New York Law Review

Tag: Evidence

  • People v. Blakeney, 88 N.Y.2d 1012 (1996): Admissibility of Subsequent Arrests to Contradict Defendant Testimony

    People v. Blakeney, 88 N.Y.2d 1012 (1996)

    A defendant’s testimony denying a relationship with a co-defendant opens the door to the admissibility of evidence of a subsequent arrest with the same co-defendant to disprove the claimed lack of relationship, even if it involves evidence of another crime.

    Summary

    Lorenzo Blakeney was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, Blakeney claimed he had never met his co-defendant, Shakira Fleming, before his initial arrest. The prosecution then introduced evidence of a subsequent arrest of Blakeney with Fleming for a similar offense. The New York Court of Appeals held that Blakeney’s testimony opened the door to this evidence to contradict his claim, even if it incidentally showed another crime. The Court also found his claims of prosecutorial bias and burden shifting were unpreserved and his other claims were without merit.

    Facts

    On November 4, 1992, Lorenzo Blakeney was arrested with Shakira Fleming for allegedly selling crack cocaine to an undercover officer.

    Twelve days later, on November 16, 1992, Blakeney was again arrested with Fleming for allegedly committing the same offense at the same location.

    At trial, Blakeney testified that he had never seen or known Fleming before the initial arrest.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found Blakeney guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s claim that he had never seen or known Fleming before his first arrest opened the door to evidence of a subsequent arrest with Fleming to disprove his claim.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s testimony denying any prior relationship with Fleming made the evidence of the subsequent arrest with her relevant to contradict his account of their relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Blakeney’s claim of never having met Fleming before his first arrest opened the door to the admission of evidence tending to disprove his account. The subsequent arrest with Fleming was deemed relevant for “contradiction and response” regarding the existence of their relationship, rather than simply to impeach his general credibility. The court cited People v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289, 295, noting that the evidence was admissible to contradict the specific testimony offered by the defendant. The court distinguished between using prior bad acts to impeach general credibility versus using them to directly contradict a specific assertion made by the defendant. The court emphasized the defendant created the issue by asserting he didn’t know Fleming. By denying the relationship, he opened the door to the prosecution’s evidence showing they were arrested together soon after, suggesting a connection that contradicted his testimony.

    The Court also found that Blakeney’s claims of prosecutorial bias and the shifting of the burden of proof were unpreserved for review because no objections were made during the trial. Further, the court summarily dismissed Blakeney’s remaining claims as without merit. The decision underscores the principle that a defendant’s specific assertions during testimony can create an opportunity for the prosecution to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to directly contradict those assertions.

  • People v. Badr, 82 N.Y.2d 86 (1993): Admissibility of Prior Sexual Misconduct Evidence

    People v. Badr, 82 N.Y.2d 86 (1993)

    Evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged crimes and offenses is inadmissible when offered solely to demonstrate criminal propensity, and is unnecessary to prove intent when intent can be easily inferred from the charged act itself.

    Summary

    Badr was convicted of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and attempted robbery. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Badr’s prior sexual misconduct to demonstrate intent, particularly given the complainant’s admitted consensual sex with Badr after the alleged attack. The trial court allowed the evidence, leading Badr to abandon his consent defense. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the prior misconduct evidence was improperly admitted because intent was easily inferable from the alleged acts, and the evidence served only to show Badr’s propensity to commit such crimes, which is inadmissible.

    Facts

    The complainant alleged that Badr, in her apartment building, threatened her, blindfolded her, and sexually assaulted her on the roof. Following the alleged attack, she exchanged phone numbers with Badr and arranged a subsequent meeting, during which they had consensual sex. Badr claimed the sexual encounter on the roof was consensual, and the later encounter occurred at his apartment. Badr was charged with rape, sodomy, attempted robbery, sexual abuse, and assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled that the prosecution could present testimony from four women regarding Badr’s prior sexual misconduct. Badr abandoned his consent defense as a result of this ruling. Badr was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution could introduce evidence of Badr’s prior sexual misconduct to prove intent, when intent was readily inferable from the charged acts and the evidence primarily served to show Badr’s criminal propensity.

