New York Law Review

Tag: Excludable Delay

  • People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676 (1993): Court Scheduling Delays and Speedy Trial Rights

    People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676 (1993)

    Delays caused by routine court scheduling or administrative transfers are generally not excludable from the time within which the prosecution must be ready for trial under New York’s speedy trial statute.

    Summary

    The defendant moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the prosecution failed to be ready for trial within the statutory speedy trial period. The prosecution conceded being responsible for 165 days of delay but argued that certain periods were excludable. The disputed periods included a six-day adjournment for transfer to an Individual Assignment System (IAS) part and a 14-day adjournment. The Court of Appeals held that the six-day delay was not excludable as it was for administrative convenience. The court also found the 14-day delay chargeable to the People, as they failed to adequately document a basis for a shorter exclusion. Consequently, the total delay exceeded the statutory limit, and the indictment was dismissed.

    Facts

    The defendant was arraigned on October 5, 1989. The case was adjourned to October 11, 1989, for transfer to an Individual Assignment System (IAS) part and to join the defendant’s other pending case. On February 7, 1990, another adjournment of 14 days until February 21, 1990 was granted, over the defendant’s objection.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division modified the decision, holding that one period of prereadiness delay was not chargeable to the People, but a period of postreadiness delay was. The Appellate Division concluded the defendant’s speedy trial rights weren’t violated. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the People were not ready for trial within the statutory period.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the six-day adjournment for transfer to an IAS part is excludable from the speedy trial calculation.

    2. Whether the 14-day adjournment between February 7, 1990, and February 21, 1990, is chargeable to the People.

    Holding

    1. No, because a delay occasioned by a rule-mandated transfer from an Arraignment Part to an IAS Part is not covered by any of the express statutory exclusions set forth in CPL 30.30.

    2. Yes, because the People failed to meet their burden of making a record to reflect the true basis for this two-week adjournment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the six-day adjournment, the court reasoned that the rules mandate assignment to an IAS part, but not any particular period of adjournment. Therefore, the delay was merely another instance of court scheduling, which does not excuse the People from filing a certificate of readiness. The court rejected the argument that the adjournment was motion-related because the record lacked any suggestion that the adjournment was for defense motions. The court also noted there was no showing the adjournment was justified by the pendency of another case against the defendant.

    Regarding the 14-day adjournment, the court found that the People failed to provide unequivocal evidence from someone with firsthand knowledge that they requested only a five-day adjournment. Absent a clear record of the basis for the adjournment, the entire period was chargeable to the People. The court cited People v. Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 and People v. Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843.

    The court stated, “[A] delay occasioned by a rule-mandated transfer from an Arraignment Part to an IAS Part is not covered by any of the express statutory exclusions set forth in CPL 30.30…[T]he six-day adjournment in this case for transfer to an IAS Part was merely another instance of a delay occasioned by court scheduling which, as we have previously held, does not excuse the People from filing a certificate of readiness.”

  • People v. Santos, 68 N.Y.2d 859 (1986): Burden of Proof for Speedy Trial Violations

    People v. Santos, 68 N.Y.2d 859 (1986)

    When a defendant alleges a violation of their statutory right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30, the People bear the burden of proving that any delays are excludable from the time calculation.

    Summary

    Santos was arrested in December 1978 and indicted on drug charges. He moved to dismiss the indictments nearly two years later, arguing he was denied a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in summarily denying Santos’s motion. Once the defendant alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum, the burden shifts to the People to demonstrate that specific periods should be excluded. The People’s failure to provide specific dates and factual bases for exclusions warranted a hearing to resolve the factual disputes.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested on December 6, 1978.

    Two weeks later, he was arraigned on drug charges.

    On October 31, 1980, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments based on a denial of his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.20 and 30.30, alleging a two-year delay mostly attributable to the prosecution.

    The prosecution responded that delays were due to plea negotiations and the defendant’s detention in New Jersey, but failed to specify dates or relevant exclusions.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss without a hearing.

