New York Law Review

Tag: Expert Testimony

  • People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251 (2009)

    When a case hinges on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications with minimal corroborating evidence, excluding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is an abuse of discretion if the testimony is relevant, scientifically accepted, offered by a qualified expert, and addresses topics beyond the average juror’s understanding.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification reliability in two cases, Abney and Allen. In Abney, where a robbery conviction rested solely on a 13-year-old victim’s identification, the court held it was an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness accuracy, particularly regarding witness confidence. In Allen, where corroborating evidence existed, the court upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude such testimony. The court emphasized that expert testimony should be admitted when it can aid the jury in understanding factors affecting eyewitness reliability that are beyond common knowledge, but its exclusion may be appropriate when other evidence supports the conviction.

    Facts

    In Abney, Farhana U. was robbed at knifepoint in a subway station. She identified Quentin Abney from a photo array and later in a lineup. At trial, Abney presented an alibi defense. In Allen, Gregory Allen was convicted of robbing a barbershop. Two witnesses, Bierd and Almonte, identified Allen. Bierd recognized Allen from the neighborhood. Allen refused to participate in a lineup without masks for all participants.

    Procedural History

    In Abney, the trial court denied Abney’s motion to present expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing corroborating evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed. In Allen, the trial court denied Allen’s motion to admit expert testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision as well.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Abney, whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification when the case turned on the accuracy of a single eyewitness and there was little to no corroborating evidence.
    2. In Allen, whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to adduce expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification when there were multiple eyewitnesses and some corroborating evidence.

    Holding

    1. In Abney, yes, because the case hinged on a single eyewitness identification with no corroborating evidence, and the expert testimony concerned topics beyond the ken of the average juror.
    2. In Allen, no, because the case did not depend exclusively on one eyewitness’s testimony and corroborating evidence existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on its prior decisions in People v. Lee, People v. Young, and especially People v. LeGrand, which established a framework for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. In Abney, the court emphasized that when a case rests solely on eyewitness testimony, excluding expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness accuracy is an abuse of discretion if the testimony is relevant, scientifically accepted, offered by a qualified expert, and addresses topics beyond the average juror’s understanding. The court found the trial court erred in not allowing testimony on witness confidence and should have held a Frye hearing on other factors. In Allen, the court found the presence of multiple eyewitnesses and corroborating evidence (Allen’s use of nicknames given to police by a witness, Allen’s knowledge that robbers wore masks) distinguished it from LeGrand and supported the trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony. The court stated that because the case did not turn entirely on one uncorroborated eyewitness, it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the expert testimony. The court also noted that factors such as stress and disguise were within the jury’s common sense understanding, and did not require expert explanation.

  • Newman v. Firman, 26 N.Y.3d 866 (2016): Establishing Causation in Medical Malpractice

    Newman v. Firman, 26 N.Y.3d 866 (2016)

    In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must present legally sufficient evidence demonstrating that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Summary

    This case concerns a medical malpractice claim where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant doctor’s failure to admit her to the hospital resulted in a larger stroke and permanent injuries. The jury found the defendant liable, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff presented legally sufficient evidence, through expert testimony, to support the jury’s finding that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries, despite the expert’s acknowledgment that quantifying the additional damage was difficult.

    Facts

    The plaintiff went to the emergency room experiencing stroke-like symptoms. Dr. Newman initially treated her, and then Dr. Firman took over her care. Dr. Firman ordered a CT scan which was inconclusive regarding bleeding in the brain. A neurological exam was normal. The Plaintiff declined a more invasive test and was discharged with a diagnosis of a migraine. Shortly after discharge, her primary care physician suspected a stroke, which was confirmed by an MRI. She suffered an ischemic stroke and resulting permanent injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Drs. Newman and Firman, and their medical groups. The jury found Dr. Firman liable for failing to admit the plaintiff to the hospital, determining this negligence caused her injuries. The Appellate Division affirmed the verdict. This appeal followed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Dr. Firman’s failure to admit her to the hospital was a substantial factor in causing her injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff’s expert testified that if Dr. Firman had admitted the plaintiff, she would have received anticoagulant medication, resulting in a less severe stroke. Therefore, there was a valid basis for the jury’s finding of liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that evidence is legally insufficient to support a verdict if “there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational men to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]). The Court relied on the plaintiff’s expert testimony which stated that admitting the plaintiff would have led to the administration of an anticoagulant, preventing a “little larger stroke than she should have had if she was properly treated.” Even though the expert found it difficult to “quantify” the extent of additional damage, the Court found a sufficient basis for the jury’s liability finding. The court stated that the finding was not “utterly irrational”. The court also held that the challenge to the consistency of the verdict was unpreserved and there was no merit to the contention that damages were speculative.

