New York Law Review

Tag: Exclusionary Zoning

  • Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 87 N.Y.2d 668 (1996): Upholding Zoning Authority Over Mining

    Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 87 N.Y.2d 668 (1996)

    A municipality retains the authority to regulate land use within its borders, including the ability to prohibit mining as a permitted use in all zoning districts, provided such regulation is a reasonable exercise of its police powers and accords with a comprehensive plan.

    Summary

    Gernatt Asphalt challenged amendments to the Town of Sardinia’s zoning ordinance that eliminated mining as a permitted use. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the town did not violate notice requirements, that the Mined Land Reclamation Law (MLRL) did not preempt the town’s zoning authority, and that the amendments did not constitute impermissible exclusionary zoning. The court emphasized that municipalities retain broad authority to govern land use, including the ability to restrict or prohibit specific activities like mining, provided such regulations are rationally related to the community’s welfare.

    Facts

    The Town of Sardinia, a rural community rich in mineral deposits, initially permitted mining in all zoning districts under its 1969 ordinance. Gernatt Asphalt operated several mines within the town. After Gernatt acquired a new 400-acre parcel (the Gabel Thomas property), the town became concerned about the potential impact of expanded mining. The Town Board introduced three ordinance amendments: the first two repealed sections permitting mining in R-A districts and requiring Town Board approval for excavation. The third, designating mining as a specially permitted use only at DEC-authorized sites, was tabled. Existing mines continued as lawful, nonconforming uses.

    Procedural History

    Gernatt sued to annul the repealer amendments. Supreme Court rejected Gernatt’s claims, upholding the amendments. The Appellate Division reversed, finding violations of notice and referral requirements, preemption by the MLRL, unconstitutional exclusionary zoning, failure to enact in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and SEQRA violations. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Town violated statutory notice and referral requirements by enacting some but not all of the proposed zoning amendments.
    2. Whether the New York State Mined Land Reclamation Law supersedes the Town’s authority to eliminate mining as a permitted use throughout the Town.
    3. Whether the Town’s action constituted impermissible exclusionary zoning.
    4. Whether the Town complied with the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) and the Open Meetings Law.

    Holding

    1. No, because the public notice fairly apprised the public of the fundamental character of the proposed zoning change, and the enacted amendments were embraced within the public notice.
    2. No, because the MLRL specifically exempts local zoning enactments from its preemptive reach.
    3. No, because the amendments did not prohibit existing mining operations, and a municipality is not obligated to permit the exploitation of all natural resources if limiting that use is a reasonable exercise of its police powers.
    4. Yes, because the Town Board identified relevant areas of environmental concern, took a “hard look” at them, and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination; and the Town Board did not draft new legislation during its executive session.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the published notice was sufficient, as it fairly apprised the public of the nature of the proposed changes. The town was not required to enact all or none of the proposed amendments, so long as the public had adequate notice of the changes that were ultimately adopted. The court emphasized that the MLRL’s express supersession provision specifically exempts local zoning ordinances that determine permissible uses in zoning districts. The court distinguished between zoning ordinances, which regulate land use generally, and local ordinances that directly regulate mining activities. The court found that municipalities are not obliged to permit mining and that the Town’s action was a reasonable exercise of its police power. The Court stated, “A municipality is not obliged to permit the exploitation of any and all natural resources within the town as a permitted use if limiting that use is a reasonable exercise of its police powers to prevent damage to the rights of others and to promote the interests of the community as a whole.” The court also found that the Town’s action accorded with a comprehensive plan, responding to concerns about the potential impact of continued mining growth. Finally, the court concluded that the Town Board did not violate the Open Meetings Law and that its SEQRA review was sufficient, stating, “The potential environmental impact of a specifically proposed project…may be entirely distinguishable from an amendment to a local zoning ordinance that limits an environmentally related land use…”.

  • Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y.2d 121 (1988): Upholding Zoning Amendments and Incentive Zoning

    Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y.2d 121 (1988)

    A zoning amendment is valid if it is adopted for a legitimate governmental purpose, bears a reasonable relationship to achieving that purpose, and accords with a well-considered plan for the development of the community, even if it does not guarantee specific outcomes such as low-income housing in a particular area.

    Summary

    Asian Americans for Equality challenged a New York City zoning amendment creating the Special Manhattan Bridge District in Chinatown, arguing it would displace low-income residents. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the amendment, finding it was enacted pursuant to a well-considered plan, and that the city has no obligation to zone specific areas for low-income housing. The court distinguished this case from exclusionary zoning cases, emphasizing that New York City, unlike suburban communities in those cases, already provides a variety of housing opportunities. The court deferred to the city’s legislative decision to use incentive zoning to address the housing needs in Chinatown.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs, representing low-income residents and workers in Chinatown, challenged a 1981 amendment to the New York City Zoning Resolution that created the Special Manhattan Bridge District. The amendment aimed to improve housing conditions by encouraging new residential construction, rehabilitating existing structures, and expanding community facilities. It allowed developers to increase building density in exchange for providing community facilities, low-income housing units, or rehabilitating substandard housing. A developer, Henry Street Partners, obtained a permit to build mixed-income housing on vacant land, contributing $500,000 to low-income housing.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging the amendment was unconstitutional for not being enacted pursuant to a well-considered plan and seeking a mandatory injunction to compel the city to create a zoning plan mandating low-income housing construction. The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Special Manhattan Bridge District amendment was enacted pursuant to a well-considered plan, as required by zoning law.
    2. Whether the City of New York has a legal obligation to zone specific areas for low-income housing, such that its failure to do so in the Special Manhattan Bridge District constitutes exclusionary zoning.

    Holding

    1. No, because the amendment was preceded by a study, considered the city’s overall zoning policies, and was reasonably related to the legitimate goal of developing and rehabilitating housing in Chinatown.
    2. No, because New York City is not engaging in exclusionary zoning by not mandating low-income housing in every district, as the City as a whole provides a variety of housing opportunities.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the amendment was part of a well-considered plan, noting that the entire city of New York is zoned and that the amendment was based on a study of the Manhattan Bridge area. The court emphasized that a “well-considered plan need not be contained in a single document; indeed, it need not be written at all.” The court found the legislation reasonably related to its goals: the development of needed housing and the rehabilitation of existing housing in one area of Chinatown. The court distinguished this case from exclusionary zoning cases like Berenson v. Town of New Castle, which involved suburban communities excluding low- or moderate-income housing. The court stated, “Constitutional principles are not necessarily offended if one or several uses are not included in a particular area or district of the community as long as adequate provision is made to accommodate the needs of the community and the region generally”. The court reasoned that requiring particular uses in every district would be “obnoxious to the City’s over-all development”. The court declined to extend the Berenson rule to the 14-block area, noting that New York City, unlike the suburban towns in Berenson, has already made extensive allowance for a variety of housing opportunities. The court acknowledged the plaintiffs’ concerns about displacement and gentrification, but concluded that the City’s attempt to use incentive zoning was a valid approach to providing realistic housing opportunities, including new apartments for the poor.

  • Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122 (1987): Judicial Deference to Zoning Implementation Absent Proof of Exclusion

    Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122 (1987)

    A court will not invalidate a town’s zoning ordinance implementation based on a failure to provide low-cost housing unless there is proof that the town’s actions, rather than external economic factors, caused the housing shortage.