    Holding

    No, because the prior misconduct evidence was relevant only to suggest that because Badr had engaged in sexual misconduct with others, he was likely to have committed the charged acts. The evidence was improperly admitted because intent was easily inferable from the alleged acts themselves.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible if its sole purpose is to suggest the defendant has a criminal disposition. While intent is a valid basis for admitting prior misconduct evidence, it’s unnecessary when intent is easily inferred from the commission of the act. The court distinguished this case from situations where intent is genuinely in question. Here, the court reasoned that if the jury believed the complainant’s account, Badr’s intent to commit the charged crimes was clear from the violent acts themselves. The prior misconduct evidence, therefore, served only to bolster the complainant’s credibility by portraying Badr as a person likely to commit such acts, which is impermissible character evidence. Quoting People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 56, the court noted the evidence tended to show only that “‘if defendant did it once * * * he would do it again; therefore, he probably abused the other children.’” The Court found that presenting two starkly different scenarios where credibility was the only issue made the prior misconduct evidence irrelevant to any issue other than criminal propensity. The Court concluded that the trial court’s ruling, which led Badr to abandon his consent defense, denied him a fair trial. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concurred.

  • People v. Angelo, 88 N.Y.2d 217 (1996): Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in Criminal Trials

    People v. Angelo, 88 N.Y.2d 217 (1996)

    Polygraph test results are inadmissible as evidence in New York criminal trials because they are not generally accepted within the scientific community as reliable.

    Summary

    Angelo, a nurse, was convicted of murder and assault for injecting patients with a neuromuscular blocking agent. At trial, he argued a mental illness prevented him from understanding the risk of his actions. He sought to introduce polygraph results, arguing they supported his expert’s diagnosis. The trial court excluded the polygraph evidence, citing its unreliability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that polygraph results are inadmissible unless generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community, which Angelo failed to demonstrate. This case reinforces the application of the *Frye* standard in New York, requiring scientific reliability for novel scientific evidence.

    Facts

    Angelo, a nurse, injected seven patients with a neuromuscular blocking agent, leading to six deaths. He claimed a dissociative disorder prevented him from understanding the risk his actions posed to the patients. Angelo sought to prove that he had feelings of inadequacy, and injected patients so he could then participate in their resuscitation, unaware that his injections caused their distress.

    Procedural History

    Angelo was convicted of murder, manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and assault. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in prohibiting Angelo’s expert from testifying that his conclusions were based, in part, on the results of Angelo’s polygraph examination.

    Holding

    No, because polygraph test results are not generally accepted by the scientific community as reliable and therefore are inadmissible as evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude the polygraph evidence. The Court reasoned that while experts can rely on out-of-court evidence, that evidence must be “of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion” or “comes from a witness subject to full cross-examination on the trial” (citing People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 460-461). This incorporates the *Frye* standard, requiring general acceptance of the scientific procedures and methodology. Because Angelo failed to demonstrate that polygraph test results meet this standard, the evidence was properly excluded.
    Specifically, the Court stated, “Because defendant did not demonstrate that polygraph test results are generally accepted by the scientific community as reliable, County Court did not err in excluding defendant’s polygraph results.”
    The court also noted that Angelo did not properly preserve his argument that a *Frye* hearing should have been held, as he did not definitively request such a hearing or argue that the scientific consensus had changed since previous rulings deeming polygraph evidence inadmissible.
    Finally, the Court rejected Angelo’s argument that the validity of the test results was not at issue, clarifying that because the polygraph was offered to prove the honesty of Angelo’s belief, its probative value depended on the reliability of the test results.

  • People v. Dunn, 85 N.Y.2d 956 (1995): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements from Mentally Incapacitated Individuals

    85 N.Y.2d 956 (1995)

    A defendant’s claim regarding the admissibility of a spontaneous statement made due to mental incapacity must be raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial to be preserved for appellate review.