  • People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007)

    Where a case hinges on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications with little corroborating evidence, excluding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability, if relevant, generally accepted, and beyond the ken of the average juror, is an abuse of discretion.

    Summary

    Joaquin Liriano was murdered in 1991. The case stalled until 1998 when the defendant, LeGrand, was identified as a suspect based on a composite sketch made shortly after the crime. The People’s case rested solely on eyewitness identifications made nearly seven years after the crime. LeGrand sought to introduce expert testimony regarding factors affecting eyewitness reliability, which the trial court precluded after a Frye hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the exclusion of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion given the lack of corroborating evidence and the centrality of eyewitness identification.

    Facts

    Joaquin Liriano was stabbed to death in Manhattan in June 1991, and his assailant fled. Four people witnessed the attack and created a composite sketch. Two years later, LeGrand was identified as a possible suspect because he resembled the sketch. The case remained dormant until 1998, when LeGrand was arrested for burglary. The authorities then located the witnesses; one identified LeGrand as the killer, two tentatively identified him, and two could not identify him. There was no forensic or physical evidence connecting LeGrand to the stabbing.

    Procedural History

    LeGrand was charged with second-degree murder in 1999. His first trial in 2001 ended in a mistrial. Prior to his second trial, LeGrand moved to introduce expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The trial court conducted a Frye hearing and precluded the testimony. The jury found LeGrand guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in precluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications after determining that the proposed testimony was based on novel scientific principles not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community, where the case turned on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there was little or no corroborating evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because where the case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications if that testimony is (1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized an emerging trend of admitting expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification, noting that such testimony can provide much-needed guidance to juries. The Court emphasized the trial court’s discretion in determining whether jurors would benefit from the specialized knowledge of an expert witness, considering the centrality of the identification issue and the existence of corroborating evidence.

    The Court referenced Frye v. United States, emphasizing that the thing from which a deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. The Court distinguished its prior holdings in People v. Lee and People v. Young, emphasizing that, unlike those cases, there was no corroborating evidence connecting LeGrand to the crime. The Court found that the expert’s testimony regarding the correlation between confidence and accuracy, the effect of post-event information, and confidence malleability met the Frye standard, while the effect of weapon focus did not. The Court emphasized, “Once a scientific procedure has been proved reliable, a Frye inquiry need not be conducted each time such evidence is offered [and courts] may take judicial notice of reliability of the general procedure.”

    Ultimately, the Court concluded that the exclusion of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion, warranting a new trial. However, it reiterated that the admissibility of such evidence also depends upon the existence of sufficient corroborating evidence to link the defendant to the crime. In the event sufficient corroborating evidence is found to exist, an exercise of discretion excluding eyewitness expert testimony would not be fatal to a jury verdict convicting defendant.

  • People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28 (2006): Limits on Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28 (2006)

    While expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification is admissible under certain circumstances, a trial court’s jury instruction stating that such testimony cannot be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony is erroneous when read in isolation, but may not require reversal if the charge as a whole conveys the correct standard.

    Summary

    Drake was convicted of assault after an eyewitness identified him as the perpetrator of a brick attack. The trial court allowed expert testimony regarding factors affecting eyewitness identification but instructed the jury that this testimony could not be used to either discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony. The New York Court of Appeals held that this specific instruction, taken by itself, was erroneous, but that, viewing the jury charge in its entirety, the jury was properly instructed on how to consider expert testimony. Thus, the conviction was upheld.

    Facts

    Nicole Barrett was seriously injured when struck in the head with a brick in Manhattan. Several eyewitnesses were present. Defendant Drake was arrested and charged with the assault after an investigation. At trial, the key issue was identification. Some eyewitnesses identified Drake as the attacker, while others did not, or were uncertain.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted defendant’s pretrial motion to admit expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, subject to limitations. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury that the expert testimony could not be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony, to which the defendant objected. Drake was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury instruction stating that expert testimony on eyewitness identification cannot be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony constitutes reversible error.

