New York Law Review

Tag: Expert Testimony

  • McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital, 15 N.Y.2d 20 (1964): Using Adverse Party Testimony to Establish Medical Malpractice

    McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital, 15 N.Y.2d 20 (1964)

    In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff may call the defendant doctor to the stand and question them as both a factual witness about the case and as an expert to establish the accepted medical practice in the community.

    Summary

    Kathleen McDermott sued several doctors and a hospital for malpractice, alleging they misrepresented the outcome of a corneal transplant surgery and that the surgery was contraindicated given her condition. The trial court dismissed the complaint after the plaintiff failed to provide expert medical testimony supporting her claim of malpractice. The Appellate Division modified the dismissal to be “without prejudice.” The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the plaintiff should have been allowed to establish her claim by questioning the defendant doctors about whether the surgery was proper given the plaintiff’s condition. The Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff in a malpractice action can call the defendant doctor to testify as both a factual witness and an expert witness to establish the accepted medical practice.

    Facts

    Kathleen McDermott, suffering from a corneal disease, consulted Dr. Schachat, who suggested a corneal transplant. Dr. Schachat referred her to Dr. Patón. Dr. Patón diagnosed her with Fuch’s dystrophy. He recommended a curettement followed by a corneal transplant on her left eye. Dr. Kleinhandler performed the operations under supervision. The operations were unsuccessful, rendering her left eye virtually blind. McDermott sued, claiming misrepresentation and that the surgery was contraindicated.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the complaint against all defendants at the close of the plaintiff’s case due to lack of expert testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal as to some defendants but modified as to others, Drs. Patón and Kleinhandler, and the hospital, making the dismissal “without prejudice,” allowing the plaintiff to refile the case. The plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case can call the defendant doctor to the stand and question them as an expert witness to establish the accepted medical practice and whether the defendant’s actions deviated from that standard.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant doctor’s knowledge of proper medical practice and any deviation is relevant to the case, and enabling the plaintiff to access this information aligns with the purpose of the adverse-party-witness rule. This is especially important when securing independent expert witnesses is difficult.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while some jurisdictions limit the scope of questioning defendant doctors to only factual matters, allowing inquiry into expert opinions aligns with the purpose of the adverse-party-witness rule. This rule intends to allow “the production in each case of all pertinent and relevant evidence that is available from the parties to the action.” The court acknowledged the difficulty in securing independent expert witnesses who are willing to testify against other doctors. Allowing the plaintiff to question the defendant doctor as an expert addresses this challenge. The court distinguished this case from People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe, which held that a person cannot be compelled to testify as an expert against their will, noting that Kraushaar involved a disinterested witness, not a defendant in the action. The court emphasized that a defendant in a civil suit has no right to remain silent and must answer questions relevant to the issues. The court stated: “If a defendant in a malpractice action may truthfully testify that his conduct conformed to the standard required, his case is, of course, substantially strengthened and, if he cannot so testify, the plaintiff’s chances of recovery are unquestionably increased. In either case, the objective of the court in doing justice is achieved.”

  • People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75 (1915): Admissibility of Mathematical Probability Evidence

    People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75 (1915)

    Evidence based on mathematical probability, particularly when used to establish the improbability of certain events or conditions, is inadmissible when it lacks a foundation in observed data and relies on speculation rather than demonstrable facts.

    Summary

    Risley, an attorney, was convicted of offering a forged document as evidence. The prosecution presented expert testimony applying mathematical probability to typewriter defects to argue the document was altered on Risley’s machine. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that such speculative probability evidence, lacking a basis in actual observed data about typewriters and their use, was inadmissible and prejudicial. The ruling underscores the importance of grounding evidence in factual observations rather than theoretical probabilities, especially when expert testimony may unduly influence the jury.

    Facts

    Risley represented Bennett in a patent dispute against Iron Clad Manufacturing. During a trial in February 1911, Risley offered an affidavit. It was alleged the words “the same” had been fraudulently inserted into the affidavit. The prosecution claimed Risley altered the affidavit to strengthen his client’s case after an appellate court highlighted deficiencies in the evidence. The prosecution presented evidence that Risley had accessed the document at the County Clerk’s office shortly before the trial. Samples of typewriting from Risley’s office typewriter were introduced to demonstrate similarities with the altered document.

