People v. Byron, 17 N.Y.2d 64 (1966)

A statute prohibiting “excessive or unusual noise” from motor vehicle mufflers provides sufficient clarity to inform a reasonable person of the prohibited conduct and is therefore constitutional.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals reversed a County Court decision, holding that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(31), prohibiting “excessive or unusual noise” from motor vehicle mufflers, is constitutional. The defendant was convicted of violating this statute for operating a car with a defective muffler. The County Court reversed, finding the statute too vague. The Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that the statute’s purpose is to minimize noise, and the term “excessive or unusual noise” is sufficiently clear to inform motorists of their duty to maintain mufflers that prevent noise beyond the usual level for their vehicle.

Facts

On May 28, 1964, a State trooper stopped Byron and issued a ticket for violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(31) because Byron was operating his 1958 Studebaker without an adequate muffler. The trooper alleged that the vehicle made a loud noise much greater than other vehicles, the muffler was in poor repair, and Byron admitted it had been that way for some time.

Procedural History

The Town of Poland’s Court of Special Sessions convicted Byron and imposed a fine. The Chautauqua County Court reversed the conviction, finding the statute’s language too vague to provide adequate warning of the prohibited conduct. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of a Judge of that Court.

Issue(s)

Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(31), which prohibits “excessive or unusual noise” from motor vehicle mufflers, is unconstitutionally vague.

Holding

No, because the statute states with sufficient clarity the rule to be obeyed, informing a reasonable person of the prohibited conduct. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court order and remitted the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the statute aims to minimize noise, not eliminate it. The term “excessive or unusual noise” is sufficiently clear because the usual noise level of a car is common knowledge. Anything exceeding that level is considered excessive or unusual. The court cited Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79 (1949), noting that terms like “loud and raucous noises” have acquired sufficient meaning through daily use. The court also distinguished the current statute from its predecessor, which had been deemed unconstitutional for vagueness. The court highlighted that the new statute “corrects the error found in the law under consideration by setting up standards and definitions covering prevention of excessive noises emanating from mufflers.” The court clarified that the statute isn’t a noise statute but a motor vehicle statute that mandates each motorist to minimize the noise from their specific vehicle. The Court further noted that Texas and California have similar statutes that have been upheld. The addition of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 386, which sets a specific decibel limit, does not supersede § 375(31) but complements it by establishing a maximum noise level while § 375(31) requires each motorist to minimize noise within that limit. Defendant’s argument that the statute was arbitrarily applied was also dismissed as the focus is on the adequacy of the muffler for each specific vehicle, not on an absolute quantity of noise. The court emphasized, “It is the adequacy of the muffler which applies equally to all vehicles and not the absolute quantity of noise.”