    Holding

    No, because while the instruction was erroneous when read in isolation, the court’s charge, taken as a whole, conveyed to the jury the correct standard as to the proper use of expert testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the challenged jury instruction was “improper and should not have been used” (People v. Fields, 87 NY2d 821, 823 [1995]). The court reasoned that the instruction could have been taken to mean that the expert testimony could not be considered for any purpose. The court emphasized that jurors are always free to accept or reject expert evidence. It clarified that jurors must be permitted to apply the identified psychological factors to the facts of the case in deciding whether they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identifications if they accept the expert’s testimony. The court then focused on the charge as a whole. It noted that the charge expressly instructed the jury that the expert testimony was admitted to provide factors relevant to a person’s ability to perceive and remember, and that the jury was the sole judge of the reliability and credibility of the eyewitness testimony. The court concluded that no reasonable juror could have concluded that the expert’s testimony had been effectively stricken from the case. The court cited People v. Russell, 266 NY 147, 153 (1934) for the proposition that “[t]he test is always whether the jury, hearing the whole charge, would gather from its language the correct rules which should be applied in arriving at decision”.

  • People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40 (2006): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40 (2006)

    A trial court has discretion to admit or deny expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, but that discretion should lean towards admission when identification evidence is weak and uncorroborated.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The defendant was convicted of robbery and burglary based on a witness’s identification, which was preceded by a suppressed lineup identification. The trial court denied the defendant’s request to present expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness reliability. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. However, the dissent argued that the expert testimony should have been admitted given the weakness of the eyewitness identification and lack of corroborating evidence. This case highlights the complexities and judicial discretion involved in determining the reliability of eyewitness testimony.

    Facts

    William and Lisa Sykes were victims of a home invasion in March 1991. The perpetrator wore a scarf and blanket, obscuring his face but revealing his eyes, forehead, and part of his nose. Lisa Sykes described the assailant to police. She could not create a composite sketch or identify anyone in a photo array. She later identified the defendant, Young, in a lineup. Young’s initial conviction was reversed due to a lack of probable cause for his arrest, leading to suppression of the lineup identification.

    Procedural History

    1. Defendant was initially convicted in 1992.
    2. The conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division in 1998 due to an unlawful arrest.
    3. Prior to the second trial, the trial court held an independent source hearing to determine if Mrs. Sykes had a basis to identify Young independent of the tainted lineup.
    4. Defendant was convicted again in January 2000.
    5. The Appellate Division affirmed the second conviction.
    6. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, with a dissent.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, given that the primary identification evidence was potentially tainted and uncorroborated.

    Holding

    No, because the decision to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification rests within the trial court’s discretion, and in this instance, the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of that discretion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals majority found that the trial court was within its discretion to exclude the expert testimony. However, the dissent argued that excluding the testimony was an error, especially given the circumstances of the identification. The dissent emphasized that Mrs. Sykes could not initially create a composite sketch or identify Young in a photo array, and her identification only occurred after the illegal lineup. The dissent cited People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 (2001), noting that while trial courts have discretion, the trend favors admitting expert testimony on eyewitness identification when it would assist the jury. The dissent pointed out that, unlike People v. Lee, where the witness made multiple identifications, Mrs. Sykes’s identification was more tenuous. The dissent quoted People v. Mooney, 76 NY2d 827, 829 (1990), stating that “the emerging trend today is to find expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification sufficiently reliable to be admitted, and the vast majority of academic commentators have urged its acceptance”. The dissent argued that when eyewitness identification is attenuated and uncorroborated, courts should be more inclined to allow expert testimony. The expert’s testimony was intended to show the weak correlation between witness confidence and accuracy, the difficulty of remembering a face when the mind cannot encode all the features at once, and the possibility of memory source confusion. Allowing it would have assisted the jury in assessing the reliability of Mrs. Sykes’ identification.

