New York Law Review

Tag: Executive Law § 259-i

  • King v. New York State Division of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994): Parole Board’s Consideration of Improper Factors

    King v. New York State Division of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994)

    A parole board must provide an inmate with a proper hearing in which only the relevant statutory guidelines are considered when determining whether to grant discretionary release to parole supervision.

    Summary

    King sought release to parole supervision after being resentenced for the shooting death of an off-duty police officer. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision to remand the matter for a new hearing after the Supreme Court initially directed the Parole Board to release King. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that King was not afforded a proper hearing because one of the Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of Executive Law § 259-i, which governs parole decisions. The Court emphasized that the Parole Board must adhere to the statutory guidelines and not consider unauthorized factors like penal philosophy or the death penalty.

    Facts

    King was convicted of fatally shooting an off-duty police officer during a fast-food restaurant robbery in 1970 and sentenced to 25 years to life. In 1987, the Second Circuit determined the original sentence was constitutionally invalid due to the sentencing judge’s misunderstanding of parole eligibility. King was resentenced to 20 years to life, making him eligible for parole supervision in 1990. He applied for parole three times, and this case concerned the denial of his most recent request.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially directed the Parole Board to release King to parole supervision. The Appellate Division reversed that portion of the order requiring release and remanded the case for a de novo hearing. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioner was afforded a proper hearing prior to the denial of his application for release to parole supervision, considering that a commissioner considered factors outside the scope of Executive Law § 259-i.

    Holding

    No, because the record showed that one of the Parole Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to society if those sentences are not in place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on Executive Law article 12-B (§ 259 et seq.), particularly § 259-i (2) (c), which outlines the procedures governing parole. This section dictates that discretionary release should not be a mere reward for good behavior but based on whether “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” The Court emphasized that the Parole Board must consider guidelines such as the inmate’s institutional record, participation in temporary release programs, and release plans, along with the seriousness of the offense and prior criminal record. The court stated that while a Parole Board need not expressly discuss each of these guidelines in its determination, it must provide the inmate with a proper hearing in which only the relevant guidelines are considered, citing People ex rel. Herbert v New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 AD2d 128, 132. The Court found that the Commissioner’s consideration of factors like penal philosophy and the death penalty was not authorized by Executive Law § 259-i, thus invalidating the hearing. The court implies that adherence to the statute’s guidelines is essential for a fair parole hearing, underscoring the importance of procedural regularity in parole decisions.

  • County of Nassau v. Cuomo, 68 N.Y.2d 740 (1986): Determining Responsibility for Detaining Parole Violators

    County of Nassau v. Cuomo, 68 N.Y.2d 740 (1986)

    Executive Law § 259-i(3)(a)(i) mandates that the county where an alleged parole violator is arrested is responsible for their detention.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between the County of Nassau and the State of New York regarding the responsibility for detaining alleged parole violators. The Appellate Division declared that the County must accept for detention all alleged parole violators supervised within Nassau County. The Court of Appeals modified this ruling, clarifying that the County’s responsibility extends to alleged parole violators arrested within the county, as explicitly stated in Executive Law § 259-i (3) (a) (i). The Court declined to address the timing of the State’s obligation to accept prisoners, as the argument was raised for the first time on appeal.

    Facts

    The central issue revolves around which entity, Nassau County or the State of New York, is responsible for housing individuals arrested for allegedly violating their parole. The case arose from a disagreement on the interpretation of relevant statutes governing the detention of parole violators. The lower courts made decisions about the number of days after sentencing the State must accept prisoners.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, which ruled on the responsibility for detaining parole violators. The Appellate Division affirmed in part but modified the lower court’s decision. The County of Nassau then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. Both parties then urged for the first time before this court that the State’s obligation to accept a prisoner commences when the prisoner becomes State-ready, rather than upon sentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Executive Law § 259-i (3) (a) (i) requires Nassau County to accept for detention all alleged parole violators whose parole is supervised in Nassau County, or only those arrested within the county?

