New York Law Review

Tag: Expert Testimony

  • People v. Angelo, 88 N.Y.2d 217 (1996): Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in Criminal Trials

    People v. Angelo, 88 N.Y.2d 217 (1996)

    Polygraph test results are inadmissible as evidence in New York criminal trials because they are not generally accepted within the scientific community as reliable.

    Summary

    Angelo, a nurse, was convicted of murder and assault for injecting patients with a neuromuscular blocking agent. At trial, he argued a mental illness prevented him from understanding the risk of his actions. He sought to introduce polygraph results, arguing they supported his expert’s diagnosis. The trial court excluded the polygraph evidence, citing its unreliability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that polygraph results are inadmissible unless generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community, which Angelo failed to demonstrate. This case reinforces the application of the *Frye* standard in New York, requiring scientific reliability for novel scientific evidence.

    Facts

    Angelo, a nurse, injected seven patients with a neuromuscular blocking agent, leading to six deaths. He claimed a dissociative disorder prevented him from understanding the risk his actions posed to the patients. Angelo sought to prove that he had feelings of inadequacy, and injected patients so he could then participate in their resuscitation, unaware that his injections caused their distress.

    Procedural History

    Angelo was convicted of murder, manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and assault. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in prohibiting Angelo’s expert from testifying that his conclusions were based, in part, on the results of Angelo’s polygraph examination.

    Holding

    No, because polygraph test results are not generally accepted by the scientific community as reliable and therefore are inadmissible as evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude the polygraph evidence. The Court reasoned that while experts can rely on out-of-court evidence, that evidence must be “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion” or “comes from a witness subject to full cross-examination on the trial” (citing People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 460-461). This incorporates the *Frye* standard, requiring general acceptance of the scientific procedures and methodology. Because Angelo failed to demonstrate that polygraph test results meet this standard, the evidence was properly excluded.
    Specifically, the Court stated, “Because defendant did not demonstrate that polygraph test results are generally accepted by the scientific community as reliable, County Court did not err in excluding defendant’s polygraph results.”
    The court also noted that Angelo did not properly preserve his argument that a *Frye* hearing should have been held, as he did not definitively request such a hearing or argue that the scientific consensus had changed since previous rulings deeming polygraph evidence inadmissible.
    Finally, the Court rejected Angelo’s argument that the validity of the test results was not at issue, clarifying that because the polygraph was offered to prove the honesty of Angelo’s belief, its probative value depended on the reliability of the test results.

  • Dufel v. Green, 84 N.Y.2d 795 (1995): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on ‘Serious Injury’ Threshold

    84 N.Y.2d 795 (1995)

    Expert medical testimony is admissible to establish whether a plaintiff has sustained a “permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member” or a “significant limitation of use of a body function or system” as defined by Insurance Law § 5102(d), even if the testimony addresses ultimate issues for the jury.

    Summary

    In a personal injury action arising from a car accident, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether it was improper for the plaintiff’s doctors to testify, using the exact language of Insurance Law § 5102(d), that the plaintiff sustained a “permanent consequential limitation” and a “significant limitation” of use of a body function. The Court held that such testimony was admissible, reasoning that whether an injury meets these statutory definitions often requires medical expertise beyond the ken of a lay jury. The Court emphasized that the expert opinions were supported by objective medical evidence and the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine and present their own expert testimony.

    Facts

    Plaintiff sustained injuries to her ankle and knee in a car accident. She sued the other driver and the vehicle’s owner for damages. To establish a “serious injury” under New York’s No-Fault Law (Insurance Law § 5102(d)), plaintiff’s physicians testified that she suffered a “permanent consequential limitation” and a “significant limitation” of the use of a body member, function, organ, or system.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed the plaintiff’s doctors to testify as to whether the plaintiff suffered a permanent consequential limitation or a significant limitation. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, determining that she sustained a permanent consequential limitation and a significant limitation and that she was medically prevented from performing normal activities for 90 out of 180 days following the accident. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine if the doctor’s testimony was improper.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether it is an error to allow medical experts to testify, using the statutory language of Insurance Law § 5102(d), as to whether a plaintiff sustained a “permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member” or a “significant limitation of use of a body function or system”.