  • People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119 (2005): Confrontation Clause and Expert Testimony

    People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119 (2005)

    The admission of an expert’s testimony that recounts testimonial hearsay from out-of-court witnesses, without affording the defendant an opportunity for cross-examination, violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

    Summary

    Goldstein was convicted of second-degree murder for killing Kendra Webdale by pushing her in front of a subway train. His defense was insanity. At trial, a prosecution psychiatrist, Dr. Hegarty, testified about interviews she conducted with individuals who knew Goldstein. Hegarty relayed statements from these individuals to the jury, and the defendant was not able to cross-examine these individuals. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that this violated Goldstein’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him because the statements were testimonial hearsay and their admission was not harmless error.

    Facts

    On January 3, 1999, Goldstein pushed Kendra Webdale in front of a subway train, resulting in her death. Goldstein had a history of schizophrenia and had been treated in mental hospitals. At trial, the defense argued that Goldstein was legally insane at the time of the killing, presenting psychiatric testimony that he suffered from an acute exacerbation of psychotic symptoms. The prosecution countered with its own expert, Dr. Hegarty, who opined that Goldstein’s mental illness was mild and that his actions were driven by antisocial tendencies.

    Procedural History

    Goldstein was charged with second-degree murder. His first trial ended in a hung jury. At the second trial, the jury convicted him. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding a violation of the Confrontation Clause.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of a psychiatrist’s testimony, recounting statements made by individuals interviewed outside of court, violates the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment when those individuals do not testify and are not subject to cross-examination.

    Holding

    Yes, because the out-of-court statements were testimonial hearsay, admitted for their truth, and the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarants, violating the Confrontation Clause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that Dr. Hegarty’s testimony regarding statements from third-party interviewees was inadmissible hearsay because the statements were offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted within them. The court reasoned that it was unrealistic to suggest that the jury could evaluate Hegarty’s opinion without assuming the truth or falsity of the underlying statements. The Court stated, “We do not see how the jury could use the statements of the interviewees to evaluate Hegarty’s opinion without accepting as a premise either that the statements were true or that they were false.”

    Furthermore, the court found these statements to be testimonial in nature because they were made to an agent of the state (Dr. Hegarty, the prosecution’s expert) during trial preparation, and the interviewees would reasonably expect their statements to be used prosecutorially. Citing Crawford v. Washington, the court emphasized that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the use of testimonial hearsay against a criminal defendant unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The Court rejected the argument that because Hegarty was an independent contractor and not a government officer, the statements would not qualify as testimonial. The court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause would offer too little protection if it could be avoided by assigning the job of interviewing witnesses to an independent contractor rather than an employee.

    The Court also concluded that the error in admitting the statements was not harmless. Even though the prosecution had a strong case for sanity, the improperly admitted statements contributed to the prosecution’s narrative, and the court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements did not affect the jury’s verdict.

  • People v. Corines, 4 N.Y.3d 231 (2005): Aiding and Abetting the Unauthorized Practice of Medicine

    4 N.Y.3d 231 (2005)

    Education Law § 6512(1) permits the prosecution of any individual, licensed or unlicensed, who aids and abets an unauthorized individual in the practice of medicine.

    Summary

    Dr. Corines, a licensed physician, was convicted of aiding and abetting Ana Marie Santi, whose medical license was suspended, in the unauthorized practice of medicine. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Education Law § 6512(1) does not exempt licensed professionals from prosecution for aiding and abetting unlicensed individuals. The court reasoned that the statute’s purpose is to protect the public, and exempting licensed professionals would lead to absurd results. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, even without expert testimony, and rejected claims of juror misconduct.

    Facts

    Dr. Peter Corines owned and operated medical offices. Ana Marie Santi, a licensed physician whose license was suspended, worked for Corines. Santi administered intravenous lines to three patients before Corines performed surgical procedures. The patients testified to experiencing sensations consistent with anesthesia. The Attorney General charged both Corines and Santi with unauthorized practice of medicine, alleging Santi administered anesthesia without a license, and Corines aided and abetted her.