    2. Whether the State’s obligation to accept a prisoner commences upon sentencing or when the prisoner becomes State-ready?

    Holding

    1. No, because Executive Law § 259-i (3) (a) (i) unambiguously states that Nassau County is responsible for lodging alleged parole violators arrested within the county.

    2. The Court did not rule on this issue because it was raised for the first time on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision primarily on the clear and unambiguous language of Executive Law § 259-i (3) (a) (i). The statute explicitly states the county’s responsibility extends to those arrested within its borders. The court deferred to the plain meaning of the statute, thus overturning the Appellate Division’s broader interpretation. Regarding the timing of the State’s obligation, the Court declined to address the argument as it was not raised in the lower courts. The Court emphasized the principle that issues generally cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The court stated, “We cannot, however, consider such an issue for the first time on appeal.”

  • People ex rel. Benedetti v. Warden, 61 N.Y.2d 920 (1984): Effect of Parolee’s Waiver on Hearing Obligations

    People ex rel. Benedetti v. Warden, 61 N.Y.2d 920 (1984)

    When a parolee knowingly and intelligently waives their right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing and the right to be present at the final hearing, the parole board is required to proceed with the final hearing in the parolee’s absence within the statutorily prescribed time period.

    Summary

    Benedetti, while on parole in New York, absconded to Mississippi and was imprisoned there. A parole violation warrant was lodged against him. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing, requesting the hearing be conducted in his absence. The parole board tried to secure his return from Mississippi, but failed. After Benedetti was paroled in Mississippi and returned to New York, Special Term annulled the parole violation warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Benedetti waived his rights, the parole board should have proceeded with the hearing in his absence within the statutory time frame. Failure to do so required dismissal of the warrant, regardless of whether Benedetti was within the board’s convenience and practical control.

    Facts

    Benedetti was on parole in New York State.
    He absconded to Mississippi, where he was convicted of a crime and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.
    On January 15, 1982, a parole violation warrant was lodged against Benedetti by the respondent.
    By letter dated February 1, 1982, Benedetti waived his right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing and his right to be present at the final hearing, requesting the hearing be conducted in his absence.
    The parole board corresponded with Mississippi officials for four months to try to secure Benedetti’s return for a hearing.
    Mississippi officials required an executive agreement between the Governors of New York and Mississippi, with New York paying for Benedetti’s transport and return to Mississippi.
    No further action was taken until May 1983, when Benedetti was paroled in Mississippi and returned to New York.

    Procedural History

    Benedetti applied on June 2, 1982, to have the parole violation warrant annulled and vacated.
    Special Term granted the application.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, citing People ex rel. Gonzales v Dalsheim, holding that the respondent had not shown that Benedetti was not within its convenience and practical control.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the parole board was required to proceed with a final parole revocation hearing in the absence of the parolee after the parolee knowingly and intelligently waived their right to be present at the hearing.

    Holding

    Yes, because Benedetti waived his rights to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing, and there was nothing to indicate that the waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently, the parole board was required to proceed with the hearing in Benedetti’s absence within the statutorily prescribed time period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that Benedetti’s waiver of his rights to a preliminary hearing and to be present at the final hearing was effective because there was no indication that it was not made knowingly and intelligently. Therefore, the parole board was obligated to proceed with the final hearing in Benedetti’s absence.
    The court emphasized that the parole board’s failure to conduct the hearing within the time period prescribed by Executive Law § 259-i required the parole violation warrant to be dismissed, citing People ex rel. Gonzales v Dalsheim. The court stated, “Inasmuch as there is nothing in the record to indicate that such waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently, the waiver was effective and there was nothing to prevent respondent from proceeding in petitioner’s absence. Indeed, it was required to proceed.”
    The court reasoned that because the hearing could have and should have been held in Benedetti’s absence, it was unnecessary to determine whether and when Benedetti came within the respondent’s convenience and practical control.