New York Law Review

Tag: Exclusionary Rule

  • People v. Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d 527 (1981): Admissibility of Police Testimony After Suppression of Evidence

    People v. Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d 527 (1981)

    Even after the suppression of physical evidence and identification testimony due to an unlawful arrest, police officers may still testify about their observations leading up to the arrest if the testimony’s probative value outweighs its potential to undermine the exclusionary rule’s purpose.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether police officers could testify about the events surrounding an unlawful arrest after the suppression of physical evidence and a showup identification resulting from that arrest. The court held that such testimony is admissible, balancing the societal cost of excluding reliable evidence against the deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct. The court reasoned that suppressing the officers’ testimony about their observations leading up to the arrest would not significantly enhance the exclusionary rule’s deterrent effect and that the jury could logically assume the defendant was arrested, regardless of the officers’ testimony. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no error in admitting the officers’ testimony.

    Facts

    Thomas Pimentel was robbed at his cousin’s grocery store by a man who first bought chewing gum and then returned with a knife to steal cash and food stamps.

    Officers Scanlon and Calise, patrolling nearby, observed Rogers acting suspiciously near the store, including entering and exiting a subway station and running to catch a bus.

    The officers received a radio alarm about the grocery store robbery near their location.

    Rogers exited the bus after two blocks, walked several blocks, and entered a construction site.

    The officers approached Rogers at the construction site, identified themselves, and told him to stop. When Rogers reached into his pocket, the officers restrained and arrested him.

    A search incident to the arrest revealed a knife, cash, and food stamps, which were seized.

    Rogers was taken back to the grocery store, where Pimentel identified him as the robber.

    Procedural History

    The trial court suppressed the knife, money, and food stamps, and Pimentel’s showup identification because the arrest lacked probable cause.

    The court allowed testimony about the arrest itself and permitted Pimentel to make an in-court identification based on an independent source (his observations during the robbery).

    Rogers was convicted of robbery and criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a criminal proceeding, police officers may testify to the facts and circumstances surrounding a defendant’s unlawful arrest, notwithstanding the suppression of physical evidence seized during the arrest and testimony regarding an unlawful showup conducted immediately after the arrest.

    Holding

    Yes, because the exclusionary rule should not be applied to preclude admission of the officers’ testimony regarding the events leading up to the arrest, as the societal cost of excluding this reliable evidence outweighs the limited deterrent benefit to the Fourth Amendment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged differing views among its members regarding whether the officers’ testimony fell within the Fourth Amendment’s proscription.

    Some justices believed the testimony concerned observations made *prior* to the illegal arrest and thus did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

    Other justices believed the testimony *did* fall within the Fourth Amendment’s scope but that the exclusionary rule should not apply. The court emphasized that the exclusionary rule aims to deter unlawful police conduct, not to redress personal privacy injuries. The court stated, “In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generated through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348).

    The court noted that the exclusionary rule is not absolute and must be balanced against the societal costs of suppressing reliable evidence, adding that “the application of the exclusionary rule is dependent ‘upon a balancing of its probable deterrent effect against its detrimental impact upon the truth-finding process’” (quoting People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 21).

    In this case, suppressing the physical evidence and showup identification already weakened the prosecution’s case, sufficiently penalizing the unlawful arrest. Further suppression of the officers’ testimony would have limited deterrent value, as the jury would logically assume an arrest occurred regardless. The court noted, “An illegal arrest, without more, has never been envisioned as a bar to prosecution or as a defense to a valid conviction” (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474).

    The court reasoned that any potential inferences the jury might draw from the officers’ testimony (e.g., that a search produced the knife and money) were speculative and could be addressed with countermanding instructions. The court stated, “Had defendant been concerned as to possible inferences which the jury might draw from the officers’ testimony his remedy was to request appropriate countermanding instructions.”

    Ultimately, the court held that the officers’ testimony was admissible, finding that its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant or undermining of the exclusionary rule.

  • People v. Jennings, 54 N.Y.2d 518 (1981): Arrests Based on Incorrect Criminal Justice System Records

    People v. Jennings, 54 N.Y.2d 518 (1981)

    An arrest is invalid, and evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed, when the arresting officer relies on criminal justice system records that, through the fault of the system, contain incorrect information about an outstanding warrant.