    Procedural History

    Corines and Santi were convicted on multiple counts of unauthorized practice of medicine. The Appellate Division initially remanded for a hearing on juror misconduct. After the hearing, the trial court upheld the verdict. The Appellate Division then affirmed the convictions on the merits. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Education Law § 6512(1) exempts licensed physicians from prosecution for aiding and abetting the unauthorized practice of medicine.
    2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions for unauthorized practice of medicine and aiding and abetting, absent expert testimony on the effects of anesthesia.
    3. Whether the trial court’s response to a jury inquiry during deliberations was adequate.
    4. Whether alleged juror misconduct warranted setting aside the verdict.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute’s purpose is to protect the public, and exempting licensed professionals would lead to unreasonable and absurd results.
    2. Yes, because the jury could reasonably infer from the patient’s testimony and other evidence that Santi administered anesthesia, and Corines aided and abetted her.
    3. Yes, because rereading the original instruction was a meaningful response in this specific context.
    4. No, because the juror’s participation did not rise to the level of misconduct; she gave lay opinions based on her life experiences and the trial evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that a literal reading of Education Law § 6512(1) to exempt licensed individuals would lead to absurd results, undermining the statute’s intent to protect the public. The Court emphasized that legislative intent should guide statutory interpretation. The statute was designed to regulate professions and ensure public safety, which would be undermined by allowing licensed professionals to assist unlicensed individuals. The Court stated, “[i]n implementing a statute, the courts must of necessity examine the purpose of the statute and determine the intention of the Legislature.”

    Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the court held expert testimony wasn’t required because the effects of anesthesia are within the common knowledge of jurors. Patient testimony describing sensations and loss of consciousness, combined with Corines’s own admissions, provided sufficient evidence. As the court stated, “modern juries are not bereft of education and intelligent persons who can be expected to apply their ordinary judgment and practical experience.”

    On the jury inquiry, the court found rereading the original instruction adequate because the jury didn’t express confusion about the meaning of the relevant elements. Finally, the court rejected the juror misconduct claim because the juror’s opinions were based on her life experiences and the trial evidence, not specialized expertise outside the record. The court noted, “Jurors are not, however, required to ‘check their life experiences at the courtroom door’.”

  • People v. Wright, 2 N.Y.3d 242 (2004): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Street-Level Drug Sales

    People v. Wright, 2 N.Y.3d 242 (2004)

    Expert testimony regarding multi-member street-level narcotics operations is inadmissible when the evidence presented at trial indicates a single-person drug transaction, but the error can be harmless if there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Summary

    Wright was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The prosecution introduced expert testimony on street-level narcotics operations, over Wright’s objection, even though the evidence showed Wright acted alone in the drug sale to an undercover officer. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the expert testimony because it was irrelevant to the facts of the case, but deemed the error harmless due to overwhelming evidence of Wright’s guilt. The court emphasized that expert testimony is only appropriate when there’s evidence of a multi-person operation.

    Facts

    An undercover officer asked Wright for a “dime” (worth $10 of crack cocaine). Wright hesitated but then said, “I’ll hook you up.” The officer gave Wright $10, and Wright gave the officer a vial of crack cocaine. After the sale, the officer attempted to lead Wright to other team members, but Wright declined. The officer radioed a description of Wright to the field team. Wright was arrested nearby, and a matching vial of cocaine was found on him, but the prerecorded buy money was not. At trial, the undercover did not testify that Wright interacted with anyone else.

    Procedural History

    Wright was charged with and convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Wright appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony on street-level narcotics transactions when the evidence presented showed a single-person drug sale.

    Holding

    Yes, because no evidence existed that the transaction at issue involved anyone other than the defendant; however, the error was harmless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Brown, which held that expert testimony on street-level narcotics transactions may be appropriate to explain the intricacies of drug sales to jurors. However, Brown cautioned that such testimony isn’t proper in every drug sale case. In Brown, the undercover officer testified about interactions with multiple individuals, providing a factual basis for the expert testimony. Here, the undercover testified that Wright acted alone. “[A]verage juror is [un]aware of the specialized terminology used in the course of narcotics street sales or the intricacies of how drugs and money are shuttled about in an effort to prevent their discovery and seizure by the police.” Nevertheless, expert testimony should not be admitted when there is no indication of a multi-person operation. The Court found the error harmless because of the overwhelming evidence of Wright’s guilt. The undercover officer gave detailed testimony, made a confirmatory identification, and narcotics were recovered from Wright. The Court quoted People v. Crimmins, stating that an error is harmless when “there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error that occurred.” The arresting officer also testified, without objection, that not finding buy money is common, because the money is quickly hidden. The chemist confirmed that the vials contained cocaine. The court emphasized that this overwhelming evidence outweighed the improper admission of expert testimony.

