New York Law Review

Tag: Executive Law § 296

  • Amorosi v. South Colonie Independent Central School District, 9 N.Y.3d 367 (2007): Statute of Limitations for Discrimination Claims Against School Districts

    9 N.Y.3d 367 (2007)

    Executive Law § 296 discrimination claims against a school district are subject to the one-year statute of limitations outlined in Education Law § 3813 (2-b), notwithstanding any other law providing a longer period.

    Summary

    Jennifer Amorosi sued the South Colonie Independent Central School District, alleging discrimination based on maternity leave in violation of Executive Law § 296. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the three-year statute of limitations for discrimination claims generally applies, or the one-year limit in Education Law § 3813 (2-b) specific to actions against school districts. The Court held that the one-year statute of limitations applied. The plain language of Education Law § 3813 (2-b) dictates a one-year limit for actions against school districts, superseding the general three-year limit for discrimination claims. Therefore, Amorosi’s claim was time-barred.

    Facts

    Jennifer Amorosi was hired as a temporary part-time guidance counselor in July 1999, becoming full-time in January 2001 with a three-year probationary period for tenure consideration. She took maternity leave in January 2002, returning in September 2002. Her probationary period was extended to June 2004 by agreement. While initial reviews were favorable, her July 2003 review indicated performance concerns. She took a second maternity leave in October 2003, returning in December 2003, after which she received a negative review and was allegedly asked to resign. She resigned in January 2004, effective June 2004. Amorosi claimed she became aware of the school district’s discriminatory practices in early 2005.

    Procedural History

    Amorosi initiated proceedings on September 7, 2005, seeking leave to file a late notice of claim, alleging discrimination. Supreme Court granted leave, applying a three-year statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Education Law § 3813 (2-b) provides a one-year statute of limitations and the Supreme Court lacked the discretion to grant leave to file a late notice of claim since the proceeding was commenced more than one year after the cause of action arose. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the one-year statute of limitations in Education Law § 3813 (2-b) applies to discrimination claims brought under Executive Law § 296 against a school district, or whether the general three-year statute of limitations for discrimination claims applies.

    Holding

    No, because the clear and unambiguous language of Education Law § 3813 (2-b) provides that, notwithstanding any other provision of law providing a longer period of time in which to commence an action or special proceeding, no action or special proceeding shall be commenced against any school district more than one year after the cause of action arose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Education Law § 3813 (2-b) clearly and unambiguously dictates a one-year statute of limitations for actions against school districts. The Court emphasized that when statutory language is clear, it must be given effect, and courts should not resort to rules of construction to broaden a statute’s scope when the words are unequivocal. The Court distinguished prior cases (Koerner and Murphy) that applied a three-year statute of limitations to discrimination claims, noting those cases did not involve the application of Education Law § 3813. The Court also addressed and distinguished two appellate division cases, Lane-Weber and Stoetzel, noting that neither decision involved the specific application of Education Law § 3813 (2-b) to an Executive Law § 296 claim. The Court stated, “[D]espite any provision for a longer statute of limitations, such as the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214 (2), as urged by petitioner, the one-year limitation prescribed in Education Law § 3813 (2-b) should govern discrimination claims against a school district.” The court found that because the legislature is presumed to be aware of existing law, the lack of an exception for discrimination claims in Education Law § 3813 (2-b), similar to the exception for tort claims, indicated a deliberate intent to subject such claims to the one-year statute of limitations. The Court acknowledged the apparent contradiction with the policy of eliminating employment discrimination but deferred to the clear statutory language.

  • Scott v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 429 (1995): Discrimination Claims by Independent Contractors Under the Human Rights Law

    Scott v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 429 (1995)

    An independent contractor cannot bring a discrimination claim under Executive Law § 296(1)(a) unless they can demonstrate an employer-employee relationship; discrimination claims under Executive Law § 296(13) require showing a boycott, blacklisting, or concerted effort to disadvantage a protected class.

    Summary

    Marilyn Scott, an insurance agent, sued Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and its general agent, G. James Blatt, alleging discrimination based on gender, age, and marital status after her contract was terminated. Scott claimed violations of New York’s Human Rights Law, specifically Executive Law § 296(1)(a) and § 296(13). The court held that as an independent contractor, Scott could not claim discrimination under § 296(1)(a) because she failed to prove an employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, the court determined that § 296(13) did not apply because Scott did not demonstrate a boycott, blacklisting, or a concerted effort by the defendants to economically disadvantage women or any other protected group.

    Facts

    Marilyn Scott was hired as an insurance agent by G. James Blatt, a general agent for Massachusetts Mutual, in 1981 under a career contract explicitly stating that no employer-employee relationship was created. In 1987, she became a district manager. Both contracts were terminable at will. Blatt terminated Scott’s contract and her license to sell certain mutual funds in 1992. Scott was responsible for her operating expenses, support staff, and taxes were not withheld from her pay. She could also sell competitors’ products. She claimed she was required to recruit and train agents according to MassMutual’s guidelines, but this applied only to agents financed by MassMutual.