    Summary

    Jennings was arrested based on a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) teletype indicating an active parole violation warrant. A search incident to the arrest uncovered stolen property. However, the warrant had been executed and vacated months before the arrest, and the New York State Identification and Intelligence System (NYSIIS) had been notified. The New York Court of Appeals held the arrest invalid because it was based on incorrect information in the criminal justice system records, requiring suppression of the evidence. The court emphasized that probable cause must be objectively reasonable and that an officer’s good faith cannot validate an arrest based on an invalid warrant.

    Facts

    In September 1978, police circulated a flyer about Jennings, who was suspected of burglaries. Officer Enright stopped Jennings for traffic violations. Enright requested a warrant check through Hempstead Police Headquarters. Hempstead headquarters relayed the information to NCIC and NYSIIS. The teletype response indicated an active parole violation warrant issued in November 1977. The warrant had been executed in January 1978, and NYSIIS was notified. Furthermore, a Supreme Court order vacated the warrant in June 1978. Based on the teletype, Enright arrested Jennings. A search incident to arrest revealed stolen jewelry and other items.

    Procedural History

    Jennings was indicted for burglary. He moved to suppress the evidence, palmprint, and statement based on Fourth Amendment grounds. The trial court denied the motion, and Jennings was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, granting the motion to suppress.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an arrest based on a computer record indicating an active warrant, when that warrant has been executed and vacated, is valid and whether evidence seized incident to that arrest is admissible.

    Holding

    No, because the arrest was based on incorrect information in the criminal justice system records, making it invalid, and the evidence seized must be suppressed as a result.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the “fellow officer” rule established in Whiteley v. Warden, which states that an officer can rely on information from another officer, but if the underlying warrant is invalid, the evidence seized is inadmissible. The court rejected the People’s argument to distinguish between an invalidly issued warrant and a validly issued but vacated warrant, stating, “In each case, police intrude upon protected Fourth Amendment interests under the purported authority of a warrant which is subsequently revealed to have furnished, at the time of the intrusion, no justification for such police conduct.” The Court further rejected the argument that Officer Enright’s “good faith” reliance on the warrant made the exclusionary rule inapplicable. The Court stated, “An assessment of probable cause turns on what was reasonably and objectively in the mind of law enforcement authorities. It does not turn on such subjective considerations as the absence of malice against a suspect, the lack of intent to violate constitutional rights…” The Court reasoned that the good faith of the officer does not validate an arrest based on a warrant that had been vacated months before the arrest. The Court emphasized the importance of accurate record-keeping within the criminal justice system to protect Fourth Amendment rights. The inevitable discovery argument was rejected because the officer conceded he would not have arrested the defendant absent the warrant information.

  • People v. LaBorde, 56 N.Y.2d 973 (1982): Admissibility of Identification Evidence After Unlawful Arrest

    People v. LaBorde, 56 N.Y.2d 973 (1982)

    An in-court identification of a defendant is admissible if it stems from an independent recollection, and a pretrial lineup identification is admissible if sufficiently distinguishable from an unlawful arrest to purge any primary taint, particularly when the defendant is held under a valid arrest warrant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a pretrial lineup identification and an in-court identification should be suppressed as fruits of an unlawful arrest. The defendant was unlawfully arrested in Suffolk County, which led to the suppression of weapons charges. Subsequently, Bronx County police, using information derived independently from Suffolk County authorities, connected the defendant to a robbery and obtained an arrest warrant. The court held that the in-court identification was admissible because it stemmed from an independent recollection. Further, the pretrial lineup identification was admissible because it was sufficiently attenuated from the initial unlawful arrest due to the intervening lawful arrest warrant.

    Facts

    Police in Bronx County connected the defendant, LaBorde, to a robbery based on information from Suffolk County authorities. LaBorde’s photograph was obtained from the Bureau of Criminal Identification, and he was identified in a photographic array by the robbery victims. LaBorde was arrested in Suffolk County on weapons charges, pursuant to a Bronx County arrest warrant for the robbery. He was then identified by one of the robbery victims in a pretrial lineup.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division reversed LaBorde’s conviction on the Suffolk County weapons charges, suppressing the seized weapons because of an unlawful arrest. Subsequently, LaBorde was convicted in Bronx County for the robbery. He appealed, arguing that the unlawful Suffolk County arrest tainted both the pretrial lineup identification and the in-court identification in the Bronx robbery case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding the robbery conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an in-court identification of a defendant is inadmissible if preceded by an unlawful arrest?
    2. Whether a pretrial lineup identification is inadmissible if the defendant’s initial contact with law enforcement stemmed from an unlawful arrest?

