting that expert witnesses providing opinions based on the testimony of others are often beneficial. The court stated, “[W]ithout the assistance of a psychiatrist to * * * present testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State’s psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high”. Regarding the speedy trial claim, the Court found that the period during which Santana was legally determined to be incompetent was properly excluded under CPL 30.30(4)(a). The Court emphasized that the New York County determination of incompetency served as a legal bar to prosecution in Queens County. The court noted, “[T]he period during which defendant is incompetent to stand trial” (CPL 30.30 [4] [a] [emphasis added]) — i.e., when, because of an existing determination of defendant’s unfitness to proceed due to his inability to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense, the prosecution may not legally proceed to trial and conviction.

  • Gilly v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 509 (1987): Admissibility of Examining Physician’s Report

    Gilly v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 509 (1987)

    A physician’s report, created after examining a plaintiff at the request of the defendant and shared with both parties, is admissible as evidence when the plaintiff calls the physician as a witness, allowing the plaintiff to elicit the substance of the report.

    Summary

    Rose Gilly, injured on a New York City ferry, sought to introduce the report of a cardiologist, Dr. Edson, hired by the City to examine her. Dr. Edson’s report indicated Gilly’s angina was likely caused by the accident. The trial court precluded Dr. Edson’s testimony. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the substance of Dr. Edson’s report should have been admitted. The Court reasoned that because the report had already been shared with both parties, preventing its admission would unfairly withhold probative evidence from the trier of fact, furthering truth-seeking objectives. This allows a plaintiff to use a defendant’s examining physician to support their case.

    Facts

    Rose Gilly was injured on November 7, 1978, when the City’s ferryboat struck a seawall, causing her to fall and be injured by other passengers. She was hospitalized with complaints of chest pain and shortness of breath.

    Prior to trial, the City retained Dr. John Edson, a cardiologist, to examine Gilly. Dr. Edson’s report, dated October 7, 1982, concluded that Gilly suffered from permanent angina and that the ferryboat accident likely caused or accelerated the condition. A copy of this report was sent to Gilly’s counsel.

    Procedural History

    Gilly sued the City for damages, claiming her injury resulted in heart disease and sought $500,000. Liability was already established, and the trial was for assessing damages and comparative fault.

    At trial, Gilly subpoenaed Dr. Edson to testify about his findings and conclusions. The City moved to preclude his testimony, which the trial court granted in its entirety.

    The jury awarded Gilly $15,000. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment.

    Gilly appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in precluding Dr. Edson’s testimony.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff can introduce the substance of a medical report prepared by a physician employed by the defendant to examine the plaintiff, when that report has been furnished to the plaintiff prior to trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because permitting such evidence furthers truth-seeking objectives without unfairly compelling expert testimony or creating ethical dilemmas, especially when the report has already been shared with both parties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., permitting a plaintiff to call a defendant-physician as an expert witness.

    The Court distinguished this case from People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe, which held that a person cannot be required to give an expert opinion involuntarily, by noting that Dr. Edson was not a disinterested witness. Dr. Edson had voluntarily involved himself in the case by examining Gilly and formulating his findings, and at trial expressed no objection to relating his findings.

    The court reasoned that once a physician’s report is written and served on the adversary, it is no longer for the exclusive use of the defendant. “At that point both sides have access to this probative evidence and there is no basis for withholding it from the trier of fact.”

    The Court acknowledged that lower courts retain discretion to protect against abuse, overreaching, and undue prejudice. However, as a general matter, the evidence should not be foreclosed.

    The court noted that the physician is not being compelled to express an opinion against his will, but only to relate conclusions already formulated and fully disclosed.

  • Selkowitz v. Economic Chimes, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 1004 (1968): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Design Inadequacy

    21 N.Y.2d 1004 (1968)

    A witness’s specialized education and extensive experience can qualify them as an expert, making their opinion admissible regarding the inadequacy of safety equipment design.

    Summary

    Selkowitz sued Economic Chimes, Inc. for personal injuries sustained from a malfunctioning machine manufactured by the defendant. The trial court struck the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness, who claimed the machine’s safety design was inadequate, deeming the witness unqualified. Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint due to insufficient evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the witness’s education and experience were sufficient to establish him as an expert and allow his opinion on the safety design’s inadequacy to be admitted as evidence. The dissent argued that the witness lacked necessary qualifications and offered only conclusions without descriptive facts.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was injured due to a malfunction in a machine manufactured by Economic Chimes, Inc. The machine was used in an industrial plant where the plaintiff worked. Plaintiff presented a witness with specialized education and extensive experience in safety equipment design on similar machinery. The witness testified that, in his opinion, the machine’s safety protection design was inadequate and a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Procedural History

    The trial court struck the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness, concluding that the witness was not qualified to give an opinion on the design of the safety equipment. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in striking the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness regarding the inadequacy of the machine’s safety design, based on a finding that the witness was not qualified to render such an opinion?