    Procedural History

    Risley was convicted in the trial court for offering a forged document in evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Risley appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony based on mathematical probabilities to demonstrate the unlikelihood of the defects in the forged document being produced by a typewriter other than the defendant’s.

    Holding

    No, because the mathematical probability evidence presented by the prosecution was speculative and lacked a sufficient foundation in observed data, rendering it inadmissible and prejudicial to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the admission of mathematical probability evidence to be reversible error. The Court emphasized that the expert witness (a mathematics professor) lacked specific expertise in typewriters and did not account for the human element in operating the machine. The Court distinguished this type of evidence from actuarial tables, which are based on observed data. The Court stated the witness’s testimony “was not based upon actual observed data, but was simply speculative, and an attempt to make inferences deduced from a general theory in no way connected with the matter under consideration supply the usual method of proof.” The Court noted that the jury might give undue weight to such complex and seemingly scientific evidence, potentially obscuring other important facts. Therefore, the Court concluded that allowing such speculative evidence was prejudicial to the defendant and warranted a new trial.

  • Strohm v. New York, Lake Erie & Western R.R. Co., 96 N.Y. 305 (1884): Admissibility of Speculative Future Consequences in Personal Injury Damages

    Strohm v. New York, Lake Erie & Western R.R. Co., 96 N.Y. 305 (1884)

    Future consequences of an injury, admissible to enhance damages, must be reasonably certain to ensue, excluding contingent, speculative, or merely possible consequences.

    Summary

    In this personal injury case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of expert testimony regarding potential future medical conditions that might arise from the plaintiff’s injuries. The court held that such testimony is admissible only if the future consequences are reasonably certain to occur. The admission of speculative testimony about possible future conditions like traumatic insanity or epilepsy was deemed reversible error because it allowed the jury to consider mere hazards rather than reasonably certain outcomes when assessing damages. This case highlights the importance of establishing a high degree of probability for future consequences in personal injury claims.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Strohm, sustained injuries due to the defendant’s (New York, Lake Erie & Western R.R. Co.) negligence. During the trial, a medical expert, Dr. Spitzka, testified about the plaintiff’s condition and potential future complications. Dr. Spitzka had examined the plaintiff and reviewed his symptoms. He stated that the plaintiff’s condition might develop into epilepsy, meningitis, or traumatic dementia. When asked about potential ‘worse signs or conditions’ that may arise, the expert answered that the plaintiff “may develop traumatic insanity, or meningitis, or progressive dementia, or epilepsy with its results.” The defendant objected to the speculative nature of this testimony.

    Procedural History

    The trial court overruled the defendant’s objection to the expert’s testimony regarding potential future conditions. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed the judgment, arguing that the admission of speculative testimony about possible future conditions was erroneous. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether expert testimony regarding potential future medical conditions, that are not reasonably certain to occur as a result of the injury, is admissible to enhance damages in a personal injury case.

    Holding

    No, because to be admissible, evidence of future consequences must be such as in the ordinary course of nature are reasonably certain to ensue, not merely possible or speculative.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that damages could only be awarded for future consequences that are reasonably certain to occur. The court found that Dr. Spitzka’s testimony regarding the possibility of the plaintiff developing traumatic insanity, meningitis, or epilepsy was too speculative. The court stated, “To entitle a plaintiff to recover present damages, for apprehended future consequences, there must be such a degree of probability of their occurring, as amounts to a reasonable certainty that they will result from the original injury.” The admission of this speculative evidence allowed the jury to consider the “mere hazard” of the plaintiff developing these conditions, which was improper. The court distinguished between consequences that are “reasonably to be expected” and those that are “contingent, speculative, or merely possible.” Only the former can be considered when calculating damages. Chief Judge Ruger and Judge Danforth dissented, arguing that expert testimony regarding the probable or even possible consequences of an injury should be admissible for the jury’s consideration; however, the majority held that only reasonably certain consequences are admissible to avoid speculation in damage calculations.