    Summary

    Earl Dunn, an inmate at Rockland Psychiatric Center, was convicted of manslaughter and aggravated sexual abuse of a fellow inmate. After the assault, Dunn made inculpatory statements to hospital personnel while under the guard of a security officer, before receiving Miranda warnings. The lower court ruled these initial statements were spontaneous and admissible. Dunn argued subsequent statements were involuntary due to his mental incapacity, but he did not argue that his initial spontaneous statement was inadmissible due to the same mental incapacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the issue of whether Dunn’s mental incapacity rendered his initial spontaneous statement inadmissible was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial.

    Facts

    Earl Dunn, an inmate at Rockland Psychiatric Center, assaulted a fellow inmate. Following the assault, hospital personnel seized Dunn and transferred him to the custody of the State Police. While under the guard of a hospital security officer, Dunn made certain inculpatory statements. The lower court found that no conduct on the part of the officer was likely to elicit a statement from Dunn. Dunn later argued that subsequent statements were involuntary because his mental incapacity made it impossible for him to understand the consequences of a Miranda warning.

    Procedural History

    Dunn was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree. At a suppression hearing, the court ruled Dunn’s initial statements were spontaneous and admissible. Dunn appealed, arguing his subsequent statements were involuntary, but he did not raise the issue of the initial statement’s admissibility due to mental incapacity. The Appellate Division considered whether his mental incapacity might render him particularly vulnerable to coercion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the issue of the admissibility of an initial, “spontaneous” statement made by a mentally incapacitated defendant is preserved for appellate review when it was not raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant did not raise the issue of the initial statement’s admissibility due to mental incapacity at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a defendant must properly preserve an issue for appellate review by raising it at the appropriate time in the lower courts. Here, Dunn argued that subsequent statements were involuntary because of his mental incapacity, but he failed to argue that his initial “spontaneous” statement was inadmissible on the same grounds. Because the argument concerning the initial statement’s admissibility was not raised at the suppression hearing or as a ground for objection to the admission of the evidence at trial, it was not preserved for review by the Court of Appeals. While the Appellate Division considered the issue in the interests of justice, this did not create a preserved question of law for the Court of Appeals to review. The court effectively applied the well-established rule that appellate courts generally only consider issues that were properly raised and preserved in the lower courts, unless there are exceptional circumstances or fundamental errors that warrant review in the interest of justice.

  • People v. Gelikkaya, 84 N.Y.2d 456 (1994): Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony for Impeachment When Competency is Questioned

    People v. Gelikkaya, 84 N.Y.2d 456 (1994)

    A defendant’s Grand Jury testimony, given after waiving immunity, can be admissible for impeachment purposes at trial, even if the defendant’s competency is later questioned, provided the trial court determines the testimony was voluntary and reliable, and the defendant was able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.

    Summary

    Gelikkaya was convicted of attempted murder. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s use of his Grand Jury testimony to impeach him was improper because he was allegedly incompetent when he gave the testimony. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Grand Jury testimony for impeachment purposes. The court reasoned that Gelikkaya was represented by counsel, consulted with counsel, and his testimony was deemed voluntary and reliable. The subsequent questioning of his competency did not automatically negate the admissibility of his prior testimony.

    Facts

    Gelikkaya was arrested for allegedly attacking the spiritual leader of a mosque. He was arraigned and indicated his intent to testify before the Grand Jury. He waived immunity with counsel present. The Grand Jury indicted him for attempted murder and assault. At arraignment on the indictment, Gelikkaya’s competency was first questioned, leading to psychiatric evaluations that initially found him unfit to proceed. After treatment, he was deemed competent. Before Gelikkaya testified at trial, his counsel moved to preclude the use of his Grand Jury testimony, arguing his incompetency at that time rendered it inadmissible. The trial court denied the motion, and portions of the Grand Jury testimony were used to impeach Gelikkaya.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Gelikkaya of attempted murder in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s Grand Jury testimony, given after waiving immunity, is inadmissible for impeachment purposes at trial if the defendant’s competency was later questioned but not established at the time of the Grand Jury proceeding?