    Holding

    1. No, because an in-court identification is admissible so long as it proceeds from an independent recollection.
    2. No, because the means used to obtain the pretrial lineup identification were sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint of the unlawful arrest, especially because the defendant was being held under a lawful arrest warrant at the time of the lineup.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that an in-court identification is admissible if based on an independent recollection, citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980). The court found no basis to suppress the in-court identification as it wasn’t tainted by the unlawful seizure by the Suffolk County police.

    Regarding the pretrial lineup identification, the court applied the attenuation doctrine from Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), asking if the evidence was obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. The court emphasized that the Bronx County police, who had not participated in the unlawful Suffolk County arrest, undertook the effort to connect LaBorde to the robbery. The court highlighted that LaBorde was held at the time of the lineup under a lawful criminal court process (the arrest warrant), not the unlawful seizure. Citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), the court stated that the fact of the arrest on a warrant was enough to dissipate any taint from the unlawful arrest.

    The court declined to address whether an illegality that reveals a defendant’s existence as a suspect can ever require suppression of evidence. The court explicitly stated, “We need not decide whether an illegality that reveals a defendant’s existence as the suspected perpetrator of another crime can ever require suppression of evidence resulting from that information. It is sufficient to note that under the circumstances here, the challenged evidence simply was not tainted by the unlawful arrest.”

    The court also addressed the photographic array identifications, noting that while inadmissible under state law (People v. Lindsay, 42 N.Y.2d 9; People v. Caserta, 19 N.Y.2d 18) as the People did not argue for their admissibility, they were obtained independently and proceeded from the witnesses’ independent recollections and thus, did not taint the lineup identification. The court cited Bynum v. United States, 274 F.2d 767, for the principle of independent source.

  • People v. Payton, 51 N.Y.2d 769 (1980): Exclusionary Rule and Warrantless Arrests Authorized by Statute

    51 N.Y.2d 769 (1980)

    The exclusionary rule applies even when police conduct is authorized by a statute later found unconstitutional, and the prosecution is entitled to a new suppression hearing to present evidence of exigent circumstances if the original hearing was limited by reliance on the statute’s validity.

    Summary

    Following a Supreme Court ruling that struck down New York statutes permitting warrantless home arrests, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether evidence seized during such an arrest should be suppressed. The court held that the exclusionary rule applies even when police act under a presumptively valid statute later deemed unconstitutional. However, the court also ruled that the prosecution was entitled to a new suppression hearing to present evidence of exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry, as the initial hearing had been limited by the now-invalidated statutes.

    Facts

    Police, with probable cause but without a warrant, forcibly entered Payton’s apartment to arrest him for murder. At the time, state statutes authorized such entries for felony arrests. During the entry, police found a shell casing in plain view, which was later used as evidence against Payton. Payton moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrantless entry was unlawful.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Payton’s motion to suppress, relying on the New York statutes authorizing warrantless arrests. Payton was convicted of murder, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding the warrantless entry unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and remanded the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence seized during a warrantless arrest conducted under the authority of a statute later declared unconstitutional.
    2. Whether the prosecution should be granted a new suppression hearing to present evidence of exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the exclusionary rule ensures that the state respects the constitutional rights of the accused, even when police act under a statute later deemed invalid.
    2. Yes, because the initial suppression hearing was limited by the now-invalidated statutes, preventing the prosecution from fully presenting evidence of exigent circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the exclusionary rule serves to ensure the State respects constitutional rights. Applying the exclusionary rule is necessary to resolve a live controversy when statutes and widespread practices affecting accused persons’ rights are challenged. The court noted precedent where evidence was suppressed even when police acted under court orders or warrants later found defective. To hold otherwise would mean statutes and practices would be beyond judicial review.

