New York Law Review

Tag: Expert Testimony

  • People v. Argro, 58 N.Y.2d 816 (1983): Establishing Drug Weight in Controlled Substance Sales

    People v. Argro, 58 N.Y.2d 816 (1983)

    In a conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance, the weight of the controlled substance must be independently proven and cannot solely rely on an offer to sell a particular quantity.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, despite finding fault with the reasoning of the Appellate Division. The defendant challenged the trial court’s limitation on cross-examination of the People’s expert regarding the effect of moisture on the weight of the cocaine and argued that the mandatory minimum sentence was disproportionate. The Court of Appeals held that the weight of the controlled substance must be independently proven and cannot be based solely on an offer to sell a specific quantity, but upheld the conviction because the expert testimony established the weight independently.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree. During the trial, the People’s expert testified about the laboratory analysis of the drugs. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the expert about the effect of moisture on the weight of the cocaine. The Appellate Division, in affirming, had incorrectly relied on the accomplice’s offer to sell “a little bit over” two ounces of cocaine as sufficient proof of weight.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but the Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, upholding the conviction but disagreeing with the lower court’s reasoning regarding the proof of weight.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erroneously limited cross-examination of the People’s expert regarding the effect of moisture on the weight of the cocaine.
    2. Whether the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence was grossly disproportionate in the circumstances of the case.
    3. Whether the weight of the controlled substance, a necessary element of the crime, can be established solely by an offer to sell a specific quantity.

    Holding

    1. No, because defense counsel failed to properly preserve the issue for appeal by not calling the trial court’s attention to the purpose of the question or disputing the People’s claim of irrelevance.
    2. No, to the extent any constitutional objection has been preserved for review.
    3. No, because the weight of the material must be independently shown.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the defendant’s arguments regarding the limitation of cross-examination and the disproportionate sentence but found them unpreserved for appellate review. Regarding the cross-examination, the Court emphasized the importance of making known one’s position to the trial court to allow for correction of any error. As for the sentence, the court cited prior precedents (People v Donovan, 59 NY2d 834; People v Broadie, 37 NY2d 100) regarding constitutional objections to sentences.

    The court explicitly rejected the Appellate Division’s reasoning that the accomplice’s offer to sell “a little bit over” two ounces of cocaine was sufficient to establish the weight for the crime of first-degree sale. Citing People v Kenny, 30 NY2d 154; People v Lawson, 84 Misc 2d 24; and People v Lam Lek Chong, 45 NY2d 64, the court clarified that while proof of an offer may establish that a sale has occurred, the weight of the material must be independently proven. The conviction was ultimately affirmed because the People’s expert testimony provided an independent basis for establishing that the cocaine weighed more than two ounces, satisfying the statutory requirement. The court stated, “While proof of an offer may in some circumstances establish that a sale has occurred (see, Penal Law § 220.00 [1]), the weight of the material must be independently shown.”

  • People v. Harmon, 65 N.Y.2d 269 (1985): Resolving Conflicting Expert Testimony to Establish Guilt

    People v. Harmon, 65 N.Y.2d 269 (1985)

    When prosecution expert witnesses present conflicting opinions, the jury can still find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt if other evidence and the opinion of one expert reasonably support that conclusion.

    Summary

    Harold Harmon was convicted of felony murder for setting a fire that killed six firemen. At trial, the prosecution presented conflicting expert testimony regarding the fire’s origin. Harmon argued that this conflict precluded a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury could reconcile the conflicting expert opinions with other evidence to conclude guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized the jury’s role in assessing witness credibility and drawing justifiable inferences.

    Facts

    On August 2, 1978, six firemen died fighting a fire at a Waldbaum’s Supermarket in Brooklyn after the roof collapsed. Harold Harmon, while incarcerated, admitted to Julio Cruz that he set the fire for payment. Harmon confessed in statements to authorities that he, along with others, made holes in the roof, stuffed them with paper, poured lighter fluid, and ignited it before dawn. At trial, a fire marshal testified that the fire originated from accelerants at four points within the store and burned upward. However, an arson detective testified that the fire was a “drop fire” that burned downward from the roof.