    Holding

    1. No, because whether an injury constitutes a “permanent consequential limitation” or a “significant limitation” often requires medical expertise, and the expert’s opinion was supported by objective evidence and subject to cross-examination and rebuttal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the admission of expert opinion is within the trial court’s discretion when it involves knowledge or skill beyond the range of ordinary training and intelligence. The Court found that determining whether an injury is permanent, “significant,” or “consequential” involves medical judgments about the seriousness and qualitative nature of an injury, compared to the normal function of the body, and thus falls within the scope of medical expertise. The court quoted Selkowitz v County of Nassau, 45 NY2d 97, 102, stating that an “expert” should be permitted to offer an opinion on an issue which involves ” ‘professional or scientific knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelligence’ ”. The Court also emphasized the No-Fault Law’s intent to weed out frivolous claims. Permitting medical testimony on the seriousness of the injury assists the jury and is consistent with that intent. The Court acknowledged that there could be instances where asking experts questions in the statutory form would be unduly prejudicial. However, in this case, because the expert’s opinions were supported by objective evidence, the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine and present its own expert who testified that the plaintiff sustained a 20% permanent loss of use of her ankle, the court found no error. Thus, the jury could exercise independent judgment without relying solely on the plaintiff’s experts’ statutory conclusions. The court cited Licari v Elliot, 57 NY2d 230, 234-235, stating that “the legislative intent underlying the No-Fault Law was to weed out frivolous claims and limit recovery to significant injuries”.

  • People v. Garcia, 83 N.Y.2d 817 (1994): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Garcia, 83 N.Y.2d 817 (1994)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must raise a specific objection at trial; a general objection, or an objection on other grounds, does not preserve the issue.

    Summary

    The defendant, Garcia, was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, the prosecution presented expert testimony on street-level drug transactions. Garcia objected, arguing the testimony would prejudice the jury by suggesting involvement in a larger narcotics organization. On appeal, Garcia argued the expert testimony was unnecessary and improperly bolstered the prosecution’s witnesses. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Garcia’s initial objection did not preserve the new arguments raised on appeal. The Court emphasized the importance of specific objections to allow the trial court to address the alleged error.

    Facts

    Garcia was arrested during a buy-and-bust operation in the Bronx and charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    At trial, a detective involved in the arrest testified about the circumstances.

    The detective was permitted to testify as an expert on street-level drug transactions, defining terms like “hawker,” “money man,” and “hand-to-hand.”

    Garcia objected to the expert testimony, arguing it would mislead the jury into believing he was involved in a larger narcotics organization, even though only a single sale was at issue.

    Procedural History

    The jury convicted Garcia.

    The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the judgment.

    One of the dissenting Justices at the Appellate Division granted Garcia leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s objection at trial, based on the potential for the jury to infer involvement in a larger narcotics organization, preserved the defendant’s appellate claims that the expert testimony was unnecessary and improperly bolstered the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s objection at trial was based on a different ground than the arguments raised on appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the initial objection did not preserve the defendant’s current claims that the expert testimony was inadmissible because it was unnecessary and that it improperly bolstered the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the principle of preservation of error. To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a specific objection at trial, giving the trial court an opportunity to address the alleged error.

    Garcia’s objection at trial was that the expert testimony would prejudice the jury by suggesting he was involved in a larger drug trafficking operation. On appeal, Garcia argued the expert testimony was unnecessary and improperly bolstered the prosecution’s case. These were distinct arguments.

    The Court stated that “That objection does not preserve defendant’s current claims that the expert testimony was inadmissible because it was unnecessary and that it improperly bolstered the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses…We therefore may not address these claims.”

    Because Garcia’s initial objection did not alert the trial court to the specific errors he now alleged, the Court of Appeals declined to review those claims.

    The Court also found that the preserved claim, that the expert testimony implied Garcia’s involvement in extensive drug trafficking, was without merit, especially since the trial court limited the testimony to defining specific terms.