    Holding

    No, because the trial court determined that the testimony was voluntary and reliable, and the defendant was able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding at the time the testimony was given.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that there is a presumption of sanity, and mental illness subsequent to the Grand Jury proceeding is not necessarily evidence of incompetency at the time of that proceeding. Even a mentally ill person may give evidentiary testimony if they understand the nature of an oath and can give a reasonably accurate account of the circumstances. The court emphasized that Gelikkaya was represented by counsel who was present during the Grand Jury proceeding and did not raise any concerns about his competency at that time. The court noted, “[s]anity being the normal and usual condition of mankind…defendant is presumed to have been competent at the time of the Grand Jury proceeding.” The Trial Judge’s determination that Gelikkaya’s Grand Jury testimony was admissible for impeachment implicitly found that he could consult with counsel “‘with a reasonable degree of rational understanding…and…ha[d] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” The court concluded that using the Grand Jury testimony for impeachment went to the credibility of his trial testimony, which the jury resolved against him. There was no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony, as there was no evidence suggesting that Gelikkaya did not comprehend the significance of his statements or the nature of the proceedings at the time.

  • People v. Inniss, 83 N.Y.2d 653 (1994): Admissibility of Evidence for Witness Impeachment

    83 N.Y.2d 653 (1994)

    A trial court does not err in excluding evidence offered solely to impeach a witness’s credibility on a collateral matter when the witness’s bias and interest have been exhaustively explored during cross-examination.

    Summary

    Kenneth Inniss was convicted of murder and weapon possession. The key witness against him, Richard Saunders, had a cooperation agreement with the prosecution. Inniss appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to admit testimony from Saunders’s alleged victim in a dismissed robbery case and the transcript of Saunders’s cooperation agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence was offered only to impeach Saunders’s credibility on a collateral matter, and Saunders’s bias had already been thoroughly explored. The court also found that the refusal to give a specific “interested witness” charge was not reversible error because the jury was aware of Saunders’s potential bias.

    Facts

    Richard Saunders, awaiting trial on robbery charges, contacted authorities claiming knowledge of Brian Rich’s killer. Saunders testified that Inniss offered him $10,000 to kill Rich, which he declined. On August 3, 1986, Saunders witnessed Inniss shooting Rich with an Uzi. Saunders had a cooperation agreement with the District Attorney’s office, promising dismissal of his charges in exchange for truthful testimony. Saunders testified about incriminating conversations with Inniss before and after the murder. Forensic evidence supported Saunders’s account. Inniss presented an alibi defense but was convicted.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Inniss. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit testimony of the complainant in Saunders’s dismissed robbery indictment and the transcript of the cooperation agreement between Saunders and the prosecution.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an interested witness charge specifically regarding Saunders’s testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was offered solely to impeach Saunders’s credibility on a collateral matter, and Saunders’s bias and interest were exhaustively explored during cross-examination.
    2. No, because the charge as a whole, including the instruction that the jury could consider the interest or bias of any witness, was sufficient to convey the need to scrutinize Saunders’s testimony with care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Inniss only sought to introduce the evidence to contradict Saunders’s denial of guilt in the dismissed robbery charges, which was a collateral matter. The court cited People v. Pavao, stating that the collateral impeachment rule bars the admission of evidence used to establish “perjury” on collateral issues. Furthermore, the court noted that the terms of the cooperation agreement and Saunders’s interest and bias were “exhaustive[ly]” explored on cross-examination, making the documentary evidence cumulative, citing People v. Chin. The Court also addressed the refusal to give an interested witness charge regarding Saunders’s testimony, finding that because Saunders’s bias and interest were heavily emphasized, the jury was sufficiently informed to scrutinize his testimony. The court stated that the jury “intensely scrutinized Saunders’ testimony,” and thus, the omission was not reversible error, citing People v. Warren. The court emphasized that the key issue was whether any benefit Saunders received affected the truthfulness of his testimony. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the trial court failed to produce Brady and Rosario material by withholding the cooperation agreement and minutes from the proceeding dismissing the robbery charge. The dissent also argued that it was essential for the trial court to give more than the standard interested witness charge.

