New York Law Review

Tag: Exaction

  • Smith v. Town of Mendon, 4 N.Y.3d 1 (2004): Conditioning Site Plan Approval on Conservation Restriction

    4 N.Y.3d 1 (2004)

    A municipality does not commit an unconstitutional taking when it conditions site plan approval on the landowner’s acceptance of a development restriction consistent with the municipality’s pre-existing conservation policy, especially when the restriction does not deprive the landowner of all economically viable use of the property.

    Summary

    The Smiths sought to build a home on their property, which contained environmentally sensitive areas subject to town regulations (EPODs). The town conditioned site plan approval on the Smiths granting a conservation restriction on the EPOD portions, mirroring the existing EPOD regulations. The Smiths argued this was an unconstitutional taking. The court held it was not a taking, because the restriction advanced a legitimate government interest (environmental preservation) and did not deprive the Smiths of all economically viable use of their land, as they could still build a home and retained the right to exclude others. The conservation restriction was not an exaction requiring heightened scrutiny under Dolan because it did not involve a dedication of property for public use.

    Facts

    Paul and Janet Smith owned a 9.7-acre lot in the Town of Mendon, which included environmentally sensitive parcels along Honeyoe Creek. The lot fell within the creek’s 100-year floodplain, was near a protected agricultural district, and contained a woodlot and steep slopes. Significant portions were classified as environmental protection overlay districts (EPODs), which imposed use restrictions. The EPODs limited construction, land clearing, sewage disposal, stormwater discharge, and excavation. Property owners could seek development permits within EPODs by showing their activities would not destabilize the soil or cause erosion, and that there was no reasonable alternative.

    Procedural History

    The Smiths applied for site plan approval to construct a single-family home. The Planning Board approved the plan, conditioning it on the Smiths filing a conservation restriction on the EPOD portions of their property. The Smiths rejected the restriction and commenced a lawsuit, arguing an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Court applied Dolan and found no taking. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no exaction and a reasonable relationship to the town’s objectives. The Smiths appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a municipality commits an unconstitutional taking when it conditions site plan approval on the landowner’s acceptance of a development restriction consistent with the municipality’s pre-existing conservation policy, which does not require dedication of property for public use.

    Holding

    No, because the conservation restriction substantially advanced a legitimate government purpose (environmental preservation) and did not deprive the Smiths of all economically viable use of their property. It was not an exaction subject to heightened scrutiny under Dolan since it did not involve dedicating property for public use.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from regulatory takings requiring heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan. Those cases involved exactions, defined as “land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use.” Here, the conservation restriction did not require dedicating property to public use; the Smiths retained the right to exclude others from their property. The court stated, “There is no such dedication of ‘property’ here.”

    Because no exaction occurred, the court applied the standard from Agins v. City of Tiburon, asking whether the restriction substantially advanced a legitimate government interest and whether it deprived the landowner of economically viable use of their property. The court found the restriction advanced environmental preservation, a legitimate government interest. It also found the restriction did not deny the Smiths economically viable use because they could still build a home on the property, making it “a valuable, marketable asset.” The court emphasized, “a modest environmental advancement at a negligible cost to the landowner does not amount to a regulatory taking.” The court held that the town’s action was a valid exercise of its police powers and did not force the landowners to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole. The court also noted that the conservation restriction was consistent with the State’s commitment to protecting critical natural resources.

    The dissent argued that the conservation restriction advanced the Town’s interests only marginally and therefore constituted a taking under Agins. The majority rejected this argument, stating that ensuring perpetual protection for open spaces from land-use battles was a significant governmental interest.

  • Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 94 N.Y.2d 440 (2000): Standard for Regulatory Taking Claims

    Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 94 N.Y.2d 440 (2000)

    A zoning regulation constitutes a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, and the appropriate standard for determining whether a zoning regulation substantially advances legitimate state interests (when no exaction is involved) is whether the action bears a reasonable relationship to achieving a legitimate objective.

    Summary

    Bonnie Briar Syndicate sued the Town of Mamaroneck, alleging that a zoning change from residential to recreational use constituted a regulatory taking. The Town rezoned Bonnie Briar’s golf course property to preserve open space, recreational opportunities, and mitigate flooding. Bonnie Briar argued the rezoning didn’t substantially advance these interests, as less restrictive options existed. The court held that the “essential nexus” standard from exaction cases like *Nollan* and *Dolan* doesn’t apply to general zoning regulations. The appropriate standard is whether the regulation bears a reasonable relationship to legitimate objectives. Because the rezoning bore a reasonable relation to legitimate objectives, no taking occurred.

    Facts

    Bonnie Briar owned a 150-acre property leased as a private golf course since 1921. In 1994, the Town of Mamaroneck rezoned the property from residential to recreational use. The Town had been studying diminishing open spaces since the 1960s, with multiple plans recommending the golf course remain as such. A study highlighted the land’s role in flood control as part of the Sheldrake River floodplain. Bonnie Briar submitted a plan for 71 residential lots before the rezoning.

    Procedural History

    Bonnie Briar sued, claiming an unconstitutional taking. The Supreme Court initially dismissed the cause of action alleging an insufficiently close relationship between the Town’s goals and zoning ordinance, which the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court then denied summary judgment for the remaining causes of action concerning an alleged economic taking, but the Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the Town and declaring the law constitutional. The New York Court of Appeals then heard the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the change in zoning of plaintiff’s property from residential to recreational use, constituted a regulatory taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the zoning regulation did not substantially advance legitimate state interests.

    Holding

    No, because the zoning regulation bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate objectives of preserving open space, providing recreational opportunities, and mitigating flooding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the *Agins* standard, which asks whether the zoning law substantially advances legitimate state interests and whether it denies an owner economically viable use of their land. Bonnie Briar only pursued the first prong. Bonnie Briar argued that the “close causal nexus” standard from *Seawall* and *Manocherian* applied, requiring a tight fit between the Town’s objectives and the law. The court rejected this, clarifying that the heightened scrutiny of *Nollan* and *Dolan* (essential nexus and rough proportionality) applies only to exaction cases, not general zoning regulations.

    The court cited *City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes* as reaffirming that the *Agins* standard applies to regulatory takings that do not involve an exaction. In *Del Monte Dunes*, the Supreme Court held that where the landowner’s challenge is based on denial of development, the rough-proportionality test of *Dolan* is inapposite. The court reasoned that because the *Dolan* test does not apply, the ‘essential nexus’ test from *Nollan* also does not apply because the Supreme Court limited its application to cases involving exactions.

    “[T]he regulatory actions of the city or any agency substantially advance a legitimate public purpose if the action bears a reasonable relationship to that objective.”

    The court concluded that because the rezoning bore a reasonable relation to the Town’s legitimate objectives, no taking occurred. The fact that less restrictive options existed was irrelevant, as long as the chosen method substantially advances the public interest. The court deferred to the zoning board’s judgment and emphasized that it’s not the court’s role to determine if a regulation is more stringent than necessary. The court emphasized that the zoning districts were shifted in response to years of study and documentation regarding recurrent flooding problems and concerns.