  • Diaz v. New York Downtown Hospital, 99 N.Y.2d 542 (2002): Sufficiency of Expert Testimony to Rebut Summary Judgment Motion in Negligence

    Diaz v. New York Downtown Hosp., 99 N.Y.2d 542 (2002)

    A medical expert’s conclusory assertion of negligence, based solely on conflicting test results without addressing the defendant’s evidence of non-negligence, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment.

    Summary

    In this medical negligence case, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant laboratory. The defendant presented evidence demonstrating the blood test was properly performed and a negative result was possible even with a later positive result. The plaintiff’s expert provided a conclusory affidavit stating the defendant’s negative result was erroneous because of the subsequent positive result. The Court of Appeals held that the expert’s conclusory statement, without more, failed to raise a triable issue of fact because it did not address the defendant’s evidence that different results could occur absent negligence.

    Facts

    The decedent had a blood test performed by the defendant laboratory. The test result was negative. Two months later, another laboratory performed a blood test on the decedent, and the result was positive. The plaintiff, presumably the decedent’s representative, brought a negligence action against the defendant laboratory, alleging the initial negative test result was erroneous and caused harm. The defendant laboratory moved for summary judgment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially ruled on the motion. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and granted summary judgment to the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit of the plaintiff’s medical expert was sufficient to raise a material issue of fact to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, where the defendant presented a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment.

    Holding

    No, because the expert’s conclusory assertion that the defendant’s negative result was erroneous, based solely on the subsequent positive result, raised no issue of fact given the defendant’s evidence that different results were possible absent negligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that a party opposing summary judgment must present evidentiary facts sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. The defendant laboratory demonstrated that the blood test was properly performed, it did not interpret the results, and the negative result could have been correct despite the later positive result. This established a prima facie case for summary judgment, shifting the burden to the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue.

    The court found the plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit insufficient because it merely asserted that the defendant’s negative result was erroneous because of the later positive result. The court noted that the expert did not address or rebut the defendant’s evidence that different test results could occur without any negligence on the part of the laboratory. The court emphasized that an expert’s conclusory assertions, without supporting factual basis, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Quoting "even if plaintiffs proof were fully credited by a fact finder, defendant has offered proof to the effect that there could be different results without any negligence, and plaintiff has offered nothing further to indicate defendant’s negligence in this case." Therefore, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the defendant’s negligence. The court cited Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324-325 and Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 NY2d 851, 853.

  • People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 824 (1990): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 824 (1990)

    The decision to admit expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision denying the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the proposed testimony unreliable, cumulative, and not beyond the ken of the jury. The dissent argued that the trial court applied incorrect legal standards and failed to properly assess the specific facts of the case, thereby signaling an overly broad deference to trial court discretion and ignoring growing research on the reliability of eyewitness testimony. The dissent emphasized the emerging trend of accepting such expert testimony and its potential to clarify misconceptions held by jurors.

    Facts

    The defendant sought to introduce expert testimony from Dr. Robert Buckhout, a psychologist specializing in cognitive factors affecting eyewitness identification. Dr. Buckhout’s testimony was intended to address the effects of stress and other factors on the accuracy of eyewitness accounts. The defense argued that the testimony would provide jurors with a framework for evaluating eyewitness testimony, particularly concerning the relationship between stress and accurate identification, susceptibility to suggestion, and the lack of correlation between confidence and accuracy.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to admit the expert testimony. The defendant appealed, arguing the denial was an abuse of discretion. The appellate division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the appellate division’s ruling.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to admit expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the proposed testimony was unreliable, cumulative, and not beyond the ken of the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the admissibility of expert testimony is primarily a matter of trial court discretion, subject to limited appellate review. The court deferred to the trial court’s assessment that the testimony on perceptual factors lacked sufficient acceptance within the scientific community. Furthermore, the court agreed that the proposed testimony would be cumulative, as defense counsel could cross-examine witnesses on relevant factors like opportunity to observe, stress, and lighting conditions, and the judge would provide a standard jury charge on considering these factors. The court stated, “Expert testimony must by the very nature, be beyond the ken of jurors whose basic intelligence should not be underestimated. The jury’s function to judge the facts should not be usurped unless expert testimony is required and necessary to assist them.”