  • People v. Ely, 82 N.Y.2d 353 (1993): Admissibility of Uncharged Conduct to Prove Intent

    People v. Ely, 82 N.Y.2d 353 (1993)

    Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove the defendant’s intent to commit the charged crime, provided that the evidence is relevant and its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    Defendant, a secretary, was convicted of grand larceny and forgery for stealing from her legally blind employer. The prosecution introduced evidence of 146 additional forged checks, discovered after the indictment, to demonstrate the defendant’s intent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was properly admitted to prove intent, and the defendant’s other claims were unpreserved or without merit. The court emphasized that this evidence did not amend the indictment but served as evidentiary support for the larceny charge.

    Facts

    The defendant, a secretary to the complainant, was charged with grand larceny and forgery for stealing money from her employer. The indictment stated that the defendant stole over $700,000 between December 1981 and October 1989. The defendant was also accused of forging the complainant’s signature on checks without authorization. An audit revealed discrepancies between the complainant’s income and bank deposits exceeding $700,000.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a jury of grand larceny and multiple counts of forgery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant’s claim that the indictment was duplicitous was unpreserved and that evidence regarding public assistance received by the defendant’s mother was properly admitted. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 146 uncharged forged checks to prove the defendant’s intent.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of insurance coverage to demonstrate bias on the part of the complainant.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the People to cross-examine the defendant on the collateral issue of her mother’s receipt of public assistance.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence of the uncharged forged checks was offered to prove the defendant’s intent to commit the crimes charged, and it did not amend or add to the charges in the indictment.
    2. No, because the defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the introduction of evidence of insurance coverage was not preserved for appellate review.
    3. No, because the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in allowing the People to cross-examine her on the collateral issue of whether her mother had received public assistance was also unpreserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the evidence of the 146 uncharged forged checks was admissible to prove the defendant’s intent to commit the charged crimes, citing People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264. The court emphasized that this evidence did not amend or add to the charges in the indictment or submitted to the jury, but rather served only as evidentiary support for the larceny count. The court found that the defendant’s arguments regarding the preclusion of insurance coverage evidence and the cross-examination about her mother’s public assistance were unpreserved because the defendant did not properly raise these objections at trial. As such, the Court of Appeals declined to review them. The Court stated, “Here, the evidence of the 146 uncharged forged checks was offered to prove defendant’s intent to commit the specific crimes charged.”

  • People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1 (1992): Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements to Rehabilitate Witness Testimony

    People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1 (1992)

    Prior consistent statements are admissible to rehabilitate a witness’s testimony if the witness’s testimony has been assailed as a recent fabrication, and the prior consistent statements predate the motive to falsify; however, mere impeachment by proof of inconsistent statements does not automatically constitute a charge that the witness’s testimony is a fabrication.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of rape and related crimes. The prosecution introduced pretrial statements by the complainant to rehabilitate her after the defense impeached her with prior inconsistent statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that the evidence of prompt outcry was admissible, but the other pretrial statements were not, because they did not predate the alleged motive to falsify. The court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that the errors were not harmless because the evidence of rape was not overwhelming, and the improperly admitted statements could have influenced the jury’s determination of whether penetration occurred, which was essential for a rape conviction.

    Facts

    Jane Doe and the defendant were intimate. Defendant spent the night at Doe’s apartment, where Doe lived with her daughter, Mary, and two younger sons, and an elderly woman, Linda Jones. Mary usually slept in a bedroom next to her mother’s, but when defendant stayed over, Mary slept in the living room. Mary testified that defendant awakened her in the middle of the night, touched her breasts, rubbed his penis against her vagina, and threatened her. A similar incident allegedly occurred one week later, with one of Mary’s friends sleeping over who testified to seeing the defendant touch Mary. Mary told her mother about both incidents, but Doe did nothing until Mary told her stepfather, who informed the police.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted of forcible and statutory rape, sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division acknowledged that some statements were improperly admitted but held the errors were harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the evidence of rape was not overwhelming and ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence of prompt outcry was properly admitted to corroborate the allegation of sexual assault?