    Regarding the new suppression hearing, the court stated that the prosecution should have a full opportunity to prove the admissibility of evidence. The court cited People v. Havelka, stating that a new hearing is warranted if “an error of law is committed by the hearing court which directly causes the People to fail to offer potentially critical evidence.” Here, the hearing court’s reliance on the statutes made it unnecessary for the prosecution to present evidence of exigent circumstances. The court emphasized that the People are not entitled to a new hearing every time they lose a suppression issue on appeal, but fairness required allowing them “one full opportunity” to prove admissibility. Because the original ruling precluded proof of exigent circumstances, the People should be given the opportunity to submit such proof. The fact that the District Attorney prompted the court’s erroneous ruling is not controlling.

  • People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447 (1980): Limits on Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest

    People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447 (1980)

    A warrantless search of an unaccessible jacket’s zippered pockets is not a valid search incident to a lawful arrest if there is no longer a risk that the arrestee or an accomplice could access the item.

    Summary

    Belton was a passenger in a car stopped for speeding. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer smelled marijuana and saw an envelope commonly used to sell drugs. The officer ordered the occupants out, frisked them, and found marijuana in the envelope. After arresting the individuals, the officer searched the passenger compartment, finding marijuana cigarette butts. He then searched the pockets of jackets on the back seat, finding cocaine and Belton’s ID in one zippered pocket. The court held that the warrantless search of the jacket was unlawful because once the arrestees were removed from the vehicle and secured, there was no longer any danger that they could access the jacket’s contents, negating the justification for a search incident to arrest.

    Facts

    A state trooper stopped a car for speeding on the New York State Thruway. The trooper smelled marijuana emanating from the car and observed an envelope on the floor he recognized as commonly used for selling marijuana. The officer ordered the occupants out of the vehicle, patted them down, and retrieved the envelope, confirming it contained marijuana.

    Procedural History

    After finding the marijuana, the officer arrested the occupants. He then searched the passenger compartment and the pockets of jackets on the back seat, finding cocaine in a zippered pocket along with Belton’s identification. Belton moved to suppress the cocaine, but his motion was denied. He pleaded guilty to attempted possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the search incident to a lawful arrest.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a warrantless search of a zippered pocket in a jacket located in the passenger compartment of a vehicle, after the occupants have been arrested and removed from the vehicle, is permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest.

    Holding

    No, because once the arrestees have been removed from the vehicle and are under the control of the police, there is no longer an exigency justifying a warrantless search of items within the vehicle.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by reaffirming that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few narrowly defined exceptions. One such exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest, which allows officers to search the arrestee’s person and the area within their immediate control to prevent access to weapons or destructible evidence. However, the court emphasized that the scope of such a search is limited by the exigency that justifies it. Quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), the court stated that a search incident to arrest is permissible of “the area ‘within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence”. Once an arrestee is effectively neutralized or the object is within the exclusive control of the police, the exigency dissipates, and the warrantless search is no longer justified. Citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the court noted that the Supreme Court had previously held that “once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest” (433 US, at p 15). The court found that because Belton and his companions had been removed from the car and were under the control of the police when the jacket was searched, no exigency existed to justify the warrantless search. The court also noted the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the zippered pockets of his jacket, which should not be lightly disregarded. Therefore, the evidence obtained from the search should have been suppressed. The car was secure and the occupants were safely away from it, so a warrant should have been obtained.

  • People ex rel. Piccarillo v. New York State Board of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76 (1979): Exclusionary Rule Applies to Parole Revocation Hearings

    People ex rel. Piccarillo v. New York State Board of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76 (1979)

    The exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of illegally seized evidence, applies to parole revocation hearings in New York, preventing the use of such evidence to revoke parole.

    Summary

    Piccarillo, a parolee, was arrested for possession of a controlled substance after a police search of his car revealed amphetamine pills. At his parole revocation hearing, the evidence from the search was admitted, and his parole was revoked. Subsequently, the evidence was suppressed in the criminal case due to an illegal search. Piccarillo then sought habeas corpus, arguing the Board of Parole should not have considered the suppressed evidence. The New York Court of Appeals held that the exclusionary rule applies to parole revocation hearings, reasoning that allowing illegally seized evidence would undermine the rule’s deterrent effect and violate a parolee’s constitutional rights.

    Facts

    Piccarillo was released on parole after serving sentences for attempted robbery. He was stopped by police for driving without operational taillights. A search of his car revealed a container of pills, leading to his arrest for possession of a controlled substance. At his parole revocation hearing, this evidence was admitted. Later, in the criminal case stemming from the same incident, a court determined the search was illegal and suppressed the evidence.