    The dissenting judge, Kaye, argued that the trial court’s stated reasons for denying the motion were legally insufficient. The dissent noted an emerging trend of judicial acceptance of expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification and emphasized the extensive research data supporting its reliability. The dissent further argued that the proposed testimony was not cumulative, as it would provide a general analytical framework not available through cross-examination or standard jury instructions. Finally, the dissent asserted that the notion that jurors are generally aware of factors relevant to eyewitness reliability has been refuted by research. The dissent cited People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 293, arguing admission of such testimony could dispel misconceptions jurors possess. The dissent concluded that the trial court’s preclusion was based on a mistaken legal analysis, warranting reversal.

  • People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427 (1989): Sufficiency of Expert Testimony to Identify Controlled Substances

    People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427 (1989)

    Expert testimony identifying a controlled substance must be sufficient to establish that the substance falls within the statutory definition of a proscribed drug; merely stating an opinion without adequate foundation or reference to the controlled substance list is insufficient.

    Summary

    In People v. Jones, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the sufficiency of expert testimony in identifying a controlled substance. The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The prosecution’s expert testified that the substance was propoxyphene but did not adequately establish that this specific substance was proscribed by the Public Health Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the conviction, holding that the expert’s testimony, without more, was insufficient to prove the substance was a controlled substance under the relevant statutes. The court emphasized that the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the substance’s inclusion on the controlled substance list.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and found to be in possession of a substance. At trial, the prosecution presented a chemist as an expert witness. The chemist testified that she analyzed the substance and determined it to be propoxyphene. The expert described the tests performed but did not explicitly connect propoxyphene to the list of controlled substances defined by the Public Health Law. The defense argued that the prosecution failed to prove that the substance was a controlled substance as defined by law.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the prosecution had failed to establish that the substance possessed by the defendant was a controlled substance under the Public Health Law. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the expert testimony presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance possessed by the defendant was a controlled substance as defined by the Public Health Law.

    Holding

    No, because the People failed to establish that the substance obtained from the defendant was proscribed by the Public Health Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The court emphasized that the mere identification of the substance as propoxyphene by an expert was not enough. The prosecution was required to present evidence demonstrating that propoxyphene was, in fact, a controlled substance listed in the relevant statutes. The court noted that the expert’s qualifications were not in question, but the substance of her testimony was lacking. The court stated, “the People did not prove by any other acceptable source which substance on the controlled substance list defendant possessed.” The concurring opinion further clarified that the error was not in the admissibility of the expert’s opinion but in the insufficiency of her identification of the substance tested. While the expert was qualified to render an opinion, the opinion itself was legally insufficient to establish the case against the defendant because it did not adequately link the substance to the controlled substance list. The court’s decision underscores the importance of establishing a clear and direct connection between the identified substance and the statutory definition of a controlled substance to secure a conviction for drug-related offenses. This case serves as a reminder for prosecutors to provide explicit evidence linking the substance to the controlled substance list, and for defense attorneys to challenge the sufficiency of such evidence when it is lacking. The failure to do so can be grounds for reversal, as demonstrated in this case.

  • Wellisch v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 293 N.Y. 178 (1944): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Suicide

    293 N.Y. 178 (1944)

    In cases involving potential suicide, expert testimony is admissible to assist the jury in understanding patterns of behavior and other circumstances surrounding the death that are not within the common knowledge of laypersons.

    Summary

    This case addresses the evidentiary standards for determining whether a death was accidental or a suicide, specifically concerning the admissibility of expert testimony. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the exclusion of expert opinion on whether the death was a suicide was an abuse of discretion. The court emphasized the jury’s role in resolving doubts when a reasonable hypothesis of accidental death exists, but also acknowledged the necessity of expert guidance on matters beyond common knowledge. The ruling underscores the importance of expert testimony in informing juries about behavioral patterns and circumstances surrounding potential suicides.