    Procedural History

    Harmon was convicted in the trial court of six counts of felony murder and one count of second-degree arson. He moved to set aside the verdict, arguing insufficient evidence and newly discovered evidence, which was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision without opinion. Harmon then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the conflicting testimony of two prosecution expert witnesses precluded the jury from finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Holding

    No, because the jury, in conjunction with other evidence presented, was able to reasonably conclude from the opinion of one of the experts that Harmon was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from situations involving a single witness providing hopelessly contradictory testimony. The court stated that conflicting testimony from multiple witnesses simply creates a credibility question for the jury to resolve. Expert opinions are based on observed facts and qualifications, creating a factual matrix for the jury to determine which opinion to accept. The court emphasized, “When all of the evidence of guilt comes from a single prosecution witness who gives irreconcilable testimony pointing both to guilt and innocence, the jury is left without basis, other than impermissible speculation, for its determination of either.” However, the court found that in this case, Harmon’s confession, coupled with the detective’s testimony that the fire began on the roof, provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the fire marshal’s conflicting opinion. The court noted that corroboration of Harmon’s statements only needed to be of circumstances “’calculated to suggest the commission of crime, and for the explanation of which the confession furnishes the key’” (quoting People v. Murray, 40 N.Y.2d 327, 332). The court concluded that the evidence supported the jury’s inference that the fire began on the roof, consistent with Harmon’s confession, and dropped into the mezzanine where it was discovered. Therefore, the jury was entitled to weigh the expert’s conflicting testimony and reach a conclusion based on the evidence as a whole.

  • O’Mara v. Petrolito, 64 N.Y.2d 724 (1984): Admissibility of Expert Testimony and the “Serious Injury” Threshold in No-Fault Cases

    O’Mara v. Petrolito, 64 N.Y.2d 724 (1984)

    Expert opinion testimony must be based on facts in the record or personally known to the witness, or the out-of-court material relied upon must be demonstrably reliable within the relevant profession.

    Summary

    In a personal injury case arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff, O’Mara, sought to recover for injuries, claiming they met the “serious injury” threshold under New York’s No-Fault Law. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of O’Mara, finding insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of serious injury. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s evidence regarding a fracture (spondylolisthesis) was inadmissible because the expert’s opinion was not properly based on admissible evidence or reliable out-of-court material, and her own testimony contradicted claims of permanent loss of use of a body function.

    Facts

    O’Mara sustained personal injuries after being struck by Petrolito’s bus and claimed a right to common-law recovery by asserting a “serious injury,” as defined in the Insurance Law. She presented evidence of a fracture, permanent loss of use of a body function, and a nonpermanent impairment lasting at least 90 out of 180 days post-accident. The jury found for O’Mara on the fracture and permanent loss claims but against her on the 90/180-day claim.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term entered a judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of O’Mara. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to establish a prima facie case of “serious injury.” O’Mara appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff’s physician’s testimony regarding the spondylolisthesis constituted admissible evidence of a fracture, given that the X-rays were not produced and admitted into evidence.

    2. Whether the plaintiff’s physician’s opinion that the spondylolisthesis was caused by a fracture was admissible, considering that the opinion was based on a discussion with a radiologist regarding an unknown study.

    Holding

    1. While it was error to allow the doctor’s testimony regarding the X-ray without the X-ray itself being entered into evidence, the matter was not preserved for review because there was no objection at trial.

    2. No, because the physician’s opinion lacked a proper foundation since it was based on an out-of-court statement from a radiologist without establishing the reliability of the radiologist’s opinion or the underlying study.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that although it was technically an error to admit the physician’s testimony about the X-ray without producing the X-ray itself, the error was not preserved for appeal because the defendant did not object at trial. Regarding the physician’s opinion that spondylolisthesis was caused by a fracture, the court emphasized the rule that expert opinion must be based on facts in the record or personally known to the witness. The court acknowledged exceptions where an expert relies on out-of-court material that is either professionally reliable or comes from a witness subject to cross-examination. Here, the physician’s reliance on a radiologist’s opinion about an undefined study did not meet the “professional reliability” exception because no evidence was presented to establish the reliability of the radiologist’s opinion or the underlying study. The court stated: “It is settled and unquestioned law that opinion evidence must be based on facts in the record or personally known to the witness.” Because the physician’s opinion was inadmissible, there was no basis for the jury to find that the spondylolisthesis was the result of a fracture constituting a “serious injury” under the No-Fault Law. The absence of this testimony undermined the plaintiff’s case regarding the “serious injury” threshold.

