New York Law Review

Tag: Excavation Permit

  • People v. Genesee Lime Prods., Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 773 (1988): Establishing Exemption from Wetlands Act Requirements

    People v. Genesee Lime Prods., Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 773 (1988)

    A general excavation permit from a town, even if issued before the Freshwater Wetlands Act’s effective date, does not automatically exempt subsequent backfilling activities on those lands from the Act’s permit requirements unless the original permit specifically authorized or required such backfilling.

    Summary

    Genesee Lime Products was convicted of illegally altering freshwater wetlands without a permit. The company argued its backfilling activities were exempt under a “grandfather clause” in the Freshwater Wetlands Act because it had obtained excavation permits from the town before the Act’s effective date. The Court of Appeals held that the town’s excavation permits did not explicitly authorize or require backfilling, and therefore the company was not exempt from the Act’s permit requirements. The court emphasized that exemptions must be based on explicit approvals, not implied intentions, and that the company’s failure to seek a DEC permit was a critical factor.

    Facts

    Genesee Lime Products purchased land in 1962 to mine lime and obtained excavation permits from the Town of Wheatland. These permits incorporated a town ordinance that mandated leveling the land after excavation to ensure adequate drainage and prevent water accumulation. The permits expired between 1963 and 1965, and excavation ceased, although backfilling continued intermittently. In 1975, the Freshwater Wetlands Act took effect, classifying the premises as wetlands. In 1985, the company backfilled approximately two to three acres of the land without a permit from the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC).

    Procedural History

    The company was convicted in Justice Court for violating the Freshwater Wetlands Act and fined $500. The County Court affirmed the Justice Court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Genesee Lime Products’ backfilling activities were exempt from the Freshwater Wetlands Act’s permit requirement under the “grandfather clause” (ECL 24-1305) because it possessed town excavation permits issued before the Act’s effective date.

    Holding

    No, because the town’s excavation permits did not explicitly authorize or require backfilling of the excavated land. The company’s actions were not protected by the grandfather clause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the “grandfather clause” in ECL 24-1305 exempts land uses with final approval obtained before the Act’s effective date. However, the town’s excavation permits did not mandate or authorize backfilling. The court noted the absence of backfilling provisions in the town ordinance concerning excavation permits, contrasting this with the specific requirements for gravel pits, which mandated reseeding and restoration. The court refused to imply authorization, stating that “judicial determinations can only be based on the record made by the parties” and that the record lacked evidence supporting an assumption that backfilling was expected or contemplated. The court also dismissed the relevance of a handwritten notation on one permit about stockpiling spoils for future backfilling, as it did not require backfilling and the company used offsite materials. Addressing the intent of the “grandfather clause” to prevent hardship, the court stated that the company’s activity, occurring 20 years after the permits’ expiration, did not represent the type of hardship the clause was designed to prevent. Moreover, the court emphasized the company’s admission that it could have sought a permit from the DEC but chose not to, undermining its claim of inequity. The court found the company’s actions in violation of ECL 24-0701(2), which prohibits filling wetlands without a DEC permit. The court concluded that the excavation permits did not authorize the backfilling, and therefore, the company was in violation of the Freshwater Wetlands Act. The court stated, “Here, however, defendant not only lacked approval for backfilling the wetlands, but also its activity takes place a full 20 years after the expiration of one-year permits. This is not the picture of hardship that gave rise to the ‘grandfather clause’.”

  • Manitou Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Ogden, 55 N.Y.2d 790 (1981): Collateral Estoppel and Changed Factual Circumstances

    55 N.Y.2d 790 (1981)

    Collateral estoppel does not apply when there is a change in factual circumstances between the prior and current proceedings that significantly alters the issues presented.

    Summary

    Manitou Sand & Gravel Co. applied for an excavation permit in 1980, encompassing land beyond what was included in their 1979 permit. The town imposed a depth limitation. Manitou challenged the limitation, arguing collateral estoppel based on the 1979 permit approval. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s ruling that collateral estoppel applied, holding that the expanded area in the 1980 application constituted a sufficient change in factual circumstances to render collateral estoppel inappropriate. The case was remanded to the Appellate Division to review the merits of the Article 78 proceeding concerning the depth limitation.

    Facts

    1. Manitou Sand & Gravel Co. received an excavation permit from the Town of Ogden in 1979.
    2. In 1980, Manitou applied for a new permit.
    3. The 1980 application included not only the property covered by the 1979 permit but also additional, contiguous acreage.
    4. The Town Board imposed a depth limitation condition on the 1980 permit.

    Procedural History

    1. Manitou brought an Article 78 proceeding to annul the depth limitation imposed by the Town Board.
    2. Special Term found in favor of Manitou, concluding that collateral estoppel applied and that Manitou was entitled to relief even without collateral estoppel.
    3. The Appellate Division affirmed solely on collateral estoppel grounds.
    4. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding collateral estoppel inapplicable due to changed factual circumstances, and remanded the case to the Appellate Division to review the merits of the Article 78 application.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the inclusion of additional contiguous acreage in the 1980 permit application, beyond what was included in the 1979 permit, constitutes a sufficient change in factual circumstances to render the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapplicable.

    Holding

    Yes, because the petitioner’s 1980 permit application encompassed not only the property it had been excavating under the 1979 permit, but also additional contiguous acreage not contemplated for excavation in 1979, thus rendering application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the 1980 proceeding inappropriate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the change in factual circumstances between the two permit applications. The court acknowledged that collateral estoppel might apply in situations where the circumstances are essentially the same. However, it found that the inclusion of additional acreage in the 1980 application constituted a significant change. This change potentially altered the considerations relevant to the Town Board’s decision regarding the permit, including environmental impact, traffic, and other factors. Because the Appellate Division affirmed solely on collateral estoppel grounds, the Court of Appeals remitted the matter for a review of the merits of the Article 78 application, addressing the validity of the depth limitation. The court reasoned that the expanded scope of the proposed excavation could reasonably lead the town to impose different or additional conditions on the permit. Therefore, the issues in the 1979 and 1980 proceedings were not identical, precluding the application of collateral estoppel. The court did not elaborate on specific policy considerations but implied that allowing collateral estoppel in such a scenario would unduly restrict the town’s ability to regulate land use based on evolving circumstances. The court stated: “To be sure there may be instances where the circumstances are so parallel as to call for the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel; however, the particular change in factual circumstances involved in this instance renders the application of the doctrine in the 1980 proceeding inappropriate.”