    Procedural History

    A preliminary parole revocation hearing found probable cause to revoke Piccarillo’s parole. At the final revocation hearing, his motion to suppress the evidence from the car search was denied, and his parole was revoked based on that evidence. Subsequently, the evidence was suppressed in the criminal case. Piccarillo then initiated a habeas corpus proceeding, which was initially denied by the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed, restoring Piccarillo to parole. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the exclusionary rule prohibits the consideration of evidence at a parole revocation hearing when such evidence has been determined by a court to be the fruit of an illegal search and seizure.

    Holding

    Yes, because the exclusionary rule applies to administrative proceedings in New York, and a parolee’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures remains intact, even while on parole.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while a parole revocation hearing is administrative, the consequences for the parolee are significant. The exclusionary rule applies to administrative as well as criminal proceedings in New York. The court emphasized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence: “To the extent that the State, or its agents, can bypass the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule by using the fruits of an illegal search in a ‘civil’ or ‘administrative’ proceeding, the incentive for enforcement and investigative personnel to exceed constitutional limitations on their activity remains and the effectiveness of the rule as a deterrent is diminished.” Allowing illegally seized evidence in parole revocation hearings would undermine this deterrent effect. The court further noted that parolees do not relinquish all constitutional rights, including the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. While a parolee’s status may be considered when determining whether a search is unreasonable, it does not justify an exception to the exclusionary rule. The court rejected the argument that the Parole Board’s need for all relevant information outweighs the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, stating that the rule is addressed to the “insidiousness of unreasonable searches and seizures.” The court concluded that applying the exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings upholds the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and prevents the rule’s erosion.

  • People v. Boodle, 47 N.Y.2d 398 (1979): Attenuation Doctrine and Independent Acts in Seizure Cases

    47 N.Y.2d 398 (1979)

    An individual’s independent act, calculated to remove incriminating evidence, even after an unlawful seizure, can attenuate the taint of the illegality, making the evidence admissible.

    Summary

    The defendant was seized without probable cause. While unlawfully detained in a police car, he threw a loaded revolver out the window. Police retrieved the gun, leading to a search that revealed heroin. The Court of Appeals held that although the initial seizure was illegal, the defendant’s act of discarding the weapon was an independent action, sufficiently attenuating the taint of the unlawful seizure. Therefore, the gun and the heroin were admissible as evidence. The court emphasized the lack of purposeful police misconduct aimed at discovering evidence.

    Facts

    Detectives investigating a homicide received information that a man called “Heavy” might have relevant information. They found a man believed to be “Heavy” (the defendant), who aroused no suspicion. The detectives asked the defendant to step over to their car, then asked him to enter the vehicle. Without identifying themselves as police officers, they began driving away. One detective asked the defendant if he was “clean” and told him to keep his hands visible. The detective then saw the defendant throw a black object out the window, which was identified as a loaded .32 caliber automatic revolver. A subsequent search at the police station revealed packets of heroin on the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and a controlled substance. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the pistol and heroin were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Special Term denied the motion to suppress. The defendant pleaded guilty to the drug charge, and a jury convicted him of the weapon offense. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s act of throwing the revolver from the car was a direct and immediate response to the illegal detention, thereby tainting the discovery of the weapon and making it inadmissible as evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s act of throwing the revolver was not in direct and immediate response to the illegal detention but an independent act, the revolver, disclosed as a result of defendant’s independent act, was not tainted by the prior illegality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the initial seizure of the defendant was unlawful because the police lacked probable cause. However, the court distinguished this case from those where the defendant’s actions were a direct consequence of unlawful police action, citing People v. Baldwin, People v. Loria, and People v. Cantor. In those cases, the evidence was revealed as a spontaneous reaction to illegal police conduct. The court reasoned that the defendant’s act in this case was an independent act involving a calculated risk, rather than a spontaneous reaction. The court noted, “While the time for reflection is not measured in minutes or seconds it is measured by facts. The time must be long enough to make a choice, as the result of thought and reflection, and to act upon the choice thus made.” Furthermore, the court emphasized that the police illegality lacked the “quality of purposefulness” to uncover incriminating evidence, meaning it was not designed to discover the weapon. The court determined that suppressing the evidence would not serve the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring lawless police activity in this particular instance because the police conduct did not provoke the defendant’s action, nor was it intended to find evidence. Citing Wong Sun v. United States, the court reasoned that the connection between the unlawful police conduct and the discovery of the challenged evidence was “‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’”.