  • De Long v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 302 (1983): Establishing Municipal Liability Through Special Relationship

    De Long v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 302 (1983)

    When a municipality establishes a special emergency service, accepts a call for assistance, and assures the caller help is on the way, it creates a special relationship with the caller and has a duty to exercise ordinary care; failure to do so can result in municipal liability.

    Summary

    Amalia De Long called 911 during a burglary. The complaint writer negligently recorded the address and dispatched police to the wrong location. Despite officers reporting no such address, no follow-up was initiated. De Long was later found stabbed and died from her injuries. Her estate sued the City of Buffalo and Erie County. The court held that by creating the 911 service and assuring De Long help was coming, the municipality established a special relationship, creating a duty of care. The court also addressed the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the monetary value of a homemaker’s services in wrongful death cases, finding such testimony admissible.

    Facts

    Amalia De Long called 911 reporting a burglary at her home at 319 Victoria Boulevard in Kenmore, NY. The Erie County complaint writer incorrectly recorded the address as 219 Victoria Avenue in Buffalo. The Buffalo Police Department dispatched officers who found no such address and reported that the highest number on Victoria Avenue was 195. The dispatcher cleared the call without further investigation. De Long was found stabbed and later died. Erie County and the City of Buffalo jointly operated the 911 service; the call was routed to Buffalo Police headquarters and handled by a county employee. Standard procedures for address verification were not followed.

    Procedural History

    De Long’s husband, as executor, sued the City of Buffalo and Erie County. The trial court found both defendants 50% liable, awarding $200,000 for conscious pain and suffering and $600,000 for wrongful death. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, with two justices dissenting on the damages award. The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the establishment of a 911 service and the assurance of assistance to a caller creates a special relationship between the municipality and the caller, thus establishing a duty of care.
    2. Whether expert testimony on the monetary value of a housewife’s services is admissible in a wrongful death action to determine pecuniary damages.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because by creating a special emergency service, accepting the call, and assuring help was on the way, the municipality established a special relationship with the caller, giving rise to a duty to exercise ordinary care.
    2. Yes, because expert testimony can help clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge beyond the ken of the typical juror and aid the jury in evaluating the housewife’s services and dispelling the notion that what is provided without financial reward may be considered of little or no financial value in the marketplace.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that this case differs from those where municipalities are generally not liable for failing to protect the public from criminal acts. Here, the municipality established a special emergency service intended to be more efficient than normal police services. The victim was encouraged to use this service. The affirmative assurance that help was on the way created a justifiable reliance, potentially influencing the victim’s decision not to seek other assistance. The court cited Florence v. Goldberg and Garrett v. Holiday Inns as examples of municipalities being held liable for voluntarily assumed duties. The Court quoted Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.: “If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction would commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward.” The court stated, “In this case the decision had been made by the municipalities to provide a special emergency service which was intended and proclaimed to be more efficient than normal police services… In addition, and most significantly, the victim’s plea for assistance was not refused. Indeed she was affirmatively assured that help would be there ‘right away’… it cannot be said as a matter of law that this assurance played no part in her decision to remain in her home and not seek other assistance. Unfortunately, it only increased the risk to her life.” Regarding expert testimony on the value of a housewife’s services, the Court determined that while jurors possess general awareness of these services, they lack knowledge of their monetary equivalent. Expert testimony can aid in evaluating these services, dispelling the misconception that non-compensated services have little financial value. The court emphasized that the admissibility of expert testimony lies within the trial court’s discretion.

  • Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Kiernan, 42 N.Y.2d 904 (1977): Use of Nationwide Percentage Lease Rates in Property Valuation

    Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Kiernan, 42 N.Y.2d 904 (1977)

    The valuation of assessed property is a question of fact, and determinations of value affirmed by the Appellate Division will be upheld unless there is an error of law or a lack of evidentiary support, even where statistical data like nationwide percentage lease rates are given controlling significance.

    Summary

    Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (A&P) challenged the property tax assessment of its property. The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after the lower courts affirmed the assessment based largely on A&P’s expert’s valuation method, which utilized nationwide abstracts of percentage lease rates. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the valuation was supported by evidence and that the use of such data, even with controlling significance, did not constitute an error of law, especially given the trial court’s rejection of the taxing authority’s comparable evidence. This case clarifies that industry-accepted statistical data can be a valid basis for property valuation, even if it plays a significant role in the final assessment.

