New York Law Review

Tag: Evidentiary Support

  • People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105 (1976): Scope of Permissible Summation Arguments

    People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105 (1976)

    Counsel’s privilege to comment in summation is not a license to state facts not in evidence or argue theories with no evidentiary support.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for assault, attempted coercion, and weapons possession. The defendant challenged the trial court’s preclusion of a summation argument suggesting the shooting victim initially displayed the gun. The Court of Appeals held that allowing such an argument would be improper because it lacked evidentiary support. The Court emphasized that summations must be based on reasonable inferences from the evidence presented, and counsel cannot introduce unsupported factual claims or theories. The court also found that a challenged portion of the jury charge, when viewed in its entirety, did not mislead the jury regarding the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of shooting a friend during a dispute. At trial, the defendant sought to argue during summation that the victim of the shooting was the first person to display the gun. There was testimony from a police officer that the victim described the gun as “heavier” (meaning larger) than a comparison gun shown to her. The trial court precluded the defendant from making this argument.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of assault in the first degree, attempted coercion in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in precluding the defendant from arguing in summation that the shooting victim was the first person to display the gun.

    2. Whether a challenged portion of the jury charge, regarding the victim’s testimony satisfying proof beyond a reasonable doubt, constituted reversible error.

    Holding

    1. No, because the requested summation argument called on the jury to reach conclusions that were “not fairly inferrable from the evidence.”

    2. No, because the jury charge, when read as a whole, did not likely confuse the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the summation argument, the Court of Appeals emphasized that “the privilege of counsel to comment in summation on any matters of fact pertinent to questions that the jury must decide is not absolute.” The Court cited Williams v. Brooklyn El. R.R. Co., 126 N.Y. 96, 103 (1891), stating that the privilege “can never operate as a license to state to a jury facts not in evidence” or to argue unsupported theories.

    The Court found no evidentiary basis for the argument that the victim first displayed the gun. The police officer’s testimony regarding the victim’s description of the gun’s size did not support the theory. Therefore, the trial court correctly precluded the argument.

    Regarding the jury charge, the Court applied the principle that a challenged sentence should not be considered in isolation but rather in the context of the entire charge. The Court cited People v. Fields, 87 N.Y.2d 821, 823 (1995). While the challenged sentence, standing alone, was inaccurate, the Court found that the trial court immediately corrected itself by stating the principle correctly. Additionally, the court repeatedly emphasized the jury’s duty to determine whether the charged crimes had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, no reasonable juror would have been misled.

    The court emphasized that the central duty of the jury was to decide whether the charged crimes had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the charge as a whole, no reasonable juror would have concluded that if he or she found the victim’s testimony credible, then he or she had to find defendant guilty, without assessing whether all of the evidence was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty.

  • People v. Bell, 48 N.Y.2d 933 (1979): Jury Instructions on Accomplice Liability Must Be Supported by Evidence

    People v. Bell, 48 N.Y.2d 933 (1979)

    A trial court commits reversible error when it instructs the jury on accomplice liability if there is no evidence presented at trial to support the theory that the defendant acted with an accomplice.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of burglary, criminal mischief, and assault. The trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding accomplice liability despite a lack of evidence suggesting an accomplice existed. The jury’s questions indicated confusion, and the improper instruction potentially influenced the verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order, finding the error prejudicial because it undermined the defendant’s claim of innocence and ordered a new trial on all charges.

    Facts

    The defendant testified that he found the complainant’s door open and apartment in disarray after returning the complainant’s dog, which he had found on the stairs. The arresting officer testified that a search of the area near the defendant’s apartment did not uncover any of the stolen property.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury on accomplice liability when no evidence supported the existence of an accomplice.

    Holding

    Yes, because instructing the jury on accomplice liability without any supporting evidence was prejudicial to the defendant’s case, potentially influencing the verdict and undermining his claim of innocence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge erred in refusing to charge that there was no evidence of an accomplice and in affirmatively answering the jury’s question about accomplice liability in a burglary context. The court emphasized that People v. Montgomery, 176 NY 219, 230, 232 and People v. Stevenson, 31 NY2d 108 support the principle that accomplice instructions must be grounded in evidence. The Court reasoned that the jury’s questions indicated that they were considering the possibility of an accomplice, and the improper instruction could have been potent in shaping the verdict. The Court noted, “That the improper accomplice charge may well have been potent in shaping the verdict on all of the charges is suggested by the questions asked by the jury… At the very least, it adversely affected defendant by explaining away the facts on which he based his claim of innocence.” The Court concluded that a new trial was necessary because the improper instruction undermined the defendant’s claim of innocence on all charges, including the assault charge, which was predicated on the commission of a felony.