    Facts

    The decedent died under circumstances suggesting a possible drug overdose. The central dispute was whether the death was accidental or a suicide. The trial involved conflicting evidence and hinged on the interpretation of circumstances surrounding the death. The key evidence included the level of toxicity found in the decedent’s body and observations about the scene where the body was discovered.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, where a jury verdict was reached. The Appellate Division reviewed the case and issued an order. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted a new trial, finding that the exclusion of certain expert testimony was an error.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented a fair question of fact as to whether the death was accidental, considering the presumption against suicide?

    2. Whether the exclusion of expert testimony regarding whether the death was a suicide constituted an abuse of discretion?

    3. Whether the redaction of the death certificate and autopsy report to omit the “suicide” conclusion was an error?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because on the record and considering the strong presumption against suicide, a fair question of fact as to accident had been presented.

    2. Yes, because whether the number of pills required to reach the level of toxicity found in decedent’s body could have been taken inadvertently or whether the circumstances surrounding the body were consistent with general patterns of behavior exhibited by other suicide victims were not matters within the jury’s common knowledge.

    3. Yes, because the Trial Judge agreed that redaction of the death certificate and autopsy report, both signed by Dr. Baden, to omit the “suicide” conclusion was error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a jury question existed because there was a reasonable hypothesis of accidental death, and it is the jury’s duty to resolve the doubt. The Court found that the exclusion of Dr. Baden’s expert opinion was an abuse of discretion. The Court stated, “Although the jury may have been able to evaluate some of the evidence presented, whether the number of pills required to reach the level of toxicity found in decedent’s body could have been taken inadvertently or whether the circumstances surrounding the body were consistent with general patterns of behavior exhibited by other suicide victims were not matters within their ken.” The Court highlighted that some issues required expert knowledge because they were not within the average person’s understanding. This made expert testimony crucial. The court also noted the error in redacting the death certificate and autopsy report to omit the “suicide” conclusion because they were official records created by the same expert whose testimony was excluded.

  • People v. Aphaylath, 68 N.Y.2d 945 (1986): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Cultural Context

    People v. Aphaylath, 68 N.Y.2d 945 (1986)

    Expert testimony on cultural context is admissible to support an extreme emotional disturbance defense, even if the expert has no personal knowledge of the defendant, as long as the testimony is relevant and probative to a fact in issue; the trial court has discretion to determine its relevance and probative value.

    Summary

    Aphaylath, a Laotian refugee, was convicted of intentionally murdering his wife. He claimed extreme emotional disturbance due to cultural differences and the stress of being a refugee. The trial court excluded expert testimony about the challenges faced by Laotian refugees assimilating into American culture because the experts lacked specific knowledge of the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that expert testimony doesn’t require personal knowledge of the defendant if it’s relevant to a fact in issue. The court determined the exclusion of expert testimony was an error, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Defendant, a Laotian refugee who had been in the U.S. for two years, was charged with the intentional murder of his wife, whom he had married a month prior.
    He argued that the stress of being a refugee and cultural differences contributed to an extreme emotional disturbance.
    His defense was that his wife’s behavior—showing affection for a former boyfriend and receiving calls from another man—brought shame on him and his family according to Laotian culture, triggering his loss of control.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted and tried in the Supreme Court, Monroe County.
    He attempted to present an affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
    The trial court excluded the testimony of two expert witnesses.
    This decision was appealed, and the New York Court of Appeals reversed the order and remitted the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony regarding the stress and disorientation experienced by Laotian refugees assimilating into American culture, offered to support the defendant’s affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.

    Holding

    Yes, because the admissibility of expert testimony that is probative of a fact in issue does not depend on whether the witness has personal knowledge of a defendant or a defendant’s particular characteristics.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony was based on an erroneous legal standard. The trial court reasoned that because the experts lacked specific knowledge of the defendant, their testimony was inadmissible. The Court of Appeals clarified that the admissibility of expert testimony doesn’t hinge on the expert’s personal knowledge of the defendant. The court cited Kulak v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 NY2d 140, 146-147, emphasizing that expert testimony is admissible if it’s “probative of a fact in issue.” The court further explained that the trial judge has discretion to determine whether the testimony is sufficiently relevant to have probative value (De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296, 307).