    The defendant was subsequently convicted on drug charges.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.

    The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order, remitting the case for a hearing on the CPL 30.30 motion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments based on CPL 30.30 without holding a hearing, given the defendant’s allegations of unexcused delay.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a defendant alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum under CPL 30.30, the burden shifts to the People to controvert the factual basis for the motion and demonstrate that specific periods should be excluded from the time calculation. If the People’s papers present a factual dispute, a hearing is required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 210.45(4), which states that if a defendant moves to dismiss an indictment and alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum, the motion must be granted unless the People controvert the factual basis for the motion. The court cited People v. Lomax, People v. Berkowitz, and People v. Gruden in support of this principle.

    The court emphasized that, as stated in People v. Kendzia, once the defendant demonstrates unexcused delay, “the burden of showing that time should be excluded falls upon the People.”

    Here, the defendant alleged a delay of nearly two years. While the initial affidavit lacked a precise starting date for the delay, the prosecutor’s response cured this defect.

    The Court found that the People failed to meet their burden because they did not provide specific dates or a factual and statutory basis for each exclusion. The court noted that the People’s obligations under CPL 30.30 are independent of obligations under the Agreement on Detainers and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, although time spent in other jurisdictions may be excludable under CPL 30.30.

    The court concluded that because the prosecutor’s affidavit raised a factual dispute but did not establish compliance with speedy trial obligations as a matter of law, a hearing was required to determine the excludability of the alleged delays.

  • People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351 (1980): Calculating Speedy Trial Time Under CPL 30.30

    People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351 (1980)

    For speedy trial calculations under CPL 30.30, a criminal action commences with the filing of the first accusatory instrument, and delays caused by the defendant’s pretrial motions are generally excluded from the time the prosecution has to be ready for trial.

    Summary

    James Lomax was arrested and indicted for robbery. After the initial indictment was dismissed, a new indictment was filed. Lomax moved to dismiss the second indictment based on a violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30. The trial court summarily denied the motion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the criminal action commenced with the first accusatory instrument. Although more than six months had passed, Lomax’s motion papers were insufficient because they did not adequately detail excludable periods resulting from his own pretrial motions, thus failing to demonstrate a clear entitlement to dismissal.

    Facts

    James Lomax was arrested on March 23, 1977, and charged with robbery. He was arraigned and subsequently indicted on March 28, 1977. The initial indictment was dismissed on June 14, 1977, following a defense motion. The District Attorney was granted leave to resubmit, and a new indictment was issued on June 23, 1977, encompassing the same charges. Lomax was re-arraigned. Lomax filed a second motion, including a request to inspect the grand jury minutes. A hearing was held in September 1977, but the decision denying the request was not announced until November 2, 1977. Lomax appeared for trial on December 8, 1977, but the trial was adjourned for three weeks to accommodate the District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Lomax’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial without an evidentiary hearing. The trial ended in a mistrial. Lomax then pleaded guilty to a reduced charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. Lomax appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the denial of his speedy trial motion was improper.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statutory speedy trial period under CPL 30.30 commences with the filing of the initial accusatory instrument or a subsequent indictment for the same charges?
    2. Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying Lomax’s speedy trial motion without a hearing, given his allegations of delay?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under CPL 1.20(17), a criminal action commences with the filing of the first accusatory instrument, regardless of subsequent indictments for the same charges.
    2. No, because Lomax’s motion papers were insufficient to establish a clear entitlement to dismissal under CPL 30.30, as they failed to adequately account for excludable periods attributable to his own pretrial motions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that under CPL 1.20(17), a criminal action commences when the first accusatory instrument is filed. The court emphasized that “[a] criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court, and, if more than one accusatory instrument is filed in the course of the action, it commences when the first of such instruments is filed”. Therefore, the speedy trial clock started on March 24, 1977, with the filing of the original felony complaint. However, the court noted that CPL 30.30(4)(a) excludes certain periods of delay, specifically those resulting from pretrial motions made by the defendant. The Court stated, “[U]nder the clear language of CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [a]), such periods would generally be excluded from the total time within which the People are required by statute to become ready to proceed to trial.” Lomax’s motion papers acknowledged delays due to his motions but failed to provide specific dates, preventing the trial court from calculating the excludable time. The court reasoned that because Lomax had demonstrated some delay was excusable, he had the burden of showing that the remaining “unexcused” delay exceeded the statutory limit. Because Lomax’s papers were deficient, the trial court acted within its discretion to deny the motion summarily under CPL 210.45(5). The court also rejected Lomax’s general speedy trial claim, finding that the nine-and-a-half-month delay was not excessive, especially considering the seriousness of the charges and the delays caused by Lomax’s motions. The court balanced the factors outlined in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975), and found no violation.