  • People v. Hanlon, 41 N.Y.2d 147 (1976): Establishing Probable Cause for a Search Warrant

    People v. Hanlon, 41 N.Y.2d 147 (1976)

    Probable cause to search must be established on the face of a warrant application; it cannot be supplemented by unsworn, unwritten, and unrecorded details presented to the issuing magistrate.

    Summary

    Hanlon was convicted of manslaughter after pleading guilty, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the search warrant was improperly issued because the affidavit supporting it lacked probable cause and was supplemented with unsworn information. The court held that probable cause must be established within the four corners of the affidavit supporting the warrant application and cannot be based on unrecorded, unsworn testimony given to the issuing magistrate. The court also rejected the argument that the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest.

    Facts

    A police detective obtained a search warrant for Hanlon’s premises. The affidavit supporting the warrant suggested evidence of a crime might be found there but provided minimal probative information in conclusory terms. The Town Justice who issued the warrant also received unsworn, unwritten, and unrecorded details of the investigation from the detective.

    Procedural History

    The defendant’s motion to suppress evidence was denied. Following presentation of some evidence at trial, Hanlon pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree. He appealed the judgment of conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause.
    2. Whether unsworn, unwritten, and unrecorded details presented to the issuing magistrate can supplement a deficient affidavit to establish probable cause.
    3. Whether the search can be justified as incident to a lawful arrest, even if the search warrant was invalid.

    Holding

    1. No, because the affidavit only obliquely suggested that evidence of the crime may be found at defendant’s premises and set forth what little may be considered probative in the most conclusional terms.
    2. No, because CPL 690.40, subd 1 requires a showing of probable cause on the face of the affidavit and any supplementation must be sworn and recorded.
    3. No, because under these circumstances, a warrantless arrest was neither necessary nor permissible and the inadmissible evidence resulting from an invalid search warrant may not be resurrected by a belated claim that there was probable cause to arrest without a warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause because it lacked specific details and relied on conclusory statements. The court emphasized that probable cause must be demonstrated on the face of the affidavit. Supplementing the affidavit with unsworn, unwritten, and unrecorded details violated CPL 690.40(1) and undermined the integrity of the warrant application process. The court cited People v. Brown, 40 NY2d 183. The court stated, “For whatever reason, the Town Justice accepted this information without an oath and without making a record and facts were omitted which may have made sufficient the affidavit prepared at his direction. Thus, there is no adequate record of these facts.”

    The court further reasoned that the search could not be justified as incident to an arrest. While probable cause to arrest may exist independently of a search warrant (citing People v. Green, 33 NY2d 496), the court found that a warrantless arrest was not necessary or permissible in this case. Allowing a search based on a later claim of probable cause to arrest would circumvent the protections of the Fourth Amendment and the warrant requirement. The court cited People v. Perel, 34 NY2d 462, 468, noting that the arrest would not justify a full-blown warrantless search of the defendant’s home.

  • People v. Dunaway, 38 N.Y.2d 813 (1975): Admissibility of Confession After Illegal Detention

    38 N.Y.2d 813 (1975)

    A confession obtained after an illegal detention may be inadmissible, even if Miranda warnings are given, if the confession is a product of that illegal detention.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reconsidered its prior affirmance of Dunaway’s conviction for felony murder and attempted robbery in light of Brown v. Illinois. The court found that Dunaway may have been illegally detained when police took him into custody without probable cause, and that the confession he subsequently gave, even after being read his Miranda rights, may have been inadmissible as a product of that illegal detention. The court remitted the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the detention was supported by probable cause and, if not, whether the confession was tainted by the illegal arrest.

    Facts

    Two men committed an armed robbery at a pizza shop in Rochester, New York, during which the proprietor was shot and killed. Four months later, three police officers went to Dunaway’s home and asked him to come downtown to talk about “something.” The record did not indicate that the police had any reason to suspect him. At the police station, Dunaway was taken to an interrogation room, given Miranda warnings, and waived his right to counsel. He then made inculpatory statements and drew incriminating sketches.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, Dunaway moved to suppress the statements and drawings, arguing they were obtained during an illegal detention without probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the statements were voluntary after proper Miranda warnings. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Brown v. Illinois.