    Facts

    The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (A&P) challenged the property tax assessment of its property.
    A&P’s expert appraiser used a method that incorporated nationwide abstracts of percentage lease rates to calculate income for valuation purposes.
    The expert testified that this statistical data was widely relied upon in the shopping center trade.
    The trial court rejected the comparable evidence introduced by the taxing authority.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court (Special Term) where the initial valuation was determined.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s determination of value.
    The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred as a matter of law in affirming a property valuation based primarily on nationwide abstracts of percentage lease rates, when such data was given controlling significance.

    Holding

    Yes, because the valuation of assessed property is essentially a question of fact, and the determination was supported by evidence widely relied upon in the shopping center trade. The fact that the data was given controlling significance does not establish an error of law, especially where the trial court rejected the taxing authority’s evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that property valuation is primarily a factual determination. It cited Grant Co. v. Srogi, 52 NY2d 496, 510, stating that valuations affirmed by the Appellate Division must be upheld unless there is an error of law or a lack of evidentiary support.
    The court found that Special Term’s determination was supported by the record, as it relied on A&P’s expert’s appraisal method, which used nationwide percentage lease rates. The expert testified that this data is widely used in the shopping center industry.
    The Court referenced Matter of Woolworth Co. v Commissioner of Taxation & Assessment of City of Plattsburgh, 45 Misc 2d 701, noting that such data may be considered in determining value.
    The court addressed the argument that the data was given “controlling significance,” stating that this alone does not establish an error of law. This was particularly true because the trial court had rejected the comparable evidence presented by the taxing authority, offering “articulated and acceptable reasons” for doing so.
    The decision underscores the importance of factual findings in property valuation cases and the deference given to lower court decisions when supported by evidence and free from legal errors. This case provides precedent for using industry-standard statistical data in property valuation, even when such data plays a significant role in the final assessment.

  • People v. Segal, 54 N.Y.2d 58 (1981): Admissibility of Expert Testimony and the Right to Rebut

    People v. Segal, 54 N.Y.2d 58 (1981)

    When a defendant introduces expert testimony to negate the element of intent in a crime, the prosecution has a right to rebut that testimony with its own expert, and the defendant’s refusal to submit to a psychiatric examination by the prosecution’s expert justifies striking the defendant’s expert testimony.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of perjury stemming from a nursing home fraud investigation. At trial, he presented expert testimony about a memory defect to negate the element of intent. The prosecution requested an examination by their own expert, which the defendant refused. The trial court struck the defendant’s expert testimony, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant could not introduce expert testimony to negate intent while simultaneously denying the prosecution an opportunity to rebut that evidence with its own expert. This ensures fairness and maintains the integrity of the trial process.

    Facts

    The defendant, a vice-president of a grocery wholesaler, met with an undercover agent investigating nursing home fraud and discussed kickback schemes. Later, before a grand jury, the defendant testified he didn’t recall the schemes or discussing them with the agent. At his perjury trial, the defendant presented expert testimony from a psychologist and psychiatrist claiming an organic brain defect impaired his memory, making him unable to recall the meeting when he testified before the Grand Jury.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for perjury and convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to strike the defense expert’s testimony after the defendant refused to submit to an examination by the People’s expert.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who introduces expert testimony to negate the element of intent can refuse to submit to an examination by the People’s expert, and if so, whether the court can strike the defendant’s expert testimony as a result.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant cannot introduce expert testimony on a mental condition to negate intent and simultaneously deny the prosecution an opportunity to rebut that evidence with its own expert. The trial court acted properly in striking the defendant’s expert testimony when the defendant refused to submit to an examination by the People’s expert.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior decision in Matter of Lee v. County Court of Erie County, which held that a defendant raising an insanity defense waives their Fifth Amendment privilege regarding mental capacity and can be precluded from introducing expert testimony if they refuse to submit to a mental examination by the prosecution. The Court reasoned that this principle extends beyond statutory defenses like insanity to any situation where a defendant introduces expert testimony to negate an element of the crime, such as intent. The Court emphasized principles of fairness and the integrity of the trial process, stating that the People must prove every element of the crime, including intent. The court stated, “a defendant who proffers an insanity defense may hide behind the defense because of his privilege and thereby make the People’s burden of proving sanity insurmountable.” By introducing expert testimony about his memory defect, the defendant sought to prove he lacked the intent to commit perjury. The court concluded that the defendant could not simultaneously put the People to their proof regarding his mental capacity while denying them the opportunity to effectively meet that burden with their own expert evidence.