    Summary

    Suffolk Housing Services sued the Town of Brookhaven, claiming the town’s zoning ordinance, as implemented, discouraged the development of low-cost housing. The plaintiffs argued the town’s special permit requirements for multifamily dwellings and failure to pre-map areas for such housing inflated costs and faced community opposition, effectively excluding low-income residents. The lower courts upheld the ordinance. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the town’s actions caused the housing shortage, as developer reluctance due to economic factors was a significant contributing factor. The court declined to undertake legislative rezoning, emphasizing the judiciary’s limited role in land use decisions.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs alleged a critical need for low-cost, multifamily rental housing in the Town of Brookhaven. The Town’s zoning ordinance required developers to obtain a special permit to construct any housing other than single-family dwellings. Developers could apply for permission to “cluster” developments in single-family residential districts or apply for rezoning to multifamily districts. Plaintiffs claimed the Town’s failure to “pre-map” vacant land for multifamily housing inflated costs and led to project failures due to community opposition. They asserted the Town actively discouraged low-income housing through its implementation of the ordinance.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiffs initially sued in a lower court, seeking to invalidate the Town of Brookhaven’s zoning ordinance and compel affirmative action to address the perceived housing shortage. The lower court ruled in favor of the Town, upholding the validity of the zoning ordinance. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The plaintiffs then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town of Brookhaven’s implementation of its zoning ordinance illegally excluded low-income housing development, justifying judicial intervention to rezone the town.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the town’s actions, rather than external economic factors, caused the claimed shortage of low-cost housing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a town’s zoning power is derived from the state and must promote the community’s health, safety, morals, or general welfare. While municipalities cannot use zoning to effectuate socioeconomic or racial discrimination, the court’s review is limited by affirmed factual findings. Both lower courts found that numerous developer applications for multifamily and subsidized housing were approved despite the special permit procedures. The court highlighted the affirmed findings that a significant reason for inadequate development was the lack of willing developers due to rising construction and financing costs and economic stagnation. The court stated, “Plaintiffs, in sum, have failed to demonstrate that efforts by the Town caused the claimed shortage of shelter.” The court distinguished this case from Berenson v. Town of New Castle, where the facial validity of a zoning ordinance was challenged. Here, the challenge was to the implementation, and the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient proof of exclusionary practices. The court declined to undertake legislative rezoning, stating, “Zoning…is an essentially legislative task, and it is therefore anomalous that courts should be required to perform the tasks of a regional planner”. The court emphasized the need for a particularized claim directed at a specific parcel of land, plan, or project for housing. The court noted the abstract character of the case and the relief sought, while reaffirming that the decision “should not be read as revealing hostility to breaking down even unconstitutional zoning barriers that frustrate the deep human yearning of low-income and minority groups for decent housing they can afford in decent surroundings”.

  • Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338 (1980): Upholding Large-Lot Zoning Absent Proof of Exclusionary Purpose

    Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338 (1980)

    A zoning ordinance requiring large minimum lot sizes is presumptively constitutional and will be upheld absent a showing that it was enacted with an exclusionary purpose or without considering regional housing needs.

    Summary

    Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. challenged the constitutionality of a Village of Upper Brookville zoning ordinance establishing a five-acre minimum lot size in certain areas. The plaintiff argued the ordinance was exclusionary and not enacted in compliance with the Village Law. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding the ordinance valid. The Court emphasized the presumption of constitutionality afforded to zoning ordinances and found the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an exclusionary purpose or a failure to consider regional housing needs. The Court stated that large-lot zoning is permissible to preserve open space and protect residents from urbanization, as long as it does not result in impermissible exclusion.

