New York Law Review

Tag: Executive Authority

  • Matter of Johnson v. Pataki, 91 N.Y.2d 214 (1997): Gubernatorial Power to Supersede a District Attorney

    91 N.Y.2d 214 (1997)

    The Governor of New York has the constitutional and statutory authority to supersede a District Attorney in a criminal prosecution, and this authority is subject to limited judicial review, primarily focusing on whether the Governor acted within the scope of their power.

    Summary

    This case concerns Governor Pataki’s executive order superseding Bronx County District Attorney Johnson in a potential death penalty case related to the murder of a police officer. The Governor believed Johnson had a blanket policy against the death penalty, hindering its faithful execution. Johnson and Bronx County voters challenged the order, arguing the District Attorney’s independence was violated. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Governor’s action, asserting his constitutional and statutory authority to ensure laws are faithfully executed, subject to limited judicial review focused on the scope of the Governor’s power.

    Facts

    On March 21, 1996, Governor Pataki issued Executive Order No. 27, directing the Attorney General to supersede District Attorney Johnson in investigations and proceedings related to the shooting death of Police Officer Kevin Gillespie. The Executive Order cited District Attorney Johnson’s prior statements and actions indicating a blanket policy against seeking the death penalty. Angel Diaz was later indicted for first-degree murder in connection with Officer Gillespie’s death.

    Procedural History

    District Attorney Johnson and Bronx County voters initiated CPLR Article 78 proceedings challenging the executive order. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, deeming the superseder an executive action within valid authority and thus nonjusticiable, also finding ample basis for the Governor’s action. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Governor acted within constitutional or statutory authority and that intervention was justified. Diaz later committed suicide, and accomplices were tried in federal court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Governor of New York has the constitutional and statutory authority to supersede a District Attorney in a criminal prosecution, and if so, to what extent is this authority subject to judicial review?

    Holding

    Yes, the Governor has the authority because article IV, § 3 of the New York Constitution and Executive Law § 63 (2) grant the Governor discretionary power to ensure laws are faithfully executed, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the Governor acted within the scope of this constitutional and statutory grant of authority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Governor’s power to supersede a District Attorney stems from the constitutional duty to ensure faithful execution of laws (Article IV, § 3) and Executive Law § 63(2), which allows the Governor to direct the Attorney General to manage criminal proceedings. Judicial review is limited to determining whether the Governor had the power to act, not the wisdom of the action. The Court rejected arguments that the District Attorney’s independence or the death penalty statute limited the Governor’s power. The Court stated, “the Governor acted lawfully under constitutional and statutory authority, and that even if the rationale for his action were subject to judicial review the superseder order here would be valid.” The court also found that Executive Order No. 27 expressed the Governor’s executive judgment that there was a threat to faithful execution of the death penalty law that supported this particular superseder.

    While acknowledging potential limitations on the superseder power in extreme circumstances (citing *Mulroy v. Carey*), the Court found no such circumstances present here. The dissent argued that the Governor overstepped by substituting his policy preference for the District Attorney’s discretion under the death penalty statute.

  • Under 21 v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.2d 374 (1982): Executive Authority and Affirmative Action Programs

    Under 21 v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.2d 374 (1982)

    The executive branch does not have the authority to initiate affirmative action mandates in hiring practices without explicit legislative authorization.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the executive branch in New York City can mandate affirmative action programs for hiring practices without legislative authorization. The Court of Appeals held that while the executive branch has the power to implement programs prohibiting discriminatory hiring practices, it cannot mandate affirmative action without explicit legislative approval. The court emphasized the separation of powers, stating that mandating affirmative action is a policy decision reserved for the legislative branch. The decision clarifies the distinction between prohibiting discrimination and actively mandating specific hiring practices based on affirmative action principles.

    Facts

    The Mayor of New York City issued an executive order mandating affirmative action in hiring practices. The order went beyond prohibiting discriminatory practices and required employers to take specific actions to increase minority representation. The plaintiffs, “Under 21,” challenged the executive order, arguing that it exceeded the Mayor’s authority.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after a challenge to the Mayor’s executive order. The lower courts did not explicitly address the core issue of executive authority but the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to address this fundamental question concerning the distribution of powers.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the executive branch has the authority to mandate affirmative action in hiring practices without legislative authorization, when existing legislation only prohibits discriminatory hiring practices?