  • People ex rel. Olson v. Sheriff of Erie County, 47 N.Y.2d 980 (1979): Evaluating Expert Testimony and Factual Determinations in Non-Jury Trials

    People ex rel. Olson v. Sheriff of Erie County, 47 N.Y.2d 980 (1979)

    In a non-jury trial, the weight given to expert testimony is a matter for the trial court, as the trier of fact, to determine, and the court’s factual determinations, once affirmed by the Appellate Division, are beyond further review by the Court of Appeals.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over whether promissory notes were signed by the deceased, whether he received consideration, and whether the notes had been paid. The trial court, acting as the finder of fact in a non-jury trial, had to determine the credibility of a handwriting expert’s opinion. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court was not bound to credit the expert’s testimony and could consider its general experience and education when weighing the evidence. Since the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s factual determinations, the Court of Appeals held that those determinations were beyond their review.

    Facts

    The case involved a dispute over promissory notes allegedly signed by Conrad Olson, who was deceased at the time of trial. The plaintiff claimed Olson signed the notes and that they were unpaid. Both Olson and the payee were deceased. The plaintiff presented a handwriting expert who testified that Olson signed the notes.

    Procedural History

    The case was tried without a jury. The trial court made factual determinations regarding the notes. The Appellate Division reviewed and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case then went to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court, as the trier of fact in a non-jury trial, was bound to credit the opinion of the plaintiff’s handwriting expert.
    2. Whether the factual determinations of the trial court, affirmed by the Appellate Division, are subject to review by the Court of Appeals.

    Holding

    1. No, because the weight to be accorded to expert testimony is a matter for the trial court to determine in its role as the trier of facts.
    2. No, because under CPLR 5501(b), the factual determinations of the trial court, after surviving scrutiny by the Appellate Division (which is empowered to pass on the facts), are beyond review by the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court, as the finder of fact, was not obligated to accept the handwriting expert’s opinion, even though it was received in evidence. The court noted that the trial judge’s general experience and education inevitably influence the weight given to evidence. The court emphasized that the trial judge’s reference to past experiences with expert opinions did not indicate an erroneous legal standard. Instead, it was a candid reflection of the thought process involved in weighing evidence. The court highlighted that the trial judge assumed the handwriting testimony was sufficient to establish a prima facie case, demonstrating a proper legal approach. The Court relied on precedent, citing Matter of Sylvestri, 44 NY2d 260, 266 and Richardson, Evidence, § 367, to support the principle that the trier of fact determines the weight of evidence. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Appellate Division’s power to review facts, combined with its affirmance of the trial court’s findings, precluded further factual review by the Court of Appeals, citing CPLR 5501(b). The Court stated, “In any event, the Trial Judge’s factual determinations having successfully survived scrutiny by the Appellate Division, empowered as that court is to pass on the facts as well as the law, they now are beyond our review (CPLR 5501, subd [b]).”

  • People v. Boundy, 43 N.Y.2d 838 (1978): Admissibility of Psychologist Testimony on Mental State

    People v. Boundy, 43 N.Y.2d 838 (1978)

    A qualified psychologist’s expert testimony regarding a defendant’s mental state is admissible, and it is an error of law to exclude such testimony solely because the witness is not a psychiatrist.

    Summary

    In a murder trial, the trial court erred by refusing to allow a psychologist to testify about whether the defendant was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the killing, based solely on the fact that the witness was not a psychiatrist. The Court of Appeals held this was an error of law. While acknowledging the trial court’s discretion in determining expert witness qualifications, the court emphasized that barring a qualified psychologist’s testimony solely due to their lack of medical training was improper, potentially prejudicing the defendant’s ability to prove an affirmative defense. The dissent argued for reversal and a new trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing his paramour.

    At trial, the defense attempted to introduce testimony from a psychologist regarding the defendant’s mental state at the time of the killing, specifically, whether he was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance.