    2. Whether prior consistent statements of the complainant were properly admitted to rehabilitate her testimony after impeachment with prior inconsistent statements?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the child’s reports to her mother on the mornings following each incident qualified as prompt outcry made at the first suitable opportunity.

    2. No, because the prior consistent statements to police and the District Attorney did not predate the alleged motive to fabricate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding prompt outcry, the court reasoned that its admissibility hinges on timeliness and the exclusion of details. A complaint is timely if made at the first suitable opportunity. The court found the child’s reports to her mother were timely, but statements to the police or prosecutor days later would not qualify. The court stated, “There can be no iron rule on the subject. The law expects and requires that it should be prompt, but there is and can be no particular time specified.”

    Regarding prior consistent statements, the court stated that they are admissible to rebut a charge of recent fabrication if they predate the motive to falsify. The court noted, “Mere impeachment by proof of inconsistent statements does not constitute a charge that the witness’ testimony is a fabrication.” The court found that the cross-examination implied fabrication influenced by her stepfather, the police, and the District Attorney. Therefore, only statements predating these influences were admissible. The statements to her mother were admissible, but statements to the police and District Attorney after the alleged influences were not. Because no physical evidence connected defendant to a rape and Mary’s testimony was inconsistent, it was likely that this error prejudiced the jury.

  • People v. Hynes, 75 N.Y.2d 844 (1990): Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Rebut Alibi Witness Testimony

    People v. Hynes, 75 N.Y.2d 844 (1990)

    Extrinsic evidence is admissible to rebut an alibi witness’s claim of promptly reporting the alibi to police, as it directly relates to the truthfulness of the alibi, a material issue in the case, and is not merely collateral impeachment.

    Summary

    Hynes was convicted of gunpoint robbery after presenting an alibi defense. During cross-examination, his alibi witnesses claimed they told police about the alibi at the time of Hynes’s arrest. The prosecution then called the arresting officer to testify that the witnesses had not come forward at the time. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the officer’s rebuttal testimony was admissible because it related to a material issue—the truthfulness of the alibi—and was not merely an attempt to impeach the witnesses on a collateral matter. This is permissible under People v. Dawson, provided that the Dawson threshold requirements are satisfied.

    Facts

    1. Defendant Hynes was charged with participating in a gunpoint robbery.
    2. Hynes claimed mistaken identity and presented an alibi defense at trial.
    3. During the prosecutor’s cross-examination, two of Hynes’s alibi witnesses stated that they had told the police their stories when the police came to their home to arrest him.
    4. Over defense objection, the prosecution called the arresting officer.
    5. The officer testified that neither of the alibi witnesses had come forward at the time of Hynes’s arrest.

    Procedural History

    1. Hynes was convicted at trial.
    2. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court had not erred in permitting the use of extrinsic evidence to rebut the alibi witnesses’ claims.
    3. Hynes appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present extrinsic evidence (the arresting officer’s testimony) to rebut the alibi witnesses’ claims that they had promptly reported the alibi to the police, where such rebuttal testimony was used to undermine the alibi defense.

    Holding

    Yes, because the issue to which the extrinsic evidence related was material, i.e., relevant to the very issues the jury had to decide (the truthfulness of the alibi), and therefore the rule prohibiting impeachment on collateral matters does not apply, provided that the threshold requirements set forth in People v. Dawson have been satisfied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule against using extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on collateral matters is meant to avoid confusion and unfair surprise on issues with minimal probative value. This rule does not apply when the evidence relates to a material issue, meaning it is relevant to the issues the jury must decide.