  • особисте життя Smithtown Central School Dist., 7 N.Y.3d 336 (2006): Adequacy of Expert Testimony in Negligent Supervision Claims

    Smith v. Smithtown Central School Dist., 7 N.Y.3d 336 (2006)

    In a negligent supervision claim against a school, an expert affidavit lacking a proper foundation or source for its standards lacks probative force and is insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.

    Summary

    This case concerns a negligence claim brought against a school district after a second-grade student was injured during a gym class activity. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ grant of summary judgment to the school district, holding that the plaintiffs’ expert affidavit failed to establish an adequate foundation for its conclusions regarding the school’s supervision. The court emphasized that expert opinions must be based on established standards and not mere speculation to overcome a motion for summary judgment. This case clarifies the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs alleging negligent supervision in school settings and the importance of well-supported expert testimony.

    Facts

    The infant plaintiff was injured while participating in a cargo net climbing exercise during her second-grade gym class at Smithtown Central School District. The physical education teacher had instructed the students on proper net climbing techniques and demonstrated these techniques before the incident. The teacher was approximately 10 to 12 steps away from the plaintiff when she fell and sustained injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued Smithtown Central School District for negligent supervision. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The plaintiffs then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the expert affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs in response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the adequacy of the school district’s supervision of the infant plaintiff.

    Holding

    No, because the expert affidavit lacked a proper foundation or source for the standards underlying its conclusion that the defendant’s supervision was inadequate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts, finding that Smithtown Central School District had demonstrated its entitlement to summary judgment. The court reiterated that while schools are not insurers of safety, they must exercise the same level of care as a reasonably prudent parent under similar circumstances. The court noted the physical education teacher’s deposition testimony, which detailed the instructions given, the demonstration of techniques, and the teacher’s proximity to the student. The critical deficiency was in the plaintiffs’ expert affidavit. The court stated that the affidavit “lacked probative force and was insufficient as a matter of law” to overcome the school district’s motion for summary judgment, quoting Diaz v New York Downtown Hosp., 99 NY2d 542, 545 (2002). The court emphasized that the expert failed to provide the foundation or the source of the standards used to conclude that the school’s supervision was inadequate. The absence of such a foundation made the expert’s conclusions speculative and unreliable. The court implicitly applied the standard that expert testimony must be based on accepted practices and not personal opinion to be admissible and to create a triable issue of fact. The Court’s decision underscores the need for expert opinions to be firmly grounded in established standards to be legally sufficient in negligence cases.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 2 N.Y.3d 808 (2004): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Rodriguez, 2 N.Y.3d 808 (2004)

    A general objection to evidence, without specifying the grounds, is insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s general objection to expert testimony, without specifying the basis (e.g., hearsay), failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. The defense attorney made a general objection during the trial, which the trial court sustained, providing a limiting instruction. The defense did not object to the instruction’s adequacy, nor did they lodge a specific hearsay objection to further testimony. Because the Appellate Division correctly determined that the Supreme Court’s CPL 330.30(1) motion grant was in error, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order reversing the Supreme Court’s order and reinstating the guilty verdict.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child.

    During the trial, an expert witness provided testimony.

    Defense counsel made a general objection to a portion of the expert’s statement.

    The trial court sustained the objection and provided a limiting instruction to the jury.

    Defense counsel did not object to the adequacy or accuracy of the limiting instruction.

    Defense counsel did not specifically object to the expert’s further testimony on hearsay grounds.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s CPL 330.30(1) motion, which allows a court to set aside a verdict based on errors during the trial.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order, denied the defendant’s motion, and reinstated the guilty verdict.

    The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a general objection to expert testimony, without specifying the basis for the objection (e.g., hearsay), is sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Holding

    No, because a party’s failure to specify the basis for its general objection renders its argument unpreserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that a general objection is insufficient to preserve an issue for appellate review. The court emphasized the need for specific objections to allow the trial court an opportunity to correct any potential errors. The court cited People v. Tevaha, 84 NY2d 879, 881 (1994) in its decision.

    Because the defense counsel made only a general objection and failed to specify the grounds (e.g., hearsay), the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review. The limiting instruction given by the trial court was not challenged for adequacy. Therefore, the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendant’s CPL 330.30(1) motion on a ground that would not have required reversal or modification as a matter of law by an appellate court.