    Procedural History

    Scott sued Massachusetts Mutual and Blatt in New York Supreme Court, alleging discrimination under the Human Rights Law. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Scott, as an independent contractor, can bring a discrimination claim under Executive Law § 296(1)(a).
    2. Whether Scott’s discrimination claim can proceed under Executive Law § 296(13), even if she is an independent contractor.

    Holding

    1. No, because Scott failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether an employer-employee relationship existed.
    2. No, because Scott failed to present evidence of a boycott, blacklisting, or a concerted effort to economically disadvantage a protected class.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the court stated that an employer-employee relationship exists when the employer exercises control over the results produced or the means used to achieve the results. Minimal control is insufficient. Here, Scott financed her operations, was paid by performance, didn’t have taxes withheld, could sell competitors’ products, and contracted as an independent contractor, demonstrating a high degree of independence. The court cited Matter of Ted Is Back Corp. [Roberts], 64 NY2d 725, 726, stating that "a determination that an employer-employee relationship exists may rest upon evidence that the employer exercises either control over the results produced or over the means used to achieve the results." Thus, summary judgment was proper.

    Regarding the second issue, the court analyzed Executive Law § 296(13), noting its focus on boycotts, blacklisting, and refusals to deal. The court reasoned that "[s]ince the term ‘discriminate’ immediately precedes the list of terms including boycott, blacklisting and refusals to trade, that term should be construed to refer to similar types of commercial activity." Legislative history revealed that § 296(13) was enacted to address economic warfare against protected classes, such as the Arab Boycott Law. The court stated, "While the enactment found its impetus in the Arab boycott of Jewish businesses, it was drafted more broadly to prohibit not only boycotts imposed by foreign entities, but any business tactics, utilized in New York State or against a New York resident or corporation, which are driven by ‘religious or racial bigotry’" The court found no evidence of a formal boycott or blacklisting campaign against Scott, nor any pattern of conduct commercially disadvantaging only members of a protected class. Thus, the claim under § 296(13) was properly dismissed. The court emphasized that even without a formal boycott, a pattern of discriminatory conduct could suffice, citing Harvey v NYRAC, Inc., 813 F Supp 206. However, Scott’s allegations were insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

  • Matter of Plato’s Cave Corp. v. State Liquor Authority, 41 N.Y.2d 672 (1977): Use of Dismissed Criminal Charges in Liquor License Renewal

    Matter of Plato’s Cave Corp. v. State Liquor Authority, 41 N.Y.2d 672 (1977)

    It is an error of law for the State Liquor Authority to base the disapproval of a liquor license renewal, even in part, on the fact that a shareholder, director, and officer of the applicant was arrested and indicted for a criminal charge that was subsequently dismissed.

    Summary

    Plato’s Cave Corp. sought review of the State Liquor Authority’s (SLA) decision to cancel its existing liquor license and deny its renewal application. The SLA based its decision partly on the arrest and indictment of Harry Gordon, a shareholder, director, and officer of Plato’s Cave, for a criminal charge that was later dismissed. While independent evidence supported findings of prostitution on the premises and a high risk to law enforcement if the license were renewed, the Court of Appeals held that the SLA’s partial reliance on the dismissed criminal charges was an error of law. The court modified the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded the renewal application for reconsideration of the sanction without considering the dismissed charges.

    Facts

    Plato’s Cave Corp. held a restaurant liquor license. The State Liquor Authority (SLA) initiated proceedings to cancel the license and deny a renewal application. The SLA’s determinations, both dated October 25, 1976, were based, in part, on the arrest and indictment of Harry Gordon, a shareholder, director, and officer of Plato’s Cave, for a criminal charge that was subsequently dismissed. The SLA also presented independent evidence of prostitution occurring at the licensed premises.

    Procedural History

    Plato’s Cave Corp. initiated an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the SLA’s determination. The Appellate Division upheld the SLA’s decision. Plato’s Cave Corp. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Liquor Authority committed an error of law by basing its disapproval of Plato’s Cave Corp.’s liquor license renewal application, even partially, on the fact that Harry Gordon was arrested and indicted for a criminal charge that was subsequently dismissed.

    Holding

    Yes, because under Executive Law § 296, subd. 14 (effective Sept. 11, 1976), it was an unlawful discriminatory practice to act adversely to an individual based on any arrest or criminal accusation which was followed by a termination of that criminal action or proceeding in favor of such individual.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that at the time of the SLA’s determination, Executive Law § 296(14) prohibited adverse actions based on arrests or criminal accusations that were followed by a termination in favor of the individual. The court acknowledged that the SLA could consider independent evidence of the conduct underlying the criminal charges. However, it held that basing the disapproval of the renewal application, even partially, on Gordon’s arrest and indictment for a dismissed charge was an error of law. The Court stated, “Thus, though there was substantial evidence for the determination in respect to cancellation, it is not for courts to speculate what penalty would have been imposed if the dismissed criminal charges had not been made one of the bases for respondent’s determination in respect to renewal.” The court could not determine what the SLA’s decision would have been had the dismissed charges not been considered. Therefore, a remand was necessary for the SLA to reconsider the sanction based solely on the other findings.