    The court noted that the defendant may have been deprived of the opportunity to present relevant information to the jury. The exclusion was deemed prejudicial because the expert testimony was directly relevant to the defendant’s affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The court stated, “Whether or not such testimony is sufficiently relevant to have probative value is a determination to be made by the Trial Judge in the exercise of her sound discretion.”

    In essence, the Court of Appeals established that while trial courts have discretion in admitting expert testimony, they cannot categorically exclude such testimony solely because the expert lacks personal knowledge of the defendant. The focus should be on the relevance and probative value of the testimony to the facts at issue, particularly when it supports an affirmative defense like extreme emotional disturbance that is rooted in cultural context.

  • Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 N.Y.2d 320 (1986): Establishing a Prima Facie Case for Summary Judgment in Medical Malpractice

    Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 N.Y.2d 320 (1986)

    A defendant physician in a medical malpractice case is entitled to summary judgment upon demonstrating the absence of any material issues of fact regarding their negligence, shifting the burden to the plaintiff to produce evidentiary proof demonstrating a triable issue of fact.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued the hospital and multiple doctors, including Dr. Stark, for medical malpractice. Dr. Stark, a radiologist, had twice diagnosed the plaintiff with a cecal neoplasm based on barium enema X-rays. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to discover and/or treat the lesions. Dr. Stark moved for summary judgment, arguing his diagnosis was correct and that, as a radiologist, he wasn’t responsible for treatment. The Court of Appeals held that Dr. Stark met his burden of demonstrating the absence of material fact issues and the plaintiff failed to adequately rebut that showing with expert testimony, warranting summary judgment for Dr. Stark.

    Facts

    Maria Alvarez was admitted to Prospect Hospital multiple times for abdominal pain.
    Dr. Stark, the chief of radiology, interpreted radiological studies during these visits.
    In 1978 and 1979, Dr. Stark identified “cecal neoplasm” in barium enema X-rays and reported it to the attending physician.
    Plaintiff was discharged after the first visit with a diagnosis of gastroenteritis.
    Later, plaintiff underwent surgery to remove a malignant growth in her colon.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the hospital and nine physicians, including Dr. Stark, alleging negligence.
    Dr. Stark moved for summary judgment, which was denied by the Supreme Court.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the denial.
    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Dr. Stark, as the moving party, made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, thereby shifting the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate a triable issue of fact.
    Whether the plaintiff adequately rebutted Dr. Stark’s showing with evidentiary proof establishing a material issue of fact regarding his alleged negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because Dr. Stark’s submissions, including his deposition testimony and the hospital records, demonstrated the absence of material triable issues of fact as to the malpractice claims asserted against him.
    No, because the plaintiff’s sole submission, an affidavit from her attorney, was insufficient to rebut Dr. Stark’s showing, as it lacked expert medical opinion and attempted to introduce a new theory of liability not asserted in the original complaint or bill of particulars.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the standards for summary judgment, stating that the moving party must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Once this is done, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof establishing material issues of fact requiring trial.

    In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must submit evidentiary facts rebutting the defendant physician’s showing of non-negligence. General, conclusory allegations are insufficient.

    The court found Dr. Stark’s submissions, including his deposition testimony supported by hospital records, sufficient to demonstrate that he properly and timely diagnosed the plaintiff’s condition and did not depart from accepted standards of care.

    The court distinguished this case from Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center, where the doctors’ affidavits contained only conclusory assertions of acting within the standard of care, without specific factual references. Here, Dr. Stark refuted the allegations with specific factual references.

    The court also cited Fileccia v. Massapequa Gen. Hosp., where summary judgment was granted to a radiologist who only interpreted X-rays. Similarly, Dr. Stark’s role was limited to interpreting radiological studies, and the plaintiff failed to provide expert medical opinion to support a new theory of liability (failure to consult with attending physicians) not previously asserted.