    Holding

    No, because mandating affirmative action in hiring practices is a policy decision that falls within the purview of the legislative branch, and the executive branch cannot impose such mandates without explicit legislative authorization.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the executive branch has the power and obligation to implement programs designed to prohibit discriminatory hiring practices, mandating affirmative action is a different matter. The court distinguished between prohibiting discrimination and mandating specific actions to achieve certain hiring percentages or quotas. According to the court, the latter constitutes a policy decision that must be made by the legislative branch. The court referenced its prior decision in Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay, emphasizing that there is a “dramatic distinction between the expressed legislative policy of prohibiting employment discrimination and the mayoral policy of mandating employment ‘percentages.’”. The court further stated that while voluntary affirmative action plans are permissible, mandating such plans under threat of legal sanctions is an overreach of executive authority. The court noted, “The difference between obligations that require the taking of certain steps, and those that merely require one to refrain from others, is, in this sensitive area of racial relations, not merely one of degree, but of kind.” The court clarified that its holding does not prevent the executive branch from implementing measures that enlarge the pool of eligible candidates based on discrimination-free merit selection; instead, the limitation applies specifically to mandating affirmative action hiring practices.

  • Mulroy v. Carey, 43 N.Y.2d 819 (1977): Limits on Judicial Review of Governor’s Authority to Supersede a District Attorney

    Mulroy v. Carey, 43 N.Y.2d 819 (1977)

    The judiciary should not restrict the scope of legislation or impose restrictions on the executive branch, particularly concerning the Governor’s constitutional duty to ensure faithful execution of laws and the power to supersede a District Attorney, unless there is a clear violation of a constitutional mandate and other remedies are inadequate.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent to which courts can interfere with the Governor’s power to direct the Attorney General to supersede a District Attorney in investigating and prosecuting criminal activities. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, emphasizing the separation of powers doctrine. While concurring in the result, Judge Cooke expressed concern over the majority’s suggestion that the court could interfere even when other remedies exist. He argued that such interference would be an unwarranted intrusion upon the executive branch, absent a clear constitutional violation and inadequate alternative remedies.

    Facts

    The specific facts underlying the dispute are not detailed in this memorandum decision. The core issue revolves around a challenge to the Governor’s action in directing the Attorney General to supersede a local District Attorney in a particular matter.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, where the challenge to the Governor’s superseder order was likely unsuccessful. The Appellate Division affirmed that decision. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the judiciary can restrict the Governor’s constitutional and statutory authority to direct the Attorney General to supersede a District Attorney in investigating and prosecuting criminal activities, absent a clear violation of a constitutional mandate and when other remedies may exist.

    Holding

    No, because the separation of powers doctrine dictates that the judiciary should not interfere with the executive branch’s exercise of its constitutional and statutory duties unless there is a clear constitutional violation and other remedies, such as political or legislative action, are inadequate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority affirmed the lower court’s decision without a full opinion, but Judge Cooke’s concurrence highlights the key legal principles at stake. Judge Cooke emphasized the separation of powers doctrine and the Governor’s constitutional duty to ensure the faithful execution of laws. He cited previous cases affirming the Governor’s broad discretion in directing the Attorney General to act, noting that courts have historically been hesitant to review the exercise of this discretion. Judge Cooke quoted from People v Kramer, stating, “The law thus confers upon the Governor a discretion, and when he has reason to doubt that the laws are being executed, I know of no judicial method by which his reason may be questioned or measured.” He argued that the voters and their elected representatives are the appropriate bodies to check any abuse of the Governor’s power through the political process. The court should only intervene when these other remedies are inadequate and a clear constitutional violation exists. He stated, “When and if these processes are an inadequate means of fashioning a timely remedy to combat an abuse of the Governor’s power to order a superseder, unquestionably the courts will act to ensure compliance with the Constitution and the laws of the State.” Judge Cooke specifically criticized the majority’s suggestion that judicial interference might be warranted even when other remedies exist, deeming this an unwarranted intrusion upon the executive branch, violating the separation of powers principle. He reasoned that allowing such interference would “thwart the constitutional and statutory policy or engraft restrictions on the executive department where none exist.”