    Holding

    Yes, because the witness’s specialized education and years of experience qualified him, prima facie, as an expert in the design of safety equipment; therefore, his opinion should have been admitted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the witness presented by the plaintiff possessed sufficient qualifications, due to his specialized education and extensive experience, to offer an expert opinion on the adequacy of the machine’s safety design. The Court emphasized that the witness’s background established a prima facie case for his expertise. By striking this testimony, the trial court improperly prevented the jury from considering crucial evidence regarding the alleged design defect. The court implicitly applied the standard for expert qualification: does the witness possess the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or experience to reliably assist the fact-finder? The dissent argued that the witness lacked the necessary qualifications and offered only conclusions without sufficient factual basis, citing Dougherty v. Milliken, 163 N.Y. 527. The majority implicitly rejected this, finding the qualifications adequate and not requiring a full recitation of underlying facts before the expert stated his conclusion. This case is significant because it clarifies the threshold for expert qualification regarding safety design, emphasizing experience and education as key factors for admissibility. The decision highlights the importance of allowing qualified experts to present opinions, especially in cases involving complex machinery where specialized knowledge is necessary to assess potential defects.

  • People v. Barberi, 149 N.Y. 256 (1896): Admissibility of Lay Witness Testimony on Sanity

    People v. Barberi, 149 N.Y. 256 (1896)

    A lay witness may testify to specific observed facts relating to a person’s sanity and characterize those acts as rational or irrational, but cannot offer a general opinion on whether the person’s mind is sound or unsound.

    Summary

    Barberi was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting Charles McFarlane. His primary defense was insanity. He presented both lay and expert witnesses to support his claim. The prosecution countered with evidence of Barberi’s actions and expert testimony asserting his sanity. A key point of contention on appeal was the trial court’s exclusion of certain questions posed to a lay witness regarding Barberi’s rationality. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, clarifying the permissible scope of lay witness testimony on the issue of sanity. They affirmed the conviction because there was enough evidence and the judge’s instructions to the jury were fair.

    Facts

    Barberi fatally shot Charles McFarlane in the Criminal Court building in New York City. The shooting occurred because McFarlane, an agent of the Anti-Policy Society, had previously prosecuted Barberi for violating policy laws. Barberi was aware McFarlane would be at the courthouse that day. Barberi waited for McFarlane, approached him, and shot him multiple times. After his arrest, Barberi expressed a lack of remorse and stated a preference for the electric chair over jail.

    Procedural History

    Barberi was indicted for first-degree murder. At trial, he pleaded insanity as his defense. The jury found him guilty. Barberi appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding certain questions to a lay witness and in a question posed by the court to an expert witness, among other things. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in excluding questions posed to a lay witness regarding the defendant’s rationality.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in asking a specific question of the expert witness, Dr. Van Giesen, based on another witness’s testimony, to test his opinion of Barberi’s insanity.

    Holding

    1. No, because lay witnesses can only characterize specific actions as rational or irrational, not offer general opinions on a person’s sanity. Moreover, the court later allowed the witness to be recalled for further questioning, negating any earlier error.
    2. No, because the question was relevant to assessing the expert’s opinion and did not prejudice the defendant, especially since the defense was later given an opportunity to clarify the expert’s testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the lay witness testimony, the Court emphasized the established rule that a lay witness may only testify about specific facts within their knowledge related to the defendant’s sanity and then characterize those acts as rational or irrational. The Court explicitly stated that, “He may not, however, express an opinion upon the general question whether the mind of the individual was sound or unsound. The opinion of witnesses who are not experts on the general question of the state of a prisoner’s mind and his mental condition, is inadmissible.” The questions posed to the lay witness sought a general opinion on Barberi’s rationality, which is inadmissible from a non-expert. The Court also noted that any potential error was cured because the trial judge allowed the defendant’s counsel to recall the witness and ask the previously excluded questions, an opportunity that was declined.

    Regarding the question posed to Dr. Van Giesen, the Court found no reversible error. Although the question was based on the testimony of another witness and aimed at testing the expert’s opinion, it was within the bounds of permissible examination. Additionally, the defense was given ample opportunity to clarify Dr. Van Giesen’s testimony and address any potential ambiguities or misinterpretations. The court reasoned that the question was not improper and the defense had the chance to clarify the expert’s answer, thus any perceived error was not prejudicial.