    The trial court refused to allow the psychologist to testify, explicitly stating the opinion sought could only be given by a psychiatrist.

    The psychologist was qualified and trained in interpreting tests and drawing conclusions but was not a medical doctor.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of second-degree murder.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow a qualified psychologist to testify as an expert witness regarding the defendant’s mental state solely because the witness was not a psychiatrist.

    Holding

    Yes, because it is an error of law to exclude a qualified psychologist’s expert testimony regarding a defendant’s mental state solely because they are not a psychiatrist. Such exclusion may prejudice the defendant’s ability to present a defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, in a dissenting opinion by Judge Meyer, emphasized that the trial court’s ruling was based solely on the psychologist’s lack of medical training, not on a finding that the psychologist was unqualified based on insufficient training in psychology.

    The court cited People v. Davis, 62 Cal. 2d 791, which held it was error to refuse a clinical psychologist’s testimony solely because of a lack of medical training. Justice Traynor stated in Davis, “A witness is qualified to testify about a matter calling for an expert opinion if his peculiar skill, training, or experience enable him to form an opinion that will be useful to the jury.”

    The court noted that while there was not unanimous agreement on the admissibility of psychologist testimony on mental state, the prevailing view favored admissibility. This view aligns with the principle that an expert’s opinion should be received if they are truly an expert on the subject, regardless of medical licensure, as stated in People v Rice, 159 NY 400, 410.

    Furthermore, CPL 730.10 (subd 8) and CPL 730.20 (subd 1) recognize “certified psychologists” as qualified “psychiatric examiners” competent to give opinions on a defendant’s mental capacity to stand trial.

    Excluding the psychologist’s testimony could have prejudiced the defendant’s ability to prove the affirmative defense that he acted under extreme emotional disturbance. Therefore, the dissent argued for a reversal and a new trial to allow the jury to consider such evidence.

    The dissent directly quoted from *People v. Davis*: “The alleged disability did not involve a matter of mental illness completely within the realm of a physician. A functional disorder is by definition nonorganic and without a biological cause. The trial court erred in ruling that only one with medical training could testify on the issue.”

  • Koehler v. Schwartz, 48 N.Y.2d 807 (1979): Establishing Causation in Medical Malpractice for Unsuccessful Procedures

    Koehler v. Schwartz, 48 N.Y.2d 807 (1979)

    In medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s deviation from accepted medical practice was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries; mere deviation from a physician’s routine practice, without proof that the deviation caused or enhanced the possibility of the unsuccessful outcome, is insufficient to establish liability.

    Summary

    Mary Koehler sued Dr. Schwartz for malpractice after he unsuccessfully attempted to abort her pregnancy. Koehler argued that Dr. Schwartz deviated from standard practice by failing to use a sharp curette after applying a suction device, or by delaying informing her that the abortion was unsuccessful. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict for the plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendant’s actions were the cause-in-fact of the unsuccessful abortion or of any claimed emotional injuries. The court emphasized that expert testimony was needed to establish causation, and that evidence presented did not show the alleged deviations contributed to the failed abortion.

    Facts

    Defendant, Dr. Schwartz, attempted to perform an abortion on plaintiff, Mary Koehler. The abortion was unsuccessful. Plaintiff claimed Dr. Schwartz was negligent in two ways: (1) by not using a sharp curette following the suction device and (2) by delaying notification that the abortion had failed. Plaintiff alleged that this negligence caused her extensive emotional and psychic injuries. Defense experts testified that either the suction method or the sharp curette were acceptable and customary practices, and that both procedures were not required.

    Procedural History

    The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed the jury’s verdict, finding insufficient evidence to support the claim of medical malpractice. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s failure to use a sharp curette following a suction device, in attempting to perform an abortion, can be considered medical malpractice when there is no expert testimony demonstrating that this omission caused the unsuccessful abortion.

    2. Whether the defendant’s delay in notifying the plaintiff of the unsuccessful abortion was an independent cause of the plaintiff’s emotional and psychic injuries.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was no evidence establishing that the omission of the sharp curette caused or enhanced the possibility of an unsuccessful abortion; expert testimony was required to establish the causal link, which was absent in this case.