    Facts

    In 1960, the Village of Upper Brookville enacted a zoning ordinance requiring minimum lot sizes of two and five acres in different areas. This ordinance was based on a comprehensive master plan developed over 18 months. In 1968, Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. purchased a 60-acre tract within the village, with 10 acres zoned for two-acre lots and the remaining 50 acres zoned for five-acre lots. The corporation developed and sold houses on the two-acre lots. It subsequently challenged the five-acre minimum lot requirement on the remaining land. The subject property was within an area characterized by estate-type developments and large lots.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance. The trial court upheld the ordinance. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the ordinance unconstitutional. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the trial court’s judgment and upholding the validity of the zoning ordinance.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Village of Upper Brookville’s zoning ordinance requiring a five-acre minimum lot size is unconstitutional as an unreasonable and improper exercise of the police power. Whether the village acted within the ambit of Section 7-704 of the Village Law in enacting the zoning ordinance.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality afforded to zoning ordinances by demonstrating an exclusionary purpose or a failure to consider regional housing needs.
    2. Yes, because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the ordinance did not meet the requirements of the Village Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that zoning ordinances carry a presumption of constitutionality, and the burden of proving unconstitutionality rests on the party challenging the ordinance. This burden requires demonstrating unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court applied the two-part test from Berenson v. Town of New Castle, requiring the local board to provide a properly balanced plan for the community and to consider regional needs when enacting zoning ordinances. The Court found the plaintiff failed to show the ordinance was enacted for an improper purpose or without regard to local and regional housing needs. The Court emphasized that preserving open space is a legitimate goal of multi-acre zoning, referencing Agins v. Tiburon. The Court acknowledged the potential for large-lot zoning to be used for exclusionary purposes but found no evidence of such a purpose in this case. Testimony from the architect, who consulted with large landowners, was insufficient to prove an exclusionary purpose. The Court quoted Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, noting that “[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addresed to family needs”. Ultimately, the Court deferred to the legislative judgment of the village, finding no clear evidence of unreasonableness or impropriety in the zoning ordinance.

  • Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102 (1975): Validity of Zoning Ordinance Excluding Multifamily Housing

    Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102 (1975)

    A zoning ordinance that excludes multifamily housing is not per se unconstitutional but must provide for a balanced, cohesive community, considering both local and regional housing needs.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs challenged the Town of New Castle’s zoning ordinance, which effectively prohibited the construction of new multifamily residential housing. The New York Court of Appeals held that while a town can regulate land use through zoning, an outright ban on multifamily housing requires a careful balancing of the town’s need to maintain its character with the broader regional need for diverse housing options. The court emphasized that zoning ordinances must consider both local and regional needs to ensure a balanced and integrated community.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs owned a 50-acre parcel in the Town of New Castle, a suburban community north of New York City. New Castle’s zoning ordinance, enacted in 1971, did not permit multifamily dwellings in any of its twelve zoning districts, most of which were restricted to single-family residential use with minimum lot sizes of one or two acres. The plaintiffs planned to build a large, age-oriented condominium development on their property, but town officials indicated that the necessary zoning changes would not be approved. The plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional because it excluded multifamily housing.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term denied cross-motions for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact regarding the town’s need for multifamily housing. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that factual issues remained, and granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment but clarified the relevant factual issues for trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a zoning ordinance that effectively prohibits the construction of all new multifamily residential housing within a town’s borders is constitutional.

    Holding

    No, because such an ordinance must provide for a balanced and well-ordered plan for the community, considering both local and regional needs for multifamily housing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the power of municipalities to regulate land use through zoning to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the community, citing Euclid v. Ambler Co. However, this power is not unlimited. The court emphasized that a zoning ordinance must provide for a balanced and cohesive community that makes efficient use of available land. This does not mean each zone must be balanced, but the town as a whole, as provided for by its zoning ordinances, must be balanced and integrated.

    The court outlined a two-part test for evaluating ordinances that exclude multifamily housing. First, the zoning board must have provided a properly balanced and well-ordered plan for the community. This requires assessing the types of housing that currently exist, their quantity and quality, and whether this array adequately meets the present needs of the town. Second, the ordinance must consider regional needs and requirements. The court recognized that zoning often has a substantial impact beyond the boundaries of the municipality and that localities cannot ignore the housing needs of the broader region. However, a town need not permit a use solely for the sake of the people of the region if regional needs are presently provided for in an adequate manner.

    The court quoted Matter of Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, cautioning against “community efforts at immunization or exclusion.” The court also noted that while zoning is a legislative act, courts must assess the reasonableness of what the locality has done until regional governmental units can make such determinations. The court emphasized the importance of balancing local desires with the greater public interest of meeting regional needs.

    The court concluded that whether New Castle could exclude high-density residential development depended on the specific facts and circumstances in the town and the community at large, which needed to be assessed at trial.