    The court cited People v. Dawson, recognizing that an alibi witness’s failure to promptly come forward with their story can have probative value, bearing directly on the alibi’s truthfulness. Evidence of a witness’s prior silence is admissible to the extent that it could “aid the trier of fact in its effort to determine whether the [witness’s] testimony * * * is an accurate reflection of the truth.” The court emphasized that evidence of the witness’s prior silence is not admissible if offered solely on the issue of the witness’s general credibility but may be admitted to the extent that it bears on the truth of the alibi—an issue that is unquestionably material.

    The court analogized the case to People v. Cade, where rebuttal evidence contradicting an alibi witness’s testimony was permitted. Here, the rebuttal evidence undermined the believability of the alibi. In both cases, the extrinsic evidence challenged the alibi’s validity, a material issue.

    The court rejected the argument that the testimony was inadmissible because the prosecutor elicited the evidence to be impeached. The court stated that “regardless of who elicited the evidence, the subject of that testimony was directly pertinent to the truthfulness of defendant’s alibi and, consequently, was relevant to a ‘material’ issue.”

  • People v. Russell, 79 N.Y.2d 1024 (1992): Admissibility of Lay Witness Identification Testimony

    People v. Russell, 79 N.Y.2d 1024 (1992)

    Lay witnesses familiar with a defendant’s appearance before a crime can offer identification testimony based on surveillance photos, even if they didn’t witness the crime, to assist the jury, especially if the defendant altered their appearance after the crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of lay witness testimony identifying the defendant in bank surveillance photographs. Four lay witnesses, who knew the defendant before the robbery, identified him in the photos, even though they were not eyewitnesses to the crime. This was deemed permissible because the defendant had changed his appearance after the robbery by shaving his beard. The court reasoned that the testimony aided the jury in making an independent assessment, and did not constitute improper bolstering. The court also held that the testimony was not cumulative because the bank tellers, while identifying the defendant in court, did not specifically identify him in the surveillance photographs.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of bank robbery. The prosecution presented bank surveillance photographs as evidence. The defendant had a beard at the time of the robbery, but shaved it off shortly afterward. The prosecution called four lay witnesses (defendant’s roommate, his roommate’s mother, his landlord, and a friend) who knew the defendant before the robbery. These witnesses identified the defendant as the person depicted in the surveillance photographs.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed the lay witness identification testimony. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing four lay witnesses, who did not witness the bank robbery, to identify the defendant as the person depicted in bank surveillance photographs.
    2. Whether the lay witnesses’ testimony constituted improper bolstering or an improper opinion about an ultimate fact.
    3. Whether the lay witnesses’ photograph identifications should have been excluded because they were unduly cumulative and duplicative of the bank tellers’ eyewitness testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the witnesses’ testimony aided the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the man in the bank photographs was indeed the defendant, especially since the defendant altered his appearance after the crime.
    2. No, because the testimony concerned the witnesses’ personal knowledge of the defendant’s appearance at the time the photographs were taken, not a previous extrajudicial identification of the defendant or the photographs.
    3. No, because the defendant did not object to the number of witnesses presented, and the bank tellers’ testimony was not duplicated, as the tellers did not specifically identify the defendant in the surveillance photographs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the lay witnesses’ testimony was relevant because the robber’s identity was the central issue in the case, and the prosecution presented proof that the defendant changed his appearance immediately after the crime. The court distinguished this case from situations involving prior extrajudicial identifications or identifications of photographs of the defendant. The court emphasized that the witnesses’ personal knowledge of the defendant’s appearance at the time the photographs were taken allowed them to aid the jury in determining whether the person in the photographs was the defendant. The court cited cases from other jurisdictions (United States v. Robinson and United States v. Farnsworth) in support of its reasoning. The court further found that the testimony was not cumulative because the bank tellers, although identifying the defendant in court as the robber, did not state that he was the person in the surveillance photographs. The court emphasized the tellers only testified the photographs accurately portrayed the crime scene and that the man in the photograph was the robber.