    The court stated, “Just as the burden of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is not met merely by repeating or incorporating by reference the allegations contained in the pleadings or bills of particulars * * * neither is that burden met by the unsubstantiated assertions or speculations of plaintiff’s counsel that a defendant may have breached a possible duty of care.”

  • Sawyer v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 328 (1986): Expert Testimony Required for Amnesia Claim in Negligence Cases

    Sawyer v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 328 (1986)

    In a negligence action where the plaintiff claims amnesia due to the defendant’s actions, expert testimony is required to establish the amnesia and its causal relationship to the defendant’s fault before the jury can apply a lesser degree of proof in evaluating the plaintiff’s claim.

    Summary

    Sawyer sued Dreis & Krump for injuries sustained while operating a press brake. Sawyer claimed he lost his memory of the incident. The trial court instructed the jury on the “amnesia rule,” allowing them to apply a lesser burden of proof. The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for Sawyer, holding that expert testimony is required to prove the amnesia and its causal link to the defendant’s actions. The court also addressed the admissibility of prior accident evidence and the appropriate jury charge regarding industry safety standards (ANSI standards), finding errors in both.

    Facts

    Sawyer, an experienced press brake operator, was injured while working on a machine manufactured by Dreis & Krump. He claimed he lost his memory of the events leading to the injury. Sawyer contended he reached under the ram to secure slipping metal and accidentally activated the machine. Dreis & Krump argued Sawyer was operating the machine improperly, causing the metal to slip and his hand to be pulled under the ram. The set-up procedure required the use of L-shaped stops at the back of the bed to secure the metal but Dreis & Krump contended that Sawyer set the stops improperly, without using a scrap piece of metal to measure. Plaintiff’s foreman heard metal fall, and found the plaintiff conscious but quiet, saying, “I finally done it.”

    Procedural History

    Sawyer sued Dreis & Krump, who then impleaded Sawyer’s employer, Cambridge Filter Corporation. The jury found in favor of Sawyer, apportioning fault equally between Dreis & Krump and Cambridge Filter. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in submitting the question of Sawyer’s amnesia to the jury without expert testimony establishing the condition or causally relating it to the accident.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in permitting Sawyer’s engineering expert to testify how the accident happened.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Sawyer’s cross-examination of Dreis & Krump’s witnesses about other accidents with the press.
    4. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury on the weight to be accorded industry safety standards (ANSI).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because amnesia is a medical condition beyond the understanding of laymen, and expert testimony is required to prove the condition by clear and convincing evidence.
    2. Yes, because the expert’s opinion was based on facts not established by the evidence.
    3. Yes, because Sawyer failed to establish that the prior accidents were similar to his.
    4. Yes, because the ANSI standards were not conclusive on the issue of negligence, and the jury should have been so instructed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while a plaintiff with amnesia is held to a lesser degree of proof, they must still establish a prima facie case, and the jury cannot presume due care. The court emphasized that “[b]ecause loss of memory is easily feigned, before plaintiff may receive the benefit of the rule, he must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in causing his condition.” The court reasoned that amnesia, like most medical conditions, requires expert evidence to establish its existence and causal relationship to the defendant’s actions. Without such evidence, a jury of laypersons cannot adequately evaluate the effects of trauma or the symptoms verifying the loss of memory. The court cited Koehler v Schwartz, 48 NY2d 807 as precedent. The Court determined that the expert testimony was required to determine if the loss of memory was “real and not feigned”.

    The court also found the expert’s testimony on how the accident occurred was speculative and lacked a proper factual foundation, noting the expert said that the metal slipped and plaintiff reached for it reflexively and stepped on the pedal, but the expert opinion was “based upon facts which were not established by the evidence”. The court found the evidence about prior accidents was improperly admitted because the plaintiff did not show the prior accidents were similar.

    Regarding the ANSI standards, the Court cited Trimarco v Klein, 56 NY2d 98, holding that industry standards can be considered as “some evidence of negligence if it first found that the standards set forth in the booklet represented the general custom or usage in the industry,” but also that the jury should have been instructed that such standards were not conclusive.