  • People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.2d 624 (1974): Determining Excludable Delay for Speedy Trial Calculations

    People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.2d 624 (1974)

    Under CPL 30.30, periods of delay are excluded from speedy trial calculations when the defendant’s location is unknown and they are attempting to avoid prosecution, or when delays are at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant for pretrial motions or plea negotiations.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court correctly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a violation of speedy trial rights. The court reasoned that certain periods of delay were excludable under CPL 30.30. Specifically, the period during which the defendant was inadvertently released from jail and his whereabouts were unknown, coupled with indications of an attempt to avoid prosecution, was excludable. Additionally, delays resulting from pre-plea negotiations and motions initiated by the defendant were also properly excluded. Because the prosecution was ready for trial within the statutory timeframe after excluding these periods, the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on October 27, 1972, while incarcerated on a parole violation. On February 28, 1973, he was inadvertently released from jail. A bench warrant was issued on March 6, 1973, when he failed to appear in court. He remained free until his arrest on October 19, 1973. He worked at a parking lot near the county jail after his release. The case was placed on the Trial Calendar on November 30, 1973. After January 4, 1974, there were adjournments for “pre-plea” consideration and to allow the defendant to obtain new counsel. The matter was placed back on the Trial Calendar on February 24, 1974.

    Procedural History

    The Monroe County Court convicted the defendant of criminal sale of a dangerous drug in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his statutory speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution was ready for trial within the statutory timeframe after excluding periods of delay attributable to the defendant’s absence and attempts to avoid prosecution, as well as delays resulting from pre-plea negotiations and motions initiated by the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on CPL 30.30, which governs speedy trial rights in New York. The court highlighted specific exclusions allowed under the statute. First, the court noted that the period between the defendant’s release and rearrest could be excluded because the defendant’s location was unknown, and evidence suggested he was attempting to avoid prosecution. The court stated, “There was a basis for exclusion, under the ‘six months rule’ computation, of the period of almost seven and one-half months, from release to arrest, when it could be found that defendant’s location was unknown and he was attempting to avoid prosecution (CPL 30.30, subd 4, par [c]).” The fact that the defendant worked near the jail, claiming he was waiting to be rearrested, did not negate the possibility that he was also attempting to avoid prosecution. Second, the court excluded delays that were at the defendant’s request or with his consent, specifically those related to pre-plea considerations and the defendant’s need to obtain new counsel. The court reasoned, “Since it appears that the prosecution was ready for trial on November 30, 1973 (CPL 30.30, subd 1, par [a]) and that the delays occasioned thereafter, more particularly after January 4, 1974, were at the request or with the consent of defendant and for the purpose of pretrial motions, the period from November 30 to February 24, 1974 was properly excluded (CPL 30.30, subd 4, pars [a], [f]).” Because the prosecution was ready for trial on November 30, 1973, and the delays thereafter were attributable to the defendant, the court found no violation of his speedy trial rights. The court therefore affirmed the lower court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.