New York Law Review

Tag: Expectation of Privacy

  • People v. Abruzzi, 42 N.Y.2d 813 (1977): Plain View Exception After Initial Lawful Entry

    People v. Abruzzi, 42 N.Y.2d 813 (1977)

    Evidence in plain view may be seized following a lawful initial entry onto premises, even if the seizure occurs after a delay, provided the suspect has fled and relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in the items seized.

    Summary

    This case addresses the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. A police officer, investigating a crime, entered the defendant’s premises and observed a potential rape victim. After she reported the rape, the officer returned to arrest the defendant but found he had fled. The officer observed a ripped sheet in plain view, potentially used in the rape. After a four-day surveillance, the police seized the sheet. The New York Court of Appeals held that the seizure was lawful because the initial entry was lawful, the defendant had fled relinquishing any privacy expectation, and the sheet was in plain view. Thus, the evidence was admissible.

    Facts

    1. A police officer entered the defendant’s premises during an investigation.
    2. The officer encountered a woman who claimed she had been raped by the defendant.
    3. The officer left to call for assistance and returned to arrest the defendant.
    4. The defendant had fled, leaving a bedroom window open.
    5. The officer observed a ripped sheet in plain view, believed to be connected to the rape.
    6. The police conducted a four-day surveillance of the premises.
    7. After the surveillance, the police seized the sheet.

    Procedural History

    1. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the sheet as evidence.
    2. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    3. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the seizure of a ripped sheet, observed in plain view after a suspect fled premises following a lawful initial entry, is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. No, because the initial entry was lawful, the defendant relinquished any expectation of privacy by fleeing, and the evidence was in plain view.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine. The initial entry by the police officer was lawful, and upon returning to arrest the suspect, they found he had fled. By fleeing, the defendant abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. The ripped sheet was in plain view, and its evidentiary value was immediately apparent. The court emphasized that the defendant had “no expectation of privacy in the premises from which he had fled.” The delay in seizing the sheet during the four-day surveillance did not negate the lawfulness of the seizure, as the key factors were the lawful initial entry, the abandonment of privacy, and the plain view nature of the evidence. The court concluded that “under the circumstances the removal of the sheet cannot be said to have been unreasonable and therefore the refusal to suppress was proper.” This case clarifies that the plain view exception can apply even after a time delay, focusing on the suspect’s expectation of privacy and the lawfulness of the initial entry. It highlights the importance of the suspect’s actions (fleeing) in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. This case can be distinguished from cases where the initial entry was unlawful or where the suspect maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy.

  • People v. Spinelli, 42 N.Y.2d 87 (1977): Warrantless Search Permissible Where No Expectation of Privacy and Exigent Circumstances Exist

    People v. Spinelli, 42 N.Y.2d 87 (1977)

    A warrantless search is permissible if conducted in an area where the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy, and exigent circumstances exist.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a tax investigator’s observation of the defendant’s activities on their driveway, coupled with information from his supervisor, established probable cause for him to be there. The court further held that the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their driveway given their overt activities. Additionally, the presence of vehicles capable of quickly removing a large quantity of illegal cigarettes created exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search and seizure of the garage’s contents.

    Facts

    A tax investigator, acting on information partly provided by his supervisor, entered the defendants’ driveway and observed their activities. The activities were overt. The defendants possessed a large stock of untaxed cigarettes stored in a garage and had vehicles readily available for the rapid removal of these cigarettes.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court ruled against suppressing the evidence found in the garage. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the tax investigator had probable cause to enter the defendant’s driveway.
    2. Whether the defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their driveway.
    3. Whether exigent circumstances existed that justified a warrantless search and seizure of the contents of the garage.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the tax investigator’s testimony, combined with information from his supervisor, furnished the requisite probable cause.
    2. No, because the defendants’ activities were carried on in such an overt manner that they had no logical expectation of privacy in their driveway.
    3. Yes, because the truck and other vehicles available to the defendants presented exigent circumstances, making the search and seizure of the garage’s contents permissible without a warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the investigator had probable cause based on his observations combined with information from his supervisor. The court acknowledged that while a private driveway is generally protected against unreasonable search and seizure, the defendants’ overt activities negated any reasonable expectation of privacy in this case. The court relied on precedent establishing that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in their own home or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Moreover, the court determined that exigent circumstances existed because the defendants possessed vehicles capable of quickly removing the large stock of illegal cigarettes, potentially thwarting any attempt to obtain a warrant in time to prevent the removal of the evidence. As such, a warrantless search and seizure was justified. The court cited People v. Vaccaro, 39 N.Y.2d 468, 472-473, and People v. Clements, 37 N.Y.2d 675, 679, cert den 425 U.S. 911, in support of this conclusion. The court found that the investigator, in positioning himself on the driveway, had not invaded an area as to which the defendants had a logical expectation of privacy. “Furthermore, though a private driveway leading to a home is not outside the area entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure…the record in this case reveals that the driveway here was one in which the defendants’ activities were carried on in such an overt manner that the suppression court had a right to find that the investigator, in positioning himself there, had not invaded an area as to which defendants had a logical expectation of privacy.”