    2. No, because the delay in notification was not shown to be an independent cause of any of the plaintiff’s injuries or damages, including emotional and psychic damages; a conclusion that earlier notification would have changed the outcome would be based on speculation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the defendant may have routinely followed procedures exceeding customary practice, the failure to adhere to these added precautions only amounts to negligence if it caused or enhanced the possibility of the unsuccessful abortion. The court emphasized that expert testimony was needed to establish causation, stating, “Whether and to what extent use of a sharp curette might contribute to the success of the procedure is not a matter of common knowledge which a lay jury could decide in the absence of expert testimony.” The court noted that the defendant’s own testimony indicated the curette was used to minimize post-operative complications, not to facilitate the procedure itself. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the failure to use a sharp curette was a cause-in-fact of the unsuccessful abortion.

    Regarding the delayed notification, the court found that while it might have exacerbated damages, it was not an independent cause of injury. The court reasoned that finding the delay as the cause of emotional distress would be speculative, especially given the plaintiff’s testimony that she could not have endured a second abortion. The court concludes, “plaintiff simply has not established that her injuries resulted from anything other than the failure of the abortion, regardless of when she received notification.”

  • People v. McMahon, 46 N.Y.2d 447 (1978): Improper Jury Communication by Court Clerk

    People v. McMahon, 46 N.Y.2d 447 (1978)

    Unauthorized communications by a court clerk to a deliberating jury regarding the judge’s supposed desire for a verdict constitute reversible error, especially when the communication is not authorized by the court and occurs outside the presence of the defendant and counsel.

    Summary

    McMahon was convicted of robbery. During jury deliberations, the court clerk allegedly told the jury that the judge wanted them to continue deliberating because a lot of time and money had been invested in the case. The defense moved to set aside the verdict based on this improper communication, submitting affidavits from jurors. The prosecution did not dispute the affidavits but argued that even if true, they were not grounds for vacating the verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unauthorized communication was a fundamental error requiring a new trial because the defendant has a right to be present during all critical stages of trial, including supplemental jury instructions. The court also noted that expert testimony bolstering the victim’s credibility was improperly admitted.

    Facts

    McMahon was accused of hijacking a truck. The jury deliberated for a significant time, sending notes indicating deadlock. After repeated deliberations spanning multiple days, the jury ultimately reached a guilty verdict. Following the verdict, two jurors provided sworn affidavits stating that the court clerk had entered the jury room and told them the judge wanted them to continue deliberating because a lot of time and money had been invested in the case. The judge had not, in fact, sent this message.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted McMahon. The Appellate Division affirmed. McMahon appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the clerk’s communication with the jury was improper. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an unauthorized communication by a court clerk to a deliberating jury, conveying the impression that the judge desires a verdict due to the time and money invested in the case, constitutes reversible error.
    2. Whether the admission of expert testimony that essentially bolsters the credibility of a witness is permissible.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a defendant has an absolute right to be present with counsel during all critical stages of trial, including communications with the jury, and unauthorized communications from court personnel violate this right.
    2. No, because it is the sole province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, and expert testimony designed solely to bolster a witness’s testimony is an improper usurpation of the jury’s function.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the defendant’s right to be present, with counsel, at all stages of trial where his presence has a relation to his opportunity to defend against the charge. This right extends to communications with the jury, especially supplemental instructions after the jury has retired. CPL 310.30 requires notification of counsel and the defendant’s presence during court communications with the jury. The court stated, “Where the court’s instructions are supplemental, coming after the jury has already once retired, they may well be determinative of the outcome of the case, coming as they do in response to questions raised by the jurors themselves. As such, the presence of the defendant and his counsel is constitutionally required whenever supplemental instructions are given, and failure to notify them is a fundamental error”. The court found the clerk’s communication was improper, even though the judge did not authorize it, as court officers are prohibited from communicating with jurors except as authorized by the court or for purely administrative duties (CPL 310.10). The court found that the People did not dispute the facts alleged in the affidavits, which were sufficient to support the motion to set aside the verdict. Regarding the expert testimony, the court held that it was improper because it effectively affirmed the credibility of the victim, which is solely the jury’s role. “This ‘opinion’ evidence was the precise equivalent of affirming the credibility of the People’s witness through the vehicle of an opinion that many hijackings occur as the victim had related.” This type of bolstering is not permitted.