New York Law Review

Tag: Evidentiary Burden

  • People v. Session, 34 N.Y.2d 254 (1974): Sufficiency of Allegations for Coram Nobis Relief

    People v. Session, 34 N.Y.2d 254 (1974)

    A defendant seeking coram nobis relief (now a motion to vacate judgment) must provide supporting evidentiary facts, not just conclusory allegations, to warrant a hearing; these facts must include the substance of potential witness testimony and how it would have benefited the defendant.

    Summary

    Josh Session appealed the denial of his coram nobis relief petition, arguing that the supporting affidavits from his codefendants warranted a hearing. These affidavits alleged an Assistant District Attorney threatened the codefendants with increased charges if they testified on Session’s behalf. The New York Court of Appeals held that Session’s allegations were insufficient because the affidavits lacked specific details about the potential testimony and its relevance to his defense. The Court affirmed the denial but granted Session leave to renew his application with proper affidavits.

    Facts

    Josh Session sought coram nobis relief, claiming prosecutorial misconduct. He presented affidavits from three codefendants alleging that an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) threatened them with increased charges if they testified on his behalf. The affidavits stated the ADA’s threats, but did not describe the substance or content of the testimony the codefendants would have provided.

    Procedural History

    Session’s initial petition for coram nobis relief was denied. He appealed this denial. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. Session then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the allegations contained in Session’s petition and supporting affidavits, specifically regarding prosecutorial misconduct, are sufficient to require a hearing for coram nobis relief.

    Holding

    No, because Session’s affidavits contained only conclusory allegations and lacked supporting evidentiary facts detailing the substance of the potential witness testimony and how it would have benefited his defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a judgment of conviction is presumed valid, and the defendant bears the burden of presenting allegations sufficient to create a factual issue. While contrary evidence can eliminate the presumption of regularity, bare allegations are insufficient. The court stated, “In a coram nobis application, it is not enough to make conclusory allegations of ultimate facts; supporting evidentiary facts must be provided.” The court reasoned that Session failed to provide the substance of the testimony his potential witnesses would have given and how that testimony would have helped his case.

    The Court acknowledged that the ADA’s denial and defense counsel affidavits placed the question of intimidation in issue but did not conclusively refute Session’s allegations. However, because Session failed to meet his initial burden of providing sufficient evidentiary facts, he was not entitled to a hearing. The Court noted that it did “not condone the alleged intimidation” but affirmed the denial of relief because of the insufficient submission. The court granted leave to renew the application with proper affidavits, implicitly setting a standard for future petitions. The Court contrasted this case with situations where documentary evidence conclusively refutes a defendant’s claims, warranting denial without a hearing.

  • Town of Clay v. Mathews, 15 N.Y.2d 505 (1964): Presumptive Evidence of Zoning Ordinance Adoption

    15 N.Y.2d 505 (1964)

    A town clerk’s certificate regarding the adoption, posting, and publication of a town ordinance, as required by the Town Law, constitutes presumptive evidence of those facts, shifting the burden to the challenger to offer contrary proof.

    Summary

    This case concerns the evidentiary weight given to a town clerk’s certificate regarding the adoption and publication of a zoning ordinance. The Town of Clay sought to enforce its zoning ordinance against Mathews. Mathews challenged the validity of the ordinance’s enactment. The Town relied on a certificate from the Town Clerk attesting to the proper adoption, posting, and publication of the ordinance. The Court of Appeals held that under Section 134 of the Town Law, the clerk’s certificate serves as presumptive evidence of proper enactment, and the burden shifts to the challenging party to present contradictory evidence. Since Mathews failed to offer any such evidence, the ordinance was deemed validly enacted.

    Facts

    The Town of Clay, Onondaga County, sought to enforce its zoning ordinance. Mathews challenged the ordinance’s validity, arguing it wasn’t properly enacted. The Town presented a certificate from the Town Clerk. The certificate attested to the correctness of the zoning ordinance transcript and confirmed its publication and posting, as mandated by law.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court initially heard the case concerning the zoning ordinance violation. The Town introduced the Town Clerk’s certificate as evidence of proper enactment. The defendant objected to the exhibit’s admission. The court admitted the certificate into evidence. The defendant offered no evidence to rebut the certificate’s claims. The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s decision regarding the validity of the ordinance based on the evidentiary value of the clerk’s certificate.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Town Clerk’s certificate, attesting to the adoption, posting, and publication of a town ordinance, constitutes presumptive evidence of these facts under Section 134 of the Town Law, shifting the burden to the challenger to offer contrary proof.

    Holding

    Yes, because Section 134 of the Town Law explicitly states that such a certificate is presumptive evidence of the ordinance’s proper adoption, posting, and publication; therefore, the burden shifts to the party challenging the ordinance to present evidence to the contrary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the plain language of Section 134 of the Town Law, which states that the Town Clerk’s certificate regarding the adoption, posting, and publication of a town ordinance is “presumptive evidence” of those matters. The Court emphasized that this section was enacted to streamline the process of proving the formal procedures underlying the enactment of public ordinances. The statute was designed to alleviate the need for extensive proof of formal procedures. It places the onus on the challenger to present evidence contesting the certificate’s claims. Since Mathews objected to the exhibit but failed to present any evidence to contradict the certificate’s assertions, the Court concluded that the Town had met its burden of proof regarding the validity of the zoning ordinance. The court noted, “This section, adopted in 1932 (ch. 634), was designed to obviate the sometimes troublesome and inconvenient need to prove formal procedures underlying the enactment of public ordinances and to require one who challenges the formal adoption or publication to offer proof on this subject.”