    Issue(s)

    1. Was Dunaway illegally detained when the police took him into custody?

    2. If Dunaway was illegally detained, was his confession inadmissible as a product of that illegal detention, even though Miranda warnings were given?

    Holding

    1. The court did not make a determination on whether Dunaway was illegally detained, because the record was inadequate to support a determination of probable cause.

    2. If there was an illegal detention, the court did not make a determination on whether Dunaway’s confession was inadmissible because the trial court needed to determine whether the confession was tainted by the illegal arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the trial court made no findings as to the nature of Dunaway’s detention or whether there was probable cause for it. The District Attorney conceded that the record was inadequate to support a determination of probable cause. The court stated, “accordingly, this case must be remitted to the Monroe County Court for a factual hearing and such other proceedings as may be necessary to determine the issues…and, in the event there was a detention and probable cause is not found for such detention, to determine the further question as to whether the making of the confessions was rendered infirm by the illegal arrest (see Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, supra).” The court recognized that even though Miranda warnings were given, a confession could still be inadmissible if it was the product of an illegal arrest. This reflects the Supreme Court’s holding in Brown v. Illinois, which held that Miranda warnings alone do not dissipate the taint of an illegal arrest. The focus must be on whether the confession was obtained by exploitation of the illegal arrest.

  • People v.ваем, 41 N.Y.2d 928 (1977): Admissibility of Evidence Derived from Statements Obtained in Violation of Miranda

    People v.ваем, 41 N.Y.2d 928 (1977)

    Evidence obtained as a result of a voluntary statement, even if the statement itself is inadmissible due to Miranda violations, is admissible, and a defendant lacks standing to assert the Miranda rights of another person.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that testimony from witnesses whose names were provided by the defendant during a police interrogation, even if the defendant’s own statements were inadmissible due to Miranda violations, was admissible. Additionally, a pistol seized pursuant to a search warrant based on information from both the defendant and another individual was admissible, as the defendant lacked standing to assert the other individual’s Miranda rights. The court also noted that an assertion of error regarding testimony about the defendant’s admission to other killings was not preserved for review due to a lack of timely objection.

    Facts

    The defendant, ваем, made statements to the police during an interrogation. These statements were deemed voluntary. During the interrogation, the defendant provided the names of certain witnesses. A search warrant was issued based on information provided by both the defendant and another individual named Russell, leading to the seizure of the defendant’s pistol. The defendant’s statements were excluded at trial due to the police’s failure to provide Miranda warnings.

    Procedural History

    The case was tried, and the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the testimony of witnesses, whose names the defendant furnished during an interrogation where Miranda warnings were not properly given, is admissible.
    2. Whether a pistol seized pursuant to a search warrant issued on information supplied by another individual, Russell, as well as the defendant is admissible, when Russell was not given Miranda warnings.
    3. Whether the defendant’s assertion of error regarding the receipt of testimony that he had admitted to other killings was preserved for review.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant’s statements were voluntary, and the derivative evidence rule does not automatically exclude evidence obtained as a result of a voluntary statement even if the statement itself is inadmissible due to Miranda violations.
    2. Yes, because the defendant lacked standing to complain about the failure of the police to give Miranda warnings to Russell.
    3. No, because no timely objection was raised, and the issue was not preserved for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. Tucker, which held that the exclusionary rule does not bar the admission of testimony from a witness whose identity was revealed by the defendant during questioning without full Miranda warnings, where the questioning was voluntary. The court reasoned that the exclusion of the defendant’s own statements was sufficient to protect his Fifth Amendment rights. The court distinguished the case from situations where the police conduct is coercive or the derivative evidence is directly obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights. Regarding the pistol, the court cited Alderman v. United States and Jones v. United States, stating that a defendant lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of another person. Therefore, the defendant could not claim that the pistol should be excluded because Russell was not given Miranda warnings. Finally, because the defendant did not object to the testimony regarding his admission to other killings during the trial, the court found that the issue was not preserved for appellate review. The court emphasized the importance of timely objections